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2ABSTRACT
Through a comparison between Catalan and Basque nationalism, this thesis describes two 
patterns of nationalism: inclusive and exclusive, cohesive and fragmented. These are 
related to the core values of national identity chosen by nationalist elites.
However, this choice cannot be arbitrary, but is based on pre-existing cultural material. As 
language is the key value of most European nationalisms, the degree of language maintenance 
has a direct influence on the patterns of nationalist mobilization.
These two patterns are tested against the different attitudes towards immigrants: early 
Basque nationalism was isolationist and exclusive, early Catalan nationalism was more 
integrationist and inclusive. However, during Francoism, Basque nationalism changed its 
focus from race/religion to language and action, although nationalists never agreed on which 
one of these was crucial. The result was a more inclusive form of nationalism.
Finally, the thesis relates the two models to the rise and spread of political violence. It is 
argued that ideological infighting and fragmented constituencies are potentially more 
conducive to violent forms of nationalism. In turn, such ideological frictions are related to 
cultural discontinuities, including partial assimilation into the dominant culture.
However, for this violent potential to fully emerge, there must intervene a second variable, 
namely state repression. It is argued that the effects of state repression have been different in 
the two cases: in Catalonia, it encouraged people to mobilize around language and related 
cultural endeavours; in the Basque Country it provided a powerful catalyst for further violent 
confrontation and for the 'militarization1 of nationalism.
3PREFACE
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of 
a number of people and institutions in several countries. First and foremost, I would like to 
express my deepest gratitude to Professor Anthony D. Smith, my supervisor, for his incisive 
guidance, comments, suggestions and encouragement I sincerely believe that this result 
could not have been achieved without his highly professional, concerned, and meticulous 
efforts.
I am also indebted to several organizations and founding bodies. For the research 
underlying chapter 5, thanks are due to the Institut d'Histdria Contemporania de Catalunya. 
In particular, I wish to thank Professors Josep Benet and Josep Ma Sold i Sabatd. Some of 
the material included are the fruit of a long interview with Josep Benet. For the research in 
chapter 4, thanks are due to the Basque Studies Program, University of Nevada, Reno, US, 
which allowed me an unique opportunity to investigate into primary sources such as 
pamphlets, interviews, and other documents by Basque leaders. My research on Catalan 
nationalism predates my interest in the Basque case and, in the years immediately preceding 
my doctorate at LSE, I was given very useful help and advice by several scholars, among 
whom I wish to acknowledge Professors Salvador Giner and Carlota Sold. In Italy, I also 
wish to thank Professor Franco Ferrarotti for encouraging me in undertaking both an inter­
disciplinary and a sociological route.
There is a long list of people whose experience and opinions gave me insights into some of 
the more subtle dimensions of the form and content of this work. Among those people, I 
would especially like to extend my most heartfelt thanks to my friend, Jacqueline Kaye for 
reading drafts of different chapters and making pertinent comments and helpful suggestions 
for translation purposes, and all those others who are too numerous to mention but who have 
helped me in the practical and linguistic aspects of my work , and to whom I am also 
indebted. Moreover, I am grateful to several members of the LSE Library staff, particularly 
to Mr. Mark Perkins of the inter-library loan service at BLPES for his most professional and 
competent inquiries about hard-to-find publications.
4In 1991,1 founded together with other research students the Association for the Study of 
Ethnicity and Nationalism. This enterprise took several months of work which was well 
worth it, since the association has now grown to become a respectable international body 
with a worldwide membership. I also became Editor of the association's Bulletin, a 
publication now acknowledged by most scholars in the field.
My 'intellectual' debts are numerous. In my theoretical approach, I owe much to several 
books by Anthony D. Smith, articles by Jerzy J. Smolicz and Frederick Barth and numerous 
other publications which I have mentioned in the first chapter. For my Catalan case study, 
there are too many authors to be mentioned. For the Basque case, the reader will find 
repeated references to three authors: Javier Corcuera, Gurutz Jauregui, and Robert Clark. 
However, I have consulted many others excellent studies. My research diverges in significant 
aspects from all the quoted authors and responsibility for my views is mine alone. Jauregui's 
own comments for chapters 4,6, and 9, have proved particularly helpful. In the final draft of 
my thesis I owe many thanks to Alison Palmer for her corrections of chapter 4,5 and 6.
For the names in Basque, I tried to use, as much as possible the official (battia) spelling, 
except for those few names, such as Navarre, which have an equivalent in English. In the 
quotations of Basque leaders and intellectuals writing before the 1980s, i.e. before battia 
was made official, I shall instead use their original spelling (for example, Arana's use of 
Euzkadi and Euskera, rather than the standard Euskadi and Euskara).
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NOTE TO MAPS
Map 1 shows the present administrative division of the Spanish state into Autonomous 
Communities. Map 2 specifies which are the three historical nations which share with the 
Castilians the multinational character of the Spanish state. By comparing these two maps, we 
can see that the historical territories claimed by Basque and Catalan nationalists do not fully 
correspond to those of their autonomous communities. For instance, all Basque nationalists 
claim Navarre as an integral part of Euskadi, and most of them are also willing to include the 
French Basque provinces. There is less unanimity concerning possible Pan-Catalanist claims, 
as mainstream nationalists have refused to get involved in territorial disputes with other 
Autonomous Communities. As in other nationalist movements, a certain ambiguity over the 
precise borders of the nation appears unavoidable, even necessary.
Map 3 shows the present diffusion of the languages of the three historical nationalities. The 
map also shows the supplementary indication of three other regional languages which do not 
have official status (aranese, bable, and fabla aragonesa. See chapter 6).
Map 4: Catalan nationalists consider Catalonia as only one of the Catalan regions, referring 
occasionally to it as the Principat, This is divided into four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, 
Lleida and Tarragona). The other regions, as defined by the spread of Catalan, are: the 
Valencian Country (Alacant, Valencia, Castelld), the Balearic Islands (Mallorca, Menorca and 
Ibiza= Eivissa), a small fringe of southern Aragon; outside Spain, we can find Roussillon in 
France, the Principality of Andorra, and the town of L'Alguer in Sardinia, Italy. 1 These are 
called Catalan Countries (Paisos Catalans). with more than 10 million inhabitants, over 7 
million of whom are Catalan-speakers.2
Map 5: Basque nationalists define Euskadi (the Basque Country) as composed of seven 
provinces: in Spain there are Alava (Araba), Vizcaya (Bizkaia), Guipuzcoa (Gipuzkoa),
1 Catalan language has no equal status throughout its territory. In the Principat it enjoys a 
relatively high prestige, in competition with Castilian. In other Catalan-speaking territories, 
especially in Valencia, it is instead considered a  stigmatized variety and associa ted  with 
peasan ts  and left-wing intellectuals. For several reasons, this situation is a  mobile one, and 
Catalan is making decisive inroads into new domains and, to a  lesser degree, is also spreading 
in the other Catalan-speaking regions. In Valencia, the second city in the Catalan Countries and a 
traditional rival of Barcelona, regionalist feelings are strong.
2 The comparison between the 1986 C ensuses for the three main regions (Catalonia, the 
Valencian Country and the Balearic Islands) puts the number of people able to understand 
Catalan at eight and an half million (8.623.202) (the Balearic Islands and Valencian Country 
censuses only included items on 'passive com petence', i.e., the ability to understand Catalan). 
The distribution of Catalan "understanders" is as follows: 5.287.200 in Catalonia (Principal), 
2.775.007 in the Valencian region, and 560.995 in the Balearic islands. No reliable data  is 
available concerning the other Catalan-speaking areas. S ee  Avui, 21 april 1988, pp. 1-3.
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which form the Autonomous Community of Euskadi (established in 1980), and Navarre 
(Nafarroa), which forms a separate autonomous community (Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra); the remaining three provinces are in France: Labourd (Lapurdi), Soule (Zuberoa) 
and Basse Navarre (Baxanabarra or Low Navarre). Basque nationalists call the former area 
Euskadi Sur (Hegoaldea) and the latter Euskadi Norte (Iparralde). Euskadi Sur includes 
85% of the Basque land mass, more than half of which lies in Navarre. There is a more 
'neutral1 term to define the same area, Euskal-Herria, which is partially devoid of nationalist 
connotations.3
The focus of this thesis is limited exclusively to the Spanish side of both ethno-regions. In 
Euskadi, we shall consider all the four provinces with particular attention to Vizcaya and 
Guipuzcoa, while for the Catalan case we shall concentrate only on Catalonia-Principat, the 
historical heartland of Catalanism, omitting all other Catalan-speaking areas.
STATISTICAL DATA
With its 6.077.000 inhabitants (1988 data), corresponding to 15.9% of the Spanish 
population, Catalonia occupies 31.932 kmq. corresponding to 6.3% of the Spanish state 
surface.4
In Euskadi (map 5), 2.3 million people (over 90%) live on the Spanish side, 200,000 on 
the French side. This makes up for an aggregate area of 20.600 kmq and over 2.5 millions 
inhabitants. Euskadi Sur (including Navarre), which is the only focus of my thesis, occupies 
17,600 kmq, about 3.5% of the Spanish territory. Its inhabitants amount to 7% of the 
Spanish population.
3 On the use of this term, a s  opposed to Euskadi, see  chapter 3, p. 97, particularly note 
151.
4 S ee Xifres de Catalunva 1988/89. Barcelona: Generalitat/ CIDC
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Introduction
This thesis is a comparison between Catalan and Basque nationalism and tries to chart the 
main differences in their developments. I concentrate on specific aspects which have been 
neglected by previous research: in contrast with virtually all previous studies on Basque and 
Catalan nationalism, either comparative or non comparative, my thesis focuses on national 
culture and symbols, their systematization and manipulation by nationalist elites, and their 
relationship with political violence. The aim is to contribute to a sociological paradigm which 
takes into account the oppositional character of nationalism 
My thesis is not about economic factors, class cleavages, or other variables. These have 
been adequately covered by many other researchers -albeit not in a comparative manner, and 
these will be referred to in the thesis. Nor am I defining culture, as I am studying the people 
who define it, the nationalists, and how they did that 
The reason for attributing so much importance to culture is that no country's politics exists 
independently from its culture. Culture is about values and the latter include attitudes, 
prescribed behaviour, expectations, as expressed in symbols and as preserved in the material 
heritage of the nation. The concept of value has been widely discussed in sociology. In 
Parsons (1975, 1991), shared values act as standard bearers and pillars of the social 
order.5 They are internalized through both primary and secondary socialization.6 Every 
society must be supported by shared values, otherwise it risks disintegration. However, both 
in times of rapid social transformation and ethnic conflict, values may change and are likely 
to clash with one another. Challenging officialdom, the values of a stateless nation compete 
with those of the nation-state. In time- and space-related changes, some values emerge
5 "Values held In common constitute the primary reference point for the analysis of a 
social system  as  an empirical system. Such a system  of societal values may, of course, change 
over a  period of time, but it is the most stable component of the social system" (Parsons 1991:
8).
C
In s ta te less  nations, socialization is often carried out by non-state agents, that is, un­
official media, informal education, self-taught research, voluntary associations, etc. I will 
refer occasionally to this as nationalist socialization.
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stronger than others, representing focal points for mass mobilizations.
It is also important to remember that most ethnonationalist movements in Europe are based 
on cultural, in particular linguistic, claims.7 The prominent position of language in many 
ethnic claims has, if anything, increased during the last twenty years.8 The exploration of 
this dimension will highlight important differences between Catalan and Basque nationalism: 
if we accept the assumption that the primary focus and means of legitimation of most 
contemporary European nationalisms has been -and is- language, a contradiction between this 
accepted precondition and the lack of a shared language has necessarily emerged within 
Basque nationalism. No such contrast has emerged within Catalanism.9
Several scholars have acknowledged en passant that the distinctive character of the two 
nationalist movements is related to cultural factors. "Catalan nationalism has always been 
more cohesive than that in the Basque Country, in part stemming from the strong cultural and 
linguistic ties..." (Hannum 1990: 267). Some went as far as asserting that violence in the 
Basque Country was a consequence of the lack of a vibrant and shared cultural tradition. "It 
was [the Catalans'] cultural self-confidence that made terrorism superfluous, a terrorism that 
perhaps suited the more racist nationalism of the Basques and their emphasis on physical 
prowess and exuberant youth. In contrast,.. .the democratic opposition achieved in Catalonia 
a degree of unity and co-operation without parallel in Spain" (Carr and Fusi 1981: 161). 
However, all these authors fail to provide a deeper, more systematic analysis for their 
intuitive assertions. To my knowledge, no study has followed this perspective -to relate 
cultural variables, or the lack of them, to violence - in either sociology or other social 
sciences. Even in comparative studies concerning other areas of the world, such an approach 
has not been given the attention it deserves.
It will be useful to list here the main research in our field. Interestingly, systematic and 
large-scale comparisons between the two movements are few, both in Spanish and in other
7 Language features to different degrees in European nationalist claims, with the Scottish 
and North Irish cases  having the least linguistic content.
8 Most independence movements in the former Soviet Union started from linguistic claims 
(Estonia, Moldova, Belarus, etc.), although this is not the  c a s e  of Y ugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia before their disintegration. In Cornwall, Brittany, W ales and several other 
W estern European s ta te le ss  nations, language features a s  a  prom inent elem ent in their 
nationalist programmes.
9 My approach considers the language as the carrier of culture, rather than conflating the 
two term s. This raises the question whether we can conceive a  distinctive culture without a 
distinctive language a s  its vehicle for expression. Many nationalists will deny that, but there 
arises the vexata quaestio of how to define a  culture. The very effort of defining a  culture as  
opposed to another implies a  process of border creation. Hence, the choice of language a s  the 
crucible of nationhood will be related to its availability a s  an 'ethnic marker'.
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languages. In English, there are studies by Payne (1971, 1976), Mansvelt Beck (1991,
1992), Medhurst (1987), and, in French, by Loyer (1990). Migu61ez (1984) has attempted a
sketchy comparison in Catalan and Euskara. The only large-scale systematic comparison
between Basque and Catalan nationalism has been carried out by Dfez-Medrano 
v<\ z<\
(forthcoming). I encountered this work too recently for it to have influenced my thesis in 
significant ways; besides, its focus is mainly political and economic.
The mutual relationship between Basque and Catalan nationalism is analyzed by several 
authors, among them Nagel (1987, 1991), until 1923.10 Hernandez, Mercadd and Oltra 
(1983) compare the ideology and platform of several regionalist and nationalist movements in 
Spain. Comparisons are also occasionally included in more general studies: Linz (1973, 
1975) balances survey data with historical insight. Perceptive comparisons are available in 
Payne (1975), as well as in Elorza (1984), Corcuera (1984), and Olabarri Cortizar (1981). 
Other authors have contrasted specific aspects of the two economies, electoral turnouts, 
social systems, etc., but without focussing on nationalism: Carreras (1985), Izard (1985), 
Gonz&lez Portilla (1985), and Roiz Celix (1984). Finally, Silver's (1988) interpretive essay 
does not offer a systematic comparison.
More studies are available comparing each nationalism with similar movements abroad. 
Scottish nationalism has been compared to Catalan by Brand (1985), Ehrlich (1993) and 
Moreno (1988), and to Basque nationalism by Zirakzadeh (1991) and Watson (1992). Pierre 
Bimbaum (1988:146-155) has attempted a comparison between Scottish, Breton and Catalan 
nationalism. Khatami (1990) has compared Eritrea and Euskadi; Kimmel (1989) Brittany- 
Euskadi-Quebec, Mayo (1974) Brittany-Euskadi-Wales, and Waldman (1989) Northern 
Ireland-Euskadi-Quebec. A special issue of the "Journal of Baltic Studies" was recendy 
devoted to comparisons between the Baltics' and other national movements, among them 
Basques and Catalans (Johnston 1992, Kasla 1992, Laitin 1992, Shafir 1992).
Few of these studies give a prominent place to culture. But is it possible to isolate cultural 
factors from economic or structural ones ? A solution is to compare two cases which offer 
similar economic, structural and social variables, whilst differing sharply in the cultural 
variables. This, of course, does not imply a refusal to take into account other dimensions, 
which will be considered throughout the thesis.
The violent character of Basque nationalism has inspired a great deal of research in the 
Basque Country, both scholarly and otherwise from several disciplines and viewpoints. In
10 For an up to date bibliography, see  Conversi (1993).
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contrast, Catalan social scientists still tend to treat nationalism as a given, as an unaccountable 
collective feeling, often as something not worth analysing. With a few exceptions, the 
Catalan contribution to the literature on nationalism is entirely limited to historians.1! 
Perhaps it is true that, "as scholarship is reactive, the spilling of ink awaits the spilling of 
blood" (Horowitz 1985:13).
Moreover, the study of Catalan nationalism has attracted left-wing historians more than 
nationalists tout court. The latter are more prolific in Euskadi. Nunez (1992: 5, 1993) 
explains this contrast in terms very similar to mine: "while in [Euskadi] an extremely clear-cut 
division exists between nationalists and non-nationalists, and, within the intellectual circles, 
between [radicals] and moderates, in Catalonia the situation is much more flexible. Catalan 
culture and language serves as a vehicle for the integration of foreigners and non-nationalists 
into publishing houses and reviews concerned with the task of propagating Catalan culture".
General orientations
As I said, given the similarity of economic or structural factors in Catalonia and Euskadi, I 
attempt to relate the development of the two ethnic movements to the vitality of shared culture 
and values. Where the latter flourish, not only do they become a central part of the 
nationalists’ claims, they also add cohesion to their struggles. That is to say, the availability 
of pre-existing cultural 'markers' which help to differentiate the group from its neighbours, 
facilitates the organisation of united political action. The common elements chosen as core 
values can work both as mobilizing symbols and as points of reference for a wide political 
platform and large constituencies. Conversely, the absence of shared cultural distinctiveness 
is likely to encourage political fragmentation within nationalist movements. In this case, the 
movement is bound to rely on an 'antagonistic identity'. An antagonistic identity is one 
constructed essentially through the opposition of the ingroup to one or more outgroups. All 
identities are in some way based on opposition, but an antagonistic identity focuses more on 
the need to define one's own group by negative comparison to others, and by exclusion. This 
border-definition process is carried out by a radical re-evaluation of the positive traits of the 
ingroup and a parallel devaluation of those of the outgroup. Borders are stressed rather than 
content, that is, the group's culture. Culture can also be oppositional, as when it is used in 
opposition to another culture, generally the dominant one. But when the ethnic culture is
11 Such exceptions are worth mentioning: in sociology, Giner (1980, 1984, 1986, 1987,
Giner and Moreno 1990), Hern&ndez (1983), and Mercadd (1982). In philosophy, Bilbeny
(1984, 1988). In political science, Colomer (1984). In anthropology, Pujadas (1983).
INTRODUCTION 22
weak and ill-defined, the whole group must be opposed to the out-group, generally the 
dominant one. Hence, a possible common bond can be provided by violent political 
mobilization. Given particular historical conditions (state repression, dictatorship and 
censorship), violence can become a source of cohesion and the principal mean of forging a 
community and fostering the long-awaited 'rebirth of the nation1.
In order to understand the source and legitimacy of most nationalist movements, especially 
cultural ones, we must also take into account the feeling o f threat.12 In the age of the 
nation-state, minorities do not generally feel protected or safe. Their very cultural survival is 
at stake under the joint pressures of centralization and modernization. In order to assure their 
survival, they try to achieve some political control over their destiny. This is only feasible by 
exercising some form of jurisdiction over an established geographical territory. Modem 
nationalism cannot be conceived without this spatial dimension. Territory lies at the heart of 
all nationalist programmes, hence the importance of maps and mapping in their strategy. 
Ultimately, in a world of nation-states, ethnic groups can only feel fully protected if they 
achieve the formation of their own nation-states. However, if a group's identity is strong 
enough and the group feels confident about its future survival within an existing nation-state, 
demands for independence or separation may become politically irrelevant1^
Definitions, Sources and Methods
In this thesis, I shall speak of Catalan and Basque nations and nationalism. I shall also use 
the suffix ethno- (ethnonationalism, ethnies, ethnic groups, ethnic borders, ethnic identity, 
ethnic conflict, ethnicity, etc.) in reference to the broader comparative dimensions.14 The
12 Som e authors treat this fear of extinction a s  a  non m easurable variable. For instance, 
Horowitz (1985: 179) speaks of a  fabricated 'anxiety-laden perception' which is potentially 
endless (175-81). But my thesis will show that this perception is rooted in historical events 
which have direct consequences upon cultural and political practices.
13 Memories of past oppression are difficult to erase . The collapse of Yugoslavia, the 
Soviet Union and Ethiopia reminds us of the all-pervasive strength of such memories of 
collective sufferings and their potential for explosion once -and even before- free expression 
has been reinstated. As a  consequence, the group may perceive that the overarching nation­
state can again represent a  threat to its future survival. Hence, apparently quiescent ethnic 
communities often keep a  'separatist' reservoir that can be revived in ca se  of a  crisis in the 
group's relation with the centre. The main variable is again the behaviour of the central 
government in its relationships with the periphery.
14 Far from being used in a  genetic sen se  (as coterminous with race), the term 'ethnic' 
will generally be used to take into account the dimension of putative descent, which is indeed 
central to any ethnic identity and distinguishes ethnic groups from other groups sharing similar 
cultural elem ents (not sharing culture a s  a  whole, which is often a  construct of ethnic groups 
them selves and serves to categorize their ascription into their own category or to legitimize 
such ascription).
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term ethnonationalism  refers exclusively to movements acting on behalf of stateless 
nations.15 The more wide-ranging term nationalism refers instead to both state and non­
state nationalisms. The distinction between the two concepts is blurred and uneven in most 
European languages: in fact, while ethno-nationalism is used to describe stateless 
nationalism, there is no specific term to define state nationalism as a distinctive 
phenomenon.!6 Indeed, in using the term ethno-nationalism, I encountered criticism from 
some Catalan scholars,17 who pointed out that the only justification for using this term lies 
in an ill-starred confusion between state and nation. Walker Connor (1972) claims that this 
confusion is historically unwarranted, since nations are nothing else but 'self-aware ethnic 
groups': many previous ethnic groups turned into nations and eventually into states. Yet, in 
the mind of West European scholars and ordinary people, the term nationalism is inextricably 
associated with state nationalism, with all the negative traits normally attached to it.
In their reach for some form of self-determination, nationalists use the instrument of the 
'nation'. It is exactly the latter's situational, transitory and instrumental value which makes it 
so difficult to define. The nation cannot be defined, because its purpose is to define. It is a 
conceptual tool and a boundary perception through which an ethnic group wishing to be 
represented in a state attempts to establish and define its own space of action. Central to this 
definition is the demarcation of a territory through an ideal reference to historical past.
My research integrates documentary material (mainly, the nationalists' recorded 
declarations and writings), sociolinguistic surveys and other data (such as language 
censuses, sociolinguistic analyses and other derivative data on the relation between identity, 
language, nationalism, voting behaviour, etc.). I rely both on primary and secondary 
sources. Particularly in chapters 4, 5 and 6 ,1 use primary data, such as political pamphlets, 
communiques, biographies, newspapers' and magazines’ excerpts, and personal 
interviews.1^
The thesis focuses on those individuals, the intellectuals and the intelligentsia, who set the 
agenda of nationalist mobilization. Many of the founding fathers of the two movements were
15 For a  discussion of the concepts of ethnonationalism, ethnic nationalism and related ones, 
see  Ma Shu Yan (1990).
16 For a  discussion of the term s nation, ethnie, minority and related concepts, see  Riggs 
(1986). Riggs (1991a, 1991b) concludes that ethnicity is the most general and scientifically 
undefined of these concepts.
17 In particular, Professors Salvador Cardtis, Jo sep  Llobera, and Rafalel Rib6, whom I 
thank for their insightful comments. Salvador Giner (1984) u ses  the term 'ethnic nationalism'.
18 As a  general bibliography on the national question in Spain from 1939 to 1983, I have 
consulted Beramendi (1984), a s  well as  the more up-to-date and comprehensive reappraisal on 
studies of nationalism in Spain by Nufiez (1992, 1993).
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primarily cultural nationalists who felt that the national culture was being threatened by state 
centralization. As the state was needed to protect the culture, the cultural nationalists needed 
to ally with political nationalists in order to reach the state. Thus, they formulated their 
regenerative programmes in political terms. Finally, in Catalonia they aimed to form alliances 
with economically hegemonic classes in order to gather the necessary financial support. 
There, they had to adapt their cultural arguments to the needs of economic elites and frame 
their programmes in a way that did not clash too harshly with the latter's interests.
I would like to compare the role of a sociologist to that of a photographer. By changing the 
perspective and colour of the light filter, the same scenario may assume a different 
appearance, revealing new and unexpected facets. Eventually, the whole picture may change. 
The aim is indeed to explain the same phenomenon with a new light, rather than a new 
phenomenon with the same light, as overarching theoretical paradigms often do.
Plan
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 is a critical overview of the main 
scholarly theories of nationalism. Those theories which are central to the argument of my 
thesis will be selected and their possible application tested. The rest of the thesis is a 
comparison divided into two parts: firstly, an historical part and, secondly, a more theoretical 
part in which the main hypotheses are tested.
The historical part consists of five chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 deal, respectively, with the 
formation of early Basque and Catalan nationalism, with the establishment of their respective 
programmes and definitions of national identity. Chapters 4 and 5 explore the 
transformations undergone by the two movements during the Francoist dictatorship and try to 
illustrate how the changed demographic, political and cultural conditions precipitated a radical 
re-formulation of the two movements. Chapter 6 focuses on the democratization process and 
the legitimacy crisis of the centralized state inherited from Francoism. The rapid political 
changes are charted taking into account the influence of peripheral nationalism in the creation 
of the new state and vice-versa.
I have divided the history of Catalan and Basque nationalism into two broad periods: from 
their foundation to the end of the Civil War (1939) and from the latter to the democratic 
Transition. The reason is that the Civil War (1936-39) was a clear-cut severance and a radical 
break from the past. In the minds of those old enough to have survived it, the war is "a 
rupture so complete that it divides time in two; there is 'before the war', and everything that
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came afterwards" (Di Giacomo 1984: 31).19 Also, nationalism was at the root of the Civil 
War, which can be seen as a conflict between official Spanish nationalism and centrifugal 
trends.20
The second part of the thesis will deal with three deeply intertwined aspects of nationalist 
mobilization: the choice of language as opposed to other core values (Chapter 7), the 
consequence of large-scale immigration (Chapter 8) and the cause and effects of political 
violence (Chapter 9). Chapter 7 will show how two different sociolinguistic situations 
influenced the nationalist leaders' attempts to forge a bounded national identity: language 
maintenance influenced the moderate and unified course of Catalan nationalism; language 
shift created a vacuum in the Basque arena, to which the leaders responded by emphasizing 
other elements, but never agreed on which of them to choose. The selection of different core 
values can result in the development of different nationalist programmes. We shall delineate 
two broad patterns o f  nationalism, inclusive and exclusive. Stress oir languager as the 
achieved epitome of a group's culture creates the preconditions for the development o f an 
inclusive form of nationalism. Stress on race, descent and other ascriptive elements creates 
the preconditions for an exclusivist form of nationalism.
Chapter 8 analyzes the contribution of immigration to the nationalist movement and 
identifies the different ways in which nationalist proto-elites reacted to the challenge. 
Immigration both reinforced and modified local core values. Encouraged by the high level of 
language maintenance, the Catalan pattern emphasized cultural integration through language. 
In contrast, immigration in Euskadi increased the original fragmentation, inspiring a more 
radical form of nationalism whose goal was to involve the immigrants in the national 
struggle. Nationalist mobilization became increasingly based on action, voluntary 
participation, subjective involvement, and the playing down of primordial symbols. New 
core values were selected and stressed in the process.
Chapter 9 attempts to relate the above to violence. Two factors are highlighted to explain 
the drift towards violent action: firstly, internal cultural, ideological and political 
fragmentation impinged upon the radicals' resort to external confrontation with the state;
19 As Term es (1986: 18) puts it, the enormously negative impact of the Civil War, a  war 
which "disintegrated nearly everybody", has been inadequately studied. In Euskadi, the change 
was also abrupt: "The tragedy of that war left unforgettable im ages and experiences in the 
memory of those who lived it. These were vividly described to us youths during our upbringing. 
After five d ecad es ... still the great divide is 'before the war' and 'after the w ar'” (Zulaika 
1988: 16).
20 This historical reality is often neglected by many, especially English, historians who 
prefer to em phasize the class nature of the conflict. This issue will be discussed in the chapters 
on Francoism.
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secondly, state repression was needed for violence not only to begin, but also to spread. 
Having related cultural assimilation to political fragmentation, I argue that the latter two, 
together with state violence, are ideal preconditions for the rise of violent confrontational 
politics.
I conclude with a brief Epilogue, setting out the main themes which have emerged from my 
comparison, drawing up some general conclusions and confirming the hypothesis (of cultural 
nationalism, core values and state repression) expressed in the previous chapters.
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Chapter 1
) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THEORIES of NATIONALISM
The first task of this thesis will be to explore some influential theories of nationalism, to see 
whether they illuminate the thesis' main hypothesis which we discussed in the introduction. 
Apart from the mainstream theories, others will be added in order to clarify specific aspects, 
as well as the overall aim of the thesis. The main interpretative currents in scholarly research 
on nationalism can be subsumed broadly within three groups: primordialism, 
instrumentalism, transactionalism.21 A fourth section on the role of culture and myths will 
be added.
PRIMORDIALISM
The most traditional approach in the study of nationalism has been defined as 
primordialism.22 It dates the origin of both nationalism and national identity back to remote 
epochs, explaining them as forms of emotional givens. All classic nationalisms proclaim the 
immutable nature of their Volksgeist and symbolic universes. Indeed, it is the very 
primordialist 'pedigree' of dominant nations which, with its determinist eschatology, 
constitutes a powerful obstacle for the transformation of "ethnies" into "nations". In 
nationalist rhetoric, existing states are often given as evidence of the primordialilty of the 
nation they enclose.23
21 Several authors however appear under more than one heading, espousing different 
interpretations. This is partly a  co nsequence of the protean, am biguous and multi­
dimensional nature of nationalism. As no single over-arching theory of nationalism has 
em erged so  far -and perhaps will never em erge-, m ost authors develop either a multi­
layered theory or several theories at once in order to deal with sep ara te  aspects  of the 
phenom enon. Yet, it is still fruitful to establish  the following th ree  main theoretical 
frameworks.
22 This term w as used for the first time by Shils (1957), who identifies ethnicity with 
'primordial ties'.
23 Thus, Pierre Vilar points out that "since the Frenchman takes nations for granted a s
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Primordialist approaches have been at the centre of much criticism. Their appeal to 
emotional and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations for ethnic mobilisation has been 
an easy target from more positivist, calculative approaches. By accentuating the explosive 
and unpredictable nature of ethnic bonds, primordialists seem to discourage further enquiries 
into the causes of ethnic conflict. They also "tend to unite upon the explicit or implicit 
argument that ethnicity, properly defined, is based upon descent" (Brass 1979: 35) ? The 
cultural non-ascriptive basis of nationalism is hence overlooked and ignored.25
An extreme variety of primordialism is Pierre Van den Berghe's sociobiological 
approach, which considers ethnic and racial sentiments as an extension of kinship ties 
(1981: 80). The idea of ethnic ties as 'kinship' ties is also embraced by Donald Horowitz 
(1975, 1985), who defines ethnic groups as 'super-families'. Using the term 'ethnic 
affiliation', Horowitz argues that "there is always an element of descent. Most people are 
bom into the ethnic group in which they will die, and ethnic groups consist mostly of those 
who have bom in them" (1985: 55). Similarly, Joshua A. Fishman notes that "ethnicity has 
always been experienced as a kinship phenomenon, a continuity within the self and within 
those who share an inter-generational link to common ancestors ... It is crucial that we 
recognize ethnicity as a tangible, living reality that makes every human a link in an eternal 
bond from generation to generation... Ethnicity is experienced as a guarantor of eternity" 
(1980: 84-5). The role of the nation as an 'extended family' has been promptly noticed by 
Churchmen and other religious leaders. We shall see that in both the Basque Country and 
Catalonia the Church has integrated this vision as part of its nationalist 'conversion'. 
Nationalism conveys the idea that the members of the nation are somehow related by birth. 
Myths of common ancestry are central to this perception. Sociobiological and other 'kinship' 
perspectives bring forth the centrality of descent in defining ethnic groups. In fact, if we wish 
to reject any biological definition of ethnic groups, sticking purely to a cultural definition, we 
shall have to include all kinds of formal or informal groupings which share some symbols, 
language and culture (although not necessarily myths and history, since the latter are related
natural facts verified by the existence of states, the existence of Portugal seem s to him to 
have been tied to the geography of the peninsula from time immemorial, while the ideas of a 
Catalan or Basque 'nation' is all the more surprising..." (1980: 527, my italics).
24 Brass concords with Smith that "it is not actual descen t that is considered essential 
to the definition of an ethnic group but a  b e lie f in common descent" (1979: 35, italics 
mine).
25 For th ese  reasons, som e authors propound a  com plete rejection of the term 
primordialism from the social science vocabulary (Eller and Coughlan 1993).
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to descent). Hence, some kind of 'biological1 component, or at least a perception of common 
descent, is necessary to distinguish ethnies and nations from other 'cultural' groups. 
However, this concept, as we shall see, is diametrically opposed to the one I wish to apply to 
the Catalan case: ethnicity as ascription is one of two possible options, the other being 
ethnicity as a free choice through the voluntary adoption of the ethnic culture.
Intellectuals and intelligentsia
How is it possible to believe in this immemorial - sometimes perennial- character of the 
nation? An answer lies in the role played by a particular stratum, which is crucial for the 
success of nationalist movements: the intelligentsia. In the social sciences there is no 
agreement on its definition. Anthony D. Smith (1971, 1982,1984) defines the intelligentsia 
as a group of individuals exposed to some form of superior education. It is not strictly a 
class, but rather a social category, since, in theory, individuals hailing from all classes can 
belong to it. As the intelligentsia starts to challenge officialdom by taking advantage of its 
strategic position, it becomes a key protagonist of emerging ethno-nationalist movements.
The intelligentsia, or the professionals, should not be confused with the narrower concept 
of intellectuals, namely the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas which the 
intelligentsia may then spread (Smith 1981: 109).26 Indeed, the intelligentsia is that group 
which has the power to apply and disseminate the ideas produced by the intellectuals. There
are, obviously, overlapping cases, such as individuals who, in their lifetime, have the
/
possibility both to create and disseminate their ideas. However, they are two clearly distinct 
activities, or 'phases' (Gella 1977, Smith 1981: 109). Generally, the tendency to be 
organized in professional corps indicate membership in the intelligentsia. One of its attributes 
is modernity; intellectuals existed in many epochs, but only with modernization do we 
encounter large numbers of individuals dedicated exclusively to applying and disseminating 
ideas, the intelligentsia (Smith 1973:79).
Within the intellectuals a decisive role is played by historians, whose mission is to 
provide a legitimizing historical perspective as the basis of the national project. In the late 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, most European historiographers and social philosophers
26 P eter Alter speaks of this category as  'the aw akeners': "every nation has done its 
utmost to praise the deeds and merits of the philologists, poets, historians and politicians 
who substan tia ted , and in m ost c a s e s  successfully  a sse rted , the  nation 's claim to 
independence and self-determination... These makers and recreators of s ta tes  were 'great 
men', individuals powerful enough to have wrought the shape of history" (Alter 1989: 80).
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were national 'propagandists1. Extolling the heroic deeds of past national leaders, they 
provided the political aims of their own leaders with an historicist justification. Nationalist 
and minority historians are often set apart from mainstream historians. The term uneven 
ethno-history has been suggested by Smith (1993) for this purpose. An ethno-history is an 
imaginary reconstruction of the past. It paints an ideal tableau of what once was. The ethno- 
historian is thus not concerned with investigating his own claims, but with creating a fiction 
which is more apt to convey the message of nationalist renaissance. The ethno-historian is 
nothing more but the modem version of the ancient myth-maker.
Yet, there is no value-free history, as there is no value-free sociology. To paraphrase 
Marx's dictum, all history is the history of the dominant nations. And borrowing from 
psychology, we can also say that memories are also selective. Turkish history books do not 
mention the Armenian genocide in which millions perished, yet Turkish mainstream history 
is not generally classified or referred to as ethno-history. What, in principle, distinguishes 
professional/ academic historians from official and ethno-historians is the latter's lack of a 
filter of analytical critique. Ethno-history was prevalent in early Catalanism, but it was even 
more central to Basque nationalism, where the lack of past statehood has prompted his 
founder to turn obscure medieval skirmishes into the guideposts of Basque historical 
continuity.
In general, the crucial importance of the intellectuals will be shown in both the Catalan and 
Basque cases. Their role is at the core of Elie Kedourie's Euro-centric approach (1993): 
nationalism is diffused by a mechanism of imitation by local intellectuals and elites. It is the 
result of the diffusion of the modem principle of self-determination as derived by the 
philosophical visions of German Kantianism and Herderian Romanticism and by the political 
praxis of the French Revolution. Intellectuals of one country emulate intellectuals from 
another country and the epicentre of everything lies in the midst of Europe (France and 
Germany). The central role of the intellectuals and the professionals brings us to the 
consideration of how far they can influence, mobilize and 'intmmentalize' public opinion.
INSTRUMENTALISM
Ethnic and national mobilization may be seen as resulting from the conscious efforts of 
groups - and/or individuals within them - to obtain access to specific social, political and 
material resources. This is obviously done in the name of 'alleged' common interests. The 
emphasis is on the instrumental tendencies of elites or proto-elites, who choose to mobilize
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their own group(s) under the banner of ethnicity or nationalism. Underlining "the strategic 
efficacy of ethnicity" in relation to the Welfare state (Glazer and Moynihan 1975:11), such 
approaches are of limited interest for this thesis. They do not recognize that mobilised groups 
may simply be interested in the defense and maintenance of their cultural heritage. Ethnicity is 
seen as a dependent variable, controlled according to its strategic utility in achieving other, 
material goods for the group.
The most radical instrumentalists assert that the category "nation" is totally invented and 
does not correspond to any objective reality. If not purely invented, nations are at least 
imagined communities (Anderson 1983), the outcome, one would say, of a collective 
hallucination.27 In some cases, an attitude of deep diffidence towards nationalism has 
inspired lapidary sentences, such as the following: "Nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (Gellner 1964: 
168). The impatience of an entire generation of scholars to demonstrate the fallacy of 
nationalism pushed them to over-state its arbitrary character and under-state its creative 
potentials. Instrumentalism postulates a sharp fracture between nationalist elites and their 
passive followers, who are depicted as totally controlled by ambitious political leaders. The 
latter are 'social engineers' (Hobsbawm 1990) deliberately stirring up the atavistic emotions 
of the masses (Kedourie 1993).
Within the instrumentalist field, resource mobilization theory sees social actions as 
adaptive answers to specific cost-benefit calculations. Their success is therefore determined 
largely by strategic factors (Jenkins 1983: 528). Broadly speaking, mobilization theorists 
visualize ethnic and racial groups as being involved in competition for the control of 
economic, political and social resources. Moreover they suggest that hostility and antagonism 
are a natural derivation of such competition (Levine and Campbell 1972: 29). Resource 
mobilization theory and its derivates have not proved helpful to illuminate the main argument 
of my thesis, although they do possess relevance in the study of ethnic conflict and 
competition.28
2 7  S e e  Petrosino (1994) for an application to the Italian c a se  of the possibility 
'inventing' ethnic groups.
2 8  Another approach which we cannot consider thoroughly, because  of its reductionism, 
is rational choice theory (Levi and Hechter 1985). The possibility of collective action 
rests on whether or not members of the ethnic group are convinced that such action would 
result in net individual benefit (Hechter 1986). For example, analyses of the electoral gains 
of regionalist parties em phasize (in a  rather tautological way) the tatter's ability to present 
them selves to the electorate as  potential channel of protest and pressure, while offering to
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In short, classic instrumentalist approaches try to single out the 'manufacturers' of nations 
amongst those classes and social groups which have given the starting signal to nationalist 
claims. Hobsbawm (1990) speaks of 'social engineering' and his term 'invention of 
tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) has now become an icon in popular usage. A 
deconstructionist urge for identifying 'invented' traditions has reached the proportion of a 
virtual industry among historians and anthropologists (Urla 1993: 101) and is particularly 
popular in Catalonia.29 Hobsbawm belongs to a Marxist tradition that has still some 
credence among European scholars. Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars seem to be the most 
self-confident in locating with mathematical certainty and surgical precision the manipulators 
of nations.
Economist approaches: Marxism and Internal Colonialism
Marxist "orthodox" thought can be easily singled out as the most traditional instrumentalist 
approach. However, its incapacity to deal with nationalism is overwhelming, and has been 
recognized by Marxists themselves. For this thesis, Marxism has proved uninspiring and 
inapplicable. Yet, influential Marxist interpretations have emerged in historical study of early 
Catalanism. For instance, Pierre Vilar (1977,1980) sees the latter as a bourgeois movement 
which turned to regionalism as a consequence of its inability to control the state. In the most 
orthodox Marxist vision, nationalism is seen as a bourgeois conspiracy and reduced to pure 
class terms.
However, Marxist political praxis also emblazoned the right to self-determination, 
especially in the works of Lenin and Stalin.30 Such incongruity between proletarian 
internationalism and the right to self-determination originated in the specific historical and 
geographical milieux which Marxist political strategists were compelled to face (Connor 
1984a). As Joshua A. Fishman shrewdly points out, "classist Marxists joined these 
movements only when they triumphed and then only to capture them from within, since 
Marxism failed to destroy them from without" (1980: 80). But nationalist movements have
their m em bers more attractive and wider "selective incentives" than other organizations 
(Rogowski 1985). The cultural aspects of the phenomenon are given little weight (when not 
totally overlooked), as  are the more general social ones.
2 9  S ee, for instance, Fradera (1992), Marfany (1987) and several contributions to the 
historical journal L'Aveng. I see  their approach a s  useful in exploring som e aspects of the 
phenomenon, but insufficient as  overall explanation.
3 °  For a  survey of classical Marxist positions on the national question, s e e  Connor 
(1984a), Nimni (1991) and Salvi (1978).
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been quick to seize on this ambiguity, by either denying or exalting the right of self- 
determination. The use of Marxism by Basque radicals in the 1960s is the case we shall 
follow in more detail.31
Perhaps the most popular and widely quoted economist theory is -or was- Michael 
Hechter's (1975) 'internal colonialism'. Support for nationalist parties originates in the 
cultural division of labour, that is, the concentration of an ethnic group in a narrow range of 
low status occupations. Nationalist movements, such as those active in the Celtic fringe, are 
seen as responses to the lack of overall social mobility, which is in turn caused by cultural 
discrimination. Economic differences are sharpened in periods of economic crises, when a 
declining core cannot afford to grant the periphery its share of scarce resources. As is well- 
known, this interpretation failed to explain why most conflicts tend to occur in regions which 
are economically and technologically more advanced than their cores (Birch 1978: 330-331, 
Brand 1985, Smith 1981). The Basque Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland, Slovenia, 
Eritrea and the Baltics all contradict the theory of internal colonialism. Furthermore, many of 
these cases illustrate that, while the economic distance between groups diminishes, the 
meaning attached to ethnic diversities can become more salient (even if such diversities do not 
in themselves increase, or even if they are actually weakened). To meet mounting criticism 
and face the facts, Hechter abandoned internal colonialism and adopted other theories, in 
particular 'rational choice' (Hechter 1985,1992).
Economist theories represent a conspicuous body within instrumentalism. Walker Connor 
rightly points out that ethnonationalism appears to operate independently from economic 
variables and that perceived economic discrimination can merely work as a reinforcing 
variable, as a "catalytic agent, exacerbator, or choice of battleground" (1984b: 356). To put 
economic issues at the centre of the analysis means to miss the basic point, that ethnic 
movements are indeed ethnic, not economic.
Modernism and modernization theory
There is an interpretation which cuts across all previous ones, with the partial exception of 
primordialism. Following Smith (1984,1986: 12, 1988), I will use the term modernism to 
indicate those mainstream theories which see the nation as an entirely modem product.32
31 Despite its shortcomings, Marxist sociology has inspired interesting contributions in 
the study of neo-nationalism; apart from Hechter, we need only to think about Nairn's
(1977) work on the 'break-up of Britain' and Blaut's (1988) reconsideration of nationalism 
as  a  form of class struggle .
THEORIES 34
This vision is shared by all the approaches mentioned so far, and is particularly relevant to 
regional nationalism in Spain.
Some 'primordialist' authors also appropriated it, seeing nationalism as the modem 
equivalent of ethnocentrism: "modernization does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely 
modernizes it" (Geertz 1963:154). This dictum is one of the few postulates overwhelmingly 
embraced by most scholars, and, hence, it represents a rare achievement in the field: 
primordialists see nationalism as a modem re-enactment of an ancient idea, instrumentalists 
see in it a thoroughly modem condition.33 In Gellner's (1983) version, this proposition 
highlights how the all-pervasive changes brought about by modernization disrupt the 
traditional balance of society, creating new constellations of shared interests.34 The set of 
theories which I intend to include in this section do not substantially contradict what we have 
said so far: albeit linked to instrumentalist conceptions, modernists do not necessarily deny 
the persistent and historical aspects of ethnicity.
Modernism is not to be confused with the modernization paradigm popularized by Karl 
Deutsch and other post-war political scientists.35 According to Deutsch (1966), 
modernization is characterized by the presence of 'social mobilization', that is, the process
33 Modernism is opposed to perennialism, according to which the origins of the nation 
fade away into immemorial times, but are destined to eternal existence. As Gellner puts it, 
it is this doubly reassuring temporal projection which, at the sam e time, represents the 
unfathomable force of nationalism and its w eakness. Perennialism is not to be confounded 
with primordialism. The former refers to nations and is opposed to modernism, the latter 
refers to ethnic groups and is opposed to instrumentalism.
33 In our ca se  study, we shall see  how modernization destroyed old Basque loyalties 
grouped around Carlism, but gave birth to a  much more radical form of nationalism. A second 
wave of m assive modernization in the 1950s-1960s sparked the birth and spread of an even 
more radical and popular nationalist movement. Similarly in Catalonia, successive w aves of 
modernization and industrialization changed the nature of ethnic identities and se t the basis 
for a  modern form of nationalism.
34  Benedict Anderson (1983), who does not offer a  unified theory, but incorporates 
parts of a  variety of theories, can still be classified a s  a modernist. His "em phasis on the 
distinction between the educated and uneducated, and the concomitant appraisal of the 
educated through literacy, are a peculiar d isease  of modernism. This d isease  perm eates 
Gellner's Nations and Nationalism a s  well" (Roberts 1993: 135).
3 5  For a  critique of the m odernization paradigm, s e e  Ferrarotti (1985), Gusfield 
(1967), and Smith (1973). The confusion over the term has, if anything, dramatically 
increased in recent years. Ever since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the conventional view 
that modernization automatically lead to secularization has been shattered. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union has dealt a  coup de grace  to the 'social mobilization' paradigm  of 
modernization still held by Deutsch's imitators.
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through which the ancestral bonds with the individuals' primary institutions are eroded, and 
by which these individuals are freely available to new forms of socialization. In brief, 
modernization theorists stress that increased communications would erase ethnic cleavages 
and result in successful achievement of nation-building. This theory remained an 
unchallenged and all-pervasive paradigm in the social science for over twenty years following 
World W arn.
Ernest Gellner (1983) does not move too far from Deutsch's tradition. Indeed, he shares 
with extreme modernists and modernization theorists the belief that there is a radical split 
between industrial and pre-industrial societies. Only some aspects of Gellner's nomothetic 
grand-theory are relevant to my purpose. In particular, his theory of social cohesion 
singles out the birth of nationalism in the modernization process itself which uproots 
traditional society, undermining its system of ascriptive relationships. Nationalism's task is 
to forge a new loyalty (and identification) for the nation-state, after industrialization has 
corroded traditional norms, values and notions which sustained 'communal life'. This 
emphasizes the functional character of nationalism: spatial and social mobility makes 
necessary the construction of a collective identity which can work as anchor and point of 
orientation for the uprooted individuals. The problem is that the forced homogenization 
imposed by the nation-state provokes the unavoidable reactions of those who have been 
excluded from both decision-making and emotional - cultural participation.
In a similar vein, mass-society theory holds that without cohesive ideological forces 
modem societies risk 'disintegrating' and being tom apart by internal conflicts of interest. In 
particular, during rapid processes of urbanization, industrialization and democratization, or 
after military defeat, the masses become highly manipulable as a result of the destruction of 
previous social bonds (Giner 1976, Komhauser 1960). Recent world-wide events, especially 
the collapse of Communism, seem to confirm these perceptions. Both Gellner and 
Komhauser are not too distant from Emile Durkheim's concept of 'anomie' which indicates 
the breakdown of norms governing social interactions.3**
In his own adaptation of the modernization theory, Walker Connor (1972, 1973, 1987) 
reverses the tables, considering how nationalism is a force directly linked to increasing 
contacts and communications: nationalism spreads as communications spread.37 This is the
3 6  According to Durkheim (1970: 241-76), the  m ost likely victims of m ass 
manipulation are uprooted and isolated individuals, whose number increases notably during 
such crises derived from rapid modernization
37 Connor's approach has been identified a s  part of the confllctual modernization 
theories, as  opposed to D eutsch's and others' melting pot modernization theories
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foreseeable reaction by peoples submitted to the steam-rolling action of nation building. 
Nationalism is, hence, "an intrinsic characteristic of the modem world" (Smith 1981: 37).38 
Tom Naim (1977) goes as far as seeing in modernization the cause of most international 
conflicts. Development produces hatred and wars. By throwing up national boundaries, 
commerce gives rise to 'atavistic urges’. Thus, there is a direct link between modernization, 
nationalism and war (Naim, cited by Smith 1981:39). My research will clearly show that the 
impact produced by industrialization and modernization was an essential, perhaps the most 
relevant, factor in the rise of regional nationalism in Spain.
Homeostatic and cause-effect models.
In what I wish to refer to as a hom eostatic approach, social movements gather 
momentum when and where there arises the need to restore a dis-equilibrium. In this vein, 
ethnic insurgency is seen as a movement in defense of a group threatened with extinction by 
an alien state or by abrupt social change.39 Patricia Mayo (1974) sees the Toss of 
community' as the crucible in the explosion of ethnic conflicts. Their origin lies in the erosion 
of traditional communitarian structures by the bureaucratic state, with the consequent 
intrusion of industrial anonymity in every area of modem life. Echoes of Tonnies' distinction 
between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft reverberate in this approach. Gellner's theory of 
social cohesion, which sees industrial society as radically in opposition with agricultural 
society, is not distant either. But in homeostatic approaches the external variable which 
causes the nationalist movement to explode is the state.40 In brief, homeostatic
(Newman 1991). The former approach could also Include Smith and Nairn. Recently, Eric 
Hobsbawm (1994) has considered the spread of nationalism as  a  reaction to several aspects 
of modernization, particularly worldwide secularization.
This thesis is shared by most historians (Kohn 1955: 10-15, Hobsbawm 1990, 1994, 
Seton-W atson 1977) and anthropologists (Gellner 1973, 1991).
39 In the past, peripheral cultures could feel relatively protected or safe. Change was 
perceived by their members as mostly acceptable and tied to the constant flux of earthly 
matters. An Heraclitean conception of panta rei may well have been widespread in many 
cultures (Heraclitus formalized and transcribed a  kind of thought probably present among the 
wise men of his time, and we have no reason to doubt that a  similar vision w as current in 
most p laces and times). In a perpetual process of adaptation, change w as constantly 
supported by the protective shield of tradition a s  a  steady point of reference, rather than 
being radical and abrupt.
40 For a  more recent and broader theory which se e s  ethnonationalist movements a s  a 
response to both sta te  intervention and the intrusion of technological society, see  Jauregui 
(1993).
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interpretations refer to a primary and spontaneous reaction against state-sponsored 
bureaucratization and assimilation. However, they do not concern specifically nationalist 
movements, since a reaction of this kind can be produced through traditionalist, 
fundamentalist, New-Age, federalist, ecologist and other movements as well. Anti-state 
reactive movements can, for example, be pursued for religious reasons, which only 
afterwards may be taken up by the intelligentsia as part of their nationalist platform.41 
Nationalist movements can be distinguished from other reactive movements by their 
assumption of typical elements of a modem western culture (secularism, appeal to citizenship 
and equality, a certain degree of centralization, etc.)42 However, in many historical cases, a 
homeostatic reaction has been an essential prerequisite for the successive formation of a 
nationalist movement. This interpretation confirms that the state is the main variable in the 
formation of nationalism, and that nationalism itself is a product, or a consequence, of the 
state. This is a theory clearly expressed by Breuilly. However, Breuilly holds that it is 
failure in state-building that gives rise to distinctive nationalist politics (1993: 367). This is a 
rather tautological argument expressed also by several scholars of Spanish politics (Linz 
1973, 1975) and its results risk reifying the state into the ultimate arbiter of all social 
processes. Again, state-centered reductionism concentrates only on a single aspect of the 
phenomena, the state. The state is a crucial element in my explanation as well, but I consider 
ethnic nationalism to have been actually reinforced by state intervention, rather than being the 
result of "the failure to concentrate sovereignty in particular institutions" (Breuilly 1993: 
367). It will become obvious in the course of this work that the catalyst was the state's failure 
to decentralize its institutions, not to concentrate them. An excess of over-zealous centralism 
engendered an homeostatic reaction which, in turn, gave rise to two powerful peripheral 
nationalisms.
A variety of this approach is the cause-effect model, which explains ethnonationalist 
insurgencies as a direct response to state repression. This model is often used to explain
4 1 Alliances between a  secularized westernized intelligentsia and religious elem ents are 
a  constant in the history of nationalism. In the case  of Islam they are certainly decisive: the 
Algerian exam ple is well-known, while the first p hase  of the Islamic revolution in Iran 
provides the most indubitable example.
42 Smith appears to be himself a modernist when he distinguishes nations  from ethnies 
for the p resence of "western features and qualities: territoriality, citizenship rights, legal 
codes, ... political culture ...[and] social mobility in an unified division of labour” (Smith 
1986: 144). Even though the latter are mostly ideal rather than real practices, and even 
though their origin dates prior to the modern age, they have imbued with their conceptions 
the contemporary societies which have been forged on the basis of nationalism.
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nationalist violence as a defensive mobilization against the state. As we shall see, a 
'repression-resistance' hypothesis has been widely used in order to explain the peculiar 
strength and virulence of Basque nationalism in terms of a direct consequence of Francoist 
repression. The nationalists themselves sometime have used this explanation in order to 
justify their recourse to anti-state violence. The worldwide role of 'politicide', genocide and 
other forms of state repression in the genesis of ethnic conflicts has been well analysed by 
Ted Gurr and others (Gurr 1993, Gurr and Scarritt 1989, Harff and Gurr 1989).
Some authors go as far as seeing the level of ethnic mobilization as directly proportional to 
the degree of repression: "The greater the opposition -economic, political, social, religious, 
or some combination thereof- perceived by an ethnic group, the greater the degree to which 
its historical sense of distinctiveness will be aroused, and hence the greater its solidarity or 
the more intense its movement towards redress" (Scott 1990: 164). We shall see that state 
repression was crucial in the crystallization of both Basque and Catalan nationalism, and, if 
this repression was directed against particular core values (such as the Catalan language), it 
only served to reinforce the latter's importance.
Alternate cycles of nationalism
In the previous section, we have observed that there is an underlying distinction between an 
instinctive self-defense of threatened communities against the early industrial onslaught, and 
nationalism per se. The former is not sufficient in itself to inspire or create the latter. As we 
have seen, the first step in this direction is the existence of a proto-elite which could set the 
basis for a revival of ethnic culture in modem terms. The final task is to put the mobilized 
'nation' on the same footing as other nations. As Gellner (1983, 1991) puts it, the modem 
world is a national world, where no space is granted for stateless ethnies. Thus, ethnies have 
to face a fatal choice, a momentous decision, and find themselves at a radical cross-road: 
either they passively accept their destiny of extinction, or they organize themselves on the 
basis of a new state model. Such organization must follow strict political lines. The latter 
process, aimed at state-building, is quite distinct from cultural resistance as such. Yet, 
cultural resistance is the first ingredient for the creation of a national culture. To clarify this 
point, Hutchinson (1987, 1992) elaborates a distinction between political nationalism and 
cultural nationalism. The latter is an important ideological force which is regularly adopted 
by an intelligentsia in expansion, as a political option against the state. Cultural nationalists 
aim at the 'moral regeneration' of the nation, and culture is to be the means.43 The
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politicization of culture is again linked to the traumatic impact of modernization guided by the 
state. Many successful nationalist movements experienced an alternation between these two 
kinds of nationalism. Hutchinson describes them as historical cycles which succeed and 
reinforce each other, since none of them is conceivable without the other, even though one of 
the two may prevail at a given historical moment. However, my research will show that the 
strength of cultural nationalism depends on the strength of the local culture, and a thriving 
local culture can produce a permanent movement of cultural nationalism. If, as in the Basque 
case, the local culture is poorly developed and urban elites are thoroughly assimilated, 
cultural nationalism may be particularly inactive. It will then have to yield most of the 
initiatives of political reawakening and 'moral regeneration’ to political nationalism.44
The crucial importance of the cultural activists is recognized by both Smith and Hroch. We 
have seen the central role played by the intellectuals in Smith's theory. Hroch (1985) 
postulates a three-stages model of national development: phase A is the period of scholarly 
research; poets, philologists, archeologists, historians, artists all contribute to the 
’discovery’, creation and formalization of the national culture. Phase B is the period of 
patriotic agitation. Finally, phase C corresponds to the rise of a mass national movement4  ^
The difference between Hroch and Hutchinson is that the first conceives the evolution from 
cultural to political nationalism as a linear process, the second as recurring cycles. Hroch and 
Hutchinson also agree that a first generation of scholars and amateurs is needed to envision 
the nation, to consolidate an embryonic 'image' of the nation, and that cultural nationalism
43 "For a  cultural nationalist... the state  is regarded with suspicion. ...The glory of a 
country com es not from its political power but from the culture of its people and the 
contribution of its thinkers and educators to humanity. The aim of cultural nationalists is 
rather moral regeneration... [It] remains in 'normal' circum stances a  sm all-scale movement 
that prom otes progress through communal self-help. ...It may, if adopted by a  young 
intelligentsia, develop into a  loose network of language societies, dram atic groups, 
publishing houses, lending libraries, sum m er schools, agricultural co-operatives and political 
parties. Even so, it generally remains a minority enthusiasm ... In term s of its communitarian 
goals, cultural nationalism fails. Often unable to extend beyond the educated strata, it is 
forced to adopt state-oriented strategies by which to institutionalize its ideals in the social 
order" (Hutchinson 1987: 15-7).
44 Even in Basque nationalism the two movements can be kept distinct. Perhaps such 
distinction is not so evident in its early phases and re-foundation, when the two movements 
were conflated in the ideology of a  single leader or organisation (Arana and ETA). In periods 
of nationalist consolidation, such a s  in 1918 and in the 1980s, the difference becam e more 
salient.
45 Recently, Hroch's model has been applied to the study of B asque and Catalan 
nationalism (Mees 1991, Nagel 1991).
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does not vanish after it has been taken up by political activists. However, Hutchinson sees 
the two movements as more separable and continually reinforcing each other.
My own contribution is that, in the study of violent movements, it is necessary to 
distinguish a third form of nationalism, military nationalism. The latter develops its own 
autonomous dynamics and follows its own route, rather than alternating with the other two. 
We shall define the phenomenon in the Basque context in both chapters 4 and 9.
TRANSACTIONALISM
A third group of theories and models fall under the broad heading of 'transactionalism' 
or boundary approach. According to its main proponent, the Norwegian anthropologist 
Frederick Barth (1969), ethnic identity cannot merely be conceived as the survival of cultural 
forms derived from geographic and social isolation.46 On the contrary, it is the outcome of 
intense interaction and transactions between groups.47 However, there is an implicit 
contradiction between its founding aspects: ethnic groups perceive themselves as independent 
and autonomous, yet it is precisely their inter-dependence which is the source of their 
differential plans, identities and self-perception. "Groups tend to define themselves, not by 
reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, that is, by comparison to 'strangers'" 
(Armstrong 1982: 5). Opposition is then the crucible of ethnic and national identity. 
According to Lantemari (1986: 67), "there is always a contradiction in the definition of a 
group, because it is a group (i.e., it has a group identity) only in relation to other groups".
The central role of opposition in identity formation has been theorized in more detail by 
Spicer (1971: 797). He defines the oppositional process as "the essential factor in the 
formation and development of the persistent identity system" (cited by Scott 1990: 164). 
Likewise, Boon (1982) sees in this contrast the central feature of cultural groups. They need 
to produce a sense of themselves only because they encounter and interact with others. Since 
juxtaposition is the key to ethnic identity and groupness, cultural nuances and details are 
often grandly exaggerated. It is part of the process which Sigmund Freud (1991: 305) called
46 In Barth's words, "though the naTve assum ption that each  tribe and people has 
m aintained its culture through a  bellicose ignorance of its neighbours is no longer 
entertained, the simplistic view that geographical and social isolation have been the critical 
factors in sustaining cultural diversity persists" (1969: 9).
47  As we have seen , the perception that ethnic identities are  reinforced through 
interaction and global communication is not what d istinguishes B arth 's theory from 
competing ones. Connor, Hechter, Anderson, Armstrong, and several modernists concur that 
ethnic boundaries are strengthened in response to intense interaction.
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the 'narcissism of small differences'. The less different are the juxtaposed groups, the more 
will be their insistence on separateness. Mechanisms of compensation are thus central to 
groups as well as to individuals. Similarity will be counter-balanced by stress on alleged 
differentiae. "Any discourse at some levels alludes to the absences it intrinsically sets in 
abeyance... Every discourse, like every culture, inclines toward what is not: toward an 
implicit negativity" (Boon 1982:232). Antagonism is thus the main element in the formation 
of social identities. We shall see that this is precisely what has occurred in the Basque case, 
where militancy was enhanced by repression. This view is also common to homeostatic and 
cause-effect models. But did the nationalist leaders deliberately know that and choose to act 
consequently? My thesis will show that it was more of an open and conscious choice, than a 
surreptitious and semi-conscious one.
As a form of oppositional social organization, ethnicity may articulate a multiplicity of 
forms of ecological interdependence between groups, from the exploitation of complementary 
niches to the maximal competition for specific resources (Barth 1969, Cohen 1985)48 
Ethnicity is defined by boundaries. This implies that the cultural and biological content of the 
group can alter, while the boundary mechanism remains unchanged. One of Barth's main 
contributions is thus the distinction between ethnic borders and ethnic contents. He 
observed that the boundaries defining a group's identity may be maintained independently 
from the culture they enclose. In particular, cultures may change, but the permanence of 
boundaries themselves is more longstanding. However, Barth's playing down of culture 
does miss its central importance of the construction of identities: even though identities are 
often constructed rather than given, they must rely on the pre-existing diffusion of shared 
symbols and cultural elements, as well as on memories of a shared past and myths of a 
common destiny (Smith 1986,1991).
My thesis emphasizes the distinction between ethnic boundaries and their content. By 
emphasizing this distinction without focussing on only one of the two poles, a proper 
emphasis will be given to the oppositional dynamics of nationalism (and of ethnic identity in 
general), without omitting the basis upon which nationalism supports itself and legitimates 
itself. The latter's legitimacy derives largely from its capacity to absorb, and to delve into, the 
local culture. The relative weakness or strength of ethnic boundaries will be correlated to the 
relative weakness or strength of cultural contents.
The comparative analysis of Basque and Catalan nationalism will define two models of
48 On ’niche theory' and the origins of the term 'niche', see  Hannan (1979: 260-4).
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nationalist mobilization, one emphasizing borders and opposition, the other emphasizing 
culture and compatibility. Different nationalist movements put a different emphasis on 
culture, as well as on opposition. Stress on opposition will be linked to the core values 
prevailing in the two societies: in the Catalan case, the persistence of a single core value, 
Catalan language, made it unnecessary to reinforce opposition and borders through frontal 
clashes with the state. Opposition was largely conveyed through linguistic nationalism in the 
form of a massive movement of cultural resistance. In the Basque case, there was no clearly 
defined core value or symbol of national identity to mobilize people around. Borders needed 
to be reinforced through opposition, and that was what the nationalist leaders chose to do. 
However, it is also true that the Basques shared powerful myths of national uniqueness 
(certainly no less powerful than the Catalan ones), although these myths clashed with a 
general lack of cultural markers and differentiae. The result was that 'un-hyphenated' 
Basques developed a much more assertive and violent form of nationalism than their 'un­
assimilated' Catalan colleagues.
Border vs. content, opposition vs. compatibility, violence vs. culture
Nationalism can also be defined as a form of group categorization. As studied by social 
psychologists, the process of social categorization is independent of real and discrete 
differences among groups (Tajfel 1970, Billig 1976, Billig and Tajfel 1973). Nationalism 
assumes that the world is naturally divided into discrete entities called nations, hence, 
nationalism is a process of social categorization, both of the 'self and the 'other'. From here 
it follows that, although cultural differences may be important in legitimizing nationalism, 
they are by no means necessary in creating opposition, antagonism and conflict. What is 
relevant is the capacity of nationalist leaders to impose upon their constituencies the idea that 
they belong to a united single body called the 'nation'. For many people, to be able to 
'imagine' a nation means that a process of social categorization has finally succeeded. The 
'art' of imagining and creating a nation is intimately bounded to the 'science' of 
classifications and categorizations. Imagination and invention concur in the process of 
founding categories named 'nations'. However, it is highly unlikely that nationalist leaders 
can manipulate their constituencies at their own discretion, as extreme instrumentalists 
uphold. In order to mobilize the 'masses', the intelligentsia, and before them the intellectuals, 
must touch some chord, their message must reverberate amongst the people, it must even
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look familiar to them. As the world is no laboratory, some ’real1 element must be present in 
order for social categorization to become effective. Some pre-existing ethnic markers must 
facilitate the ascription into a category. However, if the group to be mobilized is too 
fragmented and assimilated to retain some shared hyphen, social categorization can always be 
enforced by stimulating borders and opposition, rather than contents and uniqueness.49 
Here is where the role of violence comes in.
In the booming field of comparative studies of nationalism, few attempts have been made to 
analyse the relationship of violence to pre-existing cultural markers and the 'identity material1 
available to them. I will try to show that the presence qt absence of such cultural markers can 
have a crucial influence on the developments of nationalism. The more the external markers 
are visible, the easier will it be to 'feel1, perceive or imagine the nation. The problem arises 
when two communities share too many cultural features: then, it becomes more difficult for 
political elites or proto-elites to forge some form of separate communitarian identity out of 
this cultural mingling and overlap.50 The boost is often provided by violent conflict. Wars, 
civil strife and government oppression deeply affect the collective psyche, moulding shared 
memories, collective identities and national myths (Smith 1981b). My interpretation goes 
further, in that when there is a paucity of cultural markers, only violence can make 
communities 'imagined' as well as real.
In order to understand this statement, we have to comprehend the essential character of 
nationalist movements. Their major aim is to emphasize an 'us-them' dichotomy and 
conceptually separate their group -which they conceive as a whole- from another group. 
Hence, nationalism aims at border creation, at least as much as it aims, internally, at border 
elimination. But, if the state curtails the course of the national re-awakening, nationalist 
leaders may calculate that it is in their -and the nation's- interest to engage in open rebellion. 
As my final chapter will stress, given widespread assimilation, nationalism will more likely 
develop violent fringes. The likelihood that such violence will then spread and be legitimated 
as a replacement for the illegitimacy of the state is then connected with several other factors, 
but I will focus on the two which I conceive to be essential: political fragmentation (in itself a
49  "The boundaries are re la tio n a l rather than absolute; that is, they mark the 
community in relation to other communities" (Cohen 1985: 58).
50 If we accept Anderson's (1983) definition of the nation a s  an 'imagined community', 
its consequences also vary according to the two following patterns: it becom es easie r to 
imagine oneself a s  being part of a whole when there are objective cultural markers which 
differentiate one's own whole from another whole. In contrast, imagination needs an extra 
boost when no tangible elem ents of differentiation are  shared  by the majority of the 
populations in the would-be nations.
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consequence of cultural fragmentation, which is, in turn, related to cultural assimilation) and 
state repression. When these two factors appear together, the leaders will more likely resort 
to violence and radical forms of struggle, than in cases where cultural distinctiveness and 
cohesion are the norm.
I shall also argue that violence is a result of the (internal) conflict between persisting ethnic 
memories and lack of widespread recognizable distinctiveness. Assimilation normally results 
in cultural fragmentation. The would-be nation becomes divided among assimilated and non­
assimilated constituencies. In both the historical chapters and the final conclusions, I will 
stress how cultural fragmentation engendered political fragmentation and how, in turn, the 
latter engendered a need for either strong leadership or strong action.
Bringing culture back in
Among most present-day ethnonationalist movements, language continues to be the basic 
criterion of self-definition and nationhood. As a consequence, the sociolinguistic vitality of 
these languages can be highly relevant in determining future political developments. Starting 
from this premise, I will explore the difficulties in choosing other elements as symbols and 
carriers of nationhood where the ethnic language is scarcely spoken.
Language is a central component in many modernist approaches we have discussed so far. 
The role of mass education in Gellner's theory is related to the needs of 'national' markets 
and industrialization. Anderson's idea of print capitalism and mass literacy postulates the 
development of a national language as a prerequisite for nationalism. Hroch, Kedourie and 
many others see the work of philologists, poets and other language 'manipulators' as crucial. 
Fishman (1966,1980,1982,1985) offers the most convincing scholarly argument about the 
importance of language both in ethnic identity and nationalist programmes. He points out that 
for nationalism to emerge "it is first necessary for populations to become convinced that they 
possess in common certain unique ethno-cultural characteristics, and that these similarities... 
are of importance to them" (Fishman 1972: 5).
Other theorists are more critical of such centrality of language.51 For Smith, the 
importance of myths, memories and symbols is far more significant. Language is treated as
51 John Edwards is perhaps the most comprehensive critic of language-based identities.
He holds that "while language is commonly held to be a  highly important or, indeed, essential 
com ponent of group identity, it is not necessary  to retain an original variety in order to 
maintain the continuity of a sen se  of groupness" (1985: 159). However, Edwards hardly 
explains what then takes the place of language.
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just one of the components in the wider realm of culture and symbols (1981: 45-ff). Smith 
holds that "in general, the linguistic criterion has been of sociological importance only in 
Europe and the Middle East (to some extent)" (1971: 18-9). However, this point omits to 
stress that these two areas are among those where nationalism triumphed and accompanied 
their entrance into modernity.
Chapter 7 will show how language has been a core value for the Catalan people and 
intelligentsia, while it has not been so for their Basque counterparts, at least until very 
recently. This difference will be related to the lesser diffusion of the Basque language in 
comparison with the liveliness of Catalan, and will be finally related to violence as a 
replacement for shared cultural markers in mass mobilizations.
Cultural differences, whether relevant or residual, might provide rough clues about the 
likelihood that individuals in the past shared a common heritage. Hence, independently from 
the degree of apparent cultural assimilation, they might work as heuristic devices of a 
common descent and are hence imbued with a rich repository of meaning.52 To overcome 
the dichotomy between perennialism and modernism, Smith (1986) develops an ethno- 
symbolic approach which underlines the continuity between premodem and modem times, 
without leaving out the changes brought about by modernity. The persisting feature in the 
formation of nations and the creation of national identities are myths, memories, values and 
symbols. This is a complex of elements which Smith often uses interchangeably.
In using the concept of core values, we shall understand the impact of cultural elements 
which carry in themselves the crucibles of a nation's identity. But in all human groups, be 
they nations, secret societies or sport clubs, there is a much more powerful series of elements 
capable of synthesising the general values which that group upholds. These are the symbols. 
Catalan and Basque nationalisms provide plenty of examples of this ability to use mobilizing 
symbols which are deemed to be central to the self-definition of the community and which 
convey widely shared popular values. A symbol is more than ’a thing that stands for 
something else', or a vehicle of meaning plus meaning. It is, in Jung's view, the best 
possible expression of a relatively unknown or unfathomable fact, or, better, of a fact the 
complexity and vastness of which could not otherwise be grasped. Symbols are especially 
crucial in rationalizing or making easy to comprehend irrational things, events, taboos, 
beliefs. They act as a bridge between the rational and the irrational. Symbols are therefore
52 For instance, in areas where any form of indigenous culture has long disappeared, 
memories of separateness are often preserved in names of places and other identity clues.
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central in carrying myths.
Conclusions
All the theories so far presented have some validity for explaining different aspects of the 
development of nationalism, and many of them could be applied to the Basque and Catalan 
cases. However, some are more useful than others. Internal colonialism, Marxism and other 
economist theories are particularly flawed, even in their successive corrections and 
amendments. Gellner's approach has proved to be too abstract for an application to West 
European stateless nationalism. Older theories such as the modernization paradigm or 
structural-functionalism have been dismissed as typical ideological constructs of postwar 
Anglo-Saxon academia. Three broad streams of theories are useful for interpreting 
nationalism in the following order: transactionalism, instrumentalism and primordialism. The 
latter has proven to be least useful, but we have not rejected it altogether since it can still offer 
insights into the kinship-like vision of the nation and its feelings of common descent. 
Extreme instrumentalism has been discarded for its determinist reductionism (its exclusive 
focus on political leaders). Yet, the role of the intellectuals and the intelligentsia is crucial in 
the study of all nationalism. The latter's use of local culture, symbols and values, as well as 
their attempt to delimit the boundaries of the national community through the use of these 
materials is central to my research. In other words, the focus is on the construction of 
boundaries which separate communities, as well as on these boundaries’ relationship with 
their content (that is, the culture which they enclose). Hence, transactionalism is the most 
useful of the three broad approaches. In order to avoid falling into a reductionist form of 
transactionalism which would focus merely on ethnic borders, we have to integrate 
transactionalism with symbolic (or ethno-symbolic) approaches. The latter are necessary to 
explain the central role of values, symbols and cultural markers in the construction of national 
identities.
Since the role of the state in both nationality formation and political violence has been 
chosen as a second independent variable -the first is cultural fragmentation/ assimilation- 
theories focussing on the role of the state have been also considered. Their application has 
been intermingled with transactionalist interpretations, since the state is perceived as the main 
element of opposition to the national community. We must remember that borders and 
opposition are at the core of transactional theories. The state works as an external referent and 
is in itself a symbol of the denial of ethnic identity. Hence, the result of state action is seen as
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essential in reinforcing ethnic borders, while attempting to destroy ethnic contents. More 
generic homeostatic and cause-effect models are an intrinsic part of this focus. Finally, the 
conceptualization of cultural, political and military nationalism as distinctive phenomena has 
been useful in relation to the presence or absence of a rich regional culture, especially as 
expressed through language.
The rest of the thesis is divided into two parts. A first historical part (chapters 2-6) will 
focus on the role of the nationalist intellectuals in Euskadi and Catalonia and on the way they 
created a national vision through the use of ethnic material and symbols. In the second part 
(chapters 7-9), the focus will be on the concept of core values, the consequence of massive 
immigration and the role played by violence in the construction of the national community.
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Chapter 2
FROM THE FOUNDATION OF CATALAN 
NATIONALISM TO THE CIVIL WAR
In this chapter, we shall tackle the issue of when Catalonia began to be defined as a nation 
in the modem sense, that is, when Catalan nationalism arose. We shall see that this 
development was slow and many early Catalanists were often at pains to stress their 
Spanishness. Initially, Catalanness began to configure itself in the form of a distinct vision of 
the world, set of customs and laws. This vaguely defined identity began by attributing to a 
different mentality the existing economic gap between Madrid and Barcelona. Hence, at the 
beginning, Catalan identity was not a clearly defined notion and several cultural revivalists 
wrote in Spanish. Only gradually, did some consensus begin to emerge around the centrality 
of culture and, within the latter, of language.
Catalonia had an imperial past when the Mediterranean possession of the confederal Crown 
of Aragon extended as far as Southern Italy and Athens. After a period of decline, its 
autonomy within the kingdom of Spain was brought to an end by Felipe V (1716). A Royal 
Decree (Nueva Planta) banned most Catalan institutions, laws and customs, including the 
language, and imposed an uniform centralized administration. Although the local institutions 
were slowly eroded, the country underwent economic recovery. As a consequence, the gap 
between the region and the rest of the peninsula increased, possibly contributing to inspire 
the forthcoming regionalist movement. The establishment of the steam-powered Bonaplata 
mill in Barcelona in 1832 is commonly taken to be the beginning of Catalan contemporary 
industry.53 Catalonia became "the one Mediterranean exception to the tendency of early
53 However, its prodromes date back to the early Eighteenth-century (calico-printing was 
inaugurated in 1728), and in the 1770s-80s cotton production expanded to unprecedented 
levels. But this industry eclipsed suddenly and totally in the first decade of the Nineteenth- 
century (Thomson 1992).
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industrialization to be concentrated in Northern Europe" (Thomson 1992).54
On the pretext of a dynastic dispute, the First Carlist Wars erupted in 1833. The Carlists 
were supporters of Don Carlos Ma Isidro, the legitimate heir to the throne.55 However, 
behind this loomed more deeply rooted reasons: Catholic traditionalists, defenders of local 
charters, and proto-regionalists fought on the Carlist side. The latter were defeated after a 
bloody civil war and Isabel II (1830-1904) was elected Queen of Spain. The defeat of 
Carlism (1839) prompted the introduction of social and economic reforms, the disentailment 
of ecclesiastical properties, the suppression of guilds (gremis), and freedom of commerce. 
These measures favoured Catalan textile industries, but the repression of Catalan institutions 
continued.5**
A military pronunciamiento (an officers revolt) overthrew Isabella II in 1868 and led to the 
installment of the First Spanish Republic (1873-1874), which assumed an overtly federal 
arrangement (Hennessy 1962). Nowhere else were Republican ideas so welcome as in 
Catalonia, where there were sincere expectations for a reversal of over a century of 
centralism. But the enthusiasm for autonomy and federalism spread too quickly, running out 
of control. In many cities, particularly in the South, several cantons declared independence 
from Madrid. In 1874, the Republic fell after another pronunciamiento, preparing the way 
for Queen Regent Maria Christina's (r. 1885-1902) ascension to the throne. In the 
meanwhile, the Carlists attempted another popular rebellion: a Second Carlist War (1872 - 
1876) erupted more than 30 years after the first one, but was mostly confined to the Basque 
provinces. As we shall see in the next chapter, its end meant the demise of traditional Basque 
liberties.
According to some local historians, Catalanism was generated by the confluence of four 
distinct strains: cultural revival, traditionalist Carlism, Republican federalism, and industrial 
protectionism.57 The first of these forces is of particular concern to the present thesis.
54 Thom son maintains that s ta te  support w as essen tia l to the take-off of the cotton 
industry .
55 Fernando VII (who ruled until 1833) wanted to be succeeded by his only daughter, Isabel, 
but succession in the Bourbon family could only pass through the male line. Don Carlos Marla 
Isidro, Fernando Vll's younger brother, was supported by the Church and the traditionalists. His 
rival and niece Isabel was supported by the army, the liberals and foreign powers, France and 
Britain.
56 In 1834, Catalan tribunals were abolished. In 1837, coinage w as suppressed. In 1845, 
Madrid decided to abolish the cadastre, a  financial agreem ent designed to compound the last 
remaining taxes.
57 This is the opinion of both the nationalist historian Jes tis  Pab6n (1952) and the federalist 
Rovira i Virgili (1930, 1982). However, V icens Vives (1958) d isa g re e s  with this 
interpretation, reminding us that a  sen se  of grievance and consciousness -which he calls 
provincialisme - already existed before these four factors reached their peak. See also Simon 
(1993).
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Hence, we shall describe it in the next section.58
The Renaixenqa (1840s-1870s)
The cultural movement of the Renaixenqa (=Renaissance) provided an ideal basis for the 
subsequent spread of nationalism. Its beginnings as a literary movement during the 1830s 
and 1840s were slow, and, at the start, it seemed nothing more than a local expression of 
regionalist pride. The publication in 1833 of the poem La P&tria (=The Fatherland) by 
Bonaventura-Carles Aribau (1798-1862) is generally identified as the first literary document 
of the Renaixenqa. However, this is more myth than history.59 Much more crucial to the 
Catalan revival was the work of the poet Joaquim Rubid i Qrs (1818-1899) who, under the 
pseudonym of Lo Gayter de Llobregat, published several poems in Catalan. The verses 
were collected in the anthology Poesies (=Poems, 1841). In its preface, he mentioned for 
the first time the idea of recovering Catalonia's distinct stature.60 Since his call had a vast 
response, it was rightly considered as the manifesto of the Renaixenqa. From that moment 
onward, modem Catalan literature began to develop until its outstanding epic, lyric and 
dramatic poets became the vanguard of Spanish culture at the turn of the century. Before 
Rubid, men of letters considered Catalan no more than a dialect of Occitan, and Arib&u 
himself called it llemost.61
The Renaixenqa was not an exclusively bourgeoise phenomenon, as some authors imply 
(i.e., Vilar 1977).62 Indeed, the Catalan bourgeoisie was enthusiastically pro-Spanish in the 
1830s (Fontana 1988: 49-50). Moreover, the Renaixenqa was not simply a version of 
Romanticism (as with the case of Provengal Felibridge), since it kept on producing new
58 On pre-modern Catalan 'national' consciousness, see  Simon (1993).
59 Apparently, Aribau himself w as not interested in political Catalanism and was surprised 
by the success of his composition, which he wrote as  a  hom age for his employer's birthday. 
Both he and his boss were Catalan expatriates working in a  Madrid's bank (Miquel i Vergds 
1944).
60 As a  starting point for the association between political and cultural nationalism, Rubid 
announced Catalan literary independence, asserting that Spain is no longer 'our Fatherland'.
61 The word w as originally designed to describe the llengua d'oc (Occitan, including 
Provengal), since the most famous troubadors cam e from Limoges, north of Toulouse (Sanchis 
Guarner 1972: 23-4). Provengal literature exerted a  strong influence on all nearby Romance 
literatures, but particularly on the Catalan one and Catalan poetry w as often written in 
Provengal. However, Provengal was never used in prose. All kinds of treaties, laws, novels, 
holy books, etc., were already written in Catalan by the XIII century. The term llem osf was 
indeed used to differentiate from the latter the poetic works written by Catalan authors using 
the language of the troubadors (Sanchis Guarner 1972: 23).
62 Its initial impetus w as elitist. The first representatives of the R enaixenqa  considered 
poetry just a s  an intellectual exercise, and did not feel particularly compelled to reach the 
wider public (Sanchis i Guarner 1972: 177).
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forms of literature once the latter faded away (Balcells 1983: 41-2). The Joes Florals (Floral 
Games), ancient poetry contests and history pageants from the XTV century, were revived in 
1859 under the initiative of a group of poets, historians and literati (Joan Cortada, Victor 
Balaguer, Joaquim Rubid i Ors, Manuel Milk i Fontanals, Antoni de Bofarull) with the aim of 
re-establishing the prestige of Catalan.63 They succeeded in getting the sponsorship of 
Barcelona's Ajuntament (municipality), in whose building the first Joes Florals were 
celebrated, providing a unique stimulus for the great poets of the Renaixenga 
In contrast with the lethargy of other Spanish regions, a musical, artistic, literary and 
political wave of creativity swept every sector of society. The Renaixenga touched all fields 
of humanities: poetry, theatre, architecture, painting, sculpture, philosophy, and spread all 
over the Catalan-speaking regions, from the Balearic Islands to the French Roussillon, from 
Valencia to the Sardinian port of Alguer.65 Theatre blossomed, although at the beginning 
only in Castilian. In the realm of philosophy, Ramon Martf d' Eixalk (1808-1857) and 
Francesc-Xavier Llorens i Barba (1820-1872) introduced German idealism and the Scottish 
Philosophy of Common Sense (Batista i Roca 1959). Relying heavily on Herder, Llorens 
affirmed that every people has a national spirit (Volksgeist), which is reflected in all its 
cultural manifestations, including philosophy (Llobera 1983).66 Llorens was an influential 
thinker also in the rest of Spain: amongst his disciples were Torras i Bages, Prat de la Riba 
and Mendndez y Pelayo (Bilbeny 1988: 60), the two former of whom we shall consider later.
The Renaixenga was initially centered in Barcelona, but slowly spread to other towns and 
villages. According to Fradera (1990, 1992), the middle to upper echelons of rural society 
were keen to participate in the revival inasmuch as it suited their own ends. The rural 
intelligentsia reviled urbanization, sensing the threat it posed to their traditional lifestyles and 
customs. Nationalism provided an ideal vehicle with which to voice these apprehensions. As 
bourgeois nationalism was gaining ground in Barcelona, it tried to forge an alliance with the 
people living in its agricultural hinterland, the muntanyesos. The latter warmly embraced the
63 The original Joes Florals were a literary competition held in Provengal at Toulouse 
from 1324 onwards. The Catalan attendance at those functions w as so  g reat that the 
Consistori de la Gaia Ci&ncia (=Poetry Committee) was transferred to Barcelona in 1393.
64 These kinds of poetic context can be found among most European stateless nations, where 
they often acquire a  political meaning. The most familiar ones for the British readers may be 
the Welsh eisteddfodau (see Morgan, in Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).
65 On the manifestations of the Renaixenga in Valencia, Roussillon and the Balearic Islands, 
see  Jorba et al. (1992).
66 A very cautious scholar, Llorens always spoke in the nam e of a  Spanish nation. 
Nevertheless, he was puzzled about the wide divergences between Barcelona and Madrid in the 
realm of philosophy, economy and culture (Fradera 1992).
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programme of the Renaixenga proposed by the urban bourgeoisie. Yet, they were 
determined to resist capitalist and urban encroachment. The muntanya (hill-side, 
countryside) was seen both as a base from which insurrection against the state could be 
mounted, as during the Carlist wars, and as the last bastion of rural values which were being 
inevitably crushed by urbanization. On the one hand, the Renaixenga offered these rural 
diehards a means of redemption by which they could boost their self-esteem, here and now. 
On the other hand, it embodied for the urban dwellers a nostalgic desire to recapture a pre- 
modem past. Though the two groups came from opposing standpoints, they nevertheless 
joined together in the creative celebration of the beauty of nationhood. The greatest Catalan 
poet of the time, the priest Jacint Verdaguer (1845-1902), spent much of his life in the 
countryside. Lamenting the loss of Catalan traditions and mores, he became "the person who 
best condensed these values...by accomplishing a complete synthesis between popular and 
high culture" (Fradera 1991: 63). But the driving force behind the movement remained firmly 
city-rooted: the Liberal politician, historiographer and journalist Victor Balaguer (1824-1901) 
was the first to popularize Catalan historical dramas and poetry. He began to write in 
Spanish, but from 1868 onward shifted to Catalan. A super-active man, skillful politician and 
'commercial' writer, he can well be defined as a 'modernizer'. Imbued with Romantic and 
historicist spirit, Balaguer made full use of the new print techniques, such as the popular 
feuilleton (in periodic installments), and took full advantage of the opening markets of his 
time (Fradera 1992).67
A respectable interpretation identifies the Renaixenga as a response to the disruption and 
violence brought about by modernization. This led to the disillusionment of a previously 
Liberal intelligentsia who turned to the past "as an escape route to avoid confronting the 
problems of modernity" (Fradera 1992). One of the key schemes of the movement was the 
historicist reconstruction of an idealized, especially Medieval, past.68 Of all the arts, poetry 
acted as the core of the Renaixenga, yet poetry was itself historicist and past-oriented. The 
success of the Renaixenga and the rich output which Catalan literature has produced ever 
since, constituted a solid base upon which political nationalism could draw its stable
67 This seem s to confirm A nderson's vision of the print revolution a s  a  driving force 
behind nationalism. The novel and the new spaper provided "the technical m eans for 're­
presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation" (1983: 30).
68 This was accompanied by a  drive to reach those areas of Catalonia where modernity had 
not yet claimed its toll. In this research resided the link between historiography and other 
intellectual endeavours: the past had to be rediscovered in the present. The result w as a 
selective exaltation of those elem ents of popular culture which more suited the aspirations of 
the dominant urban classes (Fradera 1992).
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legitimacy. Once established as a political movement, Catalanism had to rely on a pre-existing 
definition of Catalan identity. By then, this work had already been completed by the cultural 
revivalists which preceded the political nationalists.
On a parallel, and sometimes independent, track, a form of political nationalism emerged. 
Some scholars consider Cataluna y los catalanes, written in 1860 by Joan Cortada (1805- 
1868), the main promoter of the Floral Games, as the earliest statement of political 
nationalism. However, the scattered sentences contained therein were still too ambiguous and 
did not present an outright political programme.69 Still others see in Joan Bias i Vidal's 
(1819-1876) Cataluna en Espaha (1855) a prelude to political Catalanism, but the book did 
not envisage any separate political development for Catalonia.70 The publication in 1887 of 
El Regionalismo, a collection of articles by the influential journalist Joan Mane i Flaquer 
(1823-1901), put forward a tenuous plan for regional autonomy. Flaquer's quasi­
traditionalist leanings were based on a defence of local customs and laws, linking them with 
the interests of Catalan upper classes (Mane 1900). However, the paternity of political 
Catalanism must certainly be ascribed to Valenti Almirall, whose work we shall analyse in the 
next section.
Almirall and the Federalist tradition
The first explicit nationalist programme was formulated by Valenti Almirall (1841-1904) in 
his Lo Catalanisme published in 1886, which outlined the transition from regionalism to 
nationalism in a federalist framework. In contrast with the historicist and culturalist 
generation of the Renaixenga, Almirall can be defined as a 'modernizer1. One of his aims 
was to reconcile the traditionalist and the progressive strands within Catalanism, adding to 
them the ingredient of the defence of Catalan economic interests. Since the 1830s, Catalan 
industrialists had been unsuccessfully pressing for protective measures to shield their 
industries against foreign competition. As a failed hegemonic class, they represented a 
precious ally to the regionalist cause. Soon, some of them rallied in support of Catalanism 
providing conspicuous financial backing for both political and cultural initiatives. Prominent
69 Far from presenting a  nationalist programme, the book simply defined Catalonia a s  a 
homeland. C ortada recalled Catalonia's historical glories in order to dem onstrate that the 
C atalans "are different from other Spaniards". He stressed  that Spain 's historical, cultural, 
and economic cleavages made centralist attem pts far more difficult than in other European 
cases. However, he demanded that Catalan interests be accommodated within the Spanish state.
70 As the Castilian title indicates, there w as no concept of 'separating ' Catalonia from 
Spain. In his timid outline of the Catalan question, lllas i Vidal protested the abuse of Catalan 
interests by the Spanish state, proposing a  greater m easure of self-government and a  change of 
economic policy on a  reformist line. The protectionist lllas i Vidal was a  politician, lawyer and 
economist, who actively participated in the Joes Florals.
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Catalan industrialists acted often as patrons, financing art production, literary festivals, 
theatres and opera. However, this class remained unconditionally pro-Spanish at heart 
(Fontana 1988).
Almirall singled out the outstanding aspects of the Catalan character and mentality, and 
language began to move to the centre of the stage, although as one among other means of 
defining national identity. As we previously mentioned, political regionalism was the fruit of 
the fusion of four currents: the cultural revivalists, the progressive federalists, the anti- 
Bourbon traditionalists and the representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie. The first alliance 
between Romantic literati, conservative lawyers and protectionist industrialists was created 
under the aegis of Almirall. Which factors triggered this successful union? The lack of 
political power for industrialists, the absence of protective measures for the Spanish 
economy, and the threats to abolish the Catalan civil code, were probably the most immediate 
catalysts lying behind the formation of this first alliance. But underlying the whole process 
was the memory of the lost freedom of Catalonia and the desire to strengthen a renewed 
ethnic identity under the guidance of the cultural revival.
One of Almirall's most important achievements was the drafting of the Memorial de 
Greuges (=grievances) presented in 1885 to King Alfonso XII (Nadal et al. 1986). This 
"Memorial in the defence of the moral and material interests of Catalonia" was signed by a 
committee of businessmen, industrialists, intellectuals, professionals, artists, workers’ 
delegates and men of letters (such as Verdaguer and Guimerit). The Memorial was quickly 
forgotten after the King's death in that same year 1885. Yet, it was a milestone in the 
evolution of Catalan consciousness. Its two immediate achievements were the creation of a 
broad front representing most social sectors and interests, and an unprecedented attempt to 
enter the 'citadel of power' through a direct dialogue with Madrid (Peers 1937:130).
We have seen how, at the beginning, Catalanism was made up of a few poets, lawyers, 
local historians, and other intellectuals. We have also seen how their alliance with politicians 
came about. The trend towards the politicization of cultural Catalanism increased in the 
forthcoming years. Greatly concerned with linguistic normalization, Almirall set up the first 
daily newspaper in Catalan, Diari Catald (f. 1879). As organizer of the the First Catalanist 
Congress (1880), Almirall attempted to coalesce around his federalist principles a group of 
poets and historians (Figueres 1985). They were members of La Jove Catalunya (Young 
Catalonia), founded in 1870 by a group of literati.71 But this group of cultural revivalists
71 As indicated by the name, they were inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini and the Romantic
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was not particularly concerned with political activities, despite their name being reminiscent 
of Mazzinian principles. They were active in the organisation of the Joes Florals, but their 
conservatism barred them from espousing the progressive federalist principles which Almirall 
inherited from his Republican upbringing. Thus, Almirall’s first attempt to bring together 
political and cultural nationalists failed as a result of ideological cleavages. Yet, two main 
agreements emerged from the Congress: the drafting of a document in defence of the Catalan 
law and the foundation of a political organisation, the Centre Catald (1882). At a Second 
Catalanist Congress (1883) convened by the Centre Catald, political affiliation within 
Spanish parties by Catalans was condemned for the first time. Motions in favour of the 
Catalan law, the co-official status of Catalan (alongside Castilian), economic protectionism, 
and a central government for Catalonia were also passed. With these initiatives, political 
Catalanism was finally merged with cultural Catalanism.
Almirall was heir to the Republican tradition of Pi i Margall, who in his Les  
Nacionalidades (=The Nationalities, 1877) summed up his vision of a federal Spain based 
on both pragmatic and historical arguments. He foresaw greater possibilities of carrying out a 
separate programme for Catalonia in which federalism would be anchored to local traditions, 
rather than relying on 'abstract' rational and internationalist principles (Llorens i Vila 1993). 
This led him to break with Pi and the Spanish federalist party and found the Centre Catald. 
In turn, Almirall’s idealism soon clashed with the bourgeois interests and political 
conservatism prevailing in his group. A particular source of friction was his opposition to the 
Barcelona Universal Exhibition in 1888, which had the backing of virtually the entire Catalan 
establishment. This stance cost him the defection from the Centre Catalk of its most right- 
wing members, which formed a separate Lliga de Catalunya in 1887.
From the Lliga de Catalunya to 1898
Since the Restoration of the Monarchy (1874), Spain had been dominated by two parties, 
the Conservatives and the Liberals, who alternated in power through a complex rotation 
system based on political corruption. Key regional issues were fought in this all-Spanish 
framework. Only from the early 1890s a new political option started to gain ground in 
Catalonia - and afterwards in Vizcaya. The decision adopted by the Second Catalanist 
Congress to condemn political affiliation within Spanish parties was crucial to this
aw akening of European s ta te le ss  nations, in particular by Italian, G erm an and Irish
nationalisms.
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development. A new possibility of political allegiance outside the two main Alfonsist parties 
(and outside Carlism) began to emerge only with Catalan regionalism. In its early stages, the 
regionalist movement did not aim at separation from Spain. On the contrary, it wished to 
influence Madrid's political choices by intervening in central Spanish affairs. The Catalan 
bourgeoisie's efforts to secure a hegemonic position within the Spanish state, were thwarted 
by the latter's incapacity for self-modernization due to the predominance in its ranks of a 
centralist landowning oligarchy permeated with Jacobin ideals. The rightist split from the 
Centre Catalk which led to the formation of the Lliga de Catalunya, was once again guided by 
literary men, although they clearly represented vested interests: the Lliga was founded by the 
playwright Angel Guimerit (1845-1924) and the lawyer Joan Permanyer (1848-1919). At the 
beginning, it appeared as a revival of conservative and 'floralesque' regionalism. Soon they 
were joined by the young students of the Centre Escolar Catalanista, founded about one year 
before, among whom was Enric Prat de la Riba. Under the leadership of the Modernist 
architect Llufs Dom&nech i Montaner (1850-1923), the Lliga become the protagonist of the 
regional scene. Dom&nech i Montaner was one of the chief planners and builders of the 
Barcelona Universal Exposition of 1888, which had been opposed by Almirall. As with other 
nationalist movements, Catalanism was made up of planners and artists. The planners 
(intelligentsia) needed an infrastructure (the state) in order to achieve their aims. The artists 
provided both the emotional inspiration and the framework of ideas for the nationalist goal.
The first salient act engineered by the Lliga was a successful campaign for the defence of 
the Catalan Civil Code, which in 1889 Madrid attempted to stamp out in order to unify legal 
procedures. In the meanwhile, Almirall's Centre Catalk became isolated from mainstream 
politics and, finally, was dissolved (1890 ca.). The fissiparous trends and recurrent schisms 
besetting incipient Catalanism gave rise to a general awareness of the need to create a more 
broadly encompassing body. Hence, the Unio Catalanista was founded in 1891 as the first 
coalition to reunite the whole gamut of groups with the aim of propagating regionalist and 
federalist ideals (Llorens i Vila l993, Riquer 1977: 48). Their delegates assembled in 1892 at 
Manresa, a town north of Barcelona, drawing up a seminal document known as the Bases 
de Manresa. Its programme -much more radical than the Memorial de Greuges- included 
among other points: political autonomy, the replacement of the artificially imposed provinces 
with more 'natural' comarques and municipis (town councils), the reservation of public 
appointments for Catalonians (by virtue of either birth or 'naturalization'), and Catalan as the 
only official language (Termes and Colomines 1992). The powers attributed to Catalonia
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should encompass taxation, coinage, legislative and executive authority, civil, penal and 
mercantile legislation, specific Catalan units for the army, a regional police force, and control 
of education by the municipi or the comarcaP2 These proposals, albeit ambitious, 
represented the first basic agreement on political terms among Catalanist forces and a stable 
basis upon which slow progress in the attainment of regional consensus was later made 
possible in a more uniform way. However, the Bases of Manresa had a limited popular 
impact and, hence, achieved their unitary aims only at an elite level.
In 1897 an international dimension was added to the conflict when the Uni6 Catalanista 
sent to King George I of the Hellenes a message of sympathy for the Cretans in their struggle 
against Turkish rule. But Madrid could not tolerate an external involvement of Catalanism 
and its response was brutal: a wave of repression struck Catalonia, with closure of 
newspapers, proscription of meetings, a thorough search of houses, closing down of clubs 
and societies, arrest of leaders (Riquer 1979: 22). The occupation of Catalonia was not lifted 
until 1901, when free elections were allowed and for the first time the Catalanists gained the 
poll (Riquer 1979: 46). In a typical pattern, repressive measures only reinforced the 
popularity of the persecuted leaders.
Barcelona fin  de siecle: a flourishing cultural life.
In the 1870s, Catalan literature entered a stage of maturity. Its foremost representatives 
were the dramatist Angel Guimera, the poet Mossen Jacint Verdaguer, and the Realist prose 
writer Narcis Oiler (1846-1930), the founder of the modem Catalan novel.73 The period 
from about 1882 to 1906 is known in Catalonia as ModernismeP4 It began with the lyrics 
of Joan Maragall (1860-1911) and his articles in the journal L'Aveng (=Progress).75 The 
latter journal (1881-4 and 1889-93) contributed to the translation and dissemination of 
European artists and thinkers, but its role in the development of Catalan nationalism is 
particularly tied to a campaign for the creation of a unified Catalan orthography, which, as we
72 Com arca  (pi. com arques) is a traditional unit that stands betw een the municipality and 
the province.
73 Verdaguer's main su ccess  was the great epic poem, L ’ Atlantida (1876), but the spirit 
of the epoch w as more fully reflected in his other poem Canigd (1886).
74 The movement received different nam es in different countries: Art Nouveau, Liberty,
Modern Style, Jugendstil, Sezessionstil, etc. Its origins lie in the English A e s th e tic  
M ovem ent of the 1870s, generally accepted as a prelude to the Parisian Art Nouveau. Catalan 
architects were at the forefront of the movement already in the 1880s, culminating in the 
1900 Paris Expo. As an outstanding symbol of the movement, the cafe'-cabaret Els Quatre 
Gats, a  work of Puig i Cadafalch immortalized in a  P icasso 's painting, becam e a  centre for
tertulies (informal and friendly talks) for artists and intellectuals a t the turn of the century.
75 Not to be confused with the present-day historical monthly L'Aveng, founded in 1977.
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shall see, only succeeded some decades later, thanks to the work of the linguist Pompeu 
Fabra. The term modernisme was probably coined in 1884 in an article published in 
L'Aveng, where it was used as a synonym of 'modem' and of the will to receive 
'cosmopolitan' influences. Modernism was a reaction against the conservative Romanticism 
of the Renaixenga , and a scramble for all things new and 'modem'.76 Modernist 
intellectuals were "Almirall's heirs insofar as they attempted to justify Catalanism not in 
nostalgic or historicist terms..., but as a vehicle of progress and a way to see this progress as 
a regenerating factor for the Catalan collectivity" (Termes and Colomines 1992: 79).
Through Modernism, a new brand of intellectuals entered into Catalanist politics. They had 
previously remained aloof because they did not share the conservative tone of the 
Renaixenga. Modernism succeeded in incorporating into Catalanism variegated groups such 
as Esperantists, naturists, occultists, Theosophists, rural teachers, employees, theatre-goers, 
members of moral centres and parish churches, small traders and shopkeepers (Castellanos 
1986: 30).77 Of all the arts, Modernism excelled in architecture.78 The years between 1880 
and 1906 were a period of great urban renewal. A Modernista desire for novelty, 
universality, and openness towards Europe was widespread among other artists, in particular 
writers (Cacho Viu 1984: ix). Such xenophile desire was not always contradictory to political 
Catalanism, and was indeed an antidote to Spanishness.
In the field of music, the Republican Antoni Clav6 (1824-1874) laid the foundations of the 
choral Masses and Orfeons choirs, devoted to the diffusion of both classical and Catalan 
traditional music amongst the working class.7  ^ Felip Pedrell (1841-1922) undertook the
76 As a  paradox common to many nationalist movements, Modernism, which aimed at the 
creation of a national art, brought about a  cosmopolitan art which w as the polar opposite of its 
original aims (Castellanos 1986).
77 A m easure of Modernism's popularity is given by its survival in a  plethora of local 
dom ains well after its intellectual dem ise: small town opinion leaders and  local writers 
assum ed the messianic overtones of Modernism and, "thanks to it, they found a  new place and a 
s e n se  of life in the world" (C astellanos 1986: 32-2). On m odernism 's relationship with 
messianism and myths, see  McCarthy (1975).
78 In 1878, Domdnech i Montaner published "In Search of a  National Architecture" (E n  
busca d' una arquitectura nacional), inaugurating a  movement which later produced the great 
m asterpieces of Antoni Gaud! (1852-1926), Jo sep  Puig i Cadafalch (1867-1957) and others. In 
architecture, the group is also known as the nova escola catalana (new Catalan school) (Rohrer 
1984). Although, ideologically, Gaudf w as a Catholic integralist, that is, an anti-modernist, 
esthetically he was the main representative of Modernist architecture (Mackay 1985).
7 ® The effort was system atized by Llufs Millet (1867-1941): in 1891 Millet created the 
Orfed Catalk  mixed choirs, which would provide an ideal milieu for C atalanist assertion 
throughout the years (Vinyes 1990, Renart 1992). Jo an  Maragall com posed El cant de la 
senyera  (Song of the Catalan flag) as the Orfeo's hymn, with music of Llufs Millet. The choir's 
popularity persists till the present-day (Poblet 1973). In chapter 5, we shall mention the role 
of choral and other amateurish societies in promoting Catalan resistance under Francoism.
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systematization of musicological studies, propounding the reform of religious music and the 
creation of a national opera. The theatre and concert hall Liceu (Lyceum), founded in 1837, 
became the paradigmatic cultural institution of the Catalan elites (McDonogh 1986: 188- 
ff.).88 Vicens Vives described its creation in the following terms: "The Catalan bourgeoisie 
of the industrial revolution needed an institution which could serve as a weapon to propagate 
its hegemony. Deprived of a Court and without rooted social traditions, the bourgeoisie 
intuitively forged the organ which expressed its arrogance, focussing on the only root of 
spirituality still existing after the crisis of values of the turn of the century: the love for 
philharmonic art" (1958: 136).
Cultural life flourished at all levels of society, and cultural associations blossomed in every 
environment. Among the most important were the athenaei or academies (ateneus). The 
original athenaeum was a "scientific and literary association dedicated to elevate the 
intellectual level of its associates through discussions, conferences, courses and lectures" 
(Alegret 1977: 318).81 Not all of them were popularly oriented, but the majority of their 
customers were artisans and day labourers (jornaleros). They were sustained mostly by their 
members' fees, although some of them received substantial contributions from generous 
patrons and philanthropists. Some were educational, others were devoted to music, 
especially choirs, still others to tourist excursions (Solk 1978: 39-44). Between 1860 and 
1910 the "people's academies" (ateneus populars) aimed at diffusing literacy and modem 
knowledge among the workers (Pi i Sunyer 1971, Solk 1978: 39-ff.). At the beginning of the 
century, Anarchist and Marxist groups too, organized their own centres, under the "cover" of 
cultural activities (Solzt 1978: 39-44). This widespread associacionisme was often strictly 
linked to Catalanism (Llorens i Vila 1992). The link between excursions and politics dates 
back to the last century. For instance, Jaume Masso' Torrents (1863-1943) was at the same 
time a co-founder of L'Aveng in 1881 and a co-founder of the Centre Excursionista de 
Catalunya (=Catalan Touring Club) in 1891, which aimed to encourage Catalan national 
consciousness.82 Jacint Verdaguer's poetry too was inspired by his solitary walks in the
80 "After using an expropriated convent for its first performances, the group m ade plans 
for a  permanent building on the Ramblas. The building was begun in 1844 and finished in 1847. 
This triennium also w itnessed such economic m ilestones a s  the foundation of the Bank of 
Barcelona (1844), the Barcelona Saving and Loan (1844), and the giant textile firm La Espafia 
Industrial (1845)" (McDonogh 1986: 189).
81 They were first born in France (Athen6e de Paris, 1785, Athende des Arts, 1792) and 
in England ( The Atheneum, 1824) a s  part of the Enlightenm ent' s  program to diffuse 
universally the fruits of reason and science. In 1820 the Ateneo Cientffico y  Literario was 
founded in Madrid (Sol& 1978: 40).
82 See his Croquis Pirenencs (=Pyrenean Sketches), Barcelona: L'Aveng, 1896.
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wilderness of the Pyrenees from 1875 to 1878.83
Catalan nationalism has been an underlying force beneath much of the contemporary avant- 
garde movement (Kaplan 1992). During the 1910s, Pablo Picasso’ s (1881-1973) cubist 
period was influenced by international anarchism as it blended with Catalan nationalism and 
the symbolist movement in Barcelona. But around this date modernism was already being 
replaced by a new artistic and intellectual trend, which will be dealt with after the next three 
chapters.
The crisis of 1898 and the rise of conservative nationalism
In 1898, Spain lost Cuba, the last of its overseas colonies in the Americas. Its loss 
represented the final expiry of the empire and, hence, the symbolic demise of a powerful and 
respected Spain. The interests of Catalonia were particularly at stake, since 60 per cent of its 
export went to the island. On this occasion, the Catalans became the most staunch defenders 
of the empire.84 However, "for most people in Spain the key issues were neither social nor 
economic, but the patriotic and emotional appeal of sustaining the Spanish flag" (Payne 1973: 
2: 510). Nearly a quarter of a million troops were sent to Cuba to face one of the first modem 
guerrilla warfares. The Spanish army inflicted enormous suffering on local people, who also 
had to confront the atrocities of both the guerrillas and the local espaholistas. An un­
compromising line prevailed on the mainland, together with tough support for unbridled 
repression. But soon after the United States was dragged into the conflict, Spain had to 
surrender and lost not only Cuba but also the Philippines, Puerto Rico and the Lesser Pacific 
islands. That was the end of the Spanish empire, which was left with a few African 
possessions.
This defeat represented one of the major traumas in modem Spanish history, the 
psychological impact of which indelibly marked its intelligentsia. The loss of empire 
provided the name for a whole generation of intellectuals, the Generation o f 98, who joined 
in a wide intellectual and political current named Regeneracionismo (Regenerationism), that 
is, calling for the 'regeneration' of Spain. The Catalan response to this generalized Spanish 
malaise was couched in regionalist terms: Catalanism was part of the Regenerationist
83 This inspiration is manifested in Verdaguer's Canigd  (from the nam e of a  peak in the 
Pyrenees), dedicated to the C atalans of France. Recounting a  medieval legend se t in the 
Roussillon, the novel recalled the historical links that spanned the frontier and called for a 
unified Catalonia.
84 The Lliga de Catalunya w as especially worried about the prospects that autonomy would 
allow the opening-up of ’their' Cuban market to American products. When Spain surrendered 
Cuba, there was an explosion of protest in Catalonia.
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movement, but, in Catalan eyes, the Cuban defeat appeared as the foreseeable outcome of 
years of faulty centralism by a putrescent corrupt administration.
For a short while it seemed that Catalan aspirations could find a sympathetic echo among a 
few progressive Spanish politicians. In particular, General Camilo Garcia de Polavieja 
(1838-1914) proposed the unification of the four Catalan provinces under a single 
administration, autonomy for the university, the compounding of taxation, a municipal 
reorganization and respect for the Catalan civil law. Hence, many Catalanists joined the 
Polaviejista party. This led to a split in the Uni6 Catalanista: in opposition to the 
Polaviejistas, a group led by Enric Prat de la Riba founded the Centre National Catald in 
1899, which performed badly at the polls. However, in 1901 Prat's group allied again with 
the Polaviejistas, obtaining a sweeping triumph in the general elections. Immediately after 
this largely unexpected outcome, they declared their permanent union under the name of 
Lliga Regionalista. This was the first fully-fledged Catalanist political party and it was 
destined to dominate Catalanist politics until the Republic of 1931. The moderate Lliga, 
hostile to political radicalism in any form, was dominated by industrialist leaders, notably the 
self-made millionaire Francesc Cambd (1876-1947). In the municipal elections, Camb6 was 
elected and entered Barcelona city politics.
The Church was soon dragged into the movement for the rediscovery of the Catalan 
personality. After the disappearance of L'Aveng (1893) and the eclipse of Modernism, 
conservative Catalanism re-emerged, finding its foremost representative in Josep Torras i 
Bages (1846-1916), who later became Bishop of Vic. Torras i Bages published in 1892 one 
of the key texts of Catalanism, La tradicio catalana. The work, inspired by the Catholic 
apologist and neo-Thomist Jaume Balmes (1810-1848), stressed the Christian origins of 
Catalonia in the Middle Ages, so that the Catalan 'spirit' and Catholicism were seen as 
inseparable dimensions. However, religion never played a central role in Catalan nationalism. 
We have to bear in mind that the first stirrings of Catalanism were uttered in the secular idiom 
of Almirall. Furthermore, Almirall's progressive attitude was at the root of the right-wing 
split which brought about the foundation of the Lliga de Catalunya, but, despite its 
conservatism, the latter could not drop altogether its secular ideological baggage. Likewise, 
its successor party, the Lliga Regionalista "had no specific religious character or platform, 
and did not need one" (Lannon 1987: 140). It never presented itself as a Catholic party, nor 
was the defence of religion an essential aspect of its programme. Although much of the
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electorate was conservative and religious, religion was considered as an established fact 
unnecessary to stress (Molas 1972: 1: 163). Catholicism remained in the background, more 
as the creed of individual Catalanist leaders. In sharp contrast with Basque nationalism, 
religion could not be used in Catalonia as an oppositional factor vis-d-vis Castile. Bages' 
work represented a belated attempt by the Church to 'Christianize' a movement which was 
bom under the mark of secularism. Until then, the Church had been an ally of Carlism, but 
as soon as it was evident that ever larger numbers of Carlists were turning to Catalanism, the 
Church had to change tactics. The immersion in a secular environment gave Catalan 
Catholicism a particular flavour. A characteristic of Catalonia became "the active presence 
...of an enlightened and tolerant Catholicism. Its Catalanist orientation forced it to 
compromise itself in a public project of national revival, which is certainly Christian at its 
root, but without a confessional or exclusivist character" (Cacho Viu, cited by Massot 1986: 
182). In chapter 7, we shall explain why language, rather than religion, became the hallmark 
of Catalan nationalism.
From Solidaritat Catalana to Lerroux's populism: the failure of popular
regionalism
The Lliga proved victorious once again in the 1905 municipal elections. The "Victory 
Banquet" organized by the party provided the occasion for a caricature published in the 
satirical Catalan magazine Cu-Cut\ The anti-militarist tradition of Catalan nationalism was 
only rivalled by the Anarchists' one. This innocuous illustration was sufficient to exacerbate 
the easily aroused sensibility of the Army. Hundreds of officers and cadets assaulted and 
seized both Cu-Cutl and the Lliga's organ, La Veu de Catalunya. But the authorities, rather 
than punishing the authors of the misdeed, pitilessly attacked the victims: the editor of the 
Veu was jailed and the publication of Cu-cut was suspended. Madrid's government was 
beset by one crisis after another and three ministries fell in a few days over this insignificant 
cartoon. In 1906, the Prime Minister Segismundo Moret (1838-1913) introduced in the 
Cortes (=Congress) a "Law of Jurisdictions", by virtue of which offences against the Army 
and national symbols (such as the flag, the name, or the anthem) were punishable by civil 
tribunals.85 With the closing down of the newspapers infringing the law, the legislative 
measure provoked an uproar in all avenues of Catalan society. Progressives and 
conservatives, Left and Right, immigrants and natives, regionalists and former centralists 
came together in protest. Nearly all Catalan parties joined in a coalition named Solidaritat
85 This law, which was aimed principally at Catalonia, was upheld until the Second Republic.
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Catalana.86 More than 200,000 demonstrators assembled in Barcelona in May, probably 
the greatest mass political event seen in the city up until that time. At a similar meeting in 
October, protesters stood in a defiant silence waving thousands of handkerchiefs.
At the 1907 elections Solidaritat's victory was sweeping: it gained 41 out of the 44 
deputies to be returned to the Cortes for the constituency of Catalonia (in Barcelona it won 
all of them). Solidaritat Catalana represents a nearly mythical event for Catalan 
historiography. It is often depicted as the culminating moment when all sectors of Catalan 
society were united as a single entity of soul and action and the 'imagined community' 
became embodied in a tangible reality. Joan Maragall described the movement as "the living 
affirmation of the existence of Catalonia as a self-conscious collectivity".87 Solidaritat's 
success was ephemeral and could not withstand the rapid changes of mood in the anarchoid 
Barcelona of the first decade of the century. When Solidaritat was defeated at Barcelona's 
parliamentary by-elections of 1908, the Republicans abandoned the coalition. This created a 
favourable environment for the affirmation of their pro-centralist rivals, Lerroux's Radicals, 
who won the March 1909 municipal elections. The demagogue Alejandro Lerroux (1864- 
1949) is one of the most emblematic figures of modem Catalan history. His blend of anti­
clerical Republicanism and 'proletarian' anti-Catalanism, coloured with populist vehemence, 
won him the quick support of large chunks of the Catalan under-classes (Alvarez Junco 
1990, Culla 1987). Lerroux's rhetoric struck a sensitive chord among immigrants, who 
found it difficult to identify with the host society at a time when an intolerant bourgeoise 
scorned any concessions to the working class. The movement, known in Catalan 
historiography as lerrouxisme, sounded an alarm bell for Catalan elites, making them realize 
that the bourgeois character of much Catalanism had produced a fracture within society and 
was incapable of integrating the newcomers. The experience was instrumental in bringing 
about the subsequent formation of a Catalan Republican left. This, in turn, created increasing 
political fragmentation. However, more than before, cultural nationalism functioned as an 
unitary reference for all Catalanists, beyond party partisanship.
Since Catalonia was the first region of Spain to undergo extensive industrialization, it was 
also the first one to experience the explosion of social conflicts and the advent of working 
class politics. As military conscription extended its grip in response to a Moorish revolt in
86 Only the Radical Republicans headed by Alejandro Lerroux did not participate in the 
platform.
87 In his Obres Completes (Maragall 1960), cited by Peers (1937: 150).
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Morocco, the Anarchists and the Syndicalists declared a general strike in 1909.88 Martial 
law was imposed, but a revolt of huge proportion suddenly broke out, with bombs, 
widespread murders, barricades, blowing up of bridges, desecration of tombs, random 
killing of clergy, burning of churches and monasteries.89 This event became historically 
known as the Semana Tragica (Tragic Week): five days of shootings, looting and savage 
destruction which have left an ineffaceable mark in the memory of many Catalans. It also 
acted as a perpetual warning of the dangerous threat posed to social stability by radical 
extremism. Once the Army, the Civil Guard and the police reestablished control over the city, 
the head of the Spanish Conservative government, Antonio Maura (1853-1925), could not 
avoid addressing the Catalan question. He drew up a plan which included the creation of 
Mancomunidades, administrative bodies closer to the historical reality of each region to be 
given superior powers to the provinces they encompassed.9® Maura's plan provided the first 
practical opportunity to bring about a minimal degree of self-government after so many years 
of failed aspirations. Such an opportunity had to be used to the maximum, since it would not 
easily return. The man who charged himself with this historical mission was Enric Prat de la 
Riba.
Catalanism1 mature age, Prat and the Mancomunitat (1914-1917)
The final transposition from regionalism into a fully-fledged nationalism was the work of 
Enric Prat de la Riba (1870-1917). Already in his 'Catechism' of 1894, we find a clear 
separation between the two concepts of state and nation: Catalonia is the fatherland of the 
Catalans, while Spain is merely a state (Prat 1894). Prat formulated this vision in much 
deeper terms in a seminal collection of lectures and articles published in 1906 as La 
nacionalitat catalana (Prat 1978). This remains the key text for the study of Catalan 
nationalism up to the present day. However, the moderate strand remained: whilst Almirall 
talked about federation rather than independence, likewise Prat avoided any reference to 
separatism. Yet, Prat de la Riba adopted a more radical stance vis-d-vis Madrid, while
88 In a  country still deeply traum atized by the Cuban tragedy, anti-militarism w as 
w idespread among all social classes. Hundreds of impaired and disabled war veterans still 
begging in the streets of Barcelona bore visible witness to past horrors and inspired average 
people with a visceral hatred for all wars (Josep Benet, personal suggestion).
89 T hese attacks on religious centres, peoples and symbols were part of a  pattern which 
w as often repeated until the end of the Civil War (Estivill and Barbat 1980, Alvarez Junco 
1990).
90 It w as the first time that a  prominent Spanish sta tesm an  seem ed  to m eet Catalan 
aspirations, although most Catalanists considered his proposals too weak. This precipitated a 
split within the Solidaritat alliance between Cam b6's Lliga supporting the plan and the Left 
opposing it.
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defending conservative interests on the social level. We shall discuss in chapter 7 the details 
of his organicist political vision.91 In 1907 he was elected President of the Barcelona's 
Diputacio (= Provincial Government). Prat's years were marked by intense activities in all 
realms of culture, politics and society. In 1906 the Estudis Universitaris Catalans was 
founded in order to provide University-level classes of Catalan history, law, language and 
literature. The greatest leap forward was achieved with the creation of the Institut d' Estudis 
Catalans (IEC) by the Diputacid of Barcelona in 1907. The Institute's task was the thorough 
investigation of all of the elements of Catalan culture. For this purpose it was divided into 
three main sections: Philology, Archeology-History and Science. In its Philological section, 
the linguist Pompeu Fabra (1868-1948) elaborated a wide programme of linguistic reforms 
which culminated in the creation of a unified standard language: the "Orthographic Norms" 
(Normes Ortogrdfiques) were published in 1913, followed by a "Catalan Grammar" in 1918 
and by a "General Dictionary of the Catalan Language" in 1932, all of them the work of 
Pompeu Fabra. This work contributed to turning Catalan into the vivid expression of an 
increasingly rich and articulate contemporary culture. The importance of this for my thesis 
will be underlined in chapter 7. The lively and affluent character of Catalan civil society 
allowed for the spread of a Catalan high culture through a plethora of intermediate bodies. 
The National Library (Biblioteca Nacional de Catalunya), with its network of smaller 
popular libraries, has been a centre of Catalan culture ever since the 1910s.92
In 1911, the idea of uniting the four provinces of Catalonia under a single administrative 
umbrella began to take shape, and accordingly Prat presented his proposal to Jos6 Canalejas 
(1854-1912), then Prime Minister of Spain. He agreed to it along with the leaders of most of 
the other parties. But, just before the Bill could be ratified, Canalejas was assassinated in 
Madrid by an Anarchist The project was then placed on file for nearly two years, when a 
massive demonstration in the streets of Barcelona succeeded in focussing the Government's 
attention.93. Under the pressure of the Catalan MPs, the Government passed a decree 
carrying into law the first article of the proposed Bill. It was the most crucial one,
91 Organicism was not just a Catalanist option. The entire 'R egenerationist' movement 
conceived Spain as an organic whole, as a  human 'body' gifted with its own personality and 
spirit. Jaum e B rossa (1875-1919) and Joan  C ortada applied this principle to Catalonia, 
asserting that Spain hampered a  full development of the Catalan character (cited in Castellanos 
1986: 25).
92 Even today the sea t of the IEC lies in the sam e building of the Biblioteca, a  magnificent 
fifteenth century palace w hose interior is decorated  with C atalan majolicas and ancient 
fu rn itu re .
93 The demonstration w as attended by representatives from 990 municipal councils (out of 
1,072 in all Catalonia)
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empowering the Diputacions (= Provincial Governments) to group together in 
Mancomunidades for administrative purposes. The Mancomunitat de Catalunya was 
officially set up in 1914, in the same building as Barcelona's provincial government. It 
worked as the administrative liaison and coordinating body of the four Diputacions of 
Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona (Camps i Arboix 1963). The Mancomunitat soon 
became intensely active in all fields, since Prat had already paved its way by the time he was 
elected President of the Diputacio in 1907. Many institutions were created or expanded under 
the aegis of the Mancomunitat. Its infrastructure was used effectively "to improve education, 
roads and local services and to foster regional culture, giving Catalonia by far the most 
intense cultural life of any region in Spain" (Payne 1973: 2: 606).94 Particularly innovative 
were the changes in the field of education. The Association for the Protection of Catalan 
Teaching was charged with the supervision of private schools where Catalan was the 
medium of instruction and was entrusted with the publication of the relevant text-books. Prat, 
this "eminently creative genius, who lived apart from the noisier exponents of his creed" 
(Peers 1937: 164) died suddenly in 1917 at the height of his activities and with "his serene 
and imperturbable optimism" (164). His successor at the head of the Mancomunitat was the 
architect and art historian Josep Puig i Cadafalch.
The world's upheavals of 1917 and the post-Worid War I settlement had their impact on 
Catalan politics. In 1917, there was a sharp increase in terrorist attacks, strikes, boycotts, 
lock-outs and various forms of violence. The regime's persistent centralism spurred the 
nationalists to radicalize their ideology. As soon as it was clear that the Monarchy would 
never accept any change in the status quo governing its relation with the periphery, 
Catalanism turned more and more towards Republicanism. At the same time, it became more 
radical and nationalist in its manifestations: incidents such as assaults on the Spanish flag 
started to become commonplace and Catalan began to be used illegally in the University. As a 
response to Madrid's intransigence, Francesc Macik (1859-1933) founded in 1922 Estat 
Catald, a party which advocated straightforward separatism. Macia, a former colonel in the 
Spanish army, lived through a personal evolution from federalist principles to 
'independentism' (Jardf 1977). He left the army in 1906 in order to join Solidaritat Catalana. 
He was a man of action, not a thinker, and wrote no major book on Catalanism. As we shall
94 Among other achievements, we can quote the Social Museum, the School of Dramatic 
Arts, the School of Fine Arts, the Agricultural School, the Industrial University, the Work 
School, the School of Local Administration, the Professional Orientation School, numerous 
technical schools, archeological excavations, restoration of ancient buildings and programmes 
of urban renewal.
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see, in his later years Macizi. became a living symbol of Catalanist struggle.
In that same 1922, the less conservative elements of the Lliga abandoned the party forming 
Accid Catalana, which attracted the support of the Left.95 The party won the elections of 
1923. One of its most ambitious achievements was the creation of a Triple Alliance (1923) 
with the other two historical nationalities of Spain: the Basques and the Galicians. But all 
these developments were brought to an end by the dictatorship. Before describing the latter's 
impact and evolution, the next section shall analyse the development of a national culture 
under the Mancomunitat and its link with political action.
Culture and politics: the Noucentista  experience
Most artists and intellectuals found in the Mancomunitat an ideal source of support, which 
was translated in the emergence of the Noucentista movement. Noucentisme (= 'Nine-
hundred-ism', referring to the new century) was "an ideological movement which.......
typified the hegemonic aspirations of the most active sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie... 
Through the creation of its own iconography and a complex corpus of linguistic signs, it 
formulated... patterns of social behaviour which could facilitate reformist action" (Murgades 
1986: 105). The entire ideological debate was addressed to a reform of Catalan society, an 
objective effectively achieved under the Mancomunitat. Noucentista intellectuals made 
extensive use of the administration's powers, aiming at transforming society through an 
efficient apparatus of self-government. They started to operate in 1906, when the Lliga 
entered the government of Barcelona's province.96
More than ever before, the project of cultural Catalanism was the common unifying 
platform for a galaxy of interests, ideologies, parties, voluntary associations, art schools, and 
professionals. The heart of the project was in fact centred around language and its 
orthographic unification. The creation of the IEC in 1907 was a turning point, since many 
outstanding intellectuals were co-opted into the running of the Institute. This was also the 
Catalan bourgeoisie's answer to the sclerotic state university: the Institute's sections were 
devised to reflect university faculties. The subsequent step was the creation of the Biblioteca
95 Its leaders were the Republican journalist and historian Antoni Rovira i Virgili (1882- 
1949), the N oucentista poet Jau m e Bofill i M ates (1878-1933) and the Medievalist 
historiographer Llufs Nicolau d'Olwer (1888-1961).
96 The fact that the Mancomunitat also attracted Modernist exponents, although they 
rejected Prat's conservatism, is a clear sign of the increased perception of the centrality of 
politics in the realm of culture. Moderate Republicans, such as  the engineer and economist 
Carles Pi-Sunyer (1888-1971), were drawn in the development projects of the Mancomunitat.
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de Catalunya in 1914 to stimulate scientific research, together with a network of popular 
libraries (Biblioteques populars). The 'national* library was to be the centre of cultural 
production, while the smaller town and barri libraries were to be centres for cultural 
dissemination (Murgades 1986). All these activities stemmed from the regional bourgeoisie's 
desire to produce its own cadres and expertise. Professional qualification was an 
indispensable need for a class aiming at reform and political rule. This ambition required both 
technical expertise and ideological orientation. The latter was an antidote against extemporary 
political radicalism, be that in the shape of national separatism or working-class agitation. 
With the Mancomunitat, political power transformed the Noucentista ideology into an 
operational praxis. In its turn, this ideology contributed to the legitimacy of the process of 
social reforms engendered by the regionalists.
There are some parallels between Modemisme and Noucentisme: both encapsulated a drive 
for social reform, both were Catalanist, admired Europe and disliked traditionalism. But, 
whereas the Modernist intellectuals moved in a power vacuum relying on militant action, the 
Noucentistes acted within the institutions. This distinction is also reflected in two conceptions 
of language reform: the Modernists tried to engage in language reform at the level of informal 
discussions, in particular from the editorial columns of L'Aveng. Reacting against the purist 
pundits of the Renaixenga and their archaizing proposals, they pursued a language suitable to 
all cultural and scientific purposes, not just for the glory of the belles lletres (Castellanos 
1986, Murgades 1986). Pompeu Fabra himself, who was originally a chemist, participated in 
the Modernists' debates. However, their impact was limited and their decisions were unlikely 
to be respected, since they lacked the authority to agree on them and the means to spread 
them. What they needed was some kind of central authority. In the anarchic ambiance of 
Modernism, no single authority was acknowledged.97
The scenario changed radically with Noucentisme. Fabra was called upon by Prat to work 
in the IEC and enthusiastically accepted the invitation, knowing that, through the power 
which Prat represented, it was possible to establish a first base of consensus for the 
standardization of Catalan. Indeed, one year after the Normes were published under the 
auspices of the IEC, the Mancomunitat took upon itself their diffusion through its large 
school and publishing network. Only then, the petty disagreements over 'correct' 
orthographic forms ceased to vitiate the scientific debate. While the Modernists' linguistic
97 The Modernist longing for novelty welcomed everybody who had something new to say. 
Different trends and attitudes co-existed, and there was a  constant curiosity for everything 
new. On the contrary, Noucentisme selected only those trends which were consistent with the 
Catalan bourgeoisie's interest for reform
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disquisitions were bedeviled by ideological radicalism, the Noucentistes found a balance 
between opposing trends under the umbrella of political power. In the name of political 
realism, it was necessary to reach a consensus. Thus, everybody was compelled to give up 
some of her/his most cherished options.
Among other things, Noucentisme glorified city life. The urban space was the locus of 
rational planning and social reform where man could operate and shape its environment. 
Under the Mancomunitat, the main network of roads was established to link the city with the 
countryside, together with other infrastructures. The emphasis was always uni-directional: it 
was the city which lavished all these benefits on the countryside. And the epitome of the city 
was Barcelona, traditionally identified as the cap i casal (head and home) of Catalonia.98 
The triumph of bourgeois ideals conveyed a message of repression of instincts and 
affections. Passion and rauxa (impetuosity) were to be eliminated in favour of reason and 
containment. Everything was subordinated to obtaining posterior gains. This is the opposite 
attitude of Modernism. In literature, the trend was reflected in an effort to eradicate all kinds 
of irrational effusions and exaggerated sensuality (Izard 1986, Castellanos 1986). Neo- 
classicism came again to the fore as a weapon against Romanticism. This reflected a rational 
faith in culture as a tool for influencing social development. "Culture was no longer seen as a 
gratuitous activity -art for art's sake- nor as a fruit of desperation -rebellious art Culture had 
to become an efficient collaborator of social reform engineered from above" (Murgades 1986: 
109).99
However, in the end, this positivist zeal marked the failure of bourgeois nationalism, 
fomenting a split between the upper classes imbued with such a puritan ideology and the rest 
of society. Yet, nobody can deny its lasting effects in the establishment of a Catalan high 
culture. But the latter risked remaining a ghetto phenomenon, if it failed to become the 
patrimony of the wider community. Immigration from other regions only increased this risk. 
The first social chasm was brought to light by the Lerrouxist revolt. Lacking any coercive 
means, the Catalan bourgeoise proved to be incapable of tackling increasing social chaos.
98 The concept of Catalunya-ciutat (Catalonia-city) was later coined by Gabriel Alomar to 
express the unity between the intellectuals of the com arques  and Barcelona. Urban-oriented 
ideologies still today perm eates the attitude of som e Catalan intelligentsia. In such a  vision, the 
countryside is merely seen  a s  an appendix of the capital city. On the other side, the concept 
acknowledges the radical historical importance of urban centres for any programme aimed at 
promoting social and administrative reform.
99 This confirms that nationalism is a  movement aimed at controlling social change, rather 
than bringing it about (that is, being favourable to, or against it). Its aim is to control 
particularly one type of social change, the one which questions the very basis of one own's 
[ethnic] identity.
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The lack of a state was at the root of this failure. The regional elites needed a stable power 
structure to sustain their reform plan. Noucentisme ended symbolically in 1925 when Primo 
de Rivera abolished the Mancomunitat. So far, we have seen the thriving vitality of a stateless 
culture. In the next section, we shall describe the state's attempt to crush that culture and its 
overall lack of success.
The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930)
General Miguel Primo de Rivera (1870-1930) declared the dictatorship on 13 September 
1923. At the beginning, most Catalanists hoped that the dictatorship would bring back some 
stability in a region plagued by social conflicts. But in only a few days a Royal Decree 
banished the Catalan flag and language and had all offences against the unity of the country 
put under the jurisdiction of military courts. Catalanist organizations were dissolved, 
meetings were prohibited or surveyed by Madrid's agents, political leaders were arrested on 
trivial pretexts. A Royal Order imposed the national syllabus on all Spanish schools, with a 
ban on teaching any subject not included therein. When Primo de Rivera realized that 
Catalanist leaders could never accept his policies, he first deposed the President of the 
Mancomunitat and then suppressed it altogether in 1925.
Despite all these prohibitions, Catalan culture persisted in a semi-clandestine environment 
(Roig i Rosich 1992). The Bemat Metge Foundation (f. 1923) for the study of Greek and 
Latin classics encouraged scientific investigations and the translation of the Ancient classics, 
under the sponsorship of Cambd. It also opened a translation school, organizing lectures 
both in Spain and abroad. The Catalan Biblical Foundation (f. 1922) was devoted to editing 
and publishing Biblical texts, again with the sponsorship of Cambd.100 The Church's 
Catalanist attitude was reinforced under the dictatorship, as it resented the latter's attempts to 
suppress the use of Catalan in the liturgy. From his exile in Paris, Francesc Macfe organized 
a military expedition to 'liberate' Catalonia. However, before they could even put foot in 
Spain, his quixotic army was rounded up in Prats-de-Molld near the border. This semi- 
glorious defeat, without even a dead or wounded person, created a mythical aura around the 
figure of Maci& and his heroic dedication to the Catalan cause. More than sixty years old, he 
became the admired Great Old Man, the Grand-pa (/' Avi) of Catalonia (Jardf 1977).
Lacking popular support and increasingly out of touch with the population, the Dictatorship
100 From 1928 to 1948, it published the Catalan version of the Bible in 15 volumes, directly 
translated from ancient Hebrew and Greek. A new version in a  single volume w as edited in 
1978.
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slowly burnt itself out, until it came to a sudden end in January 1930. The late phase of the 
Dictatorship demonstrated in embryonic form what would be the result of anti-Catalan 
policies under Franco. At first, the ban on the Catalan language only disturbed some 
intellectuals and politicians, when their lectures and speeches were interrupted by the police 
and government's agents. However, more wide-ranging actions such as the removal of street 
name-plates, prohibition on displaying or using Catalan sign-boards in shops, in public 
Masses, and for teaching the Catechism, created resentment among wide sectors of the 
population. At the same time, wherever its use was not restricted, language was used with 
increasing frequency (Roig Rosich 1992). Thus, with the return of democracy, the language 
was already experiencing a come back and the new freedoms found a fertile ground for its 
further diffusion. With the Dictatorship's demise, hundreds of ateneus blossomed 
throughout Catalonia, especially in Barcelona. Many of them were devoted to the diffusion of 
pedagogical ideas. Others were naturist, vegetarian, Esperantist, sporting, recreational, 
antiquarian, political, trade unionist, religious, artistic, theatrical, scientific, poetical, movie- 
going, historiographic, outing groups, .... 1
The Second Republic (1931-1939)
As soon as the injunctions against the use of Catalan were lifted, a new dynamism was 
released. The intelligentsias of Madrid and Barcelona experienced a rare moment of reciprocal 
entente. The President of the Spanish Academy, Ram6n Mendndez Pidal (1869-1968), 
visited Barcelona and commended the benefits of bilingualism. In turn, Catalan intellectuals 
were grateful to their Madrid fellows for having raised their voices against their persecution 
under the dictatorship. The use of the Catalan flag, anthem and emblems were once again 
restored. In a convention held in San Sebastian (Euskadi) different Republican parties signed 
the Pact of San Sebastian (1930) to bring down the monarchy. The Pact resulted in the 
creation of a 'Republican Revolutionary Committee', which in 1931 was to become the 
provisional government of the Republic. Three Catalan parties sent their delegates: Estat 
Catald, Acrid Catalana and the newly formed Accio Catalana Republicana. They subscribed 
to full-blown cooperation with their counterparts from other regions in exchange for the
101 They were a  sign of the times: in those days, before the advent of mass-media, to hold 
tertu lies  (conversations, informal and friendly talks) with friends, to 'go to the cafe' and 
discuss social events, w as a  daily habit and an imperative social need (Corredor, cited by Solci 
1978: 43). Social networks were much more close-knit and, through them, the diffusion of 
ideas w as part of every individual's social life. The contrast with today 's inward-looking 
individualism is, indeed, stark and dramatic.
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recognition of Catalan distinctiveness. Their final agreement incorporated the principle of 
self-determination for Catalonia. A major outcome was the foundation in March 1931 of 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, Catalan Republican Left), a coalition of several 
minor groups centered around the charismatic figure of Francesc MacizL They included the 
signatories of the Pact of San Sebastian. The coalition swept to victory at the municipal polls 
of April 1931, less than one month after its creation. The Lliga, which had collaborated with 
the Dictatorship, was utterly defeated. Cambd's staunch anti-Republicanism was the other 
main cause of the final demise of his party.
The Statute of Autonomy (Estatut) was approved in a plebiscite by 600,000 out of 
800.000 voters in that same year (1931). In the ensuing elections for the new Catalan 
Parliament, ERC gained votes from both the middle and popular classes. The Generalitat 
(the autonomous Catalan Government) was re-established in 1932 and Macik was elected its 
President until his death the following year. He was succeeded by Lluis Companys (1882- 
1940). Many reforms were inaugurated during the Republic. In several areas, Catalonia 
became a theatre for the most radical innovations in Europe. The Catalan school system 
became one of the most progressive in the world.102 During the first two years (Bienni 
Reformista), the Republican-Socialist government embarked on a policy of moderate 
reforms. But their 'slow' pace roused discontent among the impatient under-classes. Badly 
worked lands were handed over to day-labourers, but the speed of the reform process did not 
satisfy the latter and only irritated the landowners. In the cities, labour unrest was aggravated 
by the economic crisis. The situation prompted the Central Government to dissolve the Corts 
and call for new elections. The Right, grouped under a united cartel, the CEDA 
(Confederation Espahola de Derechas Autonomas, Spanish Confederation of Autonomous 
Rights), achieved a broad victory against the divided parties of the Left, while the Anarcho- 
syndicalists campaigned for abstention.
The victory of the Right was less sweeping in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain. In the 
ensuing Bienni Negre (Black biennium, November 1933 - February 1936), the Left 
continued to rule in the Generalitat and most Catalan municipalities. But an increasingly
102 Candel (1972: 91-8 and 273-81) recalls his own experience a s  a  child of Southern 
immigrants: "ft w as a  European education. Sunny, ventilated classroom s, courtyards with 
plants and flowers, boys and girls together, no parrotlike memorization. We learned while we 
played. We sang, we studied dance. The students weren't lined up in rows. Instead of desks, we 
had large tables, a s  at a  get-together, with v ase s  of flowers. The school had all the most 
modern facilities: a library, first aid station, showers, an anatomy model, a  skeleton, an air 
pump, a  microscope, maps, large illustrative shee ts ... In the summer, they took us away for a 
month to cam ps” (Candel, cited in Rosenthal 1991: 119, as  note 14 of ch. 1).
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right-wing Madrid Government paralyzed most reforms. A Bill in favour of small tenant 
farmers (rabassaires) was approved by the Catalan Parliament in April 1934. Through their 
powerful lobbies, the landowners stirred up anti-Catalan sentiments in Madrid against a 
Catalonia dominated by the Left. Madrid established that the Autonomous Government did 
not have authority to rule in social agrarian matters. This allegation de facto minimized 
Catalan autonomy. This and other actions carried out by Madrid provided the main rationale 
for the revolt of the Generalitat, when Lluis Companys proclaimed the 'Catalan Republic'. 
The Republic lasted only a few hours and ended in disaster, with the leaders of the 'coup' 
and more than 3,400 Catalan politicians arrested. Censorship and a state of emergency 
ensued for months, and the Estatut was suspended. Since Companys was also jailed, the 
Generalitat was stripped of all authority.
In the February 1936 elections, the Left presented itself in an united Popular Front (Cat. 
Front Popular), resulting in a historical victory. Released from prison, Companys and the 
other Catalan leaders were returned to the Generalitat However, the Anarchists came soon to 
dominate the scene. Under the Government of the Popular Front (February-July 1936), a 
new set of revolutionary reforms were carried out in a highly radicalized atmosphere. 
Anarchists, Syndicalists and Marxists participated in the Government of the Generalitat. But 
the latter proved unable to stem the tide of popular revolt and the pressure for further 
revolutionary change.
Many reasons have been given to explain why Anarchism took root with such 
extraordinary power in Catalonia. Certainly, the Restoration governments (1874-1931) had 
hindered normal development of working class organizations. However, for a scholar of 
nationalism, aware of the latter's overarching pervasiveness, the most convincing hypothesis 
relates to the region's history. Anarchism found an ideal arena for expansion in Catalonia 
insofar as it advocated "a drastic decentralization of Spain.. .It is presumably to this fact that 
Joan Maragall referred when he said 'Within every Catalonian there is an Anarchist'.. .The 
Anarchist finds no more support in Catalonia than elsewhere, but having once obtained a 
foothold he is able, by exploiting the Catalan character, or by other means, to strengthen 
it.. .Anarchism.. .was gready helped by the cantonal risings, the vogue of federalist ideas, and 
the unrest which followed the deposition of Isabel H" (Peers 1937: 156-7). Its neuralgic 
centre slowly moved from Southern Spain, particularly Andalusia, to Barcelona, in part 
following waves of immigration. However, there is another explanation of the widespread 
political radicalism in Barcelona. A frustrated bourgeoisie, incapable of asserting its control
FROM THE FOUNDATION OF CATALAN NATIONALISM TO THE CIVIL WAR 74
over the state's means of coercion and labour regulation, developed an intransigent attitude 
towards workers' organisations. The bourgeoisie could always blame social unrest on 
Madrid's anti-Catalan policies. At the same time, in Madrid we find a state dominated by 
economic elites whose interests contrasted with those of the Catalan industrialists. The 
former were not interested in settling labour disputes in Barcelona until the moment in which 
matters got seriously out of hand, threatening the very integrity of the state. Only at these 
moments did the central elites intervene, with brutal means, against both workers' and 
regionalist associations. Repression was obviously even more brutal against those sectors 
who espoused both regionalism and socialism. For them they coined the word 
rojoseparatistast which became popular under Francoism. The ultimate target was the 
regionalist movement and, with this aim, Madrid elites skillfully exploited labour unrest to 
stamp their control on Catalonia, letting class disputes rage until the moment when repression 
was strongly requested by regional elites. In this way, Madrid condemned Catalan 
industrialists to depend on state intervention, rather than give them any direct power. Thus, a 
lack of state intervention was counter-balanced by ruthless state repression. The state became 
a vicious machine increasingly delegitimized in the periphery, and, at the end, could only rely 
on brutal force to impose its will.
On the 18th of July of 1936, the Spanish garrison in Morocco, under the command of 
Francisco Franco (1892-1975), revolted against the dual threat of 'socialism' and 
'separatism'. The Civil War had began. The militant workers decreed a general strike, 
preparing for an armed insurrection. In Catalonia, the initiative passed to the leadership of the 
Anarchist mainstream CNT-FAI (Confederation Nacional del Trabajo- Federation 
Anarquica Iberica). The CNT entered the Generalitat, which acted more and more as the 
Government of an autonomous state. In October the Generalitat launched a massive campaign 
of collectivization. In November, Hitler and Mussolini recognized Franco's government. As 
we shall see in the following chapters, the Civil War brought about extensive destruction, 
hundreds of thousands of wounded and dead, and unprecedented population displacement. It 
lasted for more than three years. In January 1939, after the 'conquest' of Barcelona, the 
Generalitat was dissolved and the Catalanist leaders were either executed or escaped into 
exile. As the Civil War ended in April, the Francoist era began.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have seen how Catalan nationalism emerged initially as a moderate
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regionalist movement imbued with progressive Republican ideas at a time of relative 
economic prosperity. Its first inspiration came from a cultural revival known as the 
Renaixenga, which met the interest of an emerging industrial bourgeoisie. The latter tried to 
use political regionalism as a lever in its difficult dialogue with Madrid, especially for its 
protectionist campaign. Yet, cultural Catalanism was from its inception also a popular 
phenomenon. At the turn of the century, the political movement was dominated by the 
bourgeoisie, but it slowly came to represent middle bourgeois interests, and finally 
'descended' into the popular classes.103
The bulk of nationalist thought was conceived between the publication of Almirall's Lo 
Catalanisme (1886) and Prat de la Riba's La nacionalitat catalana (1906) (Llobera 1983: 
343). Since then, there has remained a stable body of doctrine which was kept broadly 
unchanged until recent decades. As we shall see in ch. 5, Catalonia was conceived as a nation 
in virtue of its linguistic distinctiveness, and hence the relationship between language and 
nation was always central to all nationalist discourse. When Catalan language was attacked 
by the dictatorship, its political importance increased. Thus, cultural nationalism provided the 
shared horizon for a movement which was politically fragmented. Political pluralism 
persisted, and even increased, under the hegemony of the Lliga (Brunn 1992). Indeed, the 
Lliga could exert only limited influence over a host of small and short-lived Republican 
parties (Casassas 1989). They finally united under Maci&'s populist leadership (Salles 1987). 
However, the splits were purely political and concerned attempts to dissociate themselves 
from the bourgeoise character of the Lliga and to approach the working class. Hence, the 
fragmentation was purely political and did not reflect opposite visions of Catalan identity. It 
did not reflect debates, ambiguity or confusion over Catalan identity, nor they did result from 
tensions between radical separatists and moderate regionalists, although groups such as Estat 
Catal& were bom on a separatist platform. The aim was to fill the gap between upper and 
lower classes and between natives and immigrants.
103 Refuting the classic interpretation of C atalanism  a s  evolving from regionalism to 
nationalism, Termes (1986) identifies an opposite direction, with four distinct phases. At first, 
there was the doctrinaire nationalism of 'organic intellectuals' such as  the Federalist physician 
and writer Jo sep  Narcfs Roca i Farreras (1830-1891) and the cultural revivalist Sebasti& 
Farn6s (1854-1934) (1986: 17). The latter clearly formulated Catalan identity on the basis of 
linguistic distinctiveness (Bilbeny 1988: 64). In the aftermath of the 1898 defeat, a  bourgeois 
regionalism emerged. From the end of World War I until the Second Republic, a  new popular 
nationalism developed in working class milieux. Finally, after 1931, Left-wing nationalism 
moved towards dem ands for self-determination. This right w as invoked by all Marxist parties 
without exception, from the Trotzkysts to the Stalinists, from the 'Bolsheviks' to the 'social- 
democrats'. All of them favoured the creation of a Catalan sta te  (Termes 1986: 18).
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In the next chapter, we shall focus on the rise of Basque nationalism and consider some of 
the differences and similarities with Catalanism. In chapter 5, we shall analyze the new form 
of Catalanism which emerged during Francoism without excessively departing from its 
previous tradition. This will be contrasted to the Basque case (chapter 4), where a major 
break occurred in the methods (strategy and tactics) adopted by the new Basque nationalist 
movement
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Chapter 3
BASQUE NATIONALISM: 
FROM ITS BEGINNING TO THE CIVIL WAR
The Basques have for a long time been identified as a separate people by foreign travellers, 
classical writers and local scholars. Pre-historic evidences of what were probably the 
ancestors of today’s Basques are plentiful in several caves and archeological sites found in 
the region (Collins 1986: 16-30). Roman historians and Greek geographers, such as Strabo, 
recorded their existence as early as AD 7, with the name of 'Vasconians1.104 The Romans 
never succeeded in subduing them or absorbing their culture, nor did the Visigoths, the 
Muslims, the Franks, and the Normans.
Basque speakers, who called themselves Euskaldunak, had long used the term Euskal 
Herria to define their area. Navarre was the region of the Iberian peninsula last to come 
under direct control from Castile, when the Duke of Alba conquered Pamplona and Fernando 
de Aragdn established the 'union' of the two Kingdoms under his crown (1512).105 The 
first book written in Basque of which we have knowledge appeared in 1545 by the hand of 
the poet Bernard Dechepare (Villasante 1979: 49-ff., Sarasola 1982: 35-9).106 A sense of 
separate cultural -and political- identity had existed in the area for many centuries. The Jesuit 
Father Manuel de Larramendi (1690-1766), often quoted as a pioneer of Basque 
'irredentism', conceived the Basque provinces as a unit which Castile and France had no
104 OvaaKcovot)^ for Strabo, Vascones for later Latin authors (Collins 1986: 31-7).
105 However, Navarre's constitutional liberties were granted until the end of the first 
Carlist W ar (1841).
106 A New Testam ent in Basque was published shortly afterwards (1571), followed by other 
books and translations aimed at converting the B asques to Protestantism (Sarasola 1982: 40- 
2).
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right to rule (Ortzi 1975: 57-8). The French-Basque chronicler and local historian Augustin 
Chaho (1811-1858) saw all Basque history as a history of national defence from outside 
encroachment.1**7 From his pen comes the first mention of Euskal Herria as an oppressed 
'nationality*. Chaho was also among the first scholars to interpret the Carlist War as a 
national struggle for the freedom of the four provinces (Corcuera 1979: 54, Juaristi 1987: 
76-106). Such interpretation became a common refrain in a tradition of local historiography 
which saw Carlism primarily as a catchword for proto-nationalism. It was also part of a 
popular primordialist interpretation which sees nationalism as a pre-modem force springing 
up from the soil and soul of the people. Nationalism, then, followed as a natural conclusion 
from the foralist and Carlist reading of history, readily encountering a broad resonance 
(Corcuera 1979: 211).
The structural pre-conditions
In order to highlight the difference between the Basque and the Catalan case, it is important 
to overview the circumstances in which modernization occurred. Contrary to other Spanish 
regions (we remember that Catalan autonomy was abolished in 1716), the Basque provinces 
had long kept intact their local laws and customary privileges. They were among the last 
regions of Spain to maintain their fueros (local statutes and charters), under which each 
province kept a long -but rarely unchallenged- separate record of administration. Although 
some of them date back to the seventh century, most of the fueros were codified in the 17th 
and 18th centuries as agreements between the Spanish Crown and Basque regional powers. 
Jealously guarded, they exempted the local population from both military service and 
taxation, while allowing the right of the provincial assemblies to veto royal edicts, though 
this rarely occurred. According to the centralists, the fueros were a special concession offered 
by the Spanish Crown, which always had the power to rescind them. Although the fueros 
were slowly eroded, before their abolition the Seigniory (senorio) of Vizcaya was working 
as a state within the Spanish state, and was even expanding its powers (Agirreazkuenaga 
1987).108 The foral institutions survived several attempts at centralization. However, the
107 Among other things, Chaho formulated the myth of Aitor, legendary father of the 
Basques, although it w as first conceived by Navarro Villoslada, a  riojano  (from the region of 
La Rioja) (Juaristi 1987).
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ideology which sustained their preservation was not nationalism, but foralism. I shall use the 
term foralism  (Sp. fuerismo) to indicate the ideological and political apology of the 
fueros. 109 Local historians played a key role in defending Basque institutions, since their 
studies on the antiquity, nobility, utility and democratic character of traditional Basque rights 
served to legitimise (or counter-legitimise) their continued existence. In the plethora of 
foralist claims and centralist counter-claims, historical research was crucial since each side 
had to obtain new pieces of evidence from past history.110
The persistence of the fueros and the centralist attempts to abolish them explains why the 
Carlists, who theoretically were a Spanish-wide movement, had their stronghold in the 
Basque regions. At their height, the carlistadas (Carlist Wars) were nearly exclusively 
fought in Basque territory. Here, a high level of mass mobilization was drawn in the defence 
of the ancient regime, whilst, in the rest of the peninsula, Carlism was embraced by more 
limited sectors of the population, linked to the small nobility (Corcuera 1979: 31). Giner 
(1984) has observed that Carlism was dominant in the rural hinterlands of those regions that 
actually spearheaded the process of modernization and industrialization. An overall abolition 
of the fueros in Vizcaya would have penalized the Liberals more than the Carlists, since the 
former constituted the richest strata of the country (Corcuera 1979: 84). The fueros were 
finally abolished in 1876, after two long and violent civil wars.
While their abolition was reluctantly accepted in Alava and Guipuzcoa, resistance was 
much more tenacious in Vizcaya. Here, led by the liberal foralist Fidel de Sagarmfnaga (d. 
1894), an "intransigent" line prevailed of refusal to collaborate in the levying of Spanish 
taxes.m  But the diputacion, the representative assembly of the province, was soon throttled 
by the central government which replaced it with a more "compromising" assembly.
108 The Seigniory (or Lordom) was a  seignioral form of government, that is, ruled by a 
Senor or Lord. On economic growth and social change in Euskadi between 1100 and 1850, see  
also Fernandez de Pinedo (1974). On trade and mercantile bourgeoisie in Eighteen century 
Bilbao, s e e  Basurto Larranaga (1983).
109 There is a  parallel for this defence of local rights and privileges in Justus Moser's 
arguments in mid-Eighteenth century Germany (Barnard 1985, Smith ps).
110 Probably, the most salient product of this historicist tradition w as E. J. de Labayru' s 
Historia General del Senorio de Vizcaya, the first volume of which appeared in 1895. The 
foralist tradition received a new lease of life in the aftermath of the definitive Carlist defeat 
and, also as a  reaction to this, most literature appeared after 1878.
111 As a  liberal anti-Jacobin, Sagarmfnaga conceived the state "not as a  national unity, but 
a s  [an institution] which integrated the different nationalities in a  superior unity" (Zabala 
1980: 49).
BASQUE NATIONALISM: FROM ITS BEGINNING TO THE CIVIL WAR 80
However, the latter maintained a foralist stand in order to placate the vociferous 
"intransigents''. Indeed, the renewed diputacidn wrung many concessions from Madrid 
parading the threat of a possible exacerbation of Basque bitterness as a leverage against the 
crown (Corcuera 1979: 91-92). The Diputacidn soon came under the control of the oligarchic 
bourgeoisie who struck numerous deals with Madrid. In 1878, the first concierto econdmico 
was signed, allowing the Basque diputaciones to collect taxes and remit their receipts to 
Madrid. However, the only beneficiary of this arrangement were the big industrialists who 
paid a very low share of the tax burden. The rural areas and small towns were penalized, as 
local merchants, professional sectors, and the peasants, suffered most of the hardships 
brought about by new industries and taxes. As a reaction against the abolition of the fueros, 
Basques lent their support to any movement which opposed centralism, and that explains the 
particular popularity of Carlism in Euskadi.
Following the abolition of the fueros, industrialization rapidly developed in the country. 
Modernization abruptly swept in, bringing the sudden destruction of ancient lifestyles in its 
wake. A relatively isolated and balanced society collided with new untamed forces. Its 
response to the unstoppable tide of events was a neo-traditionalist retreat, first in the form of 
continuing Carlist support, then through foralism and, finally, as an isolationist form of 
nationalism.!12
The abolition of the fueros,113 both symbols and instruments of economic autonomy, 
marked a watershed in relations between the Basques and Madrid. It was the key condition, 
although not the only one, for the subsequent appearance of Basque nationalism. The brutal 
shock of industrialization transformed the pre-existing ethnocentric awareness of a common 
identity into a political ideology (Fusi 1984). Since at least the 1880s, the Vizcayan landscape 
had become dotted with blast furnaces, large shipyards, steel mills, and open-air mines. 
Modernization was not merely an economic matter, but it infiltrated every level of society. 
Not even the most intimate relations were spared by it, with families broken apart and
112 As in other fields, nationalism took up its isolationist postures from a  pre-existing 
underlying trend. Thus, before nationalism, Sagarm fnaga reflected a widely-shared desire of 
non-interference into Spanish affairs: "Contrary to the Catalans, the Basques must not at all 
interfere in the problems of the rest of the state" (Sagarm fnaga, cited by Corcuera 1979: 
123). Since the B asques were heavily represented in Madrid's economic and political elites, 
such m essages were probably addressed to the espafiolista Basques.
113 In particular, the removal of the custom posts from the river Ebro to the actual Spanish 
border.
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'foreign' habits gaining ground in most walks of life. Industrialization was accompanied by 
proletarianization and by the displacement of the Basque youth from the countryside to the 
city. And there was more: since the demand for cheap labour required by the bourgeoisie’s 
intense programme of industrialization exceeded the local supply, immigrants flooded the 
country. This added another dimension to the conflict, as the displaced local youth had to 
compete on many levels with new arrivals originating from extremely different backgrounds. 
Most immigrants came from Castile, the land of the oppressors, and, thus, were readily 
identified as oppressor's stooges. Although the newly urbanized Basque youth was fast 
forgetting Euskara and shared a common language with the immigrants, their backgrounds 
remained very different. Modernization, therefore, can be seen as a fatal wound for which 
Basque nationalism claimed to be the cure. Basque nationalism appeared as a providential 
alternative to this chaotic human scenario. As in Catalonia and in the modem world generally, 
the age of transition to industrialism was also bound to be an age of nationalism (Gellner 
1983: 40). Basque nationalism was "bom of the intersecting of traditionalism and 
modernization, and of the need to adjust to and achieve the latter while preserving as much as 
possible of the former" (Payne 1975: 64).
Industrialization
Early Basque industrialism was dominated by a cohesive upper bourgeoisie, fairly small in 
size, which was able to set for itself considerable economic benefits from Madrid, in 
particular protection for its heavy industry.114 Hence, this autochthonous 'semi-oligarchy' 
was absorbed into mainstream Spanish economy and politics and rejected nationalism.
However, as the cycle of industrialization deepened, a local upper-middle class grew and 
began looking for a political ideology. Like most of the population, this emerging class was 
pressing for the re-establishment of the fueros, while, at the same time, it could hardly be 
attracted by the traditionalist leanings of Carlism, then the most ardent defender of the fueros 
(at least rhetorically). Both the Liberals and the Conservatives were associated with 
centralism, although in Vizcaya they often defended the f u e r o s  Furthermore, the
114 The first Chamber of Commerce in Spain was founded in 1881 in Bilbao. In the immediate 
aftermath of its foundation, "it began a  vigorous campaign for s tate  encouragem ent to Spanish 
shipbuilding" (Harrison 1977: 373).
115 Basque liberals were not necessarily centralist. Many supported the idea of creating a
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interests of the two main branches of the Basque industry, the steel magnates who controlled
Spain's high finance, and the shipbuilders, came into conflict. The latter soon passed to the
nationalist cause, joining the low and middle bourgeoisie, which were not linked to other
centres of capital accumulation outside the Basque provinces and, thus, tended to be more
naturally attracted to nationalism (Perez-Agote 1984). Once the Bourbon monarchy passed
the post-1876 reforms permitting foreign investment and the export of natural resources,
British capital for mines and furnaces poured into Vizcaya and British orders for iron ore
boomed (Zirakzadeh 1985: 254). The yearly amount of iron ore exported from Vizcaya
increased from 55,000 tons in 1866 to 4,272,000 tons in 1890. By 1900, 252 mines
operated in the province which produced 13.2 % of the world's iron ore (Ortzi 1978: 112).
The Liga de Productores Vizcainos (LPV, Vizcayan League of Producers) was founded in
1894 as a go-getting and aggressive corporate association of protectionist Basque
steelmakers.116 The economic development led by the LPV conditioned for nearly a century
an industrialization based on heavy industries and a monoculture of iron.
Economic expansion attracted a legion of wage labourers into the region. In chapter 8, we
shall deal with the dramatic demographic effect produced by this influx and we shall also
briefly describe the pitiful conditions in which the immigrants lived. The situation was an
ideal hunting-ground for socialists, anarchists, nationalists, and other kinds of populists.
However, the uprootedness of the immigrants proved a more fertile ground for the spread of
socialism and related class-oriented doctrines, than for either anarchism or nationalism. As
we shall see, the main reason for this lack of appeal by early nationalists was their open
rejection of the immigrants.
In 1890 more than 20,000 steel workers, railways workers and miners from the west bank
of Bilbao's river Nervidn (known as the 'Left Bank', where most industries were and are
still concentrated) organized a general strike, demanding reform of working conditions, wage
rises and shorter workdays. A landmark, this was the first general strike by industrial
workers in Spanish history. The immigrants were thus attracted to the Socialist cause, away
United Provinces of the Pyrenees on the federal models of the United S tates of America and the 
Netherlands (Agirreazkuenaga 1991).
116 The LPV was a tributary of the steel-making process invented by Henry Bessem er during 
England’s  second industrial revolution (Harrison 1977). The B essem er blast-furnaces allowed 
an inexpensive production of metal derivatives from low phosphorous iron ore which w as 
plentiful in Vizcaya and scarce in Britain.
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from nationalism. In 1890, year of the general strike, Socialist candidates were elected to 
public office for the first time in Spain, winning seats in Bilbao's city council.117 However, 
the post-1876 atmosphere was ripe for a nationalist counter-attack and there were also weak 
signals of a Basque cultural revival.
Euskaros and Euskalerriacos: an aborted Basque renaissance
Although not comparable in quality and size to the Catalan Renaixensa, a small cultural 
revival took place in the Basque Country before the emergence of nationalism. The 
renacimiento euskerista was centred in Navarre and, to a lesser extent, Vizcaya. The 
Association Euskara was founded in Pamplona (the capital of Navarre) in 1878 by Juan 
Iturralde y Suit (1840-1909), with the aim of studying and propagating Basque language, 
literature, history, and legislation (Elorza 1978a, L6pez Anton 1990). Limiting its 
membership to top Navarrese intellectuals, its support never spread to the wider population 
(Corcuera 1979: 134). The defence of the fueros was the association's mainstay. Persons 
from different creeds and parties joined its eminently cultural activities. Most Euskaros, as 
the members of the association were called, were moderate Liberals, and a few were Carlists 
(Corcuera 1979: 131, Elorza 1978a, Martinez-Penuela 1989). As professional classes, they 
formed the bulk of the Navarrese intelligentsia. Son of a leading banker, Iturralde studied art 
in Paris, where Romantic ideas exerted a profound impact on him. Back in Pamplona, he 
mixed artistic with political activity as a municipal councillor.
However, the key figure in the movement was Arturo Campidn (1854-1937), son of a 
French official who first came to Spain with the Napoleonic armies and returned there as a 
shopkeeper once the war was over. In a pattern common to many early nationalists, the 
abolition of the fueros radicalized Arturo's political position. He became a vocal journalist 
and writer in defence of Basque culture, whilst undertaking political activities at Pamplona's 
municipal council and as a deputy in the Spanish Cortes. The Associacidn Euskara became 
marginally involved in politics, but its main activities consisted in organizing poetry contests 
(such as the Floral Games), prizes for historical research, classes of language and music, 
lectures, etc. Ibon Sarasola (1982: 135) dates the Basque literary renaissance back to 1879,
117 Another general strike occurred in 1903, and again met with fierce repression, as
happened in 1890
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the year of the first Floral Games in the Spanish Basque Country.118 The itz-jostaldiak, 
literary contexts, were added later, organized by the municipality of San Sebastian. In 
contrast to the Catalan Joes Florals, the Basque ones were not properly a literary 
manifestation, but a folkloric event where literary competitions were mingled with popular 
sport games, folk songs, and oral poetry (Sarasola 1982: 136).119
In those years, another society emerged in Bilbao, but its orientation was more political, 
working as a vehicle for the aspirations of Bilbao's emerging middle and upper classes. A 
radical advocate of foralism, the Euskalerria (f. 1876) society was more worried about the 
expediency of its business than about local history and religion (Larronde 1977: 261-280). 
Bilbao's shipping magnate Ramon de la Sota and other representatives of the non-oligarchic 
"intransigent" bourgeoisie, such as Sagarrimaga, were its main figures (Elorza 1978a). As 
liberal intelligentsia, this group of modernizers was able to produce a political praxis and, 
later, express it in a political organization. That is why, as we shall see, the majority of the 
society's members joined Arana's nationalist party in 1898-99, bringing a key liberal 
contribution to the latter (Zabala 1980). This event is probably the real moment of 
nationalism's birth as a political option, the moment when "the messianic 'assimilationists' 
try to realize their former vision by adopting the ethnicity solution of the defensive reforming 
'revivalists'" (Smith 1971: 255, cited in Payne 1975). According to Zirakzadeh (1991), the 
entry of the Euskalerriacos into Arana's organisation, where they soon acquired key 
positions, totally changed its course, transforming it from a neo-traditionalist group to a fully 
fledged, albeit more moderate, nationalist party. However, their entrance made the party 
much more internally fragmented than it was at its birth. A clash between moderate and 
intransigent elements accompanied its history through and through. But why was this foralist 
intelligentsia attracted to nationalism?
The Sota sector felt itself to be increasingly displaced from the centres of political power
118 S ee  Arana (1982: 1987-93 and 2155-61). B asque Floral G am es w ere already 
celebrated in the Northern (French) side's town of Urrufia (Labort) over twenty years before, 
in 1853.
119 Sarasola (1982: 136) notes that the prize aw arded to the best poetry w as five fold 
inferior to the prize aw arded to the winning p e lo ta  gam e or to the b est cow milk. The 
participants were often from lower classes (with the exception of a few physicians), most of 
whom being artisans, peasants and local priests. The poetry of the gam es derived directly from 
the tradition of the b ertso lariak  (troubadors), with their improvised texts, key actors of 
popular culture (Aulestia 1994).
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controlled by the mining and siderurgy-related upper bourgeoisie (the LPV). The latter used 
electoral corruption ('caciquismo ') in order to monopolize the control of political 
representation in local governments. The excluded 'modernizers' were then searching for a 
political space which could reflect their orientation and interests. Since they did not feel to be 
sufficiently represented by mainstream political parties, they found in nationalism a suitable 
political vehicle. Arana offered them two irreplaceable advantages: a ready-made ideology 
and a popular following.
Similarities between Navarre's Euskaros and Vizcaya's Euskalerriacos were limited to 
foralist ideology and a few cultural activities. Vizcaya was facing rapid modernization, while 
Navarre's social structure remained statically rural. The movement assumed clear political 
overtones among the Euskalerriacos, whilst it remained confined to the realm of culture 
among the Euskaros. The former became nationalists and even separatists. The latter did not 
move further than regionalism and were often monarchists (Corcuera 1979: 135-6). They 
were more traditionalist, wholly Catholics, intensely anti-Liberal, and foralist to the 
backbone. This reliance upon tradition was reflected in their ideological continuity and scant 
theoretical output In contrast, their Vizcayan counterpart had to extrapolate its own balanced 
vision out of disparate social groups' interests, a search which finally led to nationalism. The 
culturalist Euskaros, disconnected from the process of modernization, dissolved as an 
organization, while the Euskalerriacos, former assimilationist intellectuals, decided to join 
arms with the nationalists. However, the works of Campidn and his Mends still remain an 
important point of reference for Basque scholars and have left their indelible mark on 
Navarrese historiography and ethnology.
Arana's legacy
Few nationalisms in the modem world can be said to have been permeated and shaped by a 
single person. Basque nationalism is one such exception. Most of its symbols and values 
have been the work of one man, Sabino Arana (1865-1903). He single-handedly formulated 
its first political programme, coined its name, defined its geographical extension, founded its 
first political organization, wrote its national anthem, and designed its flag. Moreover, the 
anniversary of Arana's 'nationalist revelation' is celebrated every year as the Basque national
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holiday (Aberri Eguna). Let us now examine all these 'inventions' one by one.
The first political programme of modem Basque nationalism was contained in Arana's 
Bizkaya por su independencia (1892). In this and other early writings, he spoke of Bizkaya 
(Cast. Vizcaya) rather then the whole Basque Country. Vizcaya was the cradle of Basque 
industrialization and the laboratory of all social changes that came with it. It was also the 
province which most resisted the surrender of its fueros.120 The neologism Euzkadi, 
invented by Arana, was later universally accepted as the national name for the Basque 
Country in its recently standardized (batua) version, Euskadi. Arana synthesized the 
geographical extension of Euskadi in the motto Zazbiak-bat (= Seven in one)121 and in the 
formula 4 + 3 = 1 (Four plus three equals one). The number seven in one alluded to the four 
provinces in the Spanish side (Euskadi Sur) and to the three departments in the French side 
{Euskadi Nord).122 In the aspirations of all nationalists, the seven areas will one day be 
united in a free Euskadi. The first nationalist organization, named later PNV {Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco = Basque Nationalist Party) was founded by Arana in Bilbao, the capital 
of Vizcaya. Although informally created in 1895, a political 'bureau' was founded only two 
years later (San Sebastian 1984:29, Corcuera 1979:413, Elorza 1978a).123 Arana composed 
the anthem of the PNV, Gora ta Euzkadi, in 1895 when he was in prison. After nearly a 
hundred years, in 1980, it was adopted as official anthem by the Autonomous Community of 
Euskadi and is today's Basque national hymn. Sabino designed the Basque flag, calling it 
ikurriha. Its red and green colours were adopted by the PNV in 1933 and it became the 
official flag of Euskadi in 1936 (Corcuera 1979: 226). Finally, the Basque national holiday, 
Aberri Eguna (Day of the Fatherland), celebrates Arana's political conversion which
12° Although Arana always perceived the Basques as  a  single people, he followed the foralist 
tradition of non-interference in m atters of other provinces, since interference w as 'contrary 
to the spirit of the fueros'. Hence, he framed his programme for Vizcaya, convinced that the 
other provinces would spontaneously follow, and, at the sam e time, intensified his visits and 
contacts with them. Arana's programme was based on a  great degree of decentralization which 
allowed each  province to separately follow its path, in accordance with the foralist tradition.
121 This motto was first used by the Navarrese Euskaros (Corcuera 1979: 132) to replace 
the older laurak-bat (= four in one), limited to the four provinces on the Spanish side (Elorza 
1978a: 23).
122 The presence of an international border running through the Basque nation has hindered 
Basque collective identity by creating two very different relationships with their respective 
central governm ents (Lancaster 1987). The border dissecting the B asque Country was 
established by the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1660).
123 In 1895, Arana founded in Bilbao the Bizkai Buru Batzar or Regional Council of Vizcaya 
(Elorza 1978a: 149).
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occurred on Resurrection Sunday, 1882.124 Thus, Easter has special meanings in Euskadi 
and its colourful celebrations assume a unique flavour. The fact that nationalist festivals 
parallel the Christian calendar seems to give substance to the interpretation of the Basques as 
a 'chosen people'. The description of Arana as a martyr, or even a suffering Christ, helped in 
this direction.
For all the above reasons, the personal biography of Arana is very important in order to 
understand the origin of Basque nationalism. Alas, its importance is greater than that of any 
life history of the main Catalan leaders and thinkers.125 Differently from Prat de la Riba, 
Arana is to be valued more as an organizer and inventor of nationalist symbols, than for his 
intellectual contributions (Ortzi 1975:134).
Sabino Arana was bom in 1865 in Abando, a borough (or parish, anteiglesia) swallowed 
up by greater Bilbao during his lifetime.126 His father, Santiago Arana, was a small 
shipbuilder and a man fervently dedicated to the Carlist cause. At the time of the Carlist 
uprising in 1872, he wholeheartedly joined the insurgents' side, hiding a leading Carlist 
general in his shipyard at Ripa. He travelled to England in order to purchase arms for the 
rebels, investing more than 50,000 duros from his own pocket (Basaldua 1977: 34-5). But 
the Carlists were defeated and, at the end of the hostilities, he had to flee becoming a refugee 
in France (Bayonne). The triumph of the Liberals represented for the Arana family the defeat 
of all they and the Carlists stood for. Vizcaya had lost its ancestral institutions, Basque 
traditional values were sinking, swept away by economic greed, Catholic religion was 
threatened by liberalism (Corcuera 1979: 185). But the defeat also badly damaged the
124 The first Aberri Eguna was celebrated in Bilbao fifty years on, in 1932, under the 
suggestion of Sabino's brother, Luis, at that time President of the 'Euzkadi-Buru- Batzar'
(Garcia Venero 1968: 516-8, Granja 1986: 236-8). The itinerant character of the celebration 
was designed to rekindle pan-Basque ties. Thus, in 1933 the festival w as celebrated in San 
Sebastian, in 1934 in Vitoria, in 1935 in Pamplona, and so  on (in 1936 it could no longer be 
publicly celebrated).
126 Most biographies of Arana tend to be hagiographic and eulogistic (see, for instance, 
B asaldua 1977). Larronde' s  (1977) in-depth study of Arana's works is more detached and 
objective. A great deal of original biographic information is available in Corcuera (1979: 184- 
241). In English, s e e  Payne (1975: 61-86). Ortzi (1975: 137) su g g ests  the need for a 
com parative biography of Arana and Prat de la Riba, with their two sharply different 
personalities and ideologies.
126 Urban expansion, the absorption of the native anteiglesias  and the destruction of the 
rural baserriak  (farmhouses) surrounding Bilbao, were a  powerful reminder of the perverse 
effects of industrialisation all through Arana's life. "In Bilbao...live a  handful of bad Vizcayans 
who govern the town by whim and keep a continuous fight against the peasant, the baserritar, 
the native of the anteiglesia..."  (Arana 1982: 1281). "The harm that Bilbao, dreadful foe of 
the Fatherland, has caused is incalculable" (Arana 1982: 1285).
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financial well-being of the Aranas: all the money generously donated for the Carlist cause 
was lost. Furthermore, the wood-hull shipbuilding industry was rapidly eclipsed by the iron- 
made one with its more modem technology. 127 When Santiago Arana returned from his 
French exile, he was a depressed man. "The Carlist collapse dealt him a psychological and 
emotional blow from which he never recovered" (Payne 1975: 65). Faced with the triumph 
over him of a cruel world which he could not comprehend, he died in 1883, bequeathing to 
his offspring a legacy of unfulfilled justice.
The young Sabino and his brother Luis were themselves raised as Carlists. Sabino later 
recognized that he was a Carlist per accidens, "insofar as the triumph of Don Carlos of 
Bourbon seemed the only way to re-establish the fueros" (Corcuera 1979: 89). The best 
account of Arana's education in the Jesuit college of Orduna is contained in Corcuera (1979: 
185-8). His schoolmates came from acomodadas (well-off) rural or small town families, and 
many were bom in the overseas colonies of the Spanish empire. However, no name in the 
list of Arana's school-fellows was linked to big industry (1979: 186). The school 
environment and the teaching methods -with their strong emphasis on Catholic missionary 
vocation- had an important effect on his upbringing. At the close of his student years, he had 
deepened the devout religiosity which imbue all his writings. Arana was also "obsessed at an 
early age by the desire to know the history and institutions of his country" (Corcuera 1979: 
189).128
Sabino 'converted' from Carlism to nationalism after an animated discussion with his 
brother Luis. According to nationalist mythology, this marked the birth of Basque
127 The economic trajectory of the Arana family responded to a  common pattern of 
industrial elites marginalized by economic development. The industrial boom after 1876 "tended 
to foster the growth of a  financial and manufacturing elite which rapidly accumulated a  large 
share of the region's industrial wealth. As a consequence, a  number of the members of the 
bourgeois sector... fell into som e degree of decline. Smaller firms were absorbed or driven out 
of business by the large industrial combines. ...The decline of this sector of Basque leadership 
was reflected in the shift of their sons from industry into the professions....They were lawyers 
and doctors, journalists and teachers, artists, com posers, and writers, the providers of 
services, such as transportation, communication, design and planning. They were the 'second' 
generation of the industrial boom" (Clark 1979: 38) and, thus, becam e the main supporters of 
the emerging ethnonationalist movement. Sabino Arana, son of an industrialist, studied law in 
Barcelona, while his brother Luis was trained a s  an architect.
128 In Bizkaya por su independencia, after a  dedicatoria  (preface) in Euskera, Arana 
presented his own interpretation of four historical battles which he converted into the emblems 
of Vizcayan independence: Arrigorriaga, Gordexola, Otxandiano and Mungia. As defined in 
chapter 1, Arana was a classical ethno-historian (Smith 1993).
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nationalism. It is said that the nationalist idea first appeared in Luis' mind on a trip to Galicia, 
shortly after his father's death.129 It is not certain in what circumstances and after what 
readings Luis came to this conclusion. Basaldua (1977: 44) recalls that the conversion 
occurred roughly at the same time that many small nationalities were awakening in other parts 
of Europe.130 On his return, Luis had a long and agitated discussion with Sabino, from 
which the latter came out thoroughly convinced that Carlism was now a lost cause, useless to 
the advancement of Basque rights. Years later, he recalled that "understanding that my 
brother knew history better than me and that he was unable to deceive me, I entered in a 
phase of doubt, and promised myself to study with a serene spirit the history of Vizcaya 
while adhering firmly to the truth" (cited by Basaldua 1977:46).
In 1882, Arana moved to Barcelona to study law, remaining there until 1888. This was a 
period in which Catalonia was experiencing a widespread cultural, economic and political 
revival. Although Catalanism had little influence on him, he was directly exposed to it. In 
particular, the renaissance of the Catalan language must have impressed him deeply, since he 
hoped to launch a similar revival for Euskara. But this proved to be a hard if not impossible 
task during his short lifetime. The Basque language was half-forgotten and derided by the 
natives as anti-modem.
From 1885 he dedicated himself to the study of Basque, publishing in Barcelona the first 
part of a Gramdtica elemental del Euzkera bizkafno (1888). As he came back to Bilbao, he 
entered a competition for a chair of Basque language at the Secondary Institute of the 
province.131 Among other candidates, stood the philologist and writer Miguel de Unamuno 
(1865-1936). However, neither of the two was awarded the place and the competition was 
won by a priest, Resurreccidn Maria de Azkue (1864-1951), who later became a prominent
129 Payne (1975: 65) refers to Luis' train trip to Galicia. The slogan Vivan los fueros (Long 
live the fueros) was carved on his suit lapel and a  travel companion remarked with indignation: 
"How could you ask for a  privilege which other Spaniards have no right to?". This statem ent 
plunged Luis into a  deep reflection and made him realize that the B asques were not Spaniards. 
We can better understand this episode if we consider that the opposite slogan was normally 
dubbed on the walls of most other Spanish towns in the aftermath of the Carlist War: Abajo los 
fueros (Down with the fueros, Hormaza, cited by Corcuera 1979: 82). The Basque provinces 
were the only region of Spain where the fueros were still preserved, while the aggressive 
campaign to abolish them was increasingly perceived a s  an assault by many Basques. Corcuera 
m entions the wave of hatred against the Basque Country and the persecutions against the 
defenders of the fueros.
130 However, in his first pamphlets and articles, Sabino Arana (1980: 10) seem s to ignore 
all of them and only mentions the former Spanish colonies of the Americas and the Pacific.
131 On the establishment and closure of this chair (catedra de vascuence), s e e  Corcuera 
(1979: 150-1). S ee  also Arana (1982ca: 1: 621).
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philologist (Basaldua 1977: 54). It is possible to speculate how this event influenced the life 
courses of two prominent Vizcayans, Unamuno and Arana. After they failed as professional 
philologists, they both had to dedicate themselves to other endeavours. And, somehow, they 
both moved away from language. However, the former turned to cosmopolitan values, 
rejecting Basque culture through and through, whilst the latter turned to defining a new 
nationalist ideology, in which language rarely became the central element. Arana continued 
his linguistic studies more as an hobby -never completing his grammar book- as he became 
involved in politics.
After the publication of his booklet, Bizkaya por su independencia (1892), Arana attracted 
limited attention in some professional sectors of Bilbao. A few days later about twenty 
admirers and friends decided to invite him and his brother for a luncheon in Laraz&bal, near 
Bilbao. On this occasion, Sabino announced to the incredulous acquaintances his political 
creed for Vizcayan independence. To him, Vizcaya was now dying, but dead would have 
been preferable. Instead, it was humiliated, trampled, mocked by that weak and miserable 
nation, Spain. Complete separation from Spain was the only hope, the only way to escape 
such misery. Despite the bystanders' cool and even hostile reception, a few years later most 
of them passed into the rank and file of Arana's party. Hence, the Larazdbal luncheon is 
conceived by some scholars as the informal act of birth of the subsequent nationalist 
organization (Elorza 1978a: 148). The average age of the audience was under 32. Most of 
them were from Vizcaya and from a relatively high social status, representing those urban 
and liberal strata which emerged with industrialization (Corcuera 1979: 2 0 8 ).^  Among 
them was Ramon de la Sota, a founding member of Euskalerria. The participation of liberal 
professions in the embryo of what will be the PNV is easily explained in terms of the 
political-economic losses suffered by these sectors since 1876.
In 1893 Arana founded the bi-weekly Bizkaitarra (the Vizcayan), where he was almost the 
only contributor, writing articles on grammar, history, morality, and local politics. Its tenth
132 Professional failure often plays a  prominent role in the careers of nationalist leaders. In 
situations of 'blocked mobility', the evolutionary vision of ethnic historicism has a  special 
appeal for the proto-national intelligentsia (Hutchinson 1987, Smith 1981: 124-8). Although 
B asques w ere over-represented in the higher echelons of the Spanish administration and 
industry (Heiberg 1975: 181), more important was "the belief that one's community [is] being 
disadvantaged, together with a  genuine shortage of opportunities” (Hutchinson 1987: 267).
133 C orcuera (1979: 208) counts two engineers, three tradesm en, one businessm an, and 
other liberal professions.
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issue (1894) published a plan for the organization of an Euskeldun Batzokis (E.B., or 
Centro Vasco, Basque Centre), a recreative society and informal club for nationalists which 
was to be the germ of ’Bizkaianism' (Elorza 1978a: 148-9). With 150 founding members, 
the first batzoki named a junta (committee), presided over by Arana.134 One year later, in 
1894, the centre assumed the form of a political 'bureau' as Bizkai Burn Batzar in order to 
contest its first municipal and provincial elections (Basaldua 1977: 91). The bureau was 
closed down in 1895 by the Spanish authorities, which also suspended the publication of 
Bizkaitarra and Arana was sentenced to four and a half months in prison.
As we shall see through his quotations, the theoretical production of Sabino Arana is often 
of a low quality, yet he can be defined an intellectual, since his main activity was the 
production of ideas.135 Furthermore, as a politician and organizer of the nationalist 
movement, he was also part of the intelligentsia. A lot of Arana's symbolic importance lies 
in his dedicated personality sincerely vowed to extreme self-sacrifice. In Laraz&bal, he 
impressed everybody by his oath of being ready to achieve the freedom of Vizcaya "with all 
my weak forces, sweeping all the obstacles on my way and disposing myself, if necessary, 
to the sacrifice of all my affects, from the family to friendship right up to social formalities, 
economic well-being and my very life" (cited in Ortzi 1975: 141). Arana was a traditional 
man living in a non-traditional world. He embodied a neo-traditionalist route to nationalism. 
In many respects, he was a man of the past, but this past was forever lost in the anomic 
metropolis. Yet, he was also a child of his times. Let's now see how this contradiction 
worked at the ideological level.
Arana the racialist
In the forthcoming chapters, we shall have the opportunity to analyze in more depth the 
attitude of Arana and other nationalists in respect to the immigrant workers who were then 
settling in Vizcaya. One of the consequences of rapid industrialization was the arrival in 
Vizcaya of unprecedented numbers of immigrants from non-Basque regions of Spain. Many
134 In a  few years similar centros sprang up throughout Euskadi and even among the Basque 
diaspora in the Americas and the Philippines (Clark 1979: 43).
135 His main activity was indeed journalism, a s  writer and editor of his own journals. "The 
fact that he was wealthy enough not to have to worry about employment allowed him to devote 
his time and energy" to the nationalist cause (Da Silva 1975: 243).
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of them came from Castile, the land of the oppressor. The traumatic impact caused by 
immigration is one of the factors which explains Arana's abandonment of cultural nationalism 
in many of his political statements. Rather than trying to revive or encourage the spread of 
Euskara, Arana and his followers chose to use it as an ethnic boundary. 1^ 6 His aim became 
not so much to preserve the language as to preserve a sense of 'unique' Basque racial purity, 
dividing the autochthonous population from the newcomers, who he called 'maketos'.
Traditionally, before the spread of nationalism, there had been some sort of pride on the 
part of many Basques about the un-intelligibility of their language. The contention that no 
foreigner has ever been able to master their tongue worked as a strong psychological barrier 
against amalgamation and 'evil infiltrations'. An ancient legend tells that, once upon a time, 
the devil visited the Basque country to learn the idiom and make disciples. He tried for 
weeks, but was defeated and returned to Hell after having learned no more of the language 
than bai (yes) and ez (no) (Clark 1979: 148, Dickson 1968: 50). Thus, the legend tells us 
not only that Euskara was God-given and crucial to the definition of Basque identity, but that 
popular ethnicity considered language already as an 'ethnic barrier' against foreign 
infiltrations. Hence, Arana's refusal to allow the immigrants to learn the language was not his 
own invention, but hailed in origin from centuries-old attitudes.
It is not certain how far Arana can be blamed for being a racist, as many of his opponents 
do. Indeed, he never espoused a biological theory of racial superiority, neither did he 
advocate an universal hierarchy of races. Most likely, he used race as a defensive barrier to 
prevent the corruption of Basque values and culture from external encroachment. It is then 
clear that his main aim was to preserve the local culture and way of life by adopting an 
extremely defensive approach (Payne 1975: 74, Corcuera 1979). For instance, Arana's 
condemnation of interracial marriage corresponded to the firm belief that any such kind of 
marriage would have inevitably resulted in a loss for Basque language and values and in a 
further expansion of Spanish influence in the family unit. When he was elected to the Bilbao 
city council, he proposed that the city's prisons be separated in order to prevent Basque 
juvenile delinquents from learning blasphemous sayings and immoral habits from their 
Spaniard inmates. Arana required that all members of his nationalist organization be Catholic,
136 Language was seen  a s  a border-guard and a  wall protecting the besieged nationalist
citadel. On the muralla (wall) conception of language, see  Sarasola (1982).
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and have at least four Basque surnames, or one grandparent who was a native Basque, in 
order to prove their Basque ascendancy.137 At the root of this isolationist posture lied a 
pervasive insecurity and pessimism about the possibility of assimilating foreigners. This 
attitude was inextricably tied to the scarce diffusion of the language, the difficulty faced by 
prospective learners, and the un-availability of other national symbols. In the absence of 
language, race proved to be a much more pervasive and ready-made criterion.
Why did Arana appear so intolerant? Was racial exclusivity a necessary step in the 
foundation of Basque nationalism? For all nationalist movements, a first and primary task is 
to instill in the people that they wish to mobilize a newly found sense of self-confidence. In 
order for this to occur, a subjugated nation must unequivocally rid itself of the sense of 
inferiority and shame to which it has been subjected over the centuries. The reverse of this 
negative self-image is often materialized as a radical upgrading of all positive traits of the 
would-be-nation. Hence, it can take the form of an openly declared sense of superiority vis- 
d-vis the outgroup.
Arana the believer
Basque civil society was far less secularized than its Catalan counterpart.1381 am not just 
talking about the countryside, which was a well-known bastion of Carlism and Integrism, 
but also about the urban middle classes and considerable sections of the native working 
class.139 Their ideological conservatism was an obstacle for the diffusion of new radical 
ideologies such as nationalism. Arana, who understood this predicament, as well as 
upholding the same theistic values, had to stress some aspects of his doctrine more than 
others. His religious education gave him the ability to understand and sympathize with the 
reverent Christian feeling of his compatriots. The religious basis of Arana1 s programme are 
resumed in the motto JEL (Jaungoikua eta Lagizarra, God and the Old Law).140
137  On the highly selective criteria for admission in the b atzo k is , their rigid internal 
discipline and ideological intransigence, see  Elorza (1978a: 148-9) and Azcona (1984: 134-7).
138 Luis Mitxelena dates this common endowment back to the Council of Trento (1545-), "the 
effect of which cam e lastingly to inform nearly all aspects of local life. ...Its consequence was 
the now familiar identification between B asqueness and Catholicism" (Mitxelena 1960: 59).
139 On the contribution of the clergy and religious orders to Basque language and culture, see  
Villasante (1979: 401-7).
140 This w as taken from the Carlist-foralist slogan Jaungoikua eta Foruak (God and 
Fueros), already 'revived' by the 'Euskaros' (Corcuera 1979: 35, 48-51 and 133). See also
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Arana derived from Catholicism a whole set of ideas which remain the bastion of the 
PNV's doctrine until the present-day. Firstly, he advocated non violent methods to achieve 
his political goals. It is important to observe that this vision was later discarded by post-1959 
radical nationalists as a burden, together with most Aranist precepts. Secondly, he espoused 
the core of social Catholicism's concern for the poor and the needy. Arana deeply resented 
the materialistic and rapacious attitude of Bilbao's upper classes: "All of us know that today 
the poor are inhumanely exploited and treated like beasts by industrialists and businessmen, 
mine owners and the property owners".141 As a solution to these injustices, Arana posited an 
utopian classless society which he identified as his traditional Catholic homeland before the 
imposition of liberalism and the maketos' invasion. Accordingly, before the latter's arrival 
upset labour relations, the employers and the employees lived in a state of near harmony 
where all classes helped each other. The employers did not hold their workers in contempt, 
and the workers did not disobey or clash with their employers. The nationalist union founded 
after his death later reflected this paternalistic attitude and concern for social justice (see 
afterward).
Arana's pious vision is stressed as he compared the Vizcayan programme with the Catalan
one: "Do Catalan nationalists, either moderates or radicals, have in their programmes a
solution to social problems, which are so important in their land? We do not think so,
because they have not adhered to a religious theme, and there is no solution without Christ.
Have the Basque nationalists fastened onto a religious theme? Yes, and this is clearly
demonstrated in their motto For God and the Old Law'. Their goal is not political but sociaL*
to Christianize the people, the poor as well as the rich. Politics is only to be the means".142
He also wrote: "My patriotism is rooted... in my love for God, and its aim is to connect God
to my blood relatives, to my great family, the Basque country".143 And: "Ideologically
speaking, before the Fatherland there is God; but in practical and temporal life here in
Vizcaya, in order to love God it is necessary to be a patriot, and in order to be a patriot it is
necessary to love God; this is what the Fatherland is all about".144 To him, political
C orcuera (1979: 314-27). According to Clark, this w as one of the first "verbal political 
symbols Basques had ever used in their native tongue” (1979: 42).
141 Arana, cited in Larronde (1977: 253) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 127).
142 Arana, cited in Larronde (1977: 258) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 127-8).
143 Arana, cited in Larronde (1977: 95) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 125).
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centralization also meant a conspiracy to deprive the Church of its hold on society and dilute 
Catholic values of piety and justice in the name of materialism and avarice. Hence, Spain was 
dominated by sinister anti-clerical forces epitomized by the Liberals and their corrupt electoral 
system. His own was a crusade against the irreligiosity and "immorality" of Spanish 
reformers who were leading devout souls astray. Indeed, his whole campaign was to provide 
a new morality and set of values for the emerging Basque society at the very moment when 
there was an absence of, and a need for, them. The disentailment of Church lands and free- 
market economic liberalization were seen as part of the same plot aimed at upsetting the 
values of Christian justice, foral autonomy, and Basque culture. He also proposed to 
establish an extremely decentralized autonomous confederacy of Catholic municipalities and 
provinces under the authority of the Church, each entity with wide powers and even the right 
to secede.
The motto of the Bizkai Burn Batzar was "For God and Custom". A logo with the 
acronym GETEJ (= Gu Euzkadirentzat ta Euzkadi Jaungoikoarentzat, "We for Euskadi, and 
Euskadi for God") also frequently appeared in their own documents and signboards. "I 
proclaim Catholicism for my country because its traditions and its political and civil character 
are essentially Catholic...If my people resist it, I would reject my race. Without God, we 
want nothing" (Arana, quoted in Basaldua 1977: 69). Soon, a large part of the Basque clergy 
was attracted to Arana's nationalism, mainly in rural areas. The PNV became "one of the 
earliest Christian democratic parties in Europe" (Clark 1979: 44).145 As for other nationalist 
conceptions, for Arana the nation was an extended 'family', and this family was closely 
linked to God.146 The nation, for Arana, was to be rejected, if it failed to obey God. Only if 
it continued to obey God, was it acceptable. This is typical for a belief in 'ethnic election': the 
Basques are chosen so long as they love God (Smith, personal suggestion).
Finally, we have to consider that, according to the pre-nationalist Basque tradition,
144 Arana (1982: 615), cited by J&uregui (1981: 19) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 125-6)
145 Furtherm ore, Arana "portrayed an alm ost sublim e faith in the workings of the 
democratic process... If Basque could only learn their history, their culture and their language, 
and if they had the freedom to vote for candidates who pledged to protect those things, then 
Basque nationalism would triumph at the ballot box" (Clark 1979: 46-7).
146 Arana himself declared that "the patriarchal family, that is, the patria  is the union of 
individuals of an historic race for whom time has formed custom s and language and on whose 
behalf history has created a  patrimony of liberties which all generations (of that race) have 
the perfect right to enjoy" (1982: 1762, also cited in Heiberg 1989: 52).
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language itself was associated with the Creator. Theological interpretations of the origins of 
Euskera defined it as the common language of mankind before the Tower of Babel. At the 
turn of the Nineteenth century, the Abb6 Dominique Lahetjuzan considered it as the first 
human tongue, spoken in the Garden of Eden (Gallop 1970: 2-5, Tovar 1957, 1980). 
Another Abb6, Diharce de Bidasouet, even claimed that Euskara was the language spoken by 
God (Gallop 1970: 2-5).
Arana the philologist
One of Arana's legacies had been to distort and complicate Euskara while attempting to 
purify it from Hispanicisms'. Basque was forced to absorb neologisms since it lacked the 
vocabulary to convey new inventions and concepts. Thus, Arana dedicated many years of his 
life attempting to cleanse its lexicon from Spanish 'borrowings' and interferences. He 
pursued this goal with a zealous fervour which led him to 'invent' a purified idiom virtually 
alien from the language spoken by the common people. However, many terms he invented 
have been successfully adopted by other nationalists and, subsequently, by most average 
Basque speakers.147 He also established an alphabet with a different order, in which, for 
instance, the letter c is absent and the letter m comes last.148
However, all these efforts have been devalued "by the secondary character which Sabino 
conferred on language as a defining element of the nation, always second to race" (Corcuera 
1979: 395). In order to grasp a further reason for Arana's choice in favour of race, we must 
remember that Euskara was barely spoken in the urban centres. This is especially true in 
Arana's home city, Bilbao, where he conducted most of his political activity and created the 
first nuclei of Basque nationalism. The same Arana clearly perceived this decline, when he 
stated in a disenchanted but sorrowful mood: "Euskara is fading away. We must 
acknowledge this fact as an undeniable reality of which everybody is aware" (quoted by
147 Among his successful creations, a few have even entered into contemporary Spanish 
usage, although with reference to Basque politics. Apart from Euzkad i and ikurrina, we can 
count abdrtzale  (patriot, derived from abdrri = fatherland) and azkatasun  (independence or 
freedom, normally associated with the acronym ETA). I am using here Arana's spelling, not the 
current batua. See Arana (1982 ca: 2: 975-ff.). He also coined many Christian nam es, such as 
Koldobika for his brother Luis, included in his Ixendegi (list of nam es/calendar) to be used as  
a baptismal registry. Individual nam es are today a  central feature of Basque identity and it is 
not uncommon among immigrant families to baptize their children with Basque nam es.
148 Hence, the title of Father de Ibero's catechism, Ami vasco, stands for an 'A to T  of 
B asqueness (Ibero 1906). This also explains why the present-day Basque education system  is 
divided into three types of school, which are identified as A, B, and D.
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Corcuera 1979: 395). Arana did not conceive a direct link between language and vision of the 
world (here including way of thinking, culture, and general values). To him, learning the 
language did not necessarily mean changing a state of mind or acquiring a new value 
orientation. Hence, the language revival was fraught with dangers, because any immigrant 
who learned Euskara threatened the Basque natives with moral contamination.
At the same time, Arana could not avoid the traditional importance of language as a signifier 
of Basqueness. For centuries the Basques had been singled out by both external observers 
and local intellectuals in virtue of their unique tongue. Hence, language worked as a readily 
available and unmistakable sign of distinctiveness for the local people. Its importance can be 
gauged by considering the self-definition of many Basques who still today name themselves 
Euskaldtinak (sing. Euskaldun), meaning a person who has (-du-n) the Basque language 
(Euskal-).149 Furthermore, the word Euskal-Herria (or Euskalerrfa) has been traditionally 
used by the Basques to define their country.150 It refers -at least in its original sense - to the 
whole of the people who speak Euskara and means the "Country of Euskara" (Euskal-= 
Basque language, -Herri = Country or People).151 Both the terms Euskaldun and Euskal- 
Herria have been used for centuries, long before the advent of nationalism, in order to define 
the collectivity of the Basques through the most visible element of their differentiation, 
language. The term Euskal-Herria appears with different spellings in early Basque literature, 
hence, according to Estomes Lasa (1965) it was already widespread in popular use by the 
Sixteenth century.152 We can define this as a case of pre-modem linguistic ethnicity (Smith, 
ps). Arana's doctrine was directly connected to this pre-existing ethnic base. As nationalists 
ante litteram, the Basques defined themselves through language: according to Campidn, an 
Euskara-speaking Basque would introduce him/herself as "euskalduna naiz" (= I am a 
Basque speaker), rather than mentioning his/her province (cited in Estomes Lasa 1965: 3:
149 This term is often Hispanised as Euskaldunes. Its antiquity is attested by the fact that 
both Strabo and the Latin authors probably coined the name 'Vasconians' as  a  rough translation 
from the local word Euskaldunak (Collins 1986: 32).
150 The term Euskal-Herria  does not have political connotations and is universally accepted 
by all social, cultural and political sectors of Basque society, a s  well as in the rest of Spain. 
The more politically salient term Euskadi is less deep-seated (Jauregui, personal suggestion).
151 Herri means, at the sam e time, 'town', 'country', and 'people'.
152 Its first recorded written usage dates back to 1571, in Leizarraga's preface to the New 
Testam ent in Basque. It subsequently appeared in 1643 in Axular's Gvero and, then, in several 
other works (Estornes Lasa 1965: 3: 25-6). The sh ee r number of local variants of the term 
testify to the adaptation of the word in the several dialects (Estornes Lasa 1965: 3: 27).
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27).
The name invented by Arana, Euzkadi {Euskadi in contemporary batua),153 has gained 
widespread acceptance with the diffusion of nationalism and today is used by non-Basque 
speakers, both in the Basque Country and, to a certain degree, in the rest of Spain. At the 
same time, Euskal-Herria is still preferred by many Euskaldunak.154 However, it is 
important to stress that the winning term, Euzkadi, can be translated as ’the place of the 
Basque race': attaching the prefix -di (locality) to the word Euzko- (= 'the Basque race', 
according to Arana), the new toponym was purposely designed to eliminate the cultural 
component and emphasize community of race.
In recent years, language has gained a prominent position in the definition of who is 
Basque. A measure of the increasingly inclusive character of today's Basque identity is given 
by the emergence of a new term, Euskaldunberri {Euskaldun= Basque-speaker, -berri= 
new). This term began to be used in the mid 1960s, referring to those adults both natives and 
immigrants who were voluntarily learning Euskara, in order to distinguish them from the 
native Euskaldun-zaharra (zaharra = old).155 Rejecting the old dichotomy between 
euskaldunak (Basque-speakers) and erdaldunak (speakers of any other language)156, 
contemporary nationalists have chosen to stress the importance of the "new Basque 
speakers", both immigrants and natives, in order to emphasize their shared participation in 
the making of Euskal-Herria.
With the advent in Nineteenth-century of comparative linguistics and the study of Indo- 
European languages, the radical distinctiveness of the Basques from other European peoples 
was clearly demonstrated by scientific investigation.157 However, in Europe during the last 
century, race soon became associated with language, rather than being opposed to it. That is, 
biology became tied to other human sciences, and, thus, the opposition between nature and 
culture was downplayed, when not nullified. In a time of global changes and widespread
153 In their effort to dissociate them selves from Arana's racialism, present-day language- 
planners have changed the spelling of many of his words, replacing, for instance, the -z  with 
an -s.
154 The political implications of the nationalist nam e, Euzkadi, led to its ban under 
Francoism, while the authorities tolerated the use of the ancient Euskal-Herria.
155 This was also a  result of the success of the ikastolak, a  sem i-clandestine network of 
schools where Euskara was -and still is- the only medium of instruction (see chapter 4).
1 Erdera (Erdara in batua) = any language other than Basque.
157 On the studies on Basque by von Humboldt and Bonaparte, see  Villasante (1979).
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socio-geographical mobility, the desire to re-build ethnic borders was pushed towards the 
extreme of confusing inherited characteristics with acquirable elements, in a desperate attempt 
to limit that very mobility. The Basque intelligentsia was also affected by this European-wide 
shift of perspective. An additional reason was the fact that many international studies of the 
time often quoted the Basques as a distinct race.158 Not only did nationalism and 
modernization appear on the scene together, but racialism soon joined them.
The first nationalist victories.
The first limited electoral victory was achieved by the nationalists in the 1898 provincial 
elections, when Arana himself was elected to the provincial assembly of Vizcaya. In the 1899 
municipal elections, the nationalists won five seats on the city council of Bilbao and three 
other seats in nearby towns. In part, this success was a consequence of the support received 
by the 'Sotistats\ followers of the shipping magnate Ramdn de la Sota. He was then the 
only leading industrialist who openly supported nationalism and his choice determined the 
subsequent evolution of the movement Ideological radicalism periodically erupted from the 
grass-roots, producing minor splits. While the heirs of Arana remained in control of the 
party's ideology, the pragmatists (Sota and other former Euskalerriacos) firmly controlled its 
political praxis. A characteristic of the PNV was thus the continuous tension between these 
two trends. Yet, this tension offered its advantages to the pragmatists, since radicalism was 
an irreplaceable tool of popular mobilization.
In Arana's later life the PNV moved pragmatically from separatism to more moderate 
postures. However, in the 1901 provincial elections the nationalists failed to gain a single 
seat. Arana was jailed for the second time in 1902, when his telegram to President Theodore 
Roosevelt was intercepted. Here, he congratulated the US for having freed Cuba from 
slavery, and praised America's federal system. What can be called Arana's second 
'conversion' from radical separatism to a more compromising and regionalist line was 
probably inspired by the triumph of the moderate Lliga Catalana (1901).159 It may also not
158 On the important contribution by foreign scholars and vascofilos (pro-Basques) to the 
study of the B asques and their culture in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth century, see  
Azcona (1984: 50-ff) and Villasante (1979: 407-16).
159 According to de la Granja (1986: 18), Catalanism began to influence Basque nationalism 
from 1901 onwards. However, Arana did not refer to Catalonia or to Galicia as nations, since 
he considered them to be part of Spain (Corcuera 1979: 188-9). Only the Basques were allowed
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have been a heart-felt decision, but the result of Arana’s desperation in experiencing 
continuous harassment by the central authorities, although he was not ill-treated during his 
prison-terms. Many present-day radical nationalists hold that Arana's moderate 
('espafiolista') evolution was merely a tactical device in order to gain wider popular support 
and the backing of the ruling classes in a period of great crisis for the PNV, while Arana 
never gave up his radical convictions. In his prison meditations, Arana apparently pondered 
about the need for a change, as all political activities of the nationalists were hampered. His 
message "could not spread with the required speed at a time of great travail for the Basque 
nation" (Basaldua 1975: 74-5). "When he emerged from jail, the bureau office had been 
closed, the party was out of money, and his supporters could not have numbered more than 
several hundred" (Clark 1979: 43-4). Arana's health, which had always been precarious, 
soon deteriorated with Addison's disease, which probably attacked his weak body as a 
consequence of the stress. He had to resign as president of the PNV (his place being taken by 
Angel de Zabala). Sabino Arana died on 25 November 1903 at the age of 38. He was long 
remembered among the Basques as a personality of irreprehensible rectitude, courage and 
self-sacrifice. His behaviour remained the model for all his followers.
That year, the PNV won two seats in the Vizcayan provincial assembly. It is somewhat 
ironical that the greatest victories of the nationalists came about only after Arana's death. A 
possible explanation of these late victories is that the party had became less intransigent and 
more pragmatic, as a result of Arana's 'second conversion', and, thus, could attract a wider 
range of supporters. Soon the party became the second political force in Vizcaya, after the 
Conservatives.
In 1906, the mayor of Bilbao was a nationalist. In 1907, the nationalists were relegated to 
third place. That year, the abortive Maura plan for the 'mancomunidades' (see chapter 2) 
failed to reach agreement over the degree of autonomy to be granted to the Basque provinces. 
In 1910, the bureau adopted a new more Catholic-oriented title, Comunion Nacionalista 
Vasca (CNV, Basque Nationalist Communion), and a less loosely organized structure. A 
new nationalist and Catholic union was set up in 1911, the Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos 
(SOV, Solidarity of Basque Workers). Informally linked to CNV, it became strong among
the 'privilege' of separate nationhood.
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railroad workers and, generally, among ethnic Basques.160
Spain's neutrality during the First World War provided an exceptional stimulus for the 
expansion of Basque industry, boosting arms manufacturing, shipping and mining. The 
ensuing wave of economic prosperity brought the first major electoral triumph for the 
nationalists in 1914 which lasted until 1918. However, most of the nationalists’ impact was 
limited to the province of Vizcaya, where they gained an absolute majority of the seats in the 
diputacion, but achieved only marginal results in Guipuzcoa and Navarre.161 The nationalists 
sent a delegation to Versailles in the hope of receiving aid from the Big Four, but to no avail. 
Urbanisation and industrialization continually increased the importance of professionals, 
tradesmen, bureaucrats, administrators, and other sectors who were providing most of the 
PNV’s cadres. However, post-war depression and the example of the Bolshevik revolution 
also led to an increase in labour strife, nourishing an unprecedented fear of Communism. The 
national question was relegated to the background, as the local ruling classes relied on the 
central government to quell working class unrest This situation was reflected in the electoral 
decline of the nationalists. The CNV returned three delegates to the Cortes in the 1919 
parliamentary elections, and in 1920 it only gained one deputy. The crisis fed internal 
dissent, leading to a split and readjustment of the party. The re-emerging party was now 
called PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco = Basque Nationalist Party) and became the 
hegemonic force in Basque politics.
The first Congress of Basque Studies (1918) and the nationalists’ internal
tensions
In 1918, at the height of industrial growth and social change, a group of Basque scholars, 
professionals, politicians, and businessmen gathered in the town of Oiiate (Guipuzcoa) in 
order to form a Basque Studies Society, Eusko Ikaskuntza or Sociedad de Estudios Vascos 
(Urla 1987: 27-60, 1988: 382). They believed that economic growth and social change could 
no longer be left to the hazards of improvisation. After the 1914 industrial boom, more poor
160 In 1933, it assum ed the present-day nam e of Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos - 
Eusko Langille Alkartasuna (STV-ELA).
161 This was obviously due to the differential impact of industrialisation on the other Basque 
provinces. Alava and Navarre remained fundamentally rural. For economic developm ent in 
Guipuzcoa between 1876 and 1915, see  Castells (1987).
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landless labourers were pouring into the industrialized areas. Social problems accumulated on 
a gigantic scale while the state stayed aloof: urban congestion, homelessness, pollution, and 
illness were affecting industrial cities like Bilbao and Renteria. The participants at the first 
Congress of Basque Studies denounced the lack of planning and pleaded for a guiding role 
not only in economic development but also in the management of social change. They 
believed that science and knowledge were powerful tools in achieving such aims. In this 
respect, the founders of Eusko Ikaskuntza were children of the Enlightenment and shared a 
positivist faith in the possibility of influencing - and even directing- socio-political change 
(Urla 1987).
The scientific study of the past was an important step in this direction. History had to be 
rescued from the fetters of nationalist distortion. Language too needed to be re-founded and 
salvaged from purist amateurism. "Authority over language reform had to be wrested away 
from zealous nationalists and handed over to language experts who would guide it according 
to the rigors of modem linguistic methods" (Urla 1988 : 383).162 A foremost proponent of 
this approach was the philologist Julio Urquijo (1871-1950).163 His attacks were directed 
against the Aranists' obsession with a purified language, with its "extravagant etymologies" 
based on "the most grotesque hypotheses" (Urquijo, cited by Urla 1988: 383). The founding 
members and organisers of the Basque Studies Society were acting independently from 
political nationalism. Many non-nationalist intellectuals were interested in the revitalization of 
Basque culture without aiming at an independent state. The Congress represented a clear 
instance of cultural nationalism as a movement autonomous from its political counterpart. 
Yet, it was hardly thinkable that such a Congress could have taken place without the previous 
nationalist victories. Behind the curtains, the feelings aroused by political nationalism gave 
the necessary impetus for many such initiatives to occur.
A Basque Language Academy (Euskaltzaindia or Academia de la Lengua Vasca) was also 
created in 1918 in Ofiate,164 aiming at working not only on the corpus (structure) of Euskara 
but also on its status. That is, the goal was not only to create a proper grammar, syntax, 
lexicon, but also to enhance its social status, in terms of prestige, literacy, publishing, and
162 On the extravagant and am ateurish character of the first euskerilogos, s e e  C orcuera
(1979: 398), Saraso la (1982: 81-3), Villasante (1979: 326).
163 On Urquijo, see  Villasante (1979: 370-ff).
164 On the Academy, see  Euskaltzaindia (1976) and Villasante (1979: 394-8).
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use in academic milieux.165 "From this new perspective, the fate of Basque was seen to 
depend primarily on the nature of its social distribution - who speaks Basque" (Urla 1988: 
383). This was a first departure from Arana's restricted conception of language as an 'ethnic 
barrier'. Urla observes that the concern for language planning "arose in conjunction with a 
host of new social concerns - public health, improving the race (sic), better schools, safety 
in the workplace, social insurance, and urban planning - problems that were emerging in the 
context of deep social and economic transformation.... For this, members of the society 
availed themselves of the latest advances in social scientific research..." (Urla 1988: 383). 
This emphasis reflects a radical shift of perspective from Arana’s defensive nationalism to a 
newly dynamic conception. Now, Basque society "did not so much have to be sheltered 
from contact as it had to be properly managed" (Urla 1988: 384).
In the meanwhile, major contrasts plagued the political field. Following Arana's tough line 
on independence and inspired by the Irish Sinn Fein (Conversi 1993), the radicals separated 
in 1921 from the CNV in order to re-found the party under the historical heading of PNV. 
Their mouthpiece was the journal Aberri (= Fatherland), founded by Luis Arana, and its 
main contributor was Eli Gallastegi (1892-1974), who adopted the nickname of Gudari (= 
warrior) (Elorza 1977, Gallastegi 1993). In 1921, the Spanish police opened fire on a 
peaceful workers' march, indiscriminately killing several attendants. Most of the media 
applauded the police's action, and even mainstream nationalists refused to condemn it. 
Against them, Gallastegi wrote a piece on Aberri calling for solidarity with the workers: 
"There had fallen idealistic men; some men who had struggled and suffered constandy. They 
are the Communists, as earlier there had fallen members of SOV...The bullets that have 
entered their chests seemingly have been lodged in our own hearts. We feel the tragedy as if 
they were our own, because we too, like them, are young, are idealistic, suffer, and are of 
modest condition".166 This piece exemplified a whole trend of Basque nationalism which 
was opposed to the Euskalerrfacos' bourgeois control over the CNV. Inspired by Arana's 
original concern for the welfare of the working class, this trend increasingly developed into a 
more articulated anti-capitalist ideology and remained crucial when, finally, Basque 
nationalism turned towards Marxism in the 1960s.167
165 w e  introduce here Heinz Kloss' distinction between corpus planning and status planning 
(Kloss 1967).
166 Eli Gallastegi, Fiesta de sangre, reprinted in Ortzi (1975: 169). S ee  also Espinosa 
(1993: 108-ff.).
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It is important to stress the fact that this and other splits occurred under the banner of a 
comeback to Arana's original principles: Arana left a legacy of contradictions and 
ambivalences that sowed the seeds of future nationalist fragmentation. Each of the opposing 
forces within the nationalist field claimed to be the true heir of Arana's ideal, be that in its 
moderate or in its radical form, in its anti-capitalist overtones or in its rapprochement with the 
industrialists, in its emphasis on language or in its stress on religion, and so on.
Under Primo de Rivera
The precepts elaborated by Arana dominated the PNV right up to the Civil War. From 
Arana's death until 1931, there is no relevant ideological evolution within Basque 
nationalism. According to Garcia Venero (1968: 315), the few ideological cleavages which 
emerged answered solely to tactical considerations.168 At the local level, the PNV was 
generous in its alliances with other parties and independent candidates. Most coalition 
partners were moderate or right-wing businessmen, theocrats and conservatives. The PNV 
always remained hostile to the Socialists, due to the latter's centralizing trends, professed 
atheism, and control of the immigrants' vote through class politics.
Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923-1930) forced both the PNV and the CNV into 
clandestine activity. The nationalist journal Aberri (Fatherland) and other independent 
publications were suppressed. Gallastegui fled to Ireland. Under such conditions, the 
nationalist torch was carried by a few groups around the PNV, the most important of which 
were the mendigoitzales or mountaineering groups, which Gallastegui himself helped to 
establish, inspired by the organisative structure of the Sinn Fein (Ortzi 1975: 176-7). "High 
atop some remote mountain, the Basque alpinists could meet safely, far from Spanish police 
scrutiny, and discuss politics freely" (Clark 1979: 51).169 
As in the case of most dictatorships worldwide, the stronger the repression, the more the
167 Many of ETA's founders were inspired by the works of Gallastegui, which they discussed 
in informal meetings.
168 For instance, the splits between the confessional and the secular, or betw een the 
dem ocrats and the liberals inside the party. Even the contrast between the CNV and the re­
founded PNV was based, not on an alternative to Arana's principles, but on a  different em phasis 
on independence or autonomy.
169 In the next chapter we will observe how important were these  -and kindred- societies 
as  forms of resistance to Francoism, especially in Catalonia. In Euskadi they soon assum ed a 
paramilitary form and in the 1960s they becam e a fertile ground for ETA recruiting.
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nationalist feelings received a boost. At the fall of Primo de Rivera (1930), both Catalan and 
Basque nationalism emerged with renewed vigour, reinforced by years of secrecy. 
Furthermore, the clandestine condition emphasized the importance of culture, since informal 
cultural and folkloric groupings were the only outlet available to express national sentiments, 
all political activities being banned. The non-violent precepts of Sabino Arana held the field, 
as he had counselled not to meet repression with open resistance, confidently assuming that 
democracy would prevail. He himself suggested that in times of trouble the Basques could 
retreat to the safe haven of their mountainous terrain and to the "mental sanctuary of then- 
ancient culture" (Clark 1979: 50).170
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the fall of Primo de Rivera prompted the principal 
antimonarchical parties to meet in San Sebastian where they set the base for a forthcoming 
Provisional Government. Although the nationalists did not directly participate in the pact, 
Basque and Catalan Republicans wrung a promise of regional autonomy from other 
Republican groups (Granja 1986: 19-23).
In the meanwhile the nationalists healed their wounds, agreeing to reunite their two wings 
(Aberri and CNV) under the banner of PNV (Granja 1986: 30-35). The dictatorship had 
helped to unite the different souls of Basque nationalism and mobilize even wider sectors 
(Estomes Zubizarreta 1990). The uppermost echelons of Basque nationalism held an 
assembly in Vergara (1930), where a new generation of political leaders emerged unsullied 
by former political rivalries (Granja 1986: 48-ff).171 What united them was a comeback to 
pure Aranist principles, only toning down separatism. Under the revived motto JEL, race and 
religion were firmly confirmed as the bastions of Basquehood. Hence, two weeks later a 
fringe group of disaffected leftists broke away to form the secular Republican Action  
Nacionalista Vasca (ANV, or Euzko Abertzale Ekintza).m  The latter's anti-clerical stand 
condemned it to play a marginal role in regional politics, yet its ideological impact would 
become relevant for later generations (Granja 1986: 601-13).173
170 "Basques must not engage in open rebellion, but simply continue the slow, steady 
p ressure of cultural resistance, wearing away the chains of tyranny" (Arana, cited by Clark 
1979: 47).
171 T hese included Jos6  Antonio Aguirre, the party's President and future leh en d akari 
(President of the Basque Government in exile), the barrister Manuel Irujo, and the lawyer Jos6  
Marfa Leizaola.
172 According to De la Granja, ANV w as more properly a nationalist party, in opposition to 
the PNV, which subordinated its nationalism to the religious question (Granja 1986: 606).
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Basque nationalism under the Republic
In the municipal elections of April 1931 the PNV ran a slate with the Carlists. In the June 
parliamentary elections, this coalition won 15 of the 24 seats reserved to the four provinces at 
the Cortes Constituyentes (parliamentary assembly) (Granja 1986: 180-229, Payne 1975: 
122). But the anti-clerical legislation passed by the Cortes provoked acrimonious debate 
among the nationalists and led to an irreparable split with the Carlists. In reaction to state- 
sanctioned secularism, the latter developed increasingly integralist trends which finally led 
them to ally with the far right. In the 1933 parliamentary elections, the PNV -running solo- 
became the largest party in the region, gaining 12 of the 24 Cortes seats (Granja 1986: 397- 
437). This was the "greatest ballot-box triumph" in the PNV's history (Payne 1975: 134). 
Even more astonishing, a proposed autonomy statute was supported in a plebiscite by 84% 
of the voters throughout the three provinces, with a turnout of 87% of eligible voters (Granja 
1986: 394-6).174 The latter was "the highest for any context in Spanish history" (Payne 
1975: 133-4). However, the disengagement of the Carlist Party from the alliance made 
possible a victory of the right wing coalition CEDA in Madrid (see chapter 2).
Since the anti-nationalist Right came to power, the PNV switched from anti-Republican 
rhetoric to bolster the Left. This shift proved counter-productive in electoral terms as the 
party lost votes in 1936, going from 12 to 7 seats in the Cortes (Granja 1986: 554). This 
again testifies to the all-pervasive strength of religion in Euskadi and suggests that any 'nod 
and a wink' towards the Left would have a price to be paid. The PNV articulated Basque 
hostility towards Republican secularism, as its support was based on the Catholic vote. Yet, 
the PNV was also a Republican party, whilst its Catholic commitment pitted it firmly against 
other forces of the Left, especially Marxist ones. The torch of radicalism was carried by Luis 
de Arana's new journal, Jagi-Jagi (= Arise). Most of its articles were a restatement of
173 For instance, ANV attacked the racist trends prevailing in PNV's rank and file. For the 
first time, a  nationalist party declared that the immigrants could be accepted  a s  Basques, 
although it also expressed  resentm ent at their moral habits (Granja 1986: 601-613). ANV 
rejected Arana's foralist idea of a  loose Confederation of provinces and opted for a  centralized 
Basque state. However, it drew its support from the sam e urban liberal middle c lasses  which 
backed the PNV (Ortzi 1975: 176-7). The creation of ANV w as inspired by the federalist 
thought of Antoni Rovira i Virgili and by the foundation of Accid Catalans, a  splinter group 
from the Lliga (Granja 1986: 18).
174 Dominated by the Carlists, Navarre defected, rejecting the autonomy draft (Blinkhorn 
1974, Granja 1986: 289-95).
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Sabino's sayings, mottos and principles. The journal implemented its radical stance devoting 
more attention to working class' aspirations. Many young writers argued in the journal's 
columns that proletarian struggle and national emancipation should go hand in hand. Back 
from his Irish exile, Gallastegui resumed his contributions (Elorza 1977). Jagi-Jagi's 
constant critique of capitalism was to be intended as an attack against capital's concentration 
into a few hands; in principle, it was not a struggle against private ownership of the means of 
production (Zirakzadeh 1991).
In the 1930s, with Jesuit support, the PNV became almost a confessional party at a time 
when secularism held sway in the rest of the state. This prompted accusations by sectors of 
the Left that a concordat between Euskadi and the Vatican was imminent and Indalecio Prieto, 
the Socialist leader, denounced the plan to establish a 'Vatican Gibraltar' (Hills 1970: 151). 
Yet, the Basque clergy committed itself to the Republican cause. This infuriated Franco's 
authorities, who, before the end of the Civil War, ordered the execution of 16 priests and 
monks. A similar kind of indiscriminate repression led many Basque priests and monks to 
join the ranks of ETA in the 1960s. It was not a complete accident that the Basque Country 
received a statute of autonomy from the Republic in December 1936, only months before the 
outbreak of the Civil War. This occurred after three different statutes had been proposed 
between 1930 and 1936 and all but the last one failed to be approved (Castells 1976). The 
main reason for this failure was anti-Republican opposition from Alava and Navarre (Aguirre 
1991).
As soon as the autonomous government was installed, local administration was fully 
reorganized making the region "the most orderly, least revolutionary part of Republican 
Spain during the next nine months. Revolutionary excesses and atrocities... were brought 
under control [and Vizcaya]... enjoyed greater political harmony than any other part of the 
Republican zone. Under the nationalist hegemony, direct conflict was largely averted, and 
relations with the Communists and other leftist groups were generally amicable" (Cortada 
1982: 78).
During the Civil War, the Basques supplied the Republicans with some of their most 
effective troops. In 1937, German planes of the Condor Legion -sent to bolster the Francoist 
insurgents- bombed the town of Guernica on a market day, partially razing it to the ground
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sectors this crisis differed from the one experienced in other countries, and its effect in 
Euskadi took a particularly heavy toll: large industries were the main pillar of the Basque 
economy. As branch plants of multinational corporations dominated, Euskadi was severely 
struck by the international crisis and many factories had to close down (Zirakzadeh 1989: 
321). When the international economy slumped in the 1970s, Euskadi was badly hit because 
of the relevance of its export sector and the specialization in metallurgy and capital goods. 
Small and big industries alike found themselves without customers. Hence, "oscillation with
international demand lead to wave of popular support for nationalist parties that aim to
protect the semi-peripheral areas from external economic pressures" (Zirakzadeh 1989:323).
Yet, wide ranging economic change had already occurred in the 1880s, but did not prompt 
a violent reaction. Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa were the poorest Spanish provinces in 1877. In a 
few years, they became the richest, creating both social discontent and demographic 
displacement. The virulent anti-Spanish tones of Arana concealed the rage of many Basques, 
yet such rage was, for the moment, simply channelled through a non-violent nationalist 
movement. Still in 1973, Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa held the first and third place respectively 
amongst all Spanish provinces in term of per capita income.513 Moreover, the economic 
crisis occurred approximately ten years after ETA had adopted armed struggle. Undoubtedly, 
violence rose to a new peak in the wake of the economic doldrums, when unemployment, 
recession and their corollary reinforced social tensions. For instance, between 1975 and 1981 
the adult labour force shrank by 11% and Euskadi's gross product had a negative growth rate 
for three successive years (Zirakzadeh 1989: 327). ETA took advantage of these negative 
circumstances. But a convincing reason for the increase of violence could hardly be given on 
the basis of the economic situation alone. Undoubtedly, the electoral programme of Herri 
Batasuna (the political wing of ETA) included powerful appeals to the economically 
dispossessed "through the use of pictorial representations of shovels, anvils and pitchforks", 
constantly alluding "to its candidates’ firsthand experiences with unemployment layoffs and 
insecure jobs" (Zirakzadeh 1989: 328). Theories of 'relative deprivation1 can be partly useful 
to explain this outcome. But, again, it seems better to consider the economic situation as a 
powerful reinforcing factor rather than as a determinant of the choice of violence.
513 See Garcfa Crespo et al. (1981) and Payne (1975: 229-33).
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and slaughtering hundreds of people. The event, immortalized by Picasso, shocked 
international public opinion. It was history's first aerial bombardment on a civilian 
population. Pressured by a world-wide outcry, the Francoists denied any responsibility.
Autonomy lasted just nine months, as Bilbao was captured by the Spanish 'nationalist' 
troops in June 1937. The short-lived statute was immediately abrogated, and all political 
parties suppressed.
Conclusion
This chapter has served to illustrate the congenital fragmentation of Basque nationalism, its 
origin as a response to modernization, and the importance assumed in Basque society by 
religion, race and other elements prior to the Civil War. It also showed the central role of 
Sabino de Arana in the birth of nationalism and his agglutinating force. Initially, Arana's 
nationalism was a nostalgic re-assertion of ancient values. As a person, he reflected in 
himself the dramatic tensions of his time. Since change was radical, the reaction of many 
Basques was a desperate rejection of all things modem and a plunge into cherished 
memories, creating a ditch between the present and the past. What distinguishes Arana from 
the main Catalan nationalists is his single-handed arbitrarity. He is the inventor of virtually all 
the key symbols of modem Basque nationalism. No Catalan nationalist can be credited for 
having similarly invented the main 'esthetic' symbols of Catalanism.17^  Catalanist ideology 
evolved slowly and steadily from Almirall to Prat, and thereafter. On the contrary, Arana 
formulated Basque symbolism ex-nihil, drawing uniquely from a pre-existing foralist and 
Carlist tradition.
This and the previous chapters have shown that ethnic nationalism is the result of both 
modernization and state-enforced assimilation. Very few scholars of nationalism still defend 
the assumption that modernization -with its concomitant processes - can erode ethnic identity. 
However, we have also seen that full-blown nationalism was related to cultural displacement 
and assimilation, rather than simple modernization. In this sense, nationalism was a radical 
response to the attack on ethnic values, culture, and identity carried out by the state. Although 
in times of democracy nationalism often rests on the cultural heritage of the nation - and it is
175 Many such symbols, such a s  the Catalan flag or anthem , pre-existed nationalism,
although it is only with the latter that they received their modern political meaning.
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especially strong where the ethnic language is maintained (Clark 1981,1984) the crucial 
role is played by hitherto assimilated elites (the intellectuals), and, later, by disaffected 
modernizers (the intelligentsia). Basque language was lost far and wide to these regional 
elites as they were fully assimilated into the dominant Castilian culture. This is especially true 
for Arana and his acolytes, as well as for all those who retained a sense of Basque identity 
without retaining tangible aspects of Basque culture. In the process, they had virtually to re­
create it from scratch. In the case of Catalonia, the nationalist elites were at least bilingual. 
Though they fully mastered Castilian, most of them knew how to express themselves 
properly in Catalan. Hence, cultural nationalism could thrive in Catalonia, whereas it could 
hardly take-off in Euskadi.
One of the contrasts between the two lies in their different assimilative power, and in the 
way the latter is perceived by the respective intellectuals and intelligentsia. The racial choice 
of Arana was due especially to a 'pessimistic' (but also traditionalist) disbelief in the capacity 
to conceive Basque culture in assimilative terms. Many ethnonationalist elites in Western 
Europe learned the ethnic tongue only after their nationalist 'conversion'. Most of them were 
-and are- raised in either dominant monolingual environments or imperfectly bilingual ones. 
Only later did they engage in the recovery of the ethnic culture.
Furthermore, we have to remember that both early Catalan and Basque nationalists 
encountered apathy in rural areas where the language was still widely spoken. In these areas, 
which normally bolstered the Carlists, the defence of the ethnic tongue was not an object of 
mobilizations. In times of rapid urbanization, it was seen rather as an annoying obstacle to 
geographical and social mobility. Like most modem nationalisms, Basque nationalism was 
bom as a typically urban phenomenon. Industrialism, urbanization, increased state control, 
the abolition of local rights and laws, and, in particular, immigration from Castile, produced 
an explosive situation that was later to find its political expression through nationalism. 
Modernization was a "challenge to Basque identity and as such it needed to be tackled, and 
only nationalism could provide the tool for such a task" (Payne 1975). Paradoxically, its full 
success came about nearly a century later, in the 1980s. Today, both Basque and Catalan 
nationalism can be counted amongst the most popular recent examples of nation-making in 
Western Europe. The next two chapters will chart this evolution.
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Chapter 4
EUSKADI: DICTATORSHIP, RESISTANCE and 
RESURRECTION
In this chapter, I shall focus my analysis on the 1950s and 1960s. This was the period 
when a new nationalist movement slowly emerged which departed sharply from Aranist neo­
traditionalism. The period of greatest interest begins in 1952, the date of the formation of the 
first radical student grouping, and lasts up to about 1970, when all significant ideological 
debate ceased. Yet, it is after 1970 that the message began to spread among the general 
population. Before coming to the 1950s, I shall address the historical and structural factors 
which brought about this radical change. The chapter's data is drawn from both secondary 
and primary sources (the writings of the nationalist leaders, newspaper excerpts and 
magazine quotations).
The darkest years
Beltza (1977) divides the period which followed the imposition of Francoist centralization 
into four phases:
1.1939-45 (Exile and Clandestine Activity), when the nationalist government in exile was 
in a precarious position due to the possibility of an Axis victory and to the Nazi occupation of 
Northern France.
2. 1945-47 (The Golden Years), when the Basque Republicans tried to channel Allied 
action against fascism in the aftermath of World War n.
3.1948-52 (The Fall), with the onset of the Cold War and the tacit rehabilitation of Franco 
as a potential bulwark against Soviet influence.
4. 1953-60 (The New Nationalism), parallel to the radicalization of the youth, with the 
slow fossilization of the PNV after the opening of Franco's Spain to the West.
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From 1939 to 1945, the Basque Country was subjected to a regime of state terror with no 
parallel in Basque history. Once they had occupied the Basque provinces, Franco's troops 
initiated a vindictive campaign of repression against any sign of Basque identity. Even the 
most innocuous aspects of popular culture, such as dance and music, were subjected to 
constant suspicion, inquiry, and proscription.176 A sketchy picture of this repression, which 
paralleled the Catalan one, is included in a message to UNESCO written in 1952 by Josd 
Antonio Aguirre (1904-1960). The then president of the Basque Govemment-in-exile 
denounced the following misdeeds: "Closure of the Basque University...Occupation by 
armed force of the libraries of social and cultural associations.. .Mass burning of books in 
Euskera.. .Elimination of all use of Euskera in schools, on radio broadcasts, in all public 
gatherings and in all publication. Suppression of Basque cultural societies.. .of all magazines, 
periodicals and reviews in Euskera. Prohibition to use Euskera.. .in the celebration of the 
Mass and in other religious ceremonies. Decree requiring the translation into Spanish of all 
Basque names in civil registries and other official documents..., official directive mandating 
the removal from tombstone and funeral markers of all inscriptions in Euskera..." (Aguirre, 
in Beltza 1977:134-6 and Clark 1979: 137).177
The ensuing atrocities were so disturbing that the Carlist supporters of Franco could no 
longer tolerate them and intervened to stem the actions of the vigilante squads (Clark 1979: 
82). In the very first years after the Civil War, innumerable people were imprisoned or 
executed on the pretext of promoting 'separatism'. The number of exiles ranged from 
100,000 to 150,000, more than 20,000 of whom were children (Legarreta 1984). A Basque 
diaspora spread throughout France, Latin America, and other Western countries. At the same 
time, the oligarchic bourgeoisie sided with Franco, thereby stamping a sinister class mark on 
state repression (Espinosa 1989, Zirakzadeh 1991).
From 1945 to 1947, in the aftermath of the World War, the Basque Republicans tried to 
drag the Allies into opposition against the dictatorship. The above message by Aguirre, 
written when Spain was knocking on UNESCO's door, is a good example of the 
international pressures which the Basque govemment-in-exile tried to exert. Overall, their 
impact was limited. In 1945, a Basque Consultative Council (Consejo Consultative Vasco) 
was set up in exile as an alliance of the most important Basque parties and labour unions, 
both leftists and nationalists. The Council was charged with coordinating the action of a
176 On Basque dance as  a  symbol of national identity, see  Lamarca (1976).
177 On the repression of Euskara, s e e  Nufiez (1977), Urrutia (1977) and Euskaltzaindia
(1 9 7 7).
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Resistance Committee {Junta de Resistencia) inside Spanish territory. The Resistance 
Committee announced a strike on 1 May 1947. As 75 percent of the workers in Vizcaya 
answered the call, the government reacted with a state of siege and the successful 
mobilization slowly died out. This experience taught the activists that an alliance between the 
nationalists and the Left was capable of mobilizing large sectors of the working class, though 
it failed to ignite other classes and spread to other regions. Nationalism had demonstrated its 
ability to unite broad sectors of society, transcending class divisions and withstanding harsh 
repression. Moreover, during the workers' mobilization, a younger generation started to 
assume leadership roles in the movement (Clark 1979:104-6).
The Basque youth had previously attempted an ephemeral political experience. A Society of 
Basque Students (Euzko Ikasle Alkartasuna, EIA) was set up in the 1940s as an apolitical 
association with its main seat in Leiden, The Netherlands. In 1947 they started to hold 
political meetings in the French Basque Country, but soon their activity began to spill over 
across the Spanish border, where they distributed clandestine leaflets and journals. The 
organization was easily uncovered by the Spanish police and in 1951 all its leaders were 
either arrested or forced to go into exile, leaving EIA completely dismantled. The rapidity 
with which the police dealt this fatal blow taught them a bitter lesson as they vowed never to 
again act except in complete secrecy.178 It was the year 1951. In this year a general strike in 
Bilbao signalled the end of the Resistance Committee. The strike was successful, but, as a 
consequence, "the repression imposed from Madrid was so intense that the network of 
clandestine cells within Spain was left in ruins" (Clark 1984: 23). At the same time, the 
Western powers withdrew their support of the Basque government in exile, dominated by the 
PNV. Thus, the Basque Country, and especially the nationalists, faced a desperate isolation 
and most of them plunged into a sense of hopelessness.
From 1947 onward, with the onset of the Cold War, the Francoists succeeded in slowly 
coming in from the cold. Clark (1979: 93-102) offers a good description of the precedents 
and the subsequent steps which led to the overture of the US towards Franco's regime, lured 
by the possibility of opening a military base in the peninsula.17^  Spain became successively a 
member of the World Health Organization (1951), UNESCO (1952), and UNO (1955). In 
1953, Spain signed a bilateral treaty with the United States and a Concordat with the Vatican. 
Thus, the Basques were amongst the several illustrious victims of the Cold War. The failure
178 Interview with Txillardegi (quoted in Ibarz&bal 1978: 362). S ee  also Ibarzabal, Eugenio
(1978) Asf nacid ETA, "Muga", n2 1, 1979, pp. 77-89.
179 On Basque refugees, especially children, see  Legarreta (1984, 1985).
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of Western democracies, especially Great Britain and the US, to isolate and exert pressures 
on the regime "led the Basques to conclude that they could not depend on outside assistance" 
(Clark 1979: 80).180 This is one of the crucial features which helps to explain the birth of 
ETA less than ten years later.
From Ekin to ETA (1952-1959)
The PNV, who had played a key role under the Republic, seemed now incapable of 
responding to the new challenges and became increasingly de-legitimised. Its forced idleness 
and prudent attitude contrasted with growing nationalist unrest among the youth.181 In the 
1950s, the Basque economy was still at a standstill. But towards the end of the decade, it 
started to undergo a phase of expansion. As a result, many Basques, including traditional 
PNV supporters, began to prosper and benefit from the regime's policies. Fearful of 
government repression, most PNV members appeared to be less interested than ever in 
Basque nationalism, except in promoting marginal cultural events and folkloric activities. 
However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the PNV's passivity. In 1956 a World Basque 
Congress was held in Paris to celebrate the twentieth Anniversary of the Basque 
government.182 Financed by exiled Basque businessmen, 363 persons from all political 
leanings were invited to participate (except the Communists, who were excluded in a further 
attempt to please the Americans). It has been remarked that "never before had there been such 
a gathering of the Basque intellectuals and political elite" (Clark, in Aguirre 1991:13). But all 
this activity was carried out abroad and the Basques within the country descended into a state 
of utter despair.
This situation inevitably created a generational crisis. Tired of the general impasse but also 
frustrated by the "obsolete" PNV's ideology, a group of university students in Bilbao started 
to hold weekly meetings to study and discuss Basque history and culture. In the beginning, 
in 1952, there were only six or seven of them, all in their early twenties.183 This clandestine 
activity "uncovered for them an unknown world which [state] terrorism under Franco had
180 Before this, the US government refused admission to refugees from the Spanish Civil War 
(Legarreta 1985: 194-6, Clark 1979: 91). Hence most of them chose to live in Venezuela, 
Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina.
1&1 The lehendakari Jo se ' Antonio Aguirre recognized that, at a  time of general disillusion, 
"one of the most consoling phenomena in the last 16 years... has been the enthusiastic adhesion 
of the Basque youth to the ideals of freedom for their people” (cited by Jauregui 1981: 75).
182 Its four sections were: Politics, Culture, Socio-Economic Aspects, and Basque Diaspora.
183 Different sources give different nam es and estim ates for Ekin's early m embers. Some 
authors (them selves early members) mention a handful participants in Ekin's sem inars (i.e., 
Kemen, 1964, in Documentos Y, vol. 1, p. 434), other claim they were a  dozen.
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relegated to the category of a non-existent reality. Thus, in their readings they discovered 
Basque nationalism and anti-Francoist resistance. Their formative period was relatively long 
and intense..." (Jauregui 1986: 571).184 An irregular bulletin, Ekin (= To do), which gave 
its name to the group, was their underground organ.185 At the beginning the PNV was kept 
in the dark about their existence. For four years they secretly and ardently worked as self- 
taught persons, confining themselves to purely intellectua1 tasks.186 But their activities were 
eventually 'discovered' by the PNV, an inevitable outcome, since all of them were raised in 
nationalist families. The reception was cool, circumspect and ridden with mutual 
incomprehensions.
Another group also maintained a modest amount of political activity. This was EGI (Euzko 
Gastedi del Interior), the youth cell of the PNV. Ekin members worked hard to keep in 
touch and join forces with the latter. They succeeded for a while (1956-59), when Ekin and 
EGI united under the PNV's patronage. Since the intellectual level of the Ekin components 
was far higher than that of EGI's, the PNV assigned to the former the task of educating the 
latter. At the same time, the fusion with EGI presented the previously isolated intellectuals of 
Ekin with a unique opportunity to spread their political credo to wider numbers of young 
activists. EGI membership consisted of local militants, most of whom lived in small towns 
and villages within the Basque cultural heartland. At that time, the EGI activists were just 
beginning to operate more or less in broad day light since repressive measures had been 
partially lifted. As EGI's activities were purely nostalgic, 'folkloric' and had scarcely any 
intellectual impact, they could be tolerated by the regime.188 But this mixture of inoffensive
184 At the beginning, they read exclusively nationalist textbooks, [such as  Arana, Eleizalde 
and Aranzadi,] all of which were outlawed and very difficult to obtain. "What united them was a 
lively aw areness of national oppression, a  g reat interest for the B asque language - the 
majority of them ignored it and would learn it [later]...- and an ethnic vision of Euskadi" (Ortzi 
1977: 279).
185 For the first meetings only seven copies, plus the original, were printed [in offset] for 
exclusive internal consumption (Documentos Y, vol. 1, p. 434), but in a few years the demand 
grew rapidly.
188 Despite the nam e (Ekin  m eans to do), their actions did not contem plate any direct 
intervention in political life. They even reproached the PNV youth sections for being too active 
and 'inconsiderate' (Ibarzabal, Eugenio, Asf nacid ETA..., op. cit.).
187 From this moment onwards the scholar is faced with twin materials and diametrically 
opposed versions of the events, one by the m oderates (PNV), the other by the radicals (Ekin). It 
is a  hard task to draw an objective balance between the two.
188 S ee  Docum entos Y, vol. 1, p. 76 (Notas a los 'Cuadernos de Ekin'). The older 
generation  subsequen tly  reversed  the accusation , blaming the Ekin group for being 
'culturalists'. Thus, the PNV leader Jestis  Solaun recalled that "our problem with them [was] to 
dem and that they did something more than the promotion of Euskara and the study of history... 
By that time, Ekin w as nothing more than a  group dedicated to intellectual labour; they did not 
admit anybody, neither agreed to do illegal works, since they did not want to arouse police 
suspicions". See Solaun, J . (1980) Memorias de antifascismo, "M u g a ", 3, pp. 35-46. While
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'openness' and 'folklorism' appeared to be a serious problem to Ekin members who were 
much more ambitious. Furthermore, the only partially clandestine character of the 
organization posed a threat to their personal safety and their freedom of speech.189
Reciprocal accusations between the PNV and Ekin-EGI of being American agents became 
increasingly frequent after what was perceived as the great American betrayal.190 In the past, 
Aguirre had been a firm friend of the US and an admirer of American society to the point that 
he beheved that his party was liable to receive the same kind of American protection enjoyed 
by other European Christian Democratic parties (Aguirre !991).191 During the 1940s, the 
PNV's Servicios, an inteUigence organization set up during the war to provide the Allies 
with data, stiU used to pass secret information on the internal situation of Spain to the 
American services. Since the pro-American stance of the PNV remained unchanged over the 
years (SuHivan 1988: 31), many nationalists had serious reasons to worry that the 
information which the Servicios was passing to the Americans was in turn given to Franco.
Furthermore, the excessivety zeaious control exercised by the PNV over the youth soon 
became a hindrance to Ekin's own evolution. The spontaneous character of Ekin and its 
enthusiastic attitude made it hard to contid, thereby arousing the mistrust of the nationaiist 
old guard. When in 1959 Ekin definitivdy broke off its aHiance with the PNV, it took with it 
most of the EGI youth.
The disappointing encounter with the peneuvistas (PNV cadres) contrasted with the 
ideahzation of nationalism during Ekin's formative years. The conservative contro1 of the old 
generation "coHided head-on with the mentality of the members of Ekin, who had been 
accustomed... to reasoning in a search for an answer to afi questions" (Jauregui !986: 572,
Ekin accused the PNV of 'folklorism', the PNV accused Ekin of 'intellectualism', not really a 
compliment in the reactionary atm osphere of those years (Moran 1982: 268).
189 In the 1950s, the regime felt secure enough to relax repression and its grip on Basque 
activities. Nevertheless, secrecy was still a  must for any committed abertzale. Ekin worked 
in the most secretive conditions and its members were bonded by an oath of total silence over 
their activities (Ibarz&bal 1979: 78). Som e of their early docum ents concluded with the 
following sen ten ce: irakurri ta gero erre egizu (= read it and then burn it). Euskara was 
rightly deem ed to be an extremely difficult tongue to learn by the 'oppressors'. Its use in ETA's 
internal communications has prompted the Spanish police to set special courses of Euskara for 
their forces quartered in the region. Its significance as  a  'secret' language and as  one of the key 
m eans of entering the inner sanctuary of B asque activism is debatable. The mastering of 
Euskara also has an initiatory component which allows the neophyte to penetrate the holiest of 
holies of the organization. However, learning the language is not mandatory and many members 
can barely understand it.
190 w hen the level of tension further arose, som e PNV leaders used to blame the Ekin group 
of being Communists. Similar accusations and other epithets were part of a  demonization 
propaganda espoused by the old leaders, at a time when Ekin w as still far away from any 
Marxist leanings.
191 On Aguirre's pro-Americanism, see  Ortzi (1975: 259-71) and Aguirre (1991).
EUSKADI: DICTATORSHIP, RESISTANCE and RESURRECTION 116
1981: 81). Perez-Agote (1984) describes this as a generation break in the face of the alleged 
inactivity of their predecessors.192 The PNV had a very bad press in most radical 
propaganda, but kept its support among the baserritarrak (farmers). Hence, the accusation 
that it was a bourgeois party is only a partial truth. The lack of open channels of 
communication and the secretive environment of those years were an ideal recipe for 
misunderstandings.
The PNV was then behaving as little more than a neo-traditionalist group, since it saw 
’Basque festivals and cultural events as, in themselves, directly political activities’. Its ideas 
of culture and nation had to be articulated in a fairly static, conservative and folkloric way so 
as not to arouse the suspicions of the regime. In contrast, Ekin members were not only 
committed revivalists, anxious that Basque culture be saved and preserved, but were also 
eager to promote it to the rank of expressive means of a modem community. This goal could 
only be achieved by political means and, since during the dictatorship this was not an option, 
it had to be worked out along clandestine lines. That is, since political constrictions hampered 
any possibility of cultural self-expression, the 'culturalists' had both to devise strategies of 
cultural maintenance and to wage a secret struggle to change the order of things.
The 'emerging' generation was young enough to be impatient with the inertia of their 
fathers, but old enough to remember the atrocities committed by Madrid after the fall of the 
Republic. They could neither forgive nor forget these atrocities, nor the impending menace of 
destruction of the Basque heritage. At the same time, they could not wait for formal niceties 
nor permit the bureaucratic fetters placed by the PNV on any spontaneous initiatives. They 
therefore decided to take the serious personal risk of organizing active resistance against the 
regime. Probably, much of the PNV members' aloofness and distrust for the Ekin group 
stemmed from their concern about the danger of such a choice, since it acted as a magnet for 
much of their children. With the experience of the Civil War and its endless atrocities still 
fresh in their memory, the old generation was terrified by the prospects that their children and 
country might undergo a similar fate. The leaders of Ekin reacted to this invitation to 
prudence by radicalizing their posture with a juvenile defiance which bordered on a belief in 
immortality.19^
192 o n e  of ETA"s ideologues synthesized the problem a s  follows: "They [the old nationalists] 
had obtained something. We cannot deny that they won an autonomous government during the 
Republic. Even if not much, this was something, hence they vigorously defended it to their teeth 
in front of the new generation who was beginning to call them to account for their inaction. But 
they did not realize that the Autonomy Statute w as part of a  body called the Second Spanish 
Republic and that, with the latter's death, the Statute was buried along with it. Thus, they were 
wishing to keep alive the member of a  putrescent body" (Krutwig 1963: 11).
EUSKADI: DICTATORSHIP, RESISTANCE and RESURRECTION 117
The main leader and intellectual figure of the group was Txillardegi (Josd Luis Alvarez 
Emparanza). Txillardegi, then a 23-year-old engineering student and a member of the Basque 
Language Academy, wrote several prize-winning novels in Euskara and rarely used Castilian 
in any of his writings. Other founding members were Julen K. Madariaga, Jos6 Mari Benito 
del Valle, Jos6 Manuel Aguirre, and Jon Nicolas, who later were among ETA's founders and 
le a d e rs .1 People like Txillardegi felt that the very existence of the Basques was under 
threat
Ekin expanded through personal contacts with friends and trustworthy acquaintances, 
especially in the rural heartland where the preservation of Basque culture was regarded as a 
guarantee of loyalty and anti-regime feelings. Since the beginning, the group had considered 
the possibility of armed actions as both the means to defeat Francoism and to revitalize a 
nation on the verge of losing its cultural identity. This second aspect, the idea of violence as a 
redeeming and regenerating force, was to take root slowly, almost imperceptibly and 
steadily. Its most ardent proponent was Madariaga, who defined Basque resistance as a form 
of anti-colonial struggle. The use of violence had been sporadically advocated as early as the 
1940s (Garmendia and Elordi 1982: 174-ff.). However, the leadership of Ekin was more 
prone to follow Arana's mandate of passive resistance at a time in which the echoes of 
Gandhism still rebounded.195
The single greatest intellectual influence on the formation of the Ekin group, particularly on 
Txillardegi, came from French existentialism.196 The later support of Jean Paul Sartre for 
the Basque cause, with his sincere sympathy for ETA's 'liberation struggle', is highly 
significant on this respect197 The first 'philosophical' seminaris at the University of Deusto
193 Personal observation by William Douglass.
194 Ibarz&bal, Eugenio (1978) Asf nacid ETA , "Muga", ns 1, 1979, page 78, mentions also G 
Ansola, M Barandiaran, A Irigoyen, R Albisu, I Larramendi and I Gainzarain a s  first members of 
Ekin. According to Ibarz&bal, the latter exercised the main influence. However, this list is not 
fully reliable, and we have to compare it with other ones. The most reliable data is probably the 
testimony of the protagonists included in Documentos Y, vol. 1, which gives us the following 
list: Benito del Valle, Txillardegi, Agirre, Madariaga, Larramend, Albisu, and others who is 
"better not to mention" (in Kem en, p. 434). Garcia de Cortazar and Montero (1983: 1: 259) 
mention Aguirre, Del Valle, Gainzarain, Madariaga and Txillardegi.
195 Only a  few years later, ETA reversed these  assum ptions holding that "non violent 
m ethods do not seem  to yield results except under relatively honest regimes. Gandhi achieved 
[Indian] independence from the British socialists, not from a  Franco or a  Stalin" {Zutik - 
Tercera Serie/n.s., ns 6, 1963, p. 9. Reprinted in Documentos Y, vol. 2, p. 283).
196 S ee  Txillardegi's interviews in G araia, op. cit., in Ibarzabal (1978: 363), and his two 
novels (Leturiaren Egunkari Ezkutua and Peru Leartzako). In particular, se e  the paper by 
Marc Lagasse on Le 'Separatisme Basque' est-il un existentialisme? (Lagasse 1951) and the 
frequent mentions of Albert Camus in several issues of Zutik.
197 Sartre 's ideas and the first ETA shared a lot more in common than has usually been
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were characterized by an extremely eclectic approach drawing from an array of sources: first 
Unamuno (as a Basque), then Maritain, Duverger, Nicolas Berdiaeff, Don Luigi Sturzo, 
Monsenor Ancel, and Saint Paul.198 The goal of all these discussions was not to proselytize 
but to reflect on the present situation of Euskadi and find some solution to its problems.199 
At the World Basque Congress of 1956 in Paris, Aguirre and Del Valle presented a paper on 
the Basque youth.200
The disenchantment with the PNV was the immediate cause of the breakthrough event in 
modem Basque history, the foundation of ETA (Euzkadi 'ta Askatasuna, Basque Land and 
Freedom) in 1959.201 With the birth of ETA, the PNV ceased to be the only legitimate 
representative of Basque nationalism, and a whole new chapter of Basque history opened up. 
The American 'betrayal' of the Basques is one of the key ingredients needed to understand 
why the organization subsequently took a Leftist and even Trotskyist turn, the other two key 
elements being immigration (with its class nature) and ideological diffusion (with the leftist 
vogue spreading over Europe in the 1960s).
The origins of ETA: its first steps and ideology (1959-68)
ETA was founded on July 31, 1959 by the same group of Ekin youth who broke away 
from the PNV after uniting with EGI.202 In the first months, their activity was limited to 
continuing the labour of study and reflection which they had already done as Ekin. The 
organization was divided into six branches.20-* Membership fell into two categories: the 
militants, who swore an oath of silence, and the sympathizers, who did no t204 A few wall- 
daubings and the hanging of ikurrinas (Basque flags) was the entirety of their external
admitted. S ee the notes of the subsequent paragraph on the Burgos Trial.
198 As mentioned by Jon Nicolas: "El grupo Ekin y los primeros pasos", Documentos Y, vol. 
1, pp. 25-8.
199 Jon Nicolas: Ibid.
200 The paper, signed by 'Ekin', dealt with economic welfare of the youth, focussing on the 
ideological influence of communism. S ee 'Grupo Ekin', Situacidn social de la juventud vasca. In 
Euskal Batzar Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 2 a aniversario. Vitoria: Gobierno Vasco/ 
Eusko Jaurlaritza, 1987, pp. 264-5.
201 Garm endia (1979) quotes four reasons for the birth and expansion of ETA: 1. The 
persistence of Basque nationalism; 2. A crisis in B asque traditional values resulting from 
economic changes in the 1950s; 3. The failure of the PNV's policies, especially its pro- 
Americanism; and 4. The attraction of other liberation movements (Cuba, Algeria and Israel).
202 Most of EGI's youth followed the new organization. In Gipuzkoa six-eights, in Vizcaya 
six-ninths, and in Navarra and Alava all, of the EGI' sections joined the successors of Ekin.
203 The six b ranches were: Secretariat (which edited internal bulletins and other 
publications), Groups (which organized study classes), Euskara (dedicated to the study and 
diffusion of the language), Legal Action (entrusted with the promotion of semi-legal actions), 
Propaganda (devoted to printing and distributing all publications) and Military.
204 S ee  Documentos Y, vol. 1, p. 22.
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activity (Garmendia 1979: 21).205 Originally, ETA was essentially a cultural movement, 
concerned with the fate of Euskera and local culture.206 For years it remained a marginal 
group, which appealed to a few hundred young activists and sympathizers who were 
disillusioned by the lack of impetus and political activity of the PNV.
The industrial development of the 1960s brought about an impoverishment and 
radicalization of the small bourgeoisie and the proletarization of rural people (Garmendia 
1979). Many ETA members came from such backgrounds. The conflict was exacerbated by 
immigration.
Immediately upon its formation, ETA chose an intransigent line rekindling old Aranist 
idiosyncrasies, that is, the rejection of all things Spanish through the re-appropriation of 
Arana's myths (Basque primitive independence, egalitarianism, social justice, the idea of the 
Basques as a noble, democratic and freedom-loving people). However, it also rejected the 
centrality of race and religion, which were the two basic tenets of Arana's ideology. The shift 
from race to language as a preferred vessel of Basque identity implied a new anxiety to halt 
the fading of Basque cultural distinctiveness: as declared by ETA, "once language is lost" 
race could not sustain Basque identity.207 Thus, the people were 'chosen' by their history, 
mores and language, not by their religion or descent.
The first acts of political violence occurred in 1961, when a few explosions shattered 
government's buildings in different cities, but responsibility for them was not claimed. On 
July 18, ETA placed an explosive pack on a rail-track attempting to derail a number of trains 
carrying Francoist veterans from the Civil War. The plot was easily discovered since the 
explosion was far too weak to derail the train but nevertheless it was clearly heard.208 A 
wave of arrests occurred amongst Basque activists and their sympathizers: 110 ETA 
members were imprisoned, many of them tortured, and another 100 or more were forced into
205 On the ban on the ikurrifia and on those patriots who risked their life hanging one of 
them, se e  Bereciartua (1977). On Basque nationalist graffiti, se e  Chaffee (1988).
206 According to P6rez-Agote, it is impossible to understand the birth of ETA without 
considering its initial evaluation of language (1984: 91).
207 From Cuadernos de ETA, cited in Garmendia (1979: 22). As observed by Garmendia 
(1979: 23), ETA seem ed  occasionally to revert to racial essentialism , especially in its 
panegyrics for persecuted militants. The noble racial features of an imprisoned or murdered 
activist were idealized and his/her martyrdom presented a s  an edifying prototype worthy of 
imitation. But this esthetic of 'race ' w as not associa ted  with racism , which w as firmly 
rejected by ETA as  Arana's most pernicious legacy. The esthetic of m asculine beauty and 
physical strength is still visible in traditional sport competitions.
208 "Characteristically for that time, the attem pt w as m ade with such precautions that it 
failed to derail even a  single car, and there was not so much as  one injury" (Clark 1984: 35). 
See also Hollyman (1976).
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exile (Ibarz 1981: 95). These numbers testify to the impressive growth of the organization. In 
1953, Ekin was made up of five militants in Bilbao, and as many in Donostia. By 1960, 
more than 300 militants had passed through its cursillos deformation (training courses).209 
Despite this blow, ETA continued its underground activity, inaugurating a long period of 
reflection. Although deeply imbued with Aranism,210 ETA's intellectuals were quite 
knowledgeable about European progressive thought, Third World struggles, and Marxist 
analysis. In the early 1960s, ETA's leaders started to bring to light the results of years of 
study and discussion. The first issue of the journal "Zutik" ('standing up!')211 and the 
circular "Cuadernos de ETA" (also called "Cuadernos de Formacidn", =Training Notes) 
began to appear respectively in 1961 and 1962.212
ETA’s First Assembly was held in exile in 1962. On that occasion, the leadership 
promulgated a 'Declaration of Principles' which synthesized the previous activities and 
outlined the organization's trends.213 ETA was defined as a 'revolutionary Basque 
movement for national liberation' (Garmendia 1979:19-21), yet it advanced no clear political 
programme, nor new theory. However, the organization was henceforth structured into cells 
of liber ados, full-time activists who were to be totally dedicated to ETA’s mission and to live 
in secrecy. A radical change occurred with the insfusion of Marxist ideology and, especially, 
with the opening up to Third World perspectives. The first full ideological formulation and 
political programme to be adopted by ETA appeared in the book Vasconia (1963) by 
Federico Krutwig, the son of a German industrialist living in Bilbao, who adopted the 
pseudonym F. Sarrailh de Ihartza. Krutwig, described as a 'solitary franc-tireur' (Ortzi 1977:
209 Interview to Txillardegi, reported in G araia, vol. I, n* 1, 1976, pp. 24-25.
210 Jauregui (1981) defines ETA's foundation a s  a  revival of Aranism.
211 The early 1960s were still a period of reflection and debate. Zutik  warmly solicited its 
readers to submit any kind of criticism on its contents. It also made calls for papers, projects, 
ideas, various information, data, etc. (Documentos Y, vol. 2, p. 317). All ETA's historical 
d eb a tes  w ere published in Zutik. "Most of ETA's political history is inseparable from the 
efforts to publish in Zutik...It is possible to say that for many years ETA existed in the m easure 
in which Zutik  w as published. And the internal conflicts and schism s focussed around the 
control of Zutik" (Documentos Y, vol. 2, p. 380). Thus, control of the magazine cam e to be 
highly prized in the infighting that ensued over the years. When splinter groups split off from 
the parent organization they usually established a  counterpart journal to maintain the flow of 
words and ideas (Clark 1984: 29).
212 Every issue of the Cuadernos de ETA was dedicated to a  single theme. As in Ekin's days, 
each leading member of the organization was charged with investigating a  specific topic and
preparing an ensuing cuaderno  (notebook). Each issue had an essential bibliography, on the
basis of which it is possible to establish the international ideological influences exerted on the 
militants (Conversi 1993).
213 As a  consequence of repression, only four members of ETA remained in Spain after the 
First Assembly. This precariousness did not deter ETA from launching a  series of frenetic 
activities, such as  the adhesion to workers' struggle, the enrollment of women, the extension 
of activities in Navarre, printing, producing propaganda, etc. (See Documentos Y, vol. 2, page 
5).
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280), was an ex-secretary of the Basque Language Academy and never had been a member 
of ETA.214 Notwithstanding its numerous distortions and exaggerations, Vasconia remains 
the key text of contemporary Basque nationalism. It is probably the only work which has 
been welcomed as vox populi by ETA. Txillardegi defined it as "the most important book on 
Euskadi published in this century". Why did this provocative book attain such an 
unparalleled success? The answer probably lies in its straightforward language, in the way in 
which otherwise controversial statements are put forward as indisputable truths. Its dry prose 
does not admit doubts, nevertheless the book's many contradictions and ambiguities seem to 
satisfy most of ETA's currents: the Aranists, the European federalists, the proponents of 
armed struggle, the believers, the secularists, the Marxists and the 'culturalists' (Jauregui 
1981:223-4). Interpreting the new spirit of defiance to dictatorship, Vasconia offered to the 
new generations both a youthful sense of immortality and a m ission .2^  It provided a series 
of cleverly presented dogmas which served to solidify the otherwise fragmented movement.
A double shift: from religion to secularism, from Americanism to Marxism
Krutwig's programme included an updated recovery of many elements of Aranism, but, as 
we mentioned before, the latter was cleansed of its racial and religious overtones. Race was 
replaced by the concept of ethnos, as manifested through language and culture. The 
missionary fervour implied in Arana's Christian vision was replaced by the idea of politics as 
a vocation. Vasconia was also a ferocious attack on the Church as an agent of de­
nationalization and an enemy of the people (Krutwig 1963: 75-ff.).216 Ancient Basque 
paganism was 'recovered' as an alternative to the current Church's impotence. Later 
conversion to Christianity was put forward as a further proof of Basque immemorial 
independence. Although the Christian ethic was still part of ETA's vision, this did not imply 
the primacy of the Church over the state, the latter ideal having been abandoned even by the
214 At the first World Basque Congress in Paris (1956), Krutwig presented a hasty report on 
B asque language and territory, which many attendants saw  as  the rantings of a  lunatic, but 
which nevertheless stimulated a  vivid debate. He argued that Violence' w as necessary  to 
create a  Basque nation: "The Americans would have not backed Franco if a  group of organized 
violence was opposing him... If the Basques will keep on acting as  a docile people, the world will 
never take them seriously". Also, language w as "more important than the Rh factor in blood 
groups". At first, Krutwig stressed  a federalist (or cantonalist) union of B asque territories. 
S ee Federico Krutwig, El echo vasco, el euskera, y  el territorio de Euskadi. In Euskal Batzar 
Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 2a aniversario. Vitoria: Gobierno Vasco/ Eusko Jaurlaritza, 
1987, pp. 130-1.
215 Personal communication by Joseba Zulaika.
216 An enormous distrust towards the Church radically opposed Ekin to the old nationalists. 
Ekin w as defined as  an 'aconfessional patriotic movement' (Ortzi 1977: 279).
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post-war PNV. In particular, since the Church was associated with the regime through the 
doctrine of nacionalcatolicismo, only the most universal principles of Catholicism were 
retained. This did not clash with the subsequent Marxist evolution of ETA, rather it 
reinforced the militants' commitment in their drive for social justice. Indeed, priests, monks 
and former seminarians continued to flow into ETA well after its Marxist - Trotskyist 
'conversion'.2!7
A constant feature of Basque life since the end of the Civil War has been the astonishment 
and complaint that the Church, by siding with Franco, 'betrayed' the Basque cause. After the 
phase of Falangist 'terror', many firm believers tacitly questioned the behaviour of the 
Church, asking repeatedly "why this silence by the [Catholic] hierarchy?" (Sierra Bustamante 
1941: 204-11). The memory of anti-clerical atrocities was not a sufficient excuse for 
justifying repression on such a scale.218 The Church was under fire from most of the 
clandestine opposition, but Basque priests and seminarians were particularly sensitive to such 
recurrent accusations (Iztueta 1981). In 1960, three years before the publication of Vasconia 
and less than one year after ETA’s creation, the lower clergy came out into the open for the 
first time: 339 priests of the dioceses of Gasteiz, Donostia and Bilbao signed a joint petition 
to their respective Bishops in which they denounced the political and cultural oppression of 
Euskadi. With unprecedented courage, the manifesto defined the official policy to be 
"reactionary and anti-human to the point of genocide".219 The importance of the Basque 
language as an instrument of evangelization was particularly stressed. With this action, the
217 Many people raised in Catholic sem inars entered ETA's ranks between 1967 and 1972. 
This period has been ironically described by the playwright Father Pierre Larzabal a s  the 
'clerical phase ' of ETA (cited in the EGIPV, entry "ETA", vol. 12, p. 126). Again, Krutwig 
com pares the guerrilla fighter to a  crusader, for "the spirit which pervades him must spring up 
over all sides a s  the faith of the Middle-Age's knight. Revolutionary war is thus an ideological 
combat similar to the medieval one. To a  certain extent, it is a  religious war. And, a s  in the 
latter, the revolutionary must promise to redeem  the humble" (Krutwig 1963: 330).
218 Even President Aguirre, leader of the PNV, normally described a s  a  Christian Democratic 
party (Brezzi 1979), emphatically recalled that the atrocities committed by Franco's troops 
were far more devastating. "Both the 'Red hordes' and the 'White hordes' w ere guilty of 
burning, pillaging and murder. But when all the truth is known the world will be even more 
horrified by the bloody accomplishment of the White hordes than it was over the tales of the 
'Red atrocities'. I can state  categorically that the victims executed by Franco's regime are far 
more num erous than the victims made to suffer at the hands of certain hangers-on of the 
Republic" (Aguirre 1991: 307-8).
219 Escrito presentado a los excmos. obispos de Vitoria, San Sebastian, Bilbao y  Pamplona, 
con las firmas de 339 sacerdotes de dichas diocesis, el dia 30 de Mayo de 1960. Reprinted in 
Documentos Y, vol. 1, 128-133. Most of the signing priests were PNV m em bers who took a 
considerable risk in raising their voices after decades of silence. O nce the first 339 priests 
signed the document, many more added their signatures. An overall climate of skepticism and 
rebellion began to creep amongst the lower clergy pitting it against the upper hierarchy. This is 
a frequent occurrence in nationalist movements (Smith, personal observation).
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Basque priests put seriously their personal safety at risk, but the Church in other parts of 
Spain (and the Vatican) did not display a sufficient sense of solidarity with the protesters. 
This stiff attitude of the Church was indeed another factor in encouraging many believers to 
join ETA or support its activists.
Another mainstay of Vasconia is the stress on action. According to Jauregui (1981: 152), 
Krutwig's ideas were directly derived from Ernest Renan's (1823-1892) voluntaristic view 
of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite'. We shall see that the concept of voluntary participation is 
central to the evolution of all present-day Basque nationalism. However, Vasconia*s most 
relevant contribution was strategic with its choice of guerrilla war as the only means to 
liberate Euskadi. In this choice, Krutwig was directly inspired by the Algerian and Cuban 
experiences. A further impulse in this direction was received with Franz Fanon's (1925- 
1961) works. Fanon rationalized anticolonial violence as a liberating and purifying principle, 
essential to the psychological well-being of the 'oppressed'. This 'third-worldist' approach 
was opposed to the pre-existing pro-European and federalist trends and this underlying 
opposition continued right up to the 1990s (Conversi 1993b).
A further step forward in the definition of ETA's programme, came in 1963 with Josd Luis 
Zalbide's booklet, Insurreccion en Euskadi,220 which synthesized those parts of Krutwig's 
programme dealing with armed struggle. Aimed at being a guerrilla manual, it can be 
regarded as the cornerstone of ETA's military branch's strategy. The influence of Mao-Tse- 
Tung and Ho-Chi-Minh is evident in many parts of the pamphlet.22! The theses of Krutwig 
and Zalbide were approved in ETA's Second Assembly (1963), in which Euskadi was 
divided into six operative zones (herrialdes) with the aim of carrying out the revolutionary 
war. Thus, local theorists began to conceive armed struggle as their primary concern, with 
violence as the only means of rescuing Euskadi from its secular torpor.222 In 1963, ETA 
participated for the first time in the organization of working class strikes. Although they kept
220 Published anonymously as a  special issue of Cuaderno de ETA, nfl 20 (1964), Bayonne: 
Goitziri. Reproduced in Documentos Y, vol. 3, pp. 20-71. The bibliography includes the main 
works of Che Guevara, Mao-Tse-Tung, Krutwig, and, especially, La Guerre Revolutionnaire by 
C laude Delmas, entire sections of which are reproduced. It may also be possible that 
Insurreci6n en Euskadi was written by M adariaga, the first ETA's proponent of armed 
struggle.
221 Especially appreciated in radical milieux w as the fam ous Maoist aphorism of the 
guerrilla fighter who moves among his people as a  'fish in the water1, a natural element which 
he needs in order to survive (Krutwig 1963: 330). One of ETA's features w as indeed its 
symbiosis with the human environment of the Basque hinterland.
222 Still in 1962, there was no agreem ent on the use of violence within ETA. For instance, 
Z u tik  ns 19 reported that "betw een Gandhi's non-violence and a  civil war there  are  
intermediate methods of struggle ...which we want to put in practice" (Zutik, n® 19 reported in 
Documentos Y, vol. 2, 229).
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a low profile and a secondary organizational role, they had to bear the brunt of the repression 
because, although the state could allow the airing of economic grievances, it could never 
tolerate ones that were couched in ethnic terms.
The Third Assembly (1964) wholeheartedly adopted Krutwig's approach defining ETA as 
an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist organization working for the liberation of Euskadi and 
for the emancipation of the working class. Zalbide wrote his Carta a los intellectuales (Letter 
to the intellectuals) which postulated the basic principles to be adopted by ETA.223 At the 
same time, the founding fathers of Ekin/ETA were expelled from France and confined to 
exile further afield in Belgium. Henceforth, the physical distance considerably hampered the 
flow of communication between the old and experienced leadership and the 'base' which 
began to act singled-handedly. ETA then came under the control of young radicals who 
advocated revolutionary war.
During the Fourth Assembly (1965), the first one which took place en el interior (within 
Spain), the programmatic link between social and national struggle was firmly adopted. Class 
struggle and national liberation became the two faces of the same coin. Zalbide's 
Insurreccidn en Euskadi provided the guidelines of this turn of events and was approved by 
ETA as an article of faith. Its central tenet was Krutwig's theory of the "cycle of 
action/repression/action", which held that, "where popular protest against injustices met with 
oppression, the revolutionary forces should act to punish the oppressor. The occupying 
forces would then retaliate with indiscriminate violence, since they would not know who the 
revolutionaries were, causing the population to respond with increased protest and support 
for the resistance in an upward spiral of resistance to the dictatorship" (Sullivan 1988: 42- 
43). This theory was to provide the overall framework of ETA's strategy throughout its long 
evolution since the publication of Vasconia. ETA started to assume a paramilitary form. The 
first direct armed attack was a robbery of a bank courier in 1965.
The main ideological rift of this period was the struggle between Trotskyists and Third- 
Woridists (tercermundistas), the latter of whom followed Krutwig's call for a Third-World- 
style mass insurgency. This tension was at its peak when ETA convened its watershed Fifth 
Assembly (1966-67), which was spread over a long period of time.224 Its first half (1966)
223 Reprinted in Garmendia (1979: 287-303).
224 Garmendia (1979) confers a  key importance to this period, when, after Zalbide's fall and 
the exile of many leaders, ETA w as left under the control of the Political Bureau (oficina  
politica) led by Paco Iturrioz. The theory of 'action/repression/action' w as dism issed and a 
new cleavage arose between patriotic workers and alleged 'bourgeoise' nationalists. ETA began 
to actively support the Cc. Oo. (Comisidn Obreras, the pro-Communist labour union) and to 
participate in unions' struggles.
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consecrated a 'holy alliance' between the tercermundistas and the 'culturalist' faction (the 
one immediately descending from Ekin). This alliance occurred at the expense of the Maoists 
who formed a separate ETA-Berri (= New ETA). It was the first split within ETA, but more 
were to follow. In the Second and crucial half of the Fifth Assembly (1967), the new concept 
of Pueblo Trabajador Vasco (Basque Working People) was elaborated to reinforce the 
notion that class struggle and nationalism were in pursuit of the same common interests. ETA 
was divided into four fronts: Cultural, Economic, Political, and Military. In the years to 
come, the great debate would be confined to the latter two, of which the Military Front 
eventually emerged victorious. The 'culturalists' and other original Ekin members formed a 
separate group, called Branka (1967), based on the name of their journal.225 Each of these 
splits was preceded by intense ideological debate, mostly in a violent atmosphere of 
confrontation polarized by secrecy and the fear of police intrusions. The political environment 
of those years could not allow the luxury of pluralism. Furthermore, ETA's logic demanded 
that one simple and unchallenged ideological choice be made in order to attract more 
conscripts from all classes. What occurred instead was a process of political fragmentation 
from which new leaders emerged or splinter groups were formed in an unceasing process of 
self-definition. Since the times of Ekin, discussions were marked by "a permanent oscillation 
between humble claims of the mere right to doubt to the fanatical rejection of those who dared 
to question what just happened to become an unquestionable truth" (Documentos Y: 1:10). 
It is important to consider that most people in Euskadi were unaware of these internal 
conflicts and saw ETA as a homogeneous body. Holding a belief in ETA's ideological 
continuity, its external supporters and sympathizers understood these conflicts as nothing but 
detail.
The beginning of armed struggle
In the meantime the spiral of violence slowly escalated with the first armed bank robberies. 
Following one of these, on 7 June 1968 a car transporting two etarras (ETA members) was 
stopped at a road block. A gunfight erupted, a member of the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) 
was killed, the first victim of ETA, but the car managed to escape.226 However, at a second 
road block one of the two etarras, Txabi Etxebarrieta, was hauled from the car and shot in
225 This tradition of naming a group after the journal or bulletin which w as their mouthpiece 
(Ekin, Branka, Saioak, etc.), testifies to the spontaneity of the process and the lack of 
formalities in their creation and, generally, in the overall Basque political evolution during 
these years.
226 7 de junio de 1968: ETA aprieta e l gatillo por primera vez, "La Vanguardia", 5 junio 
1988, pp. 6-7 (Report published on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the beginning of 
armed struggle).
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cold blood. This was the 'casus belli’ which the theorists of armed struggle were waiting for. 
Popular indignation for the killing of Etxebanieta broke out in mass demonstrations in every 
major city, town and village of Euskadi. Priests held masses in his memory for weeks, 
Etxebanieta was now a hero and "ETA's ranks swelled with new arrivals" (Clark 1984:49).
Although the use of violence had been theorized at least since the late 1950s, the first 
premeditated political murder was carried out only in 1968. When the police commissioner, 
Meliton Manzanas, a notorious torturer, was about to enter his house at 3.15 pm on 2 
August, he was shot dead with several bullets by a single assailant in front of his wife.227 
The government response was swift and ruthless. During a 'state of emergency', scores of 
suspected ETA sympathizers were rounded up, illegally detained, beaten and intimidated. In 
the meantime, people filled the street in mass demonstrations. The first phase of the "cycle of 
action/repression/action" had begun, but its heavy toll on the organization forced its leaders to 
rethink its applicability. In 1968 Zalbide wrote from jail a new booklet, Iraultza or Hacia 
una estrategia revolucionaria vasca (Towards a Basque Revolutionary Strategy), which 
replaced his anti-colonialist thesis with a broader anti-imperialist perspective (Jauregui 1981: 
417). 228
In 1969, the structure of ETA was severely disrupted by a further wave of arrests. Most of 
the leaders were forced into exile, where they rejoined the other main factions. The Sixth 
Assembly held in 1970 represented ETA’s last serious theoretical debate, but ideological 
confusion reached its peak. A host of groups emerged from it more separate than ever. The 
Red Cells (Cellulas Rojas), focussing on the magazine Saioak (=Essays) and led by Jos6 
Ezkubi, championed the extension of the struggle to the rest of Spain through contacts with 
working class organizations. The Mitts, originating from the Military Front and led by Jon 
Etxabe, refused any contacts with Spanish organizations maintaining an anti-Marxist line and 
a radical intransigence in their quest for national sovereignty. Other factions followed their 
paths.229 However, all of them remained somewhat aloof from the heat of the debate in their 
French or Belgian exile. With nearly all the experienced leadership either arrested or in exile,
227 M anzanas was one of the most hated figures in Euskadi. An article signed by Madariaga 
claimed that persons like M anzanas "will pay dearly for their crim es” (Zutik, 1962, reprinted 
in Documentos Y, vol. 3, p. 301). These accusations were reiterated in other ETA publications 
(such as  Zutik n9 2, December 1961, in Documentos Y, vol. 1, p. 406).
228 After being criticized by Krutwig and Beltza, Zalbide reformulated his thesis in Fines y  
medios en la iucha de Iiberaci6n nacional (1970), which was subsequently adopted by the new 
post-1971 ETA.
229 The tercermundistas tried to strike the balance between the goal of independence and a  
residual commitment to Marxism-Leninism. The culturalists of B ranka  tried insistently to 
form a  broad coalition, which was referred to a s  'national front'. O ther leaders of the Ekin  
days and early ETA, such as Madariaga and Beltza, maintained good relations with Branka.
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ETA's Executive Committee was now in the hands of an inexperienced youth who tried to 
patch up the pieces by attempting to placate each of the exiled factions. However, the 
participants of the Sixth Assembly were not representative of this ideological variety: the 
assembly became at first dominated by the Red Cells to the exclusion of the other factions. 
They expelled the Milis, but were in turn expelled by the Executive Committee, whilst other 
members bitterly resigned. Finally, the Milis and the old leaders (Krutwig, Beltza, 
Madariaga, Txillardegi, etc.) ruled from exile that all the participants to the Sixth Assembly 
be expelled from ETA. That meant that they re-founded the organization and for a while there 
were two ETAs.
In 1970, 16 etarras charged with the murder of Manzanas were brought before a military 
tribunal in Burgos. The famous Burgos Trial was an historical watershed for the whole 
Basque movement as well as for Spanish opposition (Halimi 1971, Sullivan 1988: 92-112). 
For weeks, international media focussed on the Basques' struggle. All over Europe mass 
demonstrations and solidarity committees sprang up in support of the condemned. Renowned 
leftist intellectuals and maitres-d-penser joined the chorus.230 European ambassadors were 
recalled for consultation and the Vatican pleaded for clemency. Popular demonstrations were 
held in many parts of Spain, while in Euskadi priests celebrated masses, general strikes 
paralyzed most activities, and universities were closed. In Madrid, dissident lawyers 
occupied the Palace of Justice, and massive demonstrations were held in other cities. Its 
legitimacy crumbling under the pressure of a powerful public opinion, the Spanish regime 
was now agonizing.231 As a consequence, ETA rose as a symbol "above public censure. 
Open criticism of ETA was judged as open support for the regime" (Heiberg 1989:107).
The trial came at a time of maximum internal strife for ETA, with factions at odds with each 
other and many disillusioned militants leaving the organization. The day before the trial 
started, the Milis kidnapped the West German consul in San Sebastian. Apparently, their 
double agenda was to put pressure on the regime and regain control over ETA. In the
230 S ee  Jean-Paul Sartre 's introduction to Halimi (1971). Sartre saw  Euskadi a s  a  colony 
exploited by a fascist s ta te  allied with American imperialism. In general, he show ed 
considerable understanding for the problems of European national minorities. Sartre accused the 
European Left of uncritically assum ing the French bourgeoisie's cultural Jacobinism  (Ortzi 
1977: 380-1). "I wish to oppose the abstract universality of bourgeois hum anism  to the 
singular universality of the B asques... A heroic people, led by a  revolutionary party, has shown 
us another [face of] socialism, tangible and decentralizing: this is the universality of the 
B asques, which ETA justly opposes to the abstract centralism  of the oppressors” (Sartre 
1972: XXIX-XXX, in Halimi 1971). Obviously, Sartre w as referring to the ETA of the Burgos 
Trial, which surged as an international champion of resistance against oppression.
231 The regime was now being abandoned even by the Church as, since 1969, the Opus Dei 
technocrats left the government coalition (Hermet 1986: 455-ff.).
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limelight of the Burgos trial, the Milis were provided with direct access to the international 
media through their spokesman Telesforo Monzdn (1904-1987).232 The kidnappers asked 
for a more lenient treatment for the Burgos sixteen and for the commutation of death 
sentences. Following secret negotiations, the consul was released unharmed and 
subsequently Franco commuted all the death sentences.
ETA's internecine conflicts continued in the following months (early 1971) as the old guard 
renamed itself ETA-V, from the Fifth-Assembly, while the followers of the Sixth Assembly 
came to be known as ETA-VI. The latter had almost dropped their nationalist emphasis, 
embracing Trotskysm and class struggle.233 Euskadi was then still conceived as an internal 
colony, but especially as an urban developed society in which the working class movement 
was to play a decisive role in the building of Basque socialism. Yet, at least in Bilbao, the 
workers were largely immigrants, therefore the emphasis had to be on class conflict, not on 
ethnic conflict. Clearly, the presence of immigrant workers played a key role in repeatedly 
shifting ETA's ideology to the far left. The need to mobilize immigrants resulted in an 
increasing radicalization of the process. Indeed, ETA's radicals quickly found out at the 
expense of the moderates that the immigrants were more likely to be involved whenever 
actions prevailed over theory and over 'abstract' debates on Basque identity.
In order to understand this mechanism, we have first to presuppose that newcomers are 
willing to integrate into the host society. Even when they chose not to do so or to give up 
their efforts at integration, they normally encourage their children to become full members of 
the host society and share its culture. However, this step is particularly difficult to 
accomplish in a society which is unable to offer shared and accessible core values. Until 
recently, race and religion worked as conscious obstacles to integration, while language was 
not widely available and extremely difficult to master.234 At the same time, in a polarized 
society mass mobilizations began to attract the immigrants' offspring. Their participation in
232 Monz6n, an independent-minded old man attracted by the enthusiasm  and good-will of the 
new generation, left the PNV in 1977 in order to join the Left abertzale  movement. S ee Idoia 
Estornes Zubtzarreta, entry ' M onz6n\ in the EGIPV, vol. 29, pp. 254-8.
233 The only earlier abandonment of nationalism dates back to the already mentioned founding 
of ETA -B erri in 1966 by the followers of the Maoist leader Paco Iturrioz. In 1970, ETA-Berri 
changed its name into Movimiento Comunista de Espafia (MCE, Communist Movement of Spain) 
in order not to be identified with ETA and avoid police persecution.
234 Although immigrants and natives nominally share the sam e religion, the reality is more 
complex. Religious practice per Sunday varies from 80% in Euskadi to 15% in Andalusia and 
Extremadura (Duocastella 1965, quoted by Martin 1978: 254-5). Castile, where most of the 
immigrants cam e from, occupies a  middle ground. Martin observes that "Catholic weekly 
practice is at its optimum where it is expression of a repressed nationalism" (1978: 152): in 
Eire, Poland, Euskadi and Brittany. On the regional distribution of religious practice in Spain see  
Duocastella (1965).
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these public events encouraged the latter to share the natives' common myths and symbols. 
They certainly were not concerned with 'purity of blood': what was at stake was their social 
peace and very existence, since any mobilization carried with it the risk of being killed by the 
'occupation forces'. Simultaneously, Left-wing nationalism carried a progressive message to 
the immigrants, while ETA's daring violence exercised an irresistible charm in many juvenile 
sectors. The more ETA’s ekintzak (armed actions) involved a direct confrontation with the 
state, the more ETA's star would rise among non-native proletarians. Thus, violence became 
a vehicle of integration into the nationalist struggle.
The move away from ethnicity to class produced continuous splits within the abertzale 
movement.235 The young members who drifted towards workers' mobilization and had 
finally dropped the nationalist cause, became unavoidably alienated from the ethnic Basque 
base, which still formed the backbone and leading force of the movement. The class 
orientation of the now Trotskyist ETA-VI, its inactivity, and its miscalculation of the 
possibility of mobilizing Basque workers on class lines, together with the arrest and 
imprisonment of their leaders, spelled its decline and subsequent end. ETA-V, a wider 
interclass alliance of various nationalist forces, took the lead of the movement. ETA-VI then 
vanished, disappearing into the cauldron of extra-parliamentary Spanish left-wing 
organizations,236 while others of its components joined mainstream left parties and still 
others were drawn back to their radical nationalist roots. As Clark puts it, "ETA served as the 
point of departure for a number of splinter groups that would occupy positions of radical 
intransigence throughout the Spanish and Basque political spectrum" (1984:44).
But other forces were also at work, trying to smooth over nationalist discord. In 1971, 
there was much talk of a proposed frente nacional (='national front') reuniting all Basque 
forces from both Left and Right. The main promoters of this idea were the 'culturalists' of 
the Branka group. Again, cultural nationalists played a key role in reinvigorating political 
nationalism by attempting to build up an inter-class alliance of all nationalist forces. The 
project was eventually to fail, because of the predominance of Marxists inside ETA who 
refused to make common cause with 'bourgeois' nationalists.
235 As a  protest against the Marxist-Leninist turn of ETA in the mid-1960s the old 
leadership (Txillardegi, Del Valle, Imaz) left the organization: "ETA is no longer a  m eans to 
achieve our goals and it has been converted into a  Marxist-Leninist party... Since we do not 
accept any of the basic tenets of this political philosophy and praxis, we have decided to 
abandon ETA" (Por que dejamos E.T.A., by J.L. Alvarez Emparanza, J.M. Benito del Valle, X. 
Imaz, 14 April 1967, pamphlet reprinted in C aracas [1967?] by Eusko Gastegi).
236 In 1973, ETA-VI was definitively absorbed into the Trotskyist LCR {Lega Comunista 
Revolucionaria), the Spanish section of one of the rival Fourth Internationals.
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The early 1970s saw an unprecedented outburst of cultural activities. The spearhead of the 
cultural revival was the movement of the ikastolas (ikastolak in Basque), or schools in 
Euskera. Its antecedents established during the Second Republic, the ikastolas were forced 
underground and nearly ceased their activity under Francoism (Arpal et al. 1982, Tejerina 
1992: 129-37). The first timid re-openings by the regime in the 1960s were quickly seized 
upon by the movement, which started anew, first in private homes, then in kindergartens, 
and in the following decade spread to every city and village of the Euskaldun area.237 The 
ikastolas were entirely financed by parents' contributions and were submitted to all sorts of 
legal hindrances by the Francoist authorities. The fundraising was carried out village by 
village and represented a high moment of collective mobilization. The revival was supported 
by many non-nationalists as well, in particular by the Left, since at that time the struggle on 
behalf of the Basque nation was considered parallel with the one for democracy. In 1960, the 
first three ikastolas were opened in Gipuzkoa (Lasa 1968). Their number increased at a 
spectacular rate, going from 520 pupils in 1966-65 (Nunez 1977) to 40,000 pupils - 
distributed in 185 schools- in 1977 (Euskaltzaindia 1977, 1979). A literary revival also 
started in this period, culmimating with the mythical novel Obabakoak by Bernardo 
Atxaga.238
From Marxism back to nationalism
ETA’s Workers Front, known as obreristas (='workerists'), was soon accused of 
espafiolismo (=Hispanicism, pro-centralist attitudes) since it promoted collaboration with 
Spanish parties on the ground that the proletariats of Euskadi and other regions shared a 
common struggle against bourgeois capitalism. The accusation of being espanolista was 
particularly onerous for people who had to live in absolute secrecy and for whom the 
slightest leak of information could have had dramatic consequences, including the arrest and 
torture of hundreds.
237 Benito del V a lle 's  declaration that the first ikastolas  were created  by Ekin (Punto y 
H ora, n® 134, p. 44-5, 1979) is firmly rebutted by Ib&rzabal (M u g a , n® 2, 1979, p. 4. See 
also M uga, n® 3, 1980, pp. 10-13). However, Txillardegi also mentions Ekin's failed attempt 
to promote ikastolas  from 1954 to 1959 (G ara ia , vol. I, n® 1, 2-9 Septem ber 1976, p. 25.). 
The cursillos de formacidn organized by Ekin gave primary importance to the teaching of 
Euskara, which was one of the main subjects and often also a  medium of instruction. After the 
'joint venture' with EGI, these initiatives spread to many villages and attracted more and more 
pupils.
238  por an anthology of recent Basque fiction, see  Lasagabaster (1990). S ee  also Coco 
(1992). However, only Atxaga's novel stands out as  a  great literary achievem ent and has been 
translated into English (Atxaga 1992). For a  review of the novel and its implication, see  
Cameron (1992).
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Once its rival ETA-VI disappeared, ETA-V joined an important fraction of the PNV's youth 
branch (EGI) merging - for the second time - under the single initials of ETA (as formally 
agreed in 1972). The infusion of 500 youths from EGI reinvigorated ETA and renewed its 
informal contacts with conservative nationalists. They adopted wholeheartedly the ideological 
principles of the Fifth Assembly (second half), thereby fusing class and national struggle. 
This new turn was translated into a stepping up of violent actions. In 1972, armed assaults 
reached an unprecedented peak. The turning point was the kidnapping of the industrialist 
Lorenzo Zabala as part of a labour dispute in early 1972. This was the first action directed 
against an ethnic Basque who, furthermore, spoke Euskara. As the workers of his factory 
had gone out on strike on a wage-raising ticket, the company responded by firing all the 
striking workers. This action provided an unique opportunity to assure the working class that 
they could count on ETA for the defence of their interests, drawing them into the struggle for 
the liberation of Euskadi. The fact that Zabala was an euskaldun (Euskara-speaking Basque) 
only added strength to ETA's claim of acting on behalf of the workers and beyond strictly 
ethnic interests. The four conditions set out by the kidnappers were all met with minor 
modifications by the employers: the rehiring of the sacked workers, the payment of wages 
lost in the striking days, an increase in salary, and the official recognition of the workers' 
committee charged with negotiating a wage settlement. Zabala was released unharmed after 
only one week of being held incommunicado.
The success of the operation proved to the regime that ETA was still alive and had regained 
considerable strength after the dark days of the Burgos trial. This action initiated an 
unprecedented wave of guerrilla attacks, unleashing renewed repression upon the whole 
Basque Country. A new generation of leaders emerged, among them Txomin’ and 'Argala'. 
Four ETA members were killed on separate occasions. The new brand of Marxism and 
nationalism (this time, without rejecting the latter) attracted the important moral support of the 
Burgos prisoners, whose statements appeared in "Zutik" (Ortzi 1975: 390-91).239 As a 
consequence, ETA reached a period of unequalled expansion. The fusion between Marxism 
and nationalism proved to be highly attractive in a country which, as we shall see, has 
traditionally stressed egalitarian values and a thirst for social justice.
The most notorious act of ETA has been the killing of Admiral Carrero Blanco, the 
expected successor of Franco, in December 1973. This act created a spate of international 
concern and admiration for ETA, as well as a diplomatic focus on the Basque question, a
239 s e e  "Zutik", n8 63, 1972, reprinted in Documentos V.vol. 12, pp. 347-ff.
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general sympathy for the Basques and even a few art works, such as the book and movie 
Operation Ogro.240 But ETA's fronts started to argue among themselves, acting 
autonomously and competing in their actions, as did different sub-factions within them.241
In 1974, a bloody terrorist attack at the Cafe Rolando in Madrid left nine people killed and 
scores injured. ETA accused the security forces of being responsible for deliberately not 
evacuating the place after ETA's bomb alert. However, the repercussions of the attack 
brought about an acrid confrontation and a new split between ETA-m (ETA-Militar) and 
ETA-pm (ETA-Politico-Militar). The latter convened its own 'second half of the Sixth 
Assembly' in 1975 and decided to expand armed struggle. After the imposition of a state of 
emergency in Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa, two etarrast Txiki and Otaegi, were executed. This 
gave the signal for a new series of mass protests, which in turn prompted further states of 
emergency. But the regime could no longer stem the tide of popular discontent. Hence, its 
raison d'etre, the drive to keep the country tightly united, risked becoming its greatest failure 
(Preston 1993). In late 1975, Franco was on his death bed and the whole region was in 
turmoil. Crucial changes were bound to happen.
Concluding rem arks
In the late 1950s, under the full impact of Francoism, the Basque Country began to 
undergo a rapid process of radical socio-economic change.242 Clashing with the 
dictatorship's stalemate, the new socio-economic changes inspired a rethinking among
240 The book was written by Eva Forest (1974) under the pseudonym of Julen Aguirre. See 
also the critique of the movie by the Italian writer Alberto Moravia, La Memoria e i suoi fig li, 
in "L 'E sp re sso ". 21-10-1979. Its director, Gillo Pontecorvo, becam e famous in the 1960s for 
his La battaglia di Algeri (Battle of Algiers) on the Algerian revolution. Operation Ogro was 
much more coldly received than its predecessor, not just in the Basque Country. This was 
possibly due to the director's rejection of armed struggle, an allegedly "moralistic" choice 
influenced by the impact of contem porary dramatic even ts in Italy, namely the array of 
murders, kidnappings and other terrorist attacks carried out by the Red Brigades. This overlap 
and confusion was one of the reasons why Basque nationalists were so  disappointed by the 
movie's overt m essage that ETA should drop armed struggle, although the movie recognized its 
legitimacy as  a  tool against Francoism. In som e way, the 'outrageous' confusion of ETA's 
struggle with an international terrorist band with the sole common denom inator of Marxism 
contributed to distance som e sectors of ETA from Marxism. Pontecorvo's mistake was to have 
misunderstood the 'Fanonian' connection between Euskadi and Algeria.
241 In 1974, both the Labour/Workers and the Cultural fronts split off to form autonomous 
parties, respectively called LAIA and EHAS. See the section on Herri B atasuna in the next 
chapter.
242 The Basque economy had been heavily penalized during early Francoism. It began to 
recover from about 1959 and in the 1960s reached boom proportions. As Madrid created 
bureaucratic difficulties for the local economy, som e businessm en suspected  that Madrid was 
trying to undermine it. Nationalism has thus been interpreted a s  a  m eans of greater control of 
regional economic destiny (Zirakzadeh 1985, 1991).
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underground opposition circles and set the bases for impressive future political upheavals.
ETA's main ideological text was written by non-member Federico Krutwig, who never 
participated in organized politics. This puts him in a different historical role from Sabino de 
Arana. Nevertheless, Arana and Krutwig shared several similarities: they were both marginal 
intellectuals. Arana was castigated by his contemporary intellectual colleagues as a quaint 
reactionary.243 Krutwig was considered a lunatic. Both were viscerally anti-bourgeois and 
saw urban capitalist society as a major cause of Basque decadence. Both were Castilian- 
speakers and learned Euskara at a later age, as a central part of their nationalist socialization. 
In their choices, both Arana and Krutwig were inspired by, and synthesized, pre-existing 
trends. Arana drew upon the Carlist tradition which he inherited from his family's 
background. To a certain extent, he was also influenced by liberal foralism (Sarramaga, 
Iturralde, etc.) and by the strong bonds persisting between city and countryside. Krutwig 
drew instead on the intellectual debate initiated by Ekin, which was later put into practice by 
ETA. However, they sharply differed in their choice of core values for Basque national 
identity. Krutwig was vehemently anti-clerical since he saw the Church as an instrument of 
oppression against the Basque people. He also proclaimed himself to be anti-racist and did 
not believe in the purity of blood and other dogmas. Therefore, he blamed his predecessor 
Arana as being 'more racist than Hitler'.244 He was so anti-clerical that he defined the 
Catholic Church as an "army used to enslave the Basque spirit, the army of the most odious 
of the oppressors" (1963: 67). Yet, there is a common thread between Arana and Krutwig. It 
is, paradoxically, a desperate search for cultural regeneration in a world that has only 
contempt for tradition. In this search, they both turned to language. Yet, at a certain stage, 
they both laid aside language and replaced it with something else, more attuned to the times 
and circumstances. Arana chose race and religion. Krutwig redefined Basque identity in 
terms of language and ethnos, but in practice placed it second after voluntary participation 
and activism, as epitomized in 'revolutionary violence'. Race and religion were no longer 
feasible instruments of mobilization.
A key feature in Basque politics and within ETA has been the continuous clash between 
cultural and political nationalism. Furthermore, after ETA had definitely chosen the path of 
armed struggle, a more dramatic conflict emerged between these two kinds of nationalism 
and a purely military one. With the increase of killings by the police and the Guardia Civil, 
and with the indiscriminate repression of the Basque people and culture, ETA fighters were
See the statem ents of Unamuno and Maetzu in chapters 9.
244 From an interview in Cambio 16, 23-1-1984 (quoted in Gilmour 1985).
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raised to the figures of martyrs and heroes. In this connection, it is important to remember 
that all the founders of Ekin and ETA were primarily cultural nationalists. Their central 
concern resided in the fate of Euskera. In the late 1960s ETA-V, and then ETA-VI, drifted 
towards a purely political brand of nationalism, focussing on class struggle. That occurred 
approximately when their leaders opted for mobilizing the immigrant working class.
This chapter has also illustrated the fissiparous trends within ETA and how these were 
overcome through the use of violence, generating a vicious circle of internal fragmentation 
and external confrontation. The trigger for the cycle of armed struggle has been the violent, 
often indiscriminate, oppression under the dictatorship. This chapter has also shown that 
ideological tensions were related to cultural fragmentation, in the form of immigration, 
rural/urban divide, class cleavages, Castilianization, etc. The dynamics of fragmentation and 
state repression will be analysed in the final chapter. In the next chapter, we shall examine 
how the interaction of different internal variables with the same external variable, state 
repression, generated a different pattern of national mobilization in Catalonia.
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Chapter 5
CATALONIA UNDER FRANCO
Francoism adopted the most radical politics of assimilation against non-Castilian cultures in 
modem Spanish history.245 The dictatorship's early stage was known as the Falangist period 
due to the predominance in the government's ranks of members of the Falange Espanola. It 
lasted approximately from 1939 to 1945. Most authors divide Francoism into two broad 
periods: from the civil war to the advent of the 'technocratic era' (1939-1959), and from the 
latter to the dictator's death (1959-1975). 1959 is therefore a watershed year, although other 
authors have pointed to different periods and focuses.246
In this chapter, an historical overview of the Francoist oppression and resurgence of 
Catalanism will serve the purpose of underlining its strong cultural character and the reasons 
it developed as a broad non-violent, inter-class and inter-party alliance. In contrast to the 
Basque case, we shall see that the all-encompassing cultural nature of Catalanism worked as 
a stimulus for bridging ancient ideological rivalries, creating the basis for a non-violent 
democratic movement which swelled local politics with the collapse of the dictatorship.
The drive to cultural homogeneity (1939-1942)
Before his assassination, the Finance Minister Jos6 Calvo Sotelo (1893-1936) loudly 
proclaimed: "I'd rather prefer a Red Spain than a broken Spain" (cited in Garcia Venero 
1968: 561). This sentence synthesized the driving force of the Falangist and Francoist 
campaigns, namely an obsession with 'national unity’. So great was this obsession that 
political hatred was directed against the 'separatists' even more than against the Left. 
Eventually, the two categories were bundled up into a unique concept and propaganda tool as
24 5  Prior to 1939 the Spanish state  failed to articulate any serious process of nation- 
building (Arbos and Puigsec 1980, Giner 1986: 447).
246 As an example, Vilar (1967) focuses on 1956 as  a  watershed. 1956 is also the year in 
which Spanish Television started broadcasting from Madrid, but its programmes could be picked 
up in Catalonia only in February 1959 (Culla 1989: 349).
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rojoseparatistas (red-separatists).
The propagandists of the Falange attacked the 'separatists' for "ignoring the Unitarian 
reality of Spain". Yet in practice, such unity, far from being 'natural', was based on the 
imposition of a single language, Castilian (Spanish), backed up by police repression and a 
centralized education system. The Jacobin idea of a common language, culture, race, history 
and territory as necessary prerequisites for state-building was deeply entrenched in the 
Falangist ideology which accompanied early Francoism. The Fascist and Nazi models of a 
strong Unitarian self-sufficient state were also imported and adapted to the Spanish reality.247 
Hence, everybody had the duty of "fluently speaking the tongue of Spanish unity, the 
ecumenical language of our hispanidad".248 Spanish was the language of the empire 
{idioma del impend) and, for this reason, "it must be spoken all over the state territory".249
Many of these ideas were inspired by the philosopher Jos6 Ortega y Gasset (1883- 
1955).250 Although Ortega was at pains to stress that he was not a nationalist, he repeatedly 
emphasized that Spanish unity could only be preserved at the cost of accepting the dominance 
of the Spanish state and imposing its cultural symbols - first of all the Castilian language. 
Hence his anti-regionalism provided a necessary tool of legitimation for the far right's 
ideology.251 He cried out for a policy of nacionalizacidn (roughly translatable as 
'nationalization') aimed at forging a "vertebrate, upright Spain" (cited in Dobson 1989: 
87).252 Ortega therefore "found himself painted into a comer, defending precisely the type of 
Spanish nationalism he always hoped to avoid....Only the shell of the idea - the Nation - 
was left, and others were to make unscrupulous use of it" (Dobson 1989:94). That was what 
eventually happened, and Ortega’s ideology was quickly picked up and upheld by the
2 4 7  For a  com parison of the Fascist, Nazi, Francoist, and Vichy’s  m odels of cultural
assimilation, se e  llle (1990).
249 Quoted in Eduardo Alvarez Puga, Diccionario de la Falange. Barcelona: Dopesa, 1937, p. 
12-3.
249 Id., page 36 (my emphasis). The quoted text also refers to the new directive of placing 
noticeboards in different Catalan public places intimating "Habla el idioma del Imperio" (Speak 
the language of the Empire), that is, Spanish.
250  Ortega's Espana invertebrada, a  sort of Bible for many Spanish fascists, is openly 
quoted in the Diccionario de la Falange. op. cit., p. 52.
251 In this, one can trace a  parallel betw een him and the Germ an philosopher Martin 
Heidegger. On the affinities and friendship between the two, see  Regalado Garcfa (1990).
252 Ortega also confused his adversaries by waving the standard of 'decentralization', which 
he claimed to regard as  a  generator of widespread public responsibility and thus of commitment 
to the 'nation'. In rhetorical contradiction with these statem ents, he also claimed that "internal 
dem ands for autonomy had to be seen  in the sam e light as  the loss of Spain's colonies - as  a 
symptom of the collapse of the nation” (cited in Dobson 1989: 94). He w as therefore a  sworn 
enemy of all regionalist and 'separatist' movements and for this reason his quotations becam e 
an ideal tool to be manipulated by the far right.
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Spanish ultra-rightists of the Falange.253
Backed by the intellectual authority of opinion-makers like Ortega, the Falangists proceeded 
in their campaign of annihilation of all vestiges of regional distinctiveness. This far-reaching 
persecution assumed Orwellian overtones and "jail sentences were imposed for even casual 
conversations carried on in the [regional] language on public streets" (Clark 1979: 81). With 
a hint of irony, Qriol Pi-Sunyer states that "a totalitarian system attempted to control the 
totality of civil culture; it was not simply the Statute of Autonomy that was abrogated but any 
entity that might seem to pose a challenge to the state, whether a boy scout troop or a choral 
society" (1980: 108-9). However, the intellectual influence of the Falangists was minimal: in 
Catalonia, a land with a highly developed associative and intellectual tradition, the Falange 
had a very low prestige. Not even the bourgeoisie, who called for his help against the 'reds', 
wished to deal with it.254
As soon as Barcelona fell to the Francoist troops, Catalonia was submitted to a special 
regime of occupation for six months (Benet 1973: 221-77). In a frenzied Tiunt for the 
separatist', all Catalan references were erased from public access (Jones 1981), and hundreds 
of thousands of books in Catalan were consigned to the pulping plants or burned in public 
places.255 Patriotic statues and monuments were smashed to the ground (Benet 1973: 369- 
71). All bills, posters, placards, notices, signposts and labels in Catalan were removed. 
People who opposed these measures were heavily fined or jailed (Benet 1973: 269-73,295- 
309,371-5 and 380-2). In the workplace, Catalan was banned even as a spoken language: a 
civil servant caught in the act of speaking Catalan risked immediate dismissal (Benet 1973: 
309-14). Municipal and state teachers suspected of Catalanist sympathies were forcibly 
removed from their jobs, or transferred to other regions, while others more loyal to the 
regime were 'imported' from the rest of Spain (Benet 1973: 328-9).256 In the University of 
Barcelona, all subjects dealing with Catalan culture were abolished, and the purge of the 
University staff reached levels unparalleled in other Spanish regions (Benet 1973:355-6).257
253 On the ideology of the Francoist regime, see  Arbos and Puigsec (1980).
254 jo se p  Benet (personal suggestion).
255 The 'Library of Catalonia' becam e the 'Central Library', and 'Catalonia Square ' (Plaga  
de Catalunya) was renam ed for a  few weeks 'Spanish Army Square ' (P laza del Ejercito
Espanof) (Fabres et al. 1978: 76, Riquer 1989: 101).
256 In only five months (between April and August 1939), seven hundreds teachers from 
Castile and Extremadura were despatched to Catalonia to replace the deported Catalan ones.
Given their total ignorance of the local language, culture and history, they w ere supposed to
work as  an instrument of de-Catalanization. All the formidable pedagogical advances registered 
by the Catalan schools were halted.
2 5 7  More than half of the teaching staff (135 professors) w ere expelled from the
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The Institut d'Estudis Catalans was closed down and replaced with an Instituto Espanol de 
Estudios Mediterraneos which existed in name only (Benet 1973: 360-7).268 All symbols of 
Catalan identity, such as the flag, anthem, etc., were strictly forbidden (Benet 1973: 387). 
Contemplating this labour of destruction, the Francoist journalist Manuel Aznar could 
triumphantly boast: "The theory of small nationalities is dead. The German, Italian and 
Spanish empires are the vital forces of the new Europe" (Benet 1973:403-4).259
There were attempts to proscribe the sardana (the national dance) and Catalan songs.260 
'Gothic' liturgical vestments were defined as 'separatist' and priests were advised to utter 
even their Latin homilies with a 'Spanish' pronunciation (Benet 1973: 435-6). The regime 
tried to build up far-fetched analogies between anti-semitism and anti-catalanism in order to 
earn Hitler's favours.261 Censorship led to the destruction of private correspondence written 
in regional 'dialects' (Benet 1973: 314).262 Punishment for the offenders went from simple 
fines to dismissal from the workplace, exile and prison. In the first years of dictatorship, 
many people were accused of 'separatism' only for 'daring' to speak in Catalan.263 
Denunciation and spying became a common practice (Riquer 1989: 82).
The scope of all these measures was not simply to suffocate Catalanism, but to eradicate 
Catalan culture and any sign of a separate Catalan identity at its very roots. Their result was 
devastating: "Barcelona, the city of revolutionary anarchists and experimental artists, of
University.
258 According to Manent (1976), these  figures were high if com pared with the total figure 
of the exile from Spain, 450,000.
259 This penchant against small minorities was typical of Francoism, and was inherited from 
the ideological armour of the Fascists and the Nazis. Note its similarity with Frederick Engel's 
attack on 'peoples without history' and its influence on Marxist ideology.
260 In one edict, the sardana  w as accursed as  a  'differentiating agent' (Benet 1973: 386).
However, according to Brandes (1990: 34-5), the dance w as prohibited only in som e locales in 
and around Barcelona, not in the countryside. "No doubt because the dictatorship considered the 
sardana  to be relatively innocuous, the dance was allowed to flourish as a  form of what we 
might call a  'peaceful protest' against the regime's more effective and oppressive campaign to
eliminate the public use of the Catalan language" (Brandes 1990: 35).
281 The Falangist identification of the C atalans a s  Jew s resulted in the coining of the 
neologism Judeo-catalanes  (Benet 1973: 128-37). Both the Nazi and Fascist governments 
agreed with a  policy avowed to the destruction of regional 'particularisms', avoiding at all 
costs the 'creation of a Catalan sta te ' (Benet 1973: 218). On the deportation of Catalan 
Republican refugees in France to Nazi concentration cam ps, se e  Roig (1992). Of the 6,000 
Republicans who died in Mauthausen, about one third were C atalans or Valencians. However, 
Franco slowly tried to dissociate himself from the Axis, especially after Jap an  entered the 
war. Thus, anti-Nazi refugees and several thousand Sephardic Jew s from the occupied Balkans 
were given sanctuary in Spain or transit visas. Finally, many Jew s were granted full Spanish 
citizenship (Avni 1982).
2 8 2  Until 1941 all private correspondence w as scrutinized by the censors, but mail 
censorship lasted up to 1948 (Riquer 1989: 102, Gallofrd i Virgili 1991, Gubern 1981).
263 On the regime's equation between Catalan language and separatism , se e  Benet (1973: 
89-1).
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thronging boulevards and excited discourse, had become another gray provincial Spanish 
town. Its political and cultural leaders were gone -some dead, some in exile. A defeated 
silence fell over the entire nation, a silence that for years would remain virtually unbroken. 
When it was broken - furtively and sporadically- it would be by the sound of bitter 
weepings" (Rosenthal 1991:45).
More than 500,000 people fled into exile in 1939,200,000 of whom came from Catalan­
speaking areas (Pi-Sunyer 1980: 109, Sauret 1979). The latter were thus deprived of part of 
their intelligentsia. In only six days from May 1 to May 6,1939, 266 people were executed 
after being judged by summary war councils (Benet 1973: 241-2, Sol6 i Sabatd 1986).264 
The president of the Generalitat Lluis Companys was shot by firing squads in October 1940 
after being seized by the Nazis who handed him over to the Falangists (Benet 1990). 
Between 1946 and 1953, most literary output was produced in exile.265 The Joes Florals 
were alternatively celebrated in America or Europe (Benet 1973: 386-7). The Catalan 
intelligentsia who remained in the country was thus forced underground and had to reunite in 
small family-based circles of friends.266 Like in Euskadi, the family emerged as the extreme 
bulwark and retreat against Castilianization, as an inviolable space where discussions on 
Catalonia's destiny could be carried out in Catalan.267
The Franco's regime tolerated regional culture only in the form of folklore. But, while the 
attempts to crush Euskara were openly aimed at its eradication, the attempts at eliminating 
Catalan included a supplementary strategy of 'dialectization': that is, the authorities tried to 
promote the view that Catalan was a mere dialect, a sub-variety of Spanish; they also tried to 
break up its linguistic unity by supporting non-standard varieties whenever they could.268
After the war, Catalonia was a broken society and a widespread apathy penetrated all walks
2 6 4  Sol6 i Sabatd (1986) puts the exact number of executed to 3,350, part of a  carefully 
planned campaign. As often happens (it w as a current practice in Guatemala, Iraq and other 
totalitarian countries in the early 1990s), repression reached its most gruesom e levels in the
countryside, away from influential opinion and m ass m edia's attention.
265 According to Manent (1976), 450 books and 180 periodicals in Catalan were published in 
exile between 1939 and 1976, the majority of them in Mexico and France.
266  Hence, a characteristic of postwar Catalonia was the absence of intellectual cadres in 
the country. The few who remained, such as Ignasi Augustf and the group Destino, were forced 
to abandon the Catalan language (Josep Benet personal suggestion).
2 6 7  On the role of the family a s  the main instrum ent of nationalist socialization, see  
H ernandez (1983), Barrera (1985), Johnston (1991), Rossinyol (1974: 409).
268 The term "dialectization", introduced in sociolinguistics by Heinz Kloss (1986), is meant
to underline a  conscious or sem i-conscious effort pursued by the state in order to undermine 
the unity of a  language, both promoting its internal fragmentation and refusing to recognize it 
a s  a  single unitary language. On Catalan, se e  Benet (1973: 72-3), and for a  comparison with 
the Occitan case  see  Lafont (1977).
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of life, preventing any possibility of political mobilization (Riquer 1990). The poet Salvador 
Espriu (1913-1985) reflected this tragedy in his lines. Speaking for many of his generation, 
Espriu expressed a "tactical withdrawal from a fraudulent public life into a few trusted 
realities.... In the background, of course, is the civil war itself, at once a collective and 
deeply personal tragedy: 1,200,000 dead and 500,000 exiled. The sense of drifting in a sea 
of specters -the ghosts of dead friends, enemies, acquaintances and relatives, all speaking a 
language itself mortally threatened" (Rosenthal 1991:46-9)
A slow recovery (1942-1959)
After the Allied victory against Fascism, Catalan expectations were raised (Rossinyol 1974: 
405). Indeed, the outcome of the war contributed to Madrid's decision to bestow some 
symbolic cultural concessions to the opposition: a few printed classical works, theatrical 
performances in Catalan, and concerts of the Orfedn Cataldn choirs were finally 
permitted.269 The regime needed to break its international isolation through a facade of feeble 
liberalization, the minimum necessary to show the world an appearance of ongoing change. 
Hence, from 1946, Catalan culture began to reawaken in semi-clandestinity (Galien 1987).
As soon as the yoke of repression was slightly loosened, Catalanism gave signs of 
renewed vitality. Every niche of freedom was exploited by the cultural activists. In spite of 
endless difficulties, the language began to experience a moderate revival. Since 1942, 
clandestine classes of Catalan history, language and literature had been set up at the Estudis 
Universitaris Catalans for small numbers of attendants. From 1944, the Institut d’Estudis 
Catalans resumed its activities, albeit only in a token way, lacking resources and 
continuously harassed by the regime. New literary prizes were established. Before 1939, the 
organization and financing of such events would have been the responsibility of the 
Generalitat, but now every initiative had to stem from private enterprise (Sams6 1990).270 
Exiled intellectuals, such as the poets Carles Riba (1893-1959) and Pere Quart (1899-1986) 
returned home beginning to contact the new generations.
The Selecta publishing house was founded in 1946, through the efforts and dynamism of 
the entrepreneur Josep Ma Cruzet (Riquer 1989: 240). The first non-religious book, the 
complete works of Jacint Verdaguer, was allowed in 1946, but not in standard Catalan in 
keeping with the regime’s policy of 'dialectization'. The printing of books in Catalan
269 On the modern Catalan tradition of choirs and their political content, se e  Artfs i Benach
(1980).
270 For the academic and literary prizes under the Generalitat, se e  Benet (1973: 54-7).
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experienced a slow but steady increase: the output passed from 12 books in 1946, to 60 in 
1948 and 96 in 1954. In 1960, they were more than 200. Catalan was first used in public for 
some papers presented at the "Seventh International Conference of Romance Linguistics", 
celebrated in 1953 at the University of Barcelona. The strictly philological character and 
international appeal of the conference could pass the scrutiny of the regime's censors.
Unofficial historiography thrived under the stimulating leadership of Jaume Vicens Vives 
(1910-1960).271 Throughout modem Catalan history, local historians played the role of 
reawakeners of the national spirit. Many works by Vives1 predecessors were largely 
apologetic eulogies, where rhetoric and mythical constructs took precedence over detailed 
scientific analysis. This myth-making function is crucial to any nationalist movement and 
characterizes Catalan historiography from its inception to the present-day. Vives broke 
radically with this tradition, nevertheless many of his works were permeated by a Catalanist 
spirit. In his classical Noticia de Catalunya, published in 1954, Vives asserted: "[We must] 
make an effort to improve the knowledge of ourselves before we begin precise plans.... We 
have to define ourselves. If we want to construct an acceptable edifice, we must know who 
we were and who we are" (Vives 1984: 9).272 The book provided some answers to these 
questions: the new Catalan identity was to be open, malleable, seaborn, reflective, etc.
In 1955, Selecta published Josep Ferrater i Mora’s (1912-1990) Les formes de vida 
catalanaP3 another key text which defined the essence of a renewed Catalan identity and 
influenced political Catalanism in the years to come. It was not a typical nationalist text, 
indeed its tones were overtly anti-separatist (Ferrater i Mora 1980:149). Yet, as an eloquent 
interpretation of a pre-existing Catalan character, Ferrater also formulated a new collective 
self-perception: the Catalans were 'reinvented' for the benefit of a more pluralistic vision of 
Catalanity.
The various cultural initiatives analysed in this section contributed to the emergence of a
271 Jaum e Vicens Vives w as the man who first sought to explain Catalan historical identity 
in concrete economic, demographic, social and psychological term s. Often referred to as  
Spain 's first modern historian, he championed the methodological inventions of the French 
Annates  school (Braudel, Le Goff, Leroy Ladurie, etc.). Yet, he envisaged the historian as 
social activist and catalyst for the recovery of Catalonia, striving to rebuild her culture, her 
institutions and her national spirit. However, this aim was to be achieved through impartial and 
factual analysis, rather than via old-fashioned panegyrics and eulogized writings.
272 Therefore, he developed the discipline of economic history, adopting statistical and 
demographic analysis. He also created a  network of international scholarly exchange, providing 
instruments like a  bibliographical index and an historical journal (Enders 1984).
273 The book was first published in 1944 in Santiago del Chile in a  limited edition. It w as then 
known by only a  few people, among them Vicens Vives, who openly quoted it as  one of his main 
sources of inspiration in Noticia de Catalunya (1984: 190-ff). To have a  clear idea of the new 
Catalan identity, the two books should be read in tandem.
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slight optimism among some intellectuals, who perceived Catalan culture to be no longer on 
the verge of extinction as it was a few years before. However, prevented from spreading 
their message to the masses, they had virtually no social impact. In the 1950s, there was a 
moment of real danger that Catalan would become a family language, extinct in the public 
sphere. Until 1945-6, many people believed in a great mutation at the end of World War II 
and clandestine press thrived in the expectation of major upheavals. When it was clear that 
the Western world was not interested in a prompt reestablishment of democracy in Spain, the 
hopes of the Catalan intelligentsia waned: in 1946, the clandestine press disappeared because 
of disillusion and the fact that the Communists were forced out of the opposition as a 
consequence of the Cold War.274 At this point, the danger of a violent turn for Catalan 
nationalism was vividly present. But the most impatient activists and the youth could find in 
cultural nationalism a channel for expressing their anxieties. We shall analyse this in brief.
Economic 'miracle1, immigration, and language revival
In 1959 Franco reshuffled his cabinet at the expense of both Falangists and Carlists, 
allowing the Catholic technocrats of the Opus Dei to enter key positions. The latter's 
Stabilisation Plan favoured a market economy "where prices would control the allocation of 
resources, and the integration of that market into the capitalist economy of the West— [The 
Plan] would cure the economy of its inherited impurities... [and] rapid growth would take 
care of all problems" (Carr 1980:156-7). This implied that Spain had to open-up to the 
world, allowing a gleam of hope for democratic reforms. These expectations were 
disappointed, as economic performance became the only criticism that the regime could 
tolerate. Indeed, the development plan became the traditional target of Left-wing criticism, 
since "the 'technocrats' faith in private enterprise.. .reinforced the hold of a narrow financial 
oligarchy ensconded in the 'big seven' private banks [as] only the private banks could 
finance industrial growth" (Carr 1980: 157).
From 1963, the milagro economico (economic miracle) had begun and Spanish growth 
rate "outpaced all capitalist economies other than the Japanese" (Carr 1980: 157). Foreign 
loans, especially from the US poured into the country, feeding a burgeoning economy. Mass 
tourism to what was then one of the cheapest places in Europe led to the irreparable 
destruction and over-building of large stretches of the Mediterranean coast.275 Finally, the
274 Jo sep  Benet (personal suggestion). Benet also stresses  the Castilianization of the youth 
(since 1955-56) who did not live through the Civil War: at all levels of instruction, only 
Castilian was allowed.
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remittances from migrants in the richest European countries also contributed to alleviate the 
economy of the poorest areas of Spain. The stress on aggregate growth led to the 
concentration of industries in a few regions, especially Euskadi and Catalonia, although the 
regime tried to favour Madrid as a financial and industrial centre whenever it could. This did 
not help redress the imbalance between rich and poor provinces. As a consequence, the three 
regions began to experience the largest influx of immigrants in their modem history. As we 
shall see, the latter phenomenon caused severe social strains and was a crucial factor in the 
process of re-definining Catalan and Basque identity which finally led to the creation of new 
forms of nationalist opposition.
The region's upper classes were generally satisfied with the regime's performance, at least 
on the surface. However, dissatisfaction boiled deep within some sectors and the comparison 
with other European countries was inevitable.276 Much of the blame was directed at the 
Spanish state because of its decisionist role in the economy. According to a member of the 
emerging regionalist bourgeoisie, Raimon Trias Fargas (1972,1974), the surplus extracted 
by the state removed the surplus necessary for profit and reinvestment in Catalonia. Only 
52% of that taken by the state was returned to the region, while the percentage of all state 
funds granted to Catalonia had decreased to 11% in 1970. Furthermore, through government 
control of banking, 45% of savings were regulated by Madrid for development programmes 
of the INI (National Institute of Industry), and were not available for reinvestment in 
Catalonia (Trias Fargas 1972: 82-3). "The increasingly closer integration of Catalonia into a 
market economy of continental dimensions... worked to alter the economic balance: from a 
developed zone within the Spanish economy, Catalonia [was] being transformed into an 
appendage of a much more powerful system" (Pi-Sunyer 1979: 60). The alternative solution 
proposed by the regionalist bourgeoisie and rejected by Madrid was that these savings must 
be held in Catalonia in order to promote development by increasing investment and 
improving local productivity (Trias Fargas 1974). Encouraged by the economic boom, these 
upper classes followed the Christian Democratic orientation of its European counterparts. 
Most of them advocated, both at a rational and emotional level, the revival of Catalan culture 
in all its aspects, centering particularly on language. As we shall see, a few regionalist
275 The number of tourists attracted to 'the playground of Europe' rose from six million in 
1960 to forty million in 1980. The C osta Brava and, even more, the C osta del Sol near 
Valencia, were spoiled to the point of resembling R um ania's cem entation projects under 
Ceausescu.
276 The Catalan bourgeoisie perceived itself to be in a  s ta te  of 'relative deprivation' in 
relation to its European partners.
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industrialists and small entrepreneurs were a crucial source of funding for several cultural 
enterprises.
In 1959, Luis de Galinsoga, the pro-Francoist director of the most popular Barcelona 
newspaper, La Vanguardia, launched a tirade against the use of Catalan while he was 
attending a Mass in Barcelona. He then rabidly shouted his famous 'aphorism1: "Todos los 
catalanes son una mierda" (All the Catalans are shit). Taking advantage of the fuss created 
by such a desecration, several grass-root groups organized a boycott of the newspaper, 
which resulted in a sharp drop in subscriptions and advertisers.277 Under direct orders from 
Franco, Galinsoga was sacked. This was a triumph for the opposition and demonstrated that 
"Catalonia [was] alive, conscious, reasserting herself, and once more will be thriving".278
On the occasion of Franco's visit to Barcelona, some slight liberal reforms were approved 
such as the compilation of Catalan civil law. However, repression reared up again during 
some trivial occurrences. At a concert in Barcelona's Palau de la Musica the audience struck 
up Maragall's Cant de la Senyera (Chant to the Catalan Flag) in the presence of some 
Francoist ministers. Twenty people were arrested and the nationalist leader Jordi Pujol, who 
the police identified as the main organizer, was sentenced to a seven years prison term.279
From 1959, Serra d'Or, a first large circulation magazine entirely written in Catalan 
prospered under the auspices of the Montserrat Abbey. With 12,000 subscriptions in 1964, it 
represented a significant achievement given the times and the religious character of the 
publication.280 Children books and magazines, such as Cavall Fort (founded in 1961), 
became important elements in the Catalan pedagogic panorama (Rossinyol 1974: 446). 
Finally, with a circulation of 100,000 copies, Tele-Estel (founded in 1966) became one of 
the four best-selling magazines in Spain.
A key event was the foundation in 1961 of Omnium Cultural, a patronage society
277 Most of these organization were Catholic-based. The main organizer of the boycott was 
Jordi Pujol's CC, which also underwent the harshest m easures of repression in the aftermath 
of the event.
278 S tatem ent from the main prom oters of the cam paign, chiefly the Catholic-based 
Acad&mia de la Llengua, quoted by Culla (1989: 302).
279 On this episode and its consequences, see  Crexell (1982). Despite police beatings, Pujol 
denied to have taken part in the events at the Palau, although he 'confessed' to be the foremost 
responsible for the Vanguardia boycott. Nevertheless, the CC group led by him w as the chief 
organizer of the Palau's act of civil disobedience. Pujol spent two and a half years in prison. 
After his release he showed less inclination to engage in direct political confrontations, turning 
to economic and cultural revival.
280 In the words of the literary critics Josep  Ma Caste I let and Joaquim Molas, Serra d ’Or 
soon becam e "the most free and best informed m agazine in the entire peninsula” (quoted by 
Culla 1989: 311).
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dedicated to promote Catalan culture in all walks of life (Rossinyol 1974:449-51). With the 
help of funding from a few industrialists and entrepreneurs, it subsidized in particular Catalan 
language classes. Closed down by the regime in 1963, it was allowed to resume its activities 
only in 1967. Subsequently, the group established scholarships and prizes, such as the 
Premi de les Lletres Catalanes (Prize for the Catalan Literature) awarded yearly from 
1969.281
The media world was shaken by the impact of the Nova Cangd (New Song) movement. In 
1961, a group of singers and songwriters known as Els Setze Jutges (literally, the Sixteen 
Judges) burst onto the scene, while the record company EDIGSA was established to promote 
Catalan songs. Songwriters performed freely in universities, parishes, boy-scout camps and 
artistic centres of cities and countryside (Culla 1989: 306-7). The song movement was one of 
the most effective vehicles for the propagation of national consciousness amongst the 
masses. The success of singers such as Raimon from Valencia and Maria del Mar Bonet from 
the Balearic Islands rekindled national consciousness in all Catalan-speaking areas. Raimon's 
version of Salvador Espriu's poetry Assaig de cdntic en el temple (Trial Hymn in the 
Temple1) became nearly an opposition's anthem. Espriu's poem was "an attack on the 
postwar prostration of Catalonia, in which there was almost no immediate resistance to the 
Franco regime" (Rosenthal 1991: 51). Catalonia was conceived as a dormant nation waiting 
for her bards to be re-awakened:
Oh. how tired I am of my 
craven old brutish land, 
and how I'd like to get away from it 
to the north, 
where they say people are clean 
and noble, learned, rich, free, 
wide-awake and happy 
Then, in the congregation, the brothers would say 
disapprovingly: 'Like a bird who leaves his nest 
is that man who forsakes his place', 
while I, now far away, would laugh 
at the law and ancient wisdom 
of this, my arid village.
But I must never follow my dream 
and I'll stay here till I die.
For I'm craven and brutish too.
And what's more I love, with a 
desperate grief, this my poor, 
dirty, sad, unlucky homeland
(Translated by David H. Rosenthal 1991:50)
According to Rosenthal, the phrase 'Like the bird... thus the man1 "echoes both style and 
the imagery of parts of the Old Testament It is also the poem’s first patriotic expression, and
281 In 1976, Omnium Cultural numbered 22,000 m embers. On the crucial activity of this 
association, see  Omnium Cultural. 1961-1986. Barcelona: Omnium Cultural, 1986.
282 Also quoted in Hooper (1986: 234).
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suggests a parallel between Catalans and Jews, two peoples often persecuted for being more 
industrious and progressive than their neighbours. Another parallel is a common sense of 
deep and sometimes fatal attachment to a national identity" (Rosenthal 191: 51).283 In 
Espriu’s most famous book, La pell de brau> Spain is referred to by its Hebrew name 
’Sepharad’, while other Hebrew words punctuate the text. As the appellative 'Sepharad' 
suggests, Spain could be emulated and desired only in its pre-1492 form.
On 11 September 1964, the first public Diada (Catalan national holiday) was celebrated by 
3,000 citizens.284 This was the first postwar Catalanist street demonstration. Seven people 
were arrested and heavy fines were inflicted upon participants. On the institutional side, 
things were moving fast as well. The struggle for the language could not be carried on 
without re-founding the education system. A petition for the introduction of Catalan at all 
levels of education and the media gathered momentum in 1963. The pedagogic centre Rosa 
Sensat, created in 1965, established the first summer schools to train teachers of Catalan. 
Classical and contemporary works were translated from foreign languages into Catalan, 
contributing to opening-up the regional culture to universal currents.283 A press law (ley de 
prensa) suppressed preventive censorship in 1966, but this served only to further restrict 
public debate and critical analyses of political reality. Indeed, penalties were increased for 
those publications that 'threatened' Spanish unity, instigating a new style of self-censorship. 
Important publications were not spared by this onslaught: the magazine Destino was closed 
down for two months, its director sacked and subjected to heavy fines for its anti­
conformism. Such 'exemplary' punishments, together with another state of emergency in 
1969, were designated to intimidate journalists and media professionals.
Yet, the half-muted revival continued unabated. An ambitious campaign to celebrate 
Pompeu Fabra's birth centenary was articulated in 1968 through hundreds of public events 
under the title La llengua d'un poble (A people's language). All the political forces of the 
opposition were involved in the celebration. The first tome of a 15-volume 'Great Catalan 
Encyclopedia' appeared in 1969. The basis and action programme for a future government of 
Catalonia were now in place. It was evident that only political autonomy could allow an
283 In the Basque case  parallels with Judaism  were less usual. On the contrary, Arana took 
as  a  matter of pride the weak Muslim and Jewish influence in the Basque Provinces.
284 They assem bled in the place where the statue of Rafael C asanova (1660-1743), a  
Catalan hero of the Barcelona's siege (1714) and the last of its consellers en cap, had 
formerly stood. As a  symbol of the defence of Catalan Constitutions, the monument receives a 
yearly homage on the occasion of the diada (11 September).
285 Censorship had began to soften its grip in 1958, allowing the translations of foreign 
works into Catalan (Gubern 1981).
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effective cultural normalization and democratization. Thanks to the strength of their culture, 
Catalanist militants acquired a new confidence in their fate as a nation. Although most 
political expression were ostracized, the Catalans could always find comfort in the study and 
contemplation of their heritage, in the certainty that it would survive and thrive again. This is 
in sharp contrast to the Basque Country where no such hopes could be cultivated by a 
disillusioned nationalist intelligentsia, who had been historically betrayed by its Castilianized 
elites.
How can this cultural revival be explained? Catalan culture was already firmly established 
before the Civil War. Repression from above and immigration from below threatened its 
vitality, but could hardly erase the awareness of a strong cultural potential. Postwar Catalonia 
was like a fertile field which had been covered with gravel, flattering all forms of life on the 
surface; grass started soon to grow up again through every available niche until nature 
reconquered what was once its own.
Moreover, Catalan language assumed an unequivocal political meaning. This was a 
telescoped repetition of what happened under Primo de Rivera. In a spiral process, the state 
wanted to erase Catalan culture because it attributed to it a political meaning, but culture itself 
increased its political meaning as a consequence of state repression: the flame of cultural 
nationalism was still burning under the ashes of the Civil War. This contrasts to the 
experience of Euskadi, where cultural nationalism was weak from the start and its place was 
taken by military nationalism. Hence, in the latter case, the process from cultural to political 
nationalism (Hroch 1985, Hutchinson 1987) was replaced by a process from military to 
political nationalism, since military action provided the cohesive force which a declining 
Basque culture could not provide.
Also, thanks to the cohesive force of the cultural claim, Catalan opposition became united 
in a loose front encompassing not only nationalists, but also Communists, Socialists, 
Catholics, and even some Anarchists. In the same period, Basque nationalism remained 
ideologically -albeit not politically- fragmented for want of a common platform, as it had 
from its inception. All Catalan political parties, voluntary associations and labour unions 
joined in their demands for linguistic rights. "It was in the obstinate adherence to language 
that the Catalans manifested the most decisive proof of their vitality and will" (Rossinyol 
1974:409).286 Political autonomy -rather than independence- was the limited goal needed for
286 o n e  of CC's founders, Miquel Coll i Alentorn described the importance of the cultural 
revival in the following terms: "Cultural questions were our concern since the beginning, as we 
saw  that the people were condem ned to ignore their own culture" (interview by Colomer i 
Mascarell 1977: 51).
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such linguistic rights to become a meaningful reality. This assertive stance was derived from 
the inner conviction that Catalonia possessed a distinctive high culture with a unique literary 
and artistic heritage.287 By contrast, Basque culture was derided by people like Maetzu and 
Unamuno (see chapter 9). Such scornful attitudes have few parallels amongst Catalan 
intellectuals. Euskara was scarcely spoken and country-rooted, but, at the same time, it 
represented an unique expression of ethnic distinctiveness. All Basque nationalists at some 
stage conceived Euskara as the quintessence of Basque identity. But its promotion was 
denigrated by mainstream intellectuals as a throwback to a degraded and past-oriented 
culture. Furthermore, the fact that Euskara was scarcely spoken, especially in the cities, 
meant that it could not properly work as a tool of mass mobilization as in the Catalan case. 
Dream and reality clashed for many nationalists, chiefly the cultural nationalists. Arana 
dreamed that through his single efforts and with the help of a few trusted friends Euskara 
could be revitalized. However, he himself had to abandon this ideal during his lifetime, as 
soon as he realized that Basque nationalism could not be constructed on the basis of language 
alone. He therefore chose race and religion, sowing the seeds of fragmentation and ambiguity 
in the nationalist message. The compensation of this fragmented character was an intransigent 
and radical emphasis on separation from Spain.
Before passing into the specific developments of the national struggle in Catalonia, we 
should reiterate the main argument of this chapter, relating it to the overall thesis. The strong 
cultural emphasis in Catalonia created the condition for a peaceful nationalist revival in which 
most opposition forces were accepted independently from their ideology. This evolution has 
been made possible by a pre-existing lively regional culture, especially in terms of language 
and literature. The contrast with the Basque case has shown the importance of the existence 
of a lively cultural basis which is able to resist the impact of the state's assimilation policies. 
The lack of shared elements of cultural distinctiveness has been an important factor in 
determining the adoption of a violent strategy by the Basque nationalist leaders.
Paradoxes of a secular society: The Church as refuge of the nation.
After the horrors of the Civil War, when hundreds of priests, monks and nuns were
287 Already in 1965, Pierre Vilar asserted  that "the stage of deep  decadence is left behind 
and Catalonia lives now an indisputable moment of ascension” (Vilar, quoted in Rossinyol 1974: 
414). This optimist Zei tgei s t  w as reflected in a positivist will to "reinforce and improve 
Catalonia in all domains, to prepare her to better face the new s tag es  of her existence by 
placing her in the context of Western society and the Europe of natural communities" (Rossinyol 
1974: 414-5).
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massacred by the Republican forces, it is no wonder that most churchmen and women 
received the Francoist troops with open arms, as liberators.288 Indeed, we have mentioned 
that anti-clerical pogroms were a feature of Catalan 'progressive' politics since at least the 
turn of the century. Through the doctrine of nacionalcatolicismo, the regime presented itself 
as saviour of the faith -and the country- and therein stood one of the pillars of its legitimacy. 
As the Vatican accepted the new Church hierarchy proposed by the regime, the Church 
became an instrument of assimilation.289 For eight years, its higher echelons attempted 
unsuccessfully to de-Catalanize the regional clergy and all religious practices. Anti-Catalanist 
bishops were appointed in Tarragona, Lleida, Barcelona and Tortosa. As we have seen, 
Francoism attempted to influence Mass celebrations to the extent of changing liturgical 
paraphernalia and ceremonies. For many years, Mass in Spanish became the rule. The 
ecclesiastic hierarchy, particularly the above mentioned bishops, were "conscious 
instruments of Castilianisation, acting, more than as pastors, as servile functionaries of a 
regime which they identified with ideologically" (Culla 1989: 309-10).290 However, the local 
clergy soon started to resent these attempts, offering the first possibilities of public gatherings 
where Catalan could be used.29! Eventually, the regional priesthood became the main actors 
in the national revival of the early 1960s.
This leading role of the Church needs explanation. As we said, Catalan society is strongly 
secular. In 1963, only 15% of the population of Barcelona considered themselves to be 
Catholics, against 82% who claimed to be indifferent.292 Paralleling the decrease in religious 
practice, the Church strove to recapture its role as a spiritual guiding light of social values. 
Young vicars of urban origin who did not live through the Civil War were beginning to enter 
into the parishes (Gil-Delgado 1975, Hermet 1986). They were alert, active and intellectually 
aware. Ten years before the Vatican Concilium n, some of them were already attracted by the 
example of the French worker-priests, who "merged a Christian concern for the poor with 
progressive issues and leftist politics" (Johnston 1991:71).
The Benedectine Abbey of Montserrat became the centre and symbol of this resistance, and
288 Riquer (1989: 22) calcu lates betw een 8,500 and 9,000 victims of Republican 
repression. Nearly a  quarter of them, that is, 2,500 men and women, were clergy-people. For 
a  collection of testimonies of the m assacres, see  Massot (1987).
289 On the shifting Vatican policies towards Catalonia and its clergy, s e e  Carreras de Nadal 
and Manent (1971).
290 The only exceptions were the Bishop of Vic and, from 1963, the Bishop of Girona.
291 On the role of the Church during the Civil War and its immediate aftermath, se e  Massot 
(1978).
292 Diocesan sources, quoted by Culla (1989: 308-9).
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people travelled there from all over Catalonia to hear a Mass in Catalan. The catalyst event 
was provided by a celebration for the enthronement of the Virgin of Montserrat on 27 April 
1947. Three years before, the Abbey launched an appeal to raise money for the construction 
of a throne for the icon of the Virgin. As popular contributions reached an extraordinary level 
with kilos of gold and silver donated, a few people organized a feast for the event by a series 
of parish meetings. Some of them, such as the historian Josep Benet, were not monks, but 
Left-wing secular nationalists. The success was exorbitant: about a hundred thousand people 
converged to Montserrat with every available means, by foot, mule or car, from all venues of 
Catalonia. For some of them the pilgrimage lasted two or three days. ’That night, very few 
people slept because there were not enough cells for the pilgrims" (Fabres et al. 1978: 126- 
9). In this first mass event of Catalanist affirmation Catalan words were for the first time 
publicly spoken and a huge senyera (Catalan flag) was hung from the peak of a mountain. 
The Civil Guard was unable to remove it for many hours. Aware that all this fervour was 
likely to be used by the Catalanist opposition, the governador civil (civil governor) 
nevertheless had to concede that "it would have been a political mistake to refuse permission 
for speaking Catalan in Montserrat" (cited by Fabres et al. 1978:129).
This unique event proved two things: the persisting strength of Catalanist sentiment among 
the faithful (and beyond), and the ideal position of the Church to act as ark and sanctuary of 
Catalan culture. But the regime unleashed a strong repression on both organizers and 
participants so that nothing vaguely similar could be enacted again for many years. 
Henceforth, religious opposition to the regime's appropriation and misuse of 
nationalcatolicismo remained muted. But, given the regime's bias in favour of Catholicism, 
Churches and monasteries all over Catalonia were turned into safe-heavens and harbours of 
refuge for Catalanist militancy. They were the only environment where Catalanists felt 
protected from police irruptions and censorship.
Things started to change again in the 1960s. The example of the 339 Basque priests who in 
1960 denounced the Church's support for the regime risking Franco's wrath (see previous 
chapter) had a strong impact on the Catalan clergy. But the great stimulus for the clergy came 
after the election of Pope John XXIII (1958), when he unexpectedly convened a second 
Vatican Council (1962-1965). His encyclica Pacem in terris (1963), the "encyclica of 
freedom", condemned cultural and political repression against national minorities stirring up 
enthusiasm amongst the open-minded clergy. Non-believers too followed with unusual 
attention the developments of the Council.293 As an unseen religious awareness permeated
293 The encyclica was directed to "all the men of good will", Independently of their religion
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the country in the early sixties (Culla 1989: 309), Church and civil society became singularly 
rejoined: Catholic-inspired political activities sprang up all over the country and secular 
families sent their children to Catholic-run or Catholic-inspired schools and leisure centres. 
The revival covered several fields and the Publications Abadia de Montserrat engaged in the 
publication of books and magazines that no private publishing house would dare to print In 
the field of social work, there were about 20 associations of the lay apostolate which catered 
to local needs throughout Catalonia (Pi Sunyer 1971: 132).294
Under the aegis of the abbot Aureli Escarr6 (1908-1968), the abbey of Montserrat became 
the core of Catalanism.295 In 1963, Escarrd released a famous interview for the French 
newspaper "Le Monde" in which he spelled out the toughest condemnation of the regime 
ever uttered from the interior. His declarations caused an international uproar and achieved 
unprecedented publicity for the Catalan cause. The accusation against the Spanish regime was 
of abjuring the fundamental Christian principles behind its facade of defender of 
Christianity.296 This was a burning indictment of the regime, since its legitimacy rested on 
Catholic backing. However, any direct attack on rebellious clergymen would have spelled a 
disaster. Repression was a harder task in post-Concilium times when the opposition could 
quote Vatican guidelines in support of its actions (Pi Sunyer 1971:132). Yet, two years later 
Escarre was forced into exile, where he remained until his death, and the Vatican 
dispossessed him of his title of abbot. Escarre's combative stance turned him into a hero for 
most Catalans. A massive crowd attended his funeral in 1968 (Minobis 1988).
In 1966, the local Church joined the student movement and 130 priests demonstrated in 
front of Barcelona's Police Headquarters {Jefatura) against the ill-treatment of a student. 
When the procession was attacked, astonished by-standers could see the priests in gowns
or belief. "Universal p eace -the Pope said- is a good which interests all mankind without 
exceptions". S ee  John XXIII, Enciclica Pacem  in Terris, presented, resum ed and annotated by 
Joaquin Ruiz-Gim6nez, Madrid: E spasa, 1963. According to Ruiz-Gim6nez, the unprecedented 
relativist and tolerant character is evident: it does not p resent "the minimal condemnation 
against any system  as  erroneous, nor the minimal concession to polemics. The only attitude 
which is openly condemned is racial prejudice”.
294 The great popularity enjoyed by the Church in the 1960s, which included a  boom of 
religious books, made many people conjecture about an 'irreversible hegemony of the Catholic 
field' (Lor6s 1980: 23).
295 At least until 1947, Escarr6 was not an opposition sympathizer. His turnabout resulted 
probably from the impact of the Montserrat gathering in 1947, which he himself helped to 
organize (Minobis 1988).
296 He claimed with words of fire: "The real subversion existing in Spain is that of the 
government.... What we have behind us is not twenty-five years of peace, but only twenty-five 
years of victories. The conquerors, including the Church, which w as obliged to fight on their 
side, have done nothing to close the gap between victors and vanquished..." (cited in Read 1978: 
203).
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being chased in the streets with batons and beaten by police contingents (Crexell 1992). The 
Christian Catalanist youth had its spearhead in the CC (Crist-Catalunya, later Comunitat 
Catalana) under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, the future president of the re-established 
Generalitat (Marcet 1987). CC was founded in 1954 as a highly informal group of friends 
imbued by social Catholic doctrine, mostly expressed in a paper called Ponincia by their 
main ideologue Raimon Galf (b. 1917). The later was a compendium of contemporary 
philosophy from a neo-traditionalist standpoint and was adopted as CC's ideological stand 
for five years (Lores 1980:10-21, Marcet 1987: 3-7, Munoz 1979,1990: 94-108).
The shift from religion to secularism was compounded by a new interest in Marxism 
among former seminarians and lay intellectuals. The re-approachement was mutual and 
paralleled by the abandonment of traditional anti-clericalism on the part of the Communists. 
Religious organizations then ceased to be the vectors of the movement, as the torch passed on 
to the Left, notably the underground Communist Party.297
Paradoxes of internationalism: the Communists as makers of the nation 
After Pujol’s imprisonment, a small number of his followers started to focus on class 
struggle, developing their own brand of revolutionary socialism and finally abjuring Catholic 
confessionalism (Culla 1989: 304, Munoz 1990: 166-ff). This evolution paralleled and was 
contemporary to ETA's massive shift towards Marxism, although revolutionary socialism 
remained an epiphenomenon in more moderate Catalonia. From 1964, the Communist Party 
(PSUC, Par tit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya) achieved primacy in the Catalan opposition. 
Nearly all active political opposition situated itself to the Left, while the Catholic nationalists 
led by Pujol limited their activity to cultural and economic enterprises devoid of political 
content. From 1958, a grass-roots movement for the propagation of national awareness and 
culture appeared under the motto Fer poble, Fer Catalunya (to make a people, to make 
Catalonia). This represented a break with pre-war Republican Catalanism, which Pujol and 
other nationalists held co-responsible for the Civil War (Culla 1989: 300). The movement’s 
Catholic inspiration was reflected in a concern for people's welfare, although it remained
297 According to Lords, the change was sudden and irreversible: in a  secular society like 
Catalonia, "the coherence of Catholicism w as maintained thanks to those Values of rationing' 
typical of a  postwar economy, [which proved] unable to withstand the impact of the Values of 
consumerism ' that displaced them in the 1960s... [This] was paralleled by a  generational crisis 
of Marxist dogmas, of the unidimensional meaning of militancy,...and by the appearance of all 
sorts of cultural 'hetherodoxies', accompanied by an expansion of knowledge which invalidated 
many of the acritical Catholic and Marxist approaches” (Lords 1980: 30). On the eclipse of CC, 
see  also Fabre and Huertas (1981).
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aloof from working-class organizations and interests. Its initial character was non-partisan. 
Convinced that the regime was destined to remain in power, Pujol preferred to dedicate his 
efforts to Fer Pa(s (Make/Build the country), that is, to build up a private cultural and 
economic infrastructure as a bulwark against de-nationalization. In this way, it was possible 
to stimulate national socialization with the spread of Catalanist values and symbols (Culla 
1989: 304). That meant partially renouncing clandestine action and taking the maximum 
possible advantages from the occasional snippets of freedom bestowed by the regime. The 
politics of Fer Pa(s was conceived by Pujol as the 'central ground' (terreny) for action, and 
his group only timidly supported overt political activities (Culla 1989: 368, Lords 1980: 21- 
8, Marcet 1987:7-10).
In contrast, the PSUC was highly organised into political fronts which covered a huge 
variety of fields and emerging struggles, such as the neighborhood associations and the 
feminist movement. Its magazine Nous Horizons, entirely written in Catalan, became an 
arena for political debate in which leading nationalist intellectuals took part The PSUC 
exercised a prominent influence on the unofficial labour union Workers' Commissions 
(<Comisiones Obreras) and the student movement. Most importantly, the PSUC was able to 
make its activities appear legal, whilst assuming an open attitude to the other opposition 
forces (Culla 1989: 368). The PSUC itself obviously remained illegal, until 1977. The 
evolution of the Communists towards nationalism was slow but steady. During its first 
Congress held in Paris in 1956, leading militants focused much of the attention on the 
'national question' (Ribd 1977). Meanwhile, atheism was slowly dropped from the official 
Communist ideology. What was the reason for this slow opening to Christian ideals and even 
theology? The new theology emerging from the Vatican Council, with its semi-official 
dialogue between Catholicism and Marxism, reinforced the commitment of those 
'progressive' elements within the Church which focussed their attention on social issues. 
Peoples of leftist leanings, such as the historian Josep Benet, played an important role in 
building bridges between the two fields (Lor6s 1980: 23, Sams6 1991). It is interesting to 
note that Benet was a cultural -as well as a political- nationalist, and that many of his works 
dealt with the repression of Catalan culture.298
On 11 September 1967, the now Communist-led Comisiones Obreras for the first time 
officially participated in the Diada. This was an important step towards the inclusion of the 
Left and the labour unions in the broader Catalanist movement. For the first time, many
298 On clandestine postwar Catalan culture, see  Sams6 (1992) and Galien (1987).
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immigrants attended. A new alliance between working-class organizations, the local Church 
and the nationalist intelligentsia was being forged. Two main issues brought together the 
Church and the Communists: the social question (particularly, immigrants' integration) and 
the national question (particularly, language rights). The 'bridge' crossing the ideological gap 
was provided by the defence of Catalan culture, identity and interests.
The students between nationalism and radical fragmentation
From the 1950s, Catholic students became increasingly attentive to social problems, 
especially those concerning the immigrants. The Universities were another sector where the 
regime decided not to intervene too heavily. One main reason was that most students came 
from the upper and upper-middle class families who supported the regime. Students were 
granted limited freedom to have their university organizations, but they increasingly resisted 
compulsory membership in the government-sponsored syndicates.299 At the same time, 
universities reeled under the heady impact of foreign ideas and became obvious candidates 
for oppositional practices. This situation of contact with the outside world also gave them 
some leverage and the opportunity to publicize the regime's excesses. The University became 
a place of relative freedom, a laboratory of ideas, and a centre of recruitment for the 
opposition, while the regime considered university life to be a barometer of public order 
(Culla 1989: 371).
In March 1966, 500 student delegates, professors and intellectuals met to set up a new 
syndacate, the Sindicat Democrdtic d’Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona (SDEUB, 
Democratic Student Union of the University of Barcelona). This event became known as the 
Caputxinada, after the name of the Capuchin convent in Sarrfe (suburb of Barcelona) where 
it took place. Again, the Church worked as an active supporter of the opposition and the 
assembly's location was an important factor in the police's initial attitude to desist from a 
frontal attack. Nevertheless, the police burst into the friary after a two-day siege. The news 
spread rapidly in the region, engendering a solidarity movement which had dramatically 
positive consequences for the consolidation of the opposition. It led to the creation of a 
coordinating body, the Taula Rodona (Round Table), under the initiative of the PSUC. For 
the first time in the postwar period, a vast array of opposition groups joined forces in a loose 
front: Communists, Socialists, Nationalists, Christian-Democrats and various independent 
figures.
299 On the student movement, see  Colomer (1978).
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The SDEUB acquired nearly unanimous support from students, 20 % of whom were 
actively involved in its events. During the academic year 1966-67, it developed intense 
political and cultural activity in the shadow of Catalanism, the high point of which was a 
massive recital by Raimon. The regime responded by expelling over a hundred students and 
professors, and suspending for one year the registration of all the students of the University 
of Barcelona.
Repression suffocated much of the student movement, but in May 1968 the echoes of the 
European student revolts brought to the universities a previously unknown gauchisme 
(’leftism1) resulting in the proliferation of several far left groups. These grupuscoles (small 
insignificant groups) tried to "compensate for their lack of support with extremism and 
violence" (Culla 1989: 372) which provided the regime with a caveat for escalating its 
repression. In turn, the subsequent state of emergency drove the groups further towards 
ideological radicalism and their grupusculitzacio in a plethora of violently militant teams. 
Before the spectre of endless fragmentation the struggle for Catalan identity offered a solid 
standpoint to many disaffected leftists, who, in turn, radicalized their posture, for instance, in 
claims for self-determination.
The vitality of Catalanist social networks: 
boy-scouts, hiking groups, football supporters, neighborhood associations 
We have mentioned the importance of the family in rearing and consolidating feelings of 
Catalanism and national identity. A major consequence of censorship was that every 
expression of national identity had to be acted out in limited circles of trusted friends and 
relatives. The result was the enlargement and reinforcement of solidarity and interaction 
within small groups. This led to the emergence of a Catalan middle-class network consisting 
of individuals from all ideologies and political leanings who knew each other well. This 
formed a "relatively homogeneous elite [who] inhabited a circumscribed physical and social 
space. Under such a situation, a village-like situation [arose]... that mitigated against 
anonymity and made it possible for almost everyone to know everyone else" (Pi i Sunyer 
1971: 129). This seems to confirm visions of the nation as an extended family. As in 
Euskadi, fear of repression led to the gradual formation of "loosely structured, often ad hoc, 
networks and cliques" (Pi i Sunyer 1971: 129). At this stage, it was impossible for the 
authorities to regulate and check the activity of a myriad of penyas (get-together meetings 
held weekly at restaurants, bars and other public locales).300
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The range and scope of quasi-formal associations which could bypass the regime's 
regulation increased. Under the disguise of hobbies, professionalism or leisure, clusters of 
families socialized their children into the same groups. Associations of sardanistes (saidana 
dancers), folk-singers, hikers, excursionists, as well as choirs, alumni associations, hobby 
congregations, private clubs, football supporters, boy and girl-scout gatherings, all served to 
encourage Catalanist socialization.301
The scout movement (escoltisme) became one of the most fertile grounds for the 
cultivation of Catalan culture and nationalism (Balcells and Samper 1993, Johnston 1985, 
Seira i Garcia 1968). Many future politicians and pedagogues were formed in its ranks. The 
scouts enjoyed special protection from the clergy, particularly in the abbey of Montserrat 
The movement expanded and in 1970 it numbered over 10,000 affiliated members. Parish 
centres organised all sort of social activities.
Excursion groups, tied to a late-Eighteenth century tradition of 'rediscovering' the 
countryside, also flourished (Torres 1979, Johnston 1985). The intimate bond between the 
territory and its inhabitants is a crucial component of all nationalisms. Since nationalism is 
per se a territorial ideology, the cult of the territory assumed a central role in the ideology of 
groups like the Centre Excursionista Cat aid (Nogu6 i Font 1991). Excursions were 
conceived as a means to communicate with nature -scientific excursions- and to identify with 
the national community -revival of folklore.
Voluntary associations have been a constant undercurrent in postwar Catalonia. In periods 
of harsh repressions, they have provided a safety valve for cultural expressions which could 
not otherwise be voiced. Under Primo de Rivera, excursion groups and all other kinds of 
grass-roots associations served the crucial purpose of cultural resistance in both Catalonia 
and Euskadi (Roig Rosich 1992).
During late Francoism, several groups began to spread in the cities which also involved 
immigrants. In both Euskadi and Catalonia, the most important ones were probably the 
neighborhood associations (associacions de veins), which addressed the lack of welfare 
provision and urban planning typical of Francoist development schemes. Hence, urban social 
movements in Barcelona were a response to the dearth of state intervention, as the 
inefficiency of the Spanish state gave rise to urban dissatisfaction (Garcia 1991). Their
300 The p e n y a , with its "fairly flexible m em bership... provides an excellent forum of 
discussion. Since everyone knows everyone e lse ... the atm osphere is relaxed and talk is 
spirited" (Pi i Sunyer 1971: 130).
301 According to Johnston (1983: 130), social networks "play an important role in the 
growth of [a] movement prior to m ass mobilization".
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success when moving from an underground basis to a programme of open participation was 
due to their mutual contacts within the framework of Catalan nationalism.
Since the nationalists did not have a state at their disposition, Catalan civil society had to 
rely on the spontaneous initiative of thousands of citizens. Grass-root Catalanist 
organizations had to work in extremely adverse conditions, as their formal recognition was 
made impossible by the dictatorship. But Catalan civil society blossomed at every level, with 
a creative strength unseen elsewhere, which was drawn from a pre-existing individualistic 
tradition of organizational autonomy (Giner 1980, Estivil and Giner 1985). Hundreds of 
informal cultural bodies and recreational entities, many of them clandestine, arose in all 
comers of the country in order to reorganize national cultural life. They did not represent a 
wholly new phenomenon, as we have seen in the preceeding chapter about Barcelona's rich 
and intense cultural life at the turn of the century. In the 1940s and up to the 1960s, they 
assumed an informal and underground character. Most of their activities functioned to 
maintain Catalan culture (Johnston 1991).
Many of these organizations acted as a strong integrative force for the immigrants, 
spreading among them the gospel of nationalism. This socio-cultural participation, 
heightened by the thrill of fighting against a waning dictatorship, was an important factor in 
forging an elusive 'alliance' among immigrants and natives. The targets of Francoist 
repression continued to be both Catalan nationalists and working class organizations. 
However, it was the former who displayed the most effective symbols of political 
mobilization and inter-ideological alliances. Irrespective of their class, regional origin or 
political belief, most sectors of Catalan society united under the common goal of struggling 
against Francoism.
Before going on to the phase of the regime's eclipse, we should briefly reiterate some 
crucial points. The scope of this chapter has been to demonstrate how the slow recovery of 
the Catalan culture determined the quality of the opposition's struggle. We have seen a deeply 
changed picture from the gloomy prospects of cultural genocide following the Civil War to 
the unexpected revival of the Catalan culture in all fields following the first gleams of 
freedom. This brought about a diffused sense of optimism, showing the unique value of 
cultural resistance -and cultural nationalism- in shaping a country's identity without needing 
to resort to violent strategies. In the concluding remarks, this will be linked to the general 
argument of the thesis on the importance of core values and how they relate to the violent or
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non-violent choices of the nationalist intelligentsia.
The Unitarian front and the regime's agony (1970-75)
In July 1970, the Crown Prince Juan Carlos was officially designated to succeed Franco, 
strengthening the impression of the regime's imperturbable continuity. But the echoes of the 
Burgos Trial in December 1971 reverberated in Catalonia, engendering a wave of protest and 
casting a dark shadow on the regime's authority.
The mobilisation for language rights continued with the campaign Catald a Vescola (For a 
school in Catalan) in 1970. November 1971 saw one of the key events of modem Catalan 
history, the creation of an unprecedentedly broad coalition of opposition forces which was 
named Assemblea de Catalunya (Assembly of Catalonia). The initiative and the main 
organisational tasks stemmed from the Communists, but the Assembly included socialists, 
social-democrats, Catholics, nationalists, left nationalists, liberals, etc. Under the banner 
Libertat, Amnistia, Estatut dAutonomiat three main points were highlighted: amnesty for 
political prisoners, guaranteed liberty of expression and association, and the reestablishment 
of the 1932 Statute of Autonomy (Colomer 1976, Batista and Playk Maset 1991).
In a backlash, neo-fascist groups stepped up their activities in the early 1970s with a series 
of bomb attacks against book-shops, publishers, journals, cinema, and other centres of 
Catalan culture. Biblio-phobic violence worked as a "complement to legal repression" 
(Balcells 1980: 362). At the same time as the killing of Admiral Carrero Blanco by ETA 
clarified the crisis which the regime faced, Catalanist opposition turned increasingly to 
politics. From 1974, moderate members of the regime such as Fraga Iribame, sought to 
introduce reforms. In 1974, Radio Barcelona broadcasted its first programme in Catalan, and 
a concert by the songwriter Lluis Llach in the Palau de la Musica attracted an enthusiastic 
audience. Cultural nationalists then began openly to turn to political nationalism. In January 
1975, Jordi Pujol called on the middle classes to take political action as the next phase, 
following the linguistic and cultural revival.
Conclusions
We have seen that the 'new' postwar Catalanism developed out of a series of historical 
events:
1. The defeat in the Civil War (1939);
2. The strong cultural and political repression (1939-42);
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3. The corresponding underground cultural resistance, followed by a slow linguistic revival 
(1942-59);
4. The economic boom (1959-72);
5. An unprecedentedly massive immigration (1959-72);
6. A slow de-legitimation of the regime (1971-75).
The main forces promoting Catalanism, especially in its cultural forms, were the Church 
and the Left (first of all, the Communists). Most social classes, with the notable exception of 
the upper bourgeoisie, joined in. Furthermore, the very economic success of Catalonia 
helped to reinforce group identity (Pi-Sunyer 1985: 262). Contrary to theories of economic 
deprivation, internal colonialism and the like, it was not a clear sense of economic grievance 
from a poorer region which engendered nationalism. True, economic complaints were often 
voiced, but they were summed up in demands for less state control and more freedom of 
enterprise.
What, then, was the rationale of the opposition? Summarising, it can be said that nationalist 
mobilisation was deemed necessary in order to redress the following injustices:
1. Cultural repression;
2. Lack of political freedom;
3. Economic 'exploitation' (the middle classes and chunks of the bourgeoisie resented 
Madrid’s centralized development plan).
In this chapter, we have also seen that the Catalanism emerging from the ashes of the 
dictatorship was a partially new phenomenon. Franco’s ruthless repression and sweeping 
social change together instigated a re-definition of Catalan identity. As the traditional elements 
of nationhood came under heavy attack, the intelligentsia attempted a counter-mobilization, 
first by addressing the contentious issue of whether 'Catalonia' still existed. This process of 
introspection began in the 1940s, and culminated in the publication of a few books on the 
'Catalan character’ (Ferrater i Mora 1980, Vicens Vives 1984).302 The fierceness with which 
the dictatorship tried to suppress Catalan culture is seen by many observers to be the main 
cause of the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism.303 The latter was thus essentially a reaction 
to the attacks against Catalan culture. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it must be 
recognized that since at least the 1940s Catalanism was centered, perhaps more than ever
302 The phenomenon was echoed by the intelligentsia of two other Catalan-speaking areas,
Valencia (Fuster 1977) and the Balearic Islands (Meli& 1967).
303 jntent to suppress the key features of a  national community can produce a  reaction
opposed to the desired one.... It is external oppression and not a  pretended national essence
which legitimizes nationalism" (Giner 1986: 447).
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before, on the issue of language and its recovery. The new Catalanism of the 1970s therefore 
had its roots in this dramatic violation of human and linguistic rights, around the defence of 
which all democratic forces converged. This concern for language stemmed from a long 
standing tradition, which we shall analyse in chapter 7.
There was a vast section of people -especially religious people- who accepted the 
dictatorship as the lesser of two evils, the other being left-wing repression. Franco presented 
himself as the saviour of the country's stability against revolutionary anarchy and fissiparous 
separatism (Preston 1993). Once this aim was achieved and no sign of overt opposition was 
visible for years, some sectors became increasingly impatient with Franco. Among the first to 
change their attitude were the local clergy, as they slowly welded alliances with the Catalanist 
opposition and, at a later stage, even with the Left.
The first nucleus of this covert opposition was formed in Montserrat and the symbol of this 
turnabout was Escair6's shift to the democratic opposition. Previously a staunch supporter of 
Franco, the abbot became slowly convinced that the regime had overdone its job and lost its 
raison d'etre. The need to defend Catalan culture and to allow democratic reform played a 
key role in this re-awakening. However, after bitter years of frontal repression, the 
dictatorship had to come to terms with the fact that Catalan culture could not be erased by 
decree. Defying formidable odds, the regional culture showed unexpected signs of strength 
beginning to revive as soon as the bans were slowly slackened. Most sections of Catalan 
society coalesced in the defence of the threatened culture, but the simple realisation that it was 
still healthy gave the whole movement a non-confrontational and optimist character. Freedom 
was to be gained by everyday struggle, rather than by eschatological solutions. All chinks in 
the armour of the regime had to be exploited. In contrast to the Basque case, dialogue and 
moderation became Catalanist key words. The nationalist poet Salvador Espriu sang in his
La Pell de Brau (The Bull's Hide):
"Always remember this, Sepharad 
keep the bridges of dialogue safe 
and seek to understand and love 
your children's diverse motives and tongues 
... That Sepharad may live forever 
in order and in peace, in work, 
in difficult and deserved 
liberty". 304
Espriu echoed a committed sense of empathy and solidarity not only with the other forces
304 Translated by David Rosenthal (1991). As previously mentioned, Sepharad was the name 
Espriu gave to this ideal Spain where all cultures and religions could live harmoniously side by 
side. The reference to Spain prior to 1492, to the Inquisition and to Liberal Jacobinism  is 
obvious.
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of the democratic opposition but also with other oppressed peoples, and La pell de brau "did 
play an important role in opening new 'bridges of dialogue1 among the nations of Spain, with 
their 'diverse motives and tongues'" (Rosenthal 1991: 54).
During late Francoism, far reaching social changes, such as immigration and a booming 
economy, shifted the focus onto new issues. In response, new political movements 
(Marxism, 'independentism', etc.) addressed these new challenges by trying to adapt to, and 
re-define, national reality. This process of re-definition was important in the intellectual 
arena, with the emergence of a new historiographic tradition and its related methodologies. 
This reflects a contrast between the two stages of defeat and renewal: early forms of 
opposition were virtually eradicated after the fall of Barcelona and barely survived until 1952 
in the form of intermittent and weak guerrilla actions.305 But a new moderate opposition 
grew out of the social upheavals released by the milagro economico.306
In contrast to the Basque case, accounts of repression and resistance to the regime are often 
pervaded by a sense of irony.307 This can only be afforded in an atmosphere of ultimate self- 
confidence when the bases of collective 'integrity' are not under radical threat. The 
philosopher Ferrater i Mora (1980: 89-ff) conceived ironia (irony) to be one of the four 
defining elements of the Catalan personality, along with continuitat (continuity),30** mesura 
(measure), and seny (wisdom, good sense, judgement).309 In the Basque case, it is 
extremely unusual to find the same sense of irony, living evidence of an underlying strong 
cultural identity. The Francoist attempts to eradicate Catalan culture had a grotesque character 
which was not lost on the opposition. Although its impact on Catalan culture was disastrous, 
the democratic forces recognized a sense of inner moral superiority in the face of centralism. 
Thus, many accounts of repression by Catalanist intellectuals, historians and social scientists, 
are pervaded by a subtle irony tempered by the bitterness of experience.
The Catalanist programme was carried out in the name of 'prudence and clarity'. This is the 
opposite of the programme that emerged from Ekin's days of reflections, which ended in
305 o n  Spanish guerrilla bands until 1960, see  Pons Prades (1977).
306 On the Spanish opposition to the dictatorship, see  the collection of articles in Tusell e t al. 
(1990).
307 s e e , for instance, Fabres et al. (1978).
308 Continuitat refers not simply to tradition and history, but to everyday persistence. The 
value treball (work) inspires every Catalan "to finish always what s/he has begun and to give 
the final touch to all enterprises" (Ferrater i Mora 1980: 42-3).
309 As the English journalist John Hooper has stressed , "there is no exact translation of 
seny. Perhaps the nearest equivalent is the northern English term 'nous' - good old common 
sen se . R espect for seny  m akes the C atalans realistic, ea rn est tolerant and at times bit 
censorious. Yet it sits uneasily with their frequently tumultuous history” (Hooper 1986: 234).
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radicalism and confusion (rather than prudence and clarity), with no hegemonical project on 
which all sectors of the Basque movement could agree and which resulted in dividing the 
radical youth from the moderate peneuvistas.
From the sixties onwards, the regime's previous "policy of frontal assault was softened to 
one of slow suffocation" (Rosenthal 1991:7). The main restrictions remained in force, while 
a steady flow of immigrants began to enter the region. This massive influx radically altered 
Catalonia’s demographic balance (as it did in the Basque Country), producing drastic cultural 
and social changes. At this point, the new nationalism hitherto confined to intellectual elites 
started to spill over into the general population, and the increasingly de-legitimized 
dictatorship could not hold back its diffusion. The main concern for progressive intellectuals 
was the reestablishment of democracy and autonomy. But at a popular level the upsurge of 
nationalism also betrayed an apprehension towards large scale immigration with its 
concomitant identity problems.
Catalanism first re-emerged in purely cultural manifestations, and then slowly took a 
political form once the prohibition was relaxed. That was, step by step, the same process 
used at the time of Primo de Rivera, and, before that, during the Renaixenga, reflecting a 
general pattern of evolution of stateless nationalisms (Hroch 1985, Hutchinson 1987). The 
fact that this itinerary could not be thoroughly followed in Euskadi because of the weakness 
of the local culture, and, hence, of cultural nationalism, has been mentioned in the previous 
chapter and will be fully analysed in the final chapter.
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Chapter 6
The TRANSITION to DEMOCRACY. 
From CLANDESTINE ACTION to the EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY (1975-1986)
This brief chapter will serve to analyse the emergence of Basque and Catalan nationalism as 
mass movements once the fall of the dictatorship reinstated free expression.
Franco's death and the beginning of the 'Transition'
On 20 November 1975, Francisco Franco died. Two days later, Juan Carlos de Borbdn 
was crowned King of Spain. The process of democratization which immediately ensued 
came to be known as the Transition' (Transition).
On 25 November, only three days after taking possession of the throne, the King 
proclaimed a first general amnesty, and about 15,000 political prisoners and exiles won back 
their freedom.310 The issue of a total amnesty was the crucial factor in the relations between 
the Basques and Madrid throughout the Transition' period.
The inability of the Franco regime to stay abreast of the radical changes brought about by 
large scale industrialization spelled its decline. At its end, not only was Francoism doomed 
but the very idea of the Spanish state was no longer legitimate in Euskadi.311 This remained 
the case at least until the late 1980s, well after the Transition had run its course.312 
Nationalist unrest spread all over Euskadi, with demands for a general amnesty and popular 
demonstrations, while ETA's violence reached its peak. "The Basque region during these
310 The abertzale magazine Hitz published a  list of 749 Basque nationalist prisoners soon 
after Franco's death. (749 Gudari gizon eta ematze espetxeetan, Hitz, na 5, january 1976, 
pp. 6-13). The pardon had affected fewer than 10 per cent of them (Preston 1986: 82). 
However, the dem ands of amnesty concerned a  much larger number of exiles.
311 On the problems of the state 's  legitimacy in Euskadi, see  Perez Agote (1982).
312 Arzallus dice que el Estado espanoi no e s ti legitimado en e l Pafs Vasco, "El Periddico", 
12 October 1987.
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days was like a pressure cooker about to explode. Sentiments for change had been so sharply 
suppressed during the dictatorship of Franco that there had been little opportunity for the 
expression of dissent. With the dictator gone, Basques now sought to release the pressures 
built up over the preceding forty years" (Clark 1984:90).
The period spanning the first general elections of 1977 to the approval of the Constitution 
in 1978 was one of crucial decision-making. As with the passing of most dictatorial regimes, 
the success of minority nationalism in Spain was tightly bound up with the democratization 
process. The prospects of democracy meant the first real possibility for decades for 
submerged nationalist feelings to freely find their voice (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986).
In 1976, the King appointed the first cabinet under the leadership of Adolfo Su£rez. The 
unitary character and superior organisation of the democratic opposition on the periphery, 
particularly in Catalonia, compelled the Spanish political forces to confront the Catalan and 
Basque question (Balcells 1992:203). The initiative passed from the Assembly of Catalonia 
to the political parties, most of which were legalized under Suarez's government. After being 
passed by the Parliament, the democratic transition was formally accepted by popular 
referendum. The Law of Political Reform was approved by 69% of the Catalan electorate. As 
a consequence, the main Catalan political parties decided to abandon their vision of 
'democratic break' or 'rupture strategy' (estrategfa de ruptura) and endorsed a smoother 
process, omitting the question of the legitimacy of the monarchy and dropping any demand to 
'purge' the state apparatus from former Francoist cadres (Balcells 1992: 204). In contrast, all 
Basque nationalist parties maintained a more intransigent line.
The initial procrastination of Madrid to fully accept democratic reform was cut short by 
huge mass mobilisations in most Spanish cities. Catalonia was by far the most mobilised 
region of Spain in terms of popular demonstrations and civic initiatives. On the Diada of 11 
September 1977, more than a million people attended the great demonstration in Barcelona 
called by all the opposition to demand 'freedom, amnesty and statute of autonomy'. Hailed as 
the biggest demonstration in postwar Europe, it gave an unmistakable signal to Madrid that 
the time for dismantling the centralist state had come. All the democratic forces contributed to 
its organisation, but the Left, rather than the nationalists per se, was its main instigator. The 
impact was immediate: on 29 September, a decree established a provisional Generalitat and 
in October Josep Tairadellas, the president of the Catalan government in exile, was recalled 
home, becoming its first President.
In Euskadi, popular mobilisations were continuously disrupted by violence. In March
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1976, nearly 80% of the work force in Vitoria demonstrated to demand pay increases. After 
several days of barricades and police charges, in which popular marches swelled with new 
participants, the death toll stood at five (Clark 1979: 269-71, Preston 1986: 82-3). Strikes, 
protests and street violence erupted in most Spanish cities in support of the Basque workers. 
As with most of the mobilisations following the Burgos Trial, such manifestations of 
solidarity proved that the Spanish opposition as a whole was more interested in real 
democracy, than in the Right's abstract claim that the unity of the Fatherland was in jeopardy.
In Euskadi, the first general elections in 1977 saw the PNV establishing itself as the main 
Basque party, but it came a close second after the PSOE, Spanish Socialists (Llera Ramo 
1985). In Catalonia, a huge victory was won by the Left, with the regional Socialists (PSC- 
PSOE) and the Communists (PSUC) heading respectively for first and second place.
Spain's path to devolution: from the Constitution to the Comunidades
Autonomas
The new Constitution was approved in 1978. Various articles concerned the so-called
'autonomous communities’. Conferring official legitimacy to the regionalization process,
article 3 runs verbatim:
"Castilian is the official language of the State. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to 
use it. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities 
according to their own Statutes. The richness of the distinct linguistic modalities of Spain represents a 
patrimony which will be the object of special respect and protection".
But any possible 'over-interpretation' of these rights was corrected by article n2 2: "The
Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible
fatherland (patria) of all the Spaniards. It acknowledges and guarantees the right to
autonomy of the nationalities and regions which form it and the solidarity among them".313
An important corrective to the latter sentence may be provided by article 145: "No federation
^ 1Abetween Autonomous Communities will be permitted under any circumstances". The 
patent aim of this article was to curb possible unifying trends among the regions. Pan- 
Catalanism spoke in the name of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, while in Euskadi the 
question of an 'irredenta' Navarre began to fuel nationalist fire.315
313 "La Constitucidn se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nacidn espanola, patria 
comCm e indivisible de todos los espanoles y  reconoce y  garantiza ei derecho a la autonomla de 
las nacionaiidades y  regiones que la integran y  la solidariedad entre ellasm (art. 2 del Titulo 
Preliminar de la Constitucidn Espanola).
314 Constitucion espanola /  Regulamento del Senado (1982). Madrid: Publicaciones del 
Senado.
315  On the definition of Navarre as a  "Basque Ulster", see  Blinkhorn (1974). However, in
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However, the most important point of the 1978 Constitution was its acknowledgment of 
the existence of other 'nationalities' (nacionalidades) within the one and indivisible Spanish 
'nation' (nacidn). The four historical nationalities, which were not explicitly mentioned in 
the Constitution, are Castile, Catalonia, Euzkadi and Galicia (Gispert and Prats 1978). But 
the obvious trick was to extend decentralization to most other regions, thereby 'relativising' 
the potential impact of Basque and Catalan autonomy. There are now 17 'autonomous 
communities' (Comunidades Autonomas, or CcAa.) on the official map, some of which 
have been entirely invented.316
The Constitution can hardly be understood without taking into account the decisive role 
played by Catalan and Basque nationalism in the debates preceding its approval. Once 
approved by the Parliament, the Constitution was submitted to popular referendum and was 
accepted all over Spain, with the exception of Euskadi. All Basque nationalist forces, 
including the PNV (which had abstained in the parliamentary vote), opposed it.^17 The 
reasons for boycotting the Constitution were numerous and all related to the ambiguities 
about Basque rights provided therein. In the ensuing referendum, the abstention rate reached 
56% in Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia. Such a figure shows the extent to which the Spanish state had 
little legitimacy in Euskadi, a state of affairs which provided fertile ground for the 
continuation and spread of violence.
The next important step was to transform the Constitution’s regionalist ideal into practice 
by creating the instruments of regional self-determination. With its robust tradition, Catalonia 
was obviously an ideal candidate to be granted such honour first. The Statute of Autonomy 
of Catalonia (Estatut) was approved in 1979 after a popular referendum: 61% of the eligible 
voters cast ballots and 88% of those supported the Estatut. Catalonia achieved an
contrast to Ulster, religious cleavages are absent and the main conflict is between pro-Madrid 
'regionalists', who want a  limited degree of autonomy within Spain, and the nationalists, who 
defend Navarre's autonomy within a unified Euskadi. Navarre itself is divided betw een an 
EuskaldOn north which is sympathetic to radical Basque nationalism, and a  Castilianized south 
which supports autonomy within Spain. The capital Pamplona (Irufiea) is broadly situated a t the 
intersection between these two areas.
316  For instance, autonomy statu tes were granted to Cantabria, an a rea  w hose ancient 
nam e w as La Montana, and La Rioja, both regions culturally and historically part of Castile. 
Madrid  has been detached from its historical hinterland, Castile, and established a s  a  separate 
Comunidad Autonoma, a  sort of 'federal district' on the pattern of Canberra, Washington, or 
Mexico City. Recently, local historians have been mobilized in order to confer on these  
administrative units a  new regional dignity.
Not everybody is satisfied with the present sta tu s and som e regions claim a  separa te  
autonomy based on alleged historical roots. Thus, some organisations in Leon wish their region 
to 'secede' from the Autonomous Community of Castile.
317 On the Basque nationalists' attitude towards the Constitution and the Statute, se e  Hills 
(1980) and Tamayo (1988).
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autonomous government (the Generalitat), and its own Parliament. The Statute’s charter 
declared Catalan the 'proper language’ (llengua propria) of Catalonia, although it had to 
share the status of 'official language' (llengua official) with Castilian (Moll 1983).
The Basque Autonomy Statute was approved in the same period as the Catalan one and 
both were inspired by the experience of the Generalitat under the Republic.318 Again, a 
popular referendum ratified its approval in 1979, with 61% voting and 89% supporting the 
statute. Jesus Maria De Leizaola (1896-1980), the successor of Aguirre as president of the 
Basque parliament in exile, returned from France ending the 43-years-old 'government in 
exile'. In April 1980, Carlos Garaikoetxea, at that time leader of the PNV, became the first 
post-war lendakari (head of the Basque government, or lehendakari).
The ghost of Spanish nationalism
However, for some people the process of devolution went too far. Provoked by the rapid 
spread of democratization and regional autonomy, as well by ETA's assassinations, the most 
reactionary elements in the military were anxious to put a halt to the process. On 23 February 
1981, a plenary session of the Spanish Parliament was interrupted by a group of Civil 
Guards led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who seized the assembly and held the MPs prisoners 
for more than one day. A providential intervention by the king apparently prevented the 
attempted coup, nicknamed the Tejerazo, from becoming an open military revolt 319 
The shock of this adventure had long-lasting and damaging implications for the young 
democracy and halted further democratic progress, especially in matters of regional 
devolution. In a move conceived to pacify the 'bunker'320 and remove rumours of a more
3 1 8  According to Clark (1979: 349), "the Catalan exam ple proved to be the only one of 
negotiation over the transfer of powers. Since the C atalan regime w as the first to be 
developed, its powers were subject to more bargaining. Subsequent regional entities, such as  
the Basque General Council, would have to follow the pattern established by the Catalan 
Generalitat".
319 The king has played a key role in transforming the regime while preventing a  coup d'6tat 
by the army. His firm behaviour in the face of the abortive coup by Tejero in 1981 caused the 
military revolt to subside, and the Transition to continue its course. The former leader of the 
Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, has often remarked that without the king Spain 
would be at civil war (cited in Alba 1983). The King has probably been the m ost popular 
political figure in Spain during the whole period of transition. A survey carried out by DATA in 
1977 indicated that 59% of the Spaniards chose monarchy, 19% were indifferent, while no 
more than 18% preferred the republic (cited by Linz 1979). The reason for this preference 
does not simply relate to the beloved personality of the King, but it is also historical. Since 
Spain 's two previous republican experiences w ere fraught with conflicts and civil wars, 
Republicanism does not have a positive profile in Spanish politics. The monarchy is seen  as a 
supra-national symbol of unity and stability.
320 The term 'bunker' was often used in Spain "to cover the extrem e right committed to 
fighting democracy from the rubble of Francoism" (Preston 1986: 232).
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serious coup, Madrid tried to pass a basic law (LOAPA, Ley Orgdnica de Armonizacidn del 
Proceso Autonomico). The law was officially designed to 'harmonize' the devolution 
process, but its surreptitious aim was to curtail the powers of the two main autonomous 
communities, Catalonia and Euskadi, by standardizing the political power and representation 
of each community. Its attempted introduction in 1982 stirred vigorous popular protest from 
most of the opposition.321 The impending threat of another golpe (coup d'€tat) was one of 
the main 'justifications' for the promotion of the LOAPA. Finally, in August 1983, the law 
was considered ultra vires by the Constitutional Court and thus was dropped after its 
enormous unpopularity became clear.322
Another event put the Transition process in Catalonia under considerable strain. Barely a 
month after the Tejerazo, a manifesto signed by a few sociologists (the complete list of 
names was never revealed) appeared, claiming that Castilian-speakers were subject to 
discrimination, and making an implicit call to oppose Catalanisation with political means. The 
reaction was immediate, but contrary to the one sought by its authors. Within five days, a 
counter-call 'in defence of the Catalan language, culture and nation* (Crida a la solidaritat en 
defensa de la llengua, la cultura i la nacid catalanes) was published with the support of over 
1,300 institutions and voluntary associations. Its organizers set in motion a vast mobilisation 
campaign, culminating on 24 June 1981 in a festival cum demonstration which filled up the 
Camp Nou, the largest football stadium in Europe. In 14 March 1982, the Crida with other 
groups organised a huge anti-LOAPA demonstration.
In a pattern recurring throughout Catalan history, what started as a reaction against an 
attack on Catalan culture, turned into an increasingly political movement. But, since this 
attack occurred within the framework of autonomy agreed by the nationalists with Madrid, 
the declared objective now became separation from the rest of Spain. The Crida*s leaders 
capitalized on the threat to the core values of the nation, claiming that only with independence 
would Catalonia be liberated from the espanolista threat. In order to counteract the radical 
independentist movement, which was popular amongst the youth, Madrid had to move 
rapidly and grant concessions to Catalonia. In the end, only the success of the Generalitat's 
politics of linguistic normalisation could curtail those who proclaimed that only independence
321 El PNV se sentirA desligado del estatuto si se 'nivelan' las autonomfas, afirma Sudupe, 
"El Pals", 1 November 1984. Apart from all Basque and the Catalan nationalists, the anti- 
LOAPA front also included the Communists (PCE) and the Andalusian regionalists (PSA). The law 
had been agreed on by the PSOE and UCD.
322 For a  legislative assessm ent of the LOAPA and the entire decentralisation process in 
comparative perspective, se e  Hannum (1990: 263-79).
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would grant cultural freedom to Catalonia.323
In the 1982 general elections, the PSOE won an absolute majority in the Madrid’s Cortes. 
For the first time, Spain was ruled by a Socialist government, which has lasted till the present 
day (1994).
The end of the PNV's monopoly over Basque nationalism
Since 1970, all relevant ideological activity within ETA has ceased. Yet, with the decline of 
Francoism, the ideological debate which originated in the 1960s spread amongst the wider 
population. From the first elections held in 1977, the nationalist parties experienced 
continuous growth until they achieved an absolute majority of the vote (over 70%).324 The 
spread of nationalism has enveloped all areas of society. It is difficult to relate this explosion 
to political violence. Certainly, many nationalists from all over the political spectrum believed 
that ETA still played a useful function to put pressure on Madrid. Moreover, active logistical 
support for ETA has been discovered in many respectable sectors, such as law firms, 
unemployed welfare societies, religious orders, etc.325 The PNV was the first party to 
benefit from democratization, as it emerged reinvigorated from the political process which 
promoted autonomy. However, democracy and autonomy triggered the people's will to 
express their grudges and claims through other forces. In a pluralist system, the PNV could 
no longer claim to be the only representative of Basque nationalism.
The situation was complicated by the persistence of political violence, which put the whole 
nationalist movement under considerable pressure. A large sector of nationalist opinion was 
still operating underground and they looked to the 'heroic' gestures of the ETA activists 
rather than the moderate peneuvistas. Hence the challenge to both democracy and 
nationalism became -and remains to this day - the question of how to integrate this 
widespread support for the radical cause into the democratic game. This process has resulted 
in the formation of three new nationalist parties: in order of creation, EE, HB and EA.
Once Euskadi was granted an autonomy Statute, ETA-pm, then the main branch of ETA, 
decided altogether to drop the armed struggle, while ETA-m continued its attacks. Together 
with a relevant sector of the local Communist Party, many ex-militants of ETA-pm formed in
323 For a  comprehensive, albeit partisan, history of the Crida, see  Monnd and Selga (1991). 
For a  more critical viewpoint, s e e  Candel (1985: 197-248, especially p. 239) and Laitin 
(1989).
324 GURRUTXAGA, Inigo (1986a) Avance costante de los partidos nacionalistas, "El Pals", 2 
Decem ber 1986, p. 16. See also Clark (1987).
325 La polic(a cita a HB, comitds de parados y  a los abogados de San Sebastiin dentro del 
"complejo ETA", "El Pafs", 13 Septem ber 1987.
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1976 the electoral alliance EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra). At the time of its foundation, EE 
adopted a Marxist and pro-independence line, but eventually moved on to an overall 
acceptance of the regional autonomy framework. The renunciation of violence was a slow 
process and had to pass through a period in which armed actions were used to supplement 
legal action whenever the results of the latter were insufficient. As Preston (1986:125) points 
out, "the abandonment of violence was to cause internal division, schisms and a nostalgic 
longing for armed action". This testifies to the thesis that violence served a functional 
unifying imperative and, whenever violence was abandoned, fissiparous trends emerged 
within the ’pacified' organisation.
At the same time, the continued use of violence was advocated by important sectors of 
Basque public opinion who uncompromisingly vowed to achieve independence. Since the 
Spanish state was still perceived as the main enemy, the whole democratization process was 
only seen as a fa9 ade disguising a perennial Spanish attempt to eliminate Basque identity. 
This was the "sectarian view that the elections were a stunt 'to legitimise fascism' [and 
that]... Spanish tyranny was now masked by the trapping of a fraudulent democracy" 
(Preston 1986:126). Notwithstanding the autonomy concessions, the radical leftists declared 
that the Basques were "persecuted more than before".326 Indeed, the 'occupation forces' 
were still massively present in the region as a reminder of Madrid's past attempts to crush 
Basque aspirations. Hence, important sectors saw the severing of all ties from Spain as the 
only viable solution. In order to achieve this goal, ETA's actions were considered not only 
justified but necessary.
Herri Batasuna: the universe of anti-state protest
Eventually, those important sectors which supported radical separatism and gave moral 
endorsement to the use of violence had to be democratically represented. In November 1977, 
the veteran abertzale leader Telesforo Monz6n (1904-1987) called a meeting of these forces 
in Alsasua, Navarre, in which they agreed to form an electoral coalition named Mesa de 
Alsasua. In April 1978, the Mesa de Alsasua adopted the name of Herri Batasuna (HB, 
Popular Unity). The plethora of groups which formed the HB coalition had a vested interest 
in the continuation of ETA.327 Some of them had been accused of being directly dependent
326 In 1983, the exiled leader F. Letamendia (Ortzi) declared that the B asques in general, not 
only the nationalist Left, were more persecuted than years before. "Lo vasco, en general, y  no 
sdlo la izquierda abertzale, esti ahora m is  perseguido que hace algunos afios", "Egin", 16 July 
1983 .
327 Probably, if one of these parties decided to go it alone it would fail to gain any relevant
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on ETA.328
Like ETA, HB never had a proper leader or central figure-head,329 and it has been 
characterized by an unparalleled flexibility in the renewal of its cadres.330 An interesting 
feature has always been its ideological heterogeneity. Marxists, environmentalists, gay 
activists, neo-traditionalists, anti-nuclearists, cultural revivalists, punks, pacifists, feminists, 
unemployed, priests, small-town businessmen, students, peasants and every other 
imaginable sector from both urban and rural milieux are all well represented in what is 
probably one of the most unorthodox, unconventional and sui generis parties in Europe. 
What united all these groups was the rejection of both the Spanish Constitution and the 
Autonomy Statute, and the aspiration to independence. What kept their disparate interests in a 
single front was the confrontational character of the struggle, the blanket division of the 
world into oppressor(s) and oppressed. Violence and counter-violence turned into the leit­
motifs and the glue of this multitude of social actors. Since independence was the key goal, 
all ideological differences were momentarily put aside. Thus, the main inspirer of the Mesa 
de Alsasua, Telesforo Monzdn, was a traditionalist jelkide (= follower of God and the Old 
Laws) from the conservative wing of the PNV. But he declared himself ready to make 
alliances with anybody who was prepared to fight for national sovereignty.
HB and its predecessors seemed to have the capacity to absorb and make their own any 
conflict emerging in Basque society. That is, all contemporary cleavages and social 
movements have been skilfully appropriated by radical nationalism finding a 'natural1 means 
of expression in its milieux. A good example is the anti-nuclear movement before the 
formation of HB.33l in j uiy 1 9 7 7 , an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people demonstrated in 
Bilbao against the nuclear power plant of Lemoniz. Most of the mobilizing efforts was 
carried out by the abertzale Left. "Hailed as the biggest anti-nuclear demonstration ever" 
(Riidig 1990: 138), the event triggered other political activities which culminated in ETA's 
attempt to blow up part of the installations. Also in this case, we can acknowledge the radical
support. At most it could achieve the control of som e minor municipality.
328 Javier Solana dice que los partidos integrados en HB dependen de ETA, "El Pafs", 24 
December 1987, p. 15.
329  Rather, its leadership was beset by endemic discontinuity and power shifts. S ee  Clark 
(1984: 204-18) on the internal organisation and hierarchical structure of ETA in 1981. 
However, such kinds of hierarchy were continuously changing.
330 Herri Batasuna renovari a primeros de ano a todos los componentes de su mesa 
nacional, "El Pafs", 24 December 1987, p. 15.
331 On the anti-nuclear struggles in Euskadi, see  the pamphlet by Altabizkar (1974). A good 
synthesis is available in the international manual by Rudig (1990: 137-9 and 212-3).
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nationalists' ability to capitalize key social issues, and their awareness of both popular 
feelings and burning contemporary problems. Although Lemoniz was "primarily used as a 
political resource to further the appeal of Basque nationalism", ..."it is one of the few 
European nuclear stations which have been abandoned at a well-advanced stage of 
construction" (Riidig 1990: 138-9).
By the 1980s, HB became the first party in Gipuzkoa, the second in Bizkaia and the fourth 
in Alava and Navarre. HB was voted for by the youth of other regions as well, including 
Madrid.332 There, it has attracted the anti-state feelings of a few relevant sectors, especially 
students, fringe intellectuals and the unemployed. In these cases, the vote for HB was not so 
much a vote in favour of Basque separatism as a vote against the 'system'. In Catalonia, HB 
became in 1987 the most popular of the lists not represented in the Parliament (and the 
seventh among all parties, with over 40,000 votes), providing a vehicle for expressing the 
separatist feelings of the Catalan radical youth.333 Herri Batasuna was finally legalized in 
June 1986,334 although many Socialist leaders opposed the move on the ground that it could 
stimulate HB's electoral growth to the prejudice of the PSOE.335
The challenge posed by the increasing popularity of the abertzale movement created strong 
tensions within the moderate nationalist field. In October 1986, a new party, EA (Eusko 
Alkartasuna , Basque Solidarity), arose as a splinter group from the PNV. The split 
precipitated early elections for the Basque Parliament, since the PNV lost its ruling majority. 
In the ensuing elections (30 November 1986), EA won 14 seats in the 81-member Basque 
parliament, exactly the same number as the PNV, a remarkable achievement for a brand-new 
party.336 The success was ultimately due to the charismatic personality of its leader, Carlos 
Garaikoetxea, the former lehendakari337 A major reason for EA's breakaway move was the 
PNV's governing alliance with the PSOE, which was considered not to be nationalist 
enough, threatening to erode the centrist position in favour of HB and the radical Left.
332 s e e  Anuario de Euskal-Herria, 1987. Bilbao: Editorial de Amigos del Libro Vasco, pp. 
163-4.
333 f_a presencia de Herri Batasuna en Barcelona ha sido mayor que la del resto de grupos 
minoritarios, "El Pafs", 10 June 1987. HB es la sdptima lista m is  votada en Catalufia para el 
Paramento Europeo, "El Pafs", 13 June 1987.
334 £■/ Supremo ordena la legalizacidn de Herri Batasuna, pp. 1, 12, 15 and 16, "El Pafs", 3 
June 1986.
335 Benegas relaciona el ascenso de HB con su mlegitimacci6nm por los tribunales, "El Pafs", 
25 June 1986.
336  In those sam e elections, the PSOE becam e the first party with 19 sea ts, HB increased 
its representation to 14 sea ts , and EE received 11 sea ts . Overall, parties advocating more 
autonomy or straightaway independence gathered more than 70% of the vote.
33 ? Garaikoetxea had been the lendakari from 1980 to 1984, when he w as forced to resign.
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Another important reason which strained Garaikoetxea* s relations with the PNV was the 
issue of centralization:338 Garaikoetxea aimed at concentrating powers in Vitoria (= Gasteiz, 
the capital of the Autonomous Community) in order to avoid further administrative 
fragmentation.339 His modernizing approach was opposed by the PNV's old guard, who 
advocated an articulation of provincial interests, especially in Alava.340 The PNV's position 
was a tribute to the Aranist idea of a ’confederacy of free territories' honoured by a centuries- 
old tradition of provincial autonomies. As a non-violent party occupying the middle ground 
between the PNV and EE, Euzko Alkartasuna soon gained the support of hundreds of 
mayors and local councilors.
Basque and Catalan social networks
The youth has been the main protagonist of Basque radical nationalism.341 Their nationalist 
socialization was accompanied by the creation of a counter-culture different from that of the 
forefathers, yet assertively Basque. A main vehicle for the explosion of nationalist slogans 
were rock concerts. The new cultural universe thereby expressed shared many elements of 
contemporary international mass culture. Yet, it retained a strong militant flavour, expressed 
in the singing of lyrics in Euskara.342 City and countryside met on such occasions. Although 
youth nationalist culture was made up of this unique blend of local, urban and cosmopolitan 
elements, the core of radical nationalism was firmly entrenched in the countryside.343 Its 
population formed the bulk of the support for the abertzale parties.344 Another channel for 
the diffusion of nationalism has been sport, both traditional and modem, which we shall deal
338 £ / p n v  n e v a  anie f0 S  tribunates del partido a Carlos Garaikoetxea, "El Pafs", 21 de julio 
de 1986, pp. 1 and 14.
339 UNZUETA, Patxo (1986) Identidad nacional y  territorios histdricos, "El Pafs", 25 
November 1986, p. 17
340 The Ekin generation consistently criticized the PNV's old guard for the loosely 
decentralized structure of the party. They accused  it of being can ton a lis ta  and tied to 
parochial interests, thereby hampering any possibility of a  coordinated policy across provincial 
interests (See Documentos Y, vol. 1, pp. 13, 19, etc.).
341 CASTELLANO, Rafael (1986) La extrema juventud radical, "El Pafs", 1 December 1986, 
p. 19. PfrREZ-AGOTE, Alfonso (1986) Euskadi, ia nueva generacidn, "El Pafs", 2 December 
1986, p. 11.
342 Al trepidante ritmo de Euskadi. Folkis, punkis, jivi, "Punto y Hora", n8 442, special
issue, August 1986. Rock' vasco deseo de cambio, "El Pafs Domingo- Historia del Rock", p.
563. S ee  also BLASCO, ROGELIO (1987) Nuevo rock vasco: un fenom eno sociologico, 
Cuadernos de Alzate, 6, pp. 12-30. On the movement of the nueva canci6n vasca, parallel to 
the Catalan nova cango, see  also Muga, 59, vol. VIII, 1986, pp. 4-23.
343  The Town Hall councils have been the principal political scene of HB's political activity, 
especially in the small villages of Gipuzkoa.
344 El voto m£s radical se asienta en zonas rurales, "El Pafs", 12 February 1984. S ee  also
Clark (1981, 1984: 185-203, 1987).
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with in a separate appendix.
The anti-nuclear struggle was carried out mainly by neighborhood organizations, fishing 
collectivities, etc. Professional middle classes (doctors, architects, academics, cultural and 
leisure organizations) took up the issue (Riidig 1990:138).
In the Basque Country, the crucial issue around which the whole Transition process 
revolved was the call for a total amnesty (Amnistiak Osuna) and all nationalist parties have 
included this demand in their programmes.345 Amnesty demonstrations sprang up in every 
comer of Spain, but in Euskadi they assumed a special overtone. "Frequent demonstrations 
were backed by labour disputes, sit-ins, hunger strikes and mass resignations by municipal 
officials" (Preston 1986: 82). From 1976, the spearhead of this kind of mobilisation was the 
Gestoras Pro-Amnistla (Pro-Amnesty Committees).346 These were classical awareness- 
raising groups, as well as associations for the moral and material support of the prisoners and 
their families. Each of the four provinces had its own committee, while their representatives 
toured Western European capitals to publicize the Basque prisoners' plight. Their stalls 
selling badges, stick-on labels, T-shirts, publications, and pamphlets, could be seen at any 
major Basque fiesta or street market. They participated in rallies and demonstrations, held 
press conferences, and raised money for the families of the prisoners. They also provided 
medical aid for those lucky ones who were released from jail. Finally, they had contacts with 
international human-rights groups, such as Amnesty International, which monitored any 
possible human-right abuse by police forces during the Transition. The fruit of years of 
popular mobilisations in favour of amnesty was Herri Batasuna. The coalition derived much 
of its strength from the periodic, cyclical, quasi-ritual character of such mobilisations: as ETA 
would continue its armed attacks, "there would always be, no matter how many amnesties 
were granted, a fresh supply of ETA prisoners as a focus to rally the HB rank and file 
through amnesty mobilisations" (Preston 1986:152).
Catalan social networks functioned in a different way, since there was not the catalyst of 
political violence. With the establishment of democracy, many formerly private and semi- 
clandestine initiatives passed into public hands. The nationalist movement was itself 
formalized and articulated in different political parties.347 But, as political struggle became
345 Carlos Garaikoetxea propone una amnistfa sin restriciones en el Pafs Vasco, "El Pafs", 
23 Septem ber 1987.
346 On the Pro-Amnesty Associations and the struggle for unconditional am nesty during the 
first y ears  of dem ocracy, s e e  Clark (1979: 277-300) and Ortzi (1991: vol. 4: ch. 1: 
paragraphs 1-9; ch. 2: paragraph 84: vol. 2: ch. 6 : paragraph 77).
347  Since 1909, state-wide parties have not stood a chance of success in Catalonia if they 
have not been "Catalanized” through either sem antic arrangem ents or the establishm ent of
TRANSITION 175
institutionalized, the civil society, which was previously its only support, began to loose its 
former central role. The neighbourhood associations which were the backbone of the urban 
social movement in the mid-1970s were on the wane and nearly disappeared (Garcia 1991). 
After achieving a massive peak during the mobilisations of 1977 and 1978, labour union 
membership drastically declined (Balfour 1989). Furthermore, Catalonia was not able to 
produce a nationalist union, perhaps an indication of the gulf existing between immigrants 
and native Catalans. In contrast, the Basque nationalist union STV-ELA became the biggest 
in Euskadi.348
Both in Euskadi and Catalonia, popular fiestas (festas in Catalan) represent a culminating 
moment for the expression of national identity. Local events, celebrations, folkloric, religious 
and even pre-Christian festivals acted as catalyst of nationalist expression.349 We shall 
mention their integrative role in the chapter on immigration. The basic unit of any 
mobilization, and indeed of all social life in Euskadi, is the cuadrilla, the informal group of 
friends who meet regularly.350
Nationalist mobilization was conducted against the backdrop of a general secularization of 
society. In Catalonia, we have seen the sudden decline of religion as a mobilising factor in 
the late 1960s. A recent survey has shown that about 75% of the Basques are believers, 
although only one third of them are practicing Catholics.351 The present-day abertzale 
movement is basically secular, yet, as we said, it has attracted membership from committed 
priests and former seminarists.
regional sections. Left parties are  among the strongest advocates of Catalanism : many 
m em bers of the Communist Party endorse Catalonia's right to self-determination and even 
independence, while the Catalan Socialists propound a  broad federalism  for the existing 
Autonomous Communities.
348 In the elections for workers' delegates held in enterprises in 1986, the ELA/STV took 
first place in the Basque Autonomous Community, with 34.9 % of the delegates, entitling it to 
"most representative" sta tu s at regional level (see  Trade Unions of the World 1989-1990. 
1991. Harlow: Longman, 2nd edition, p. 349).
349 For an excellent study of the relationship between these festas  and Catalan identity, 
see  Barrera (1985). One of the most important is the Patum  celebrated every Corpus Dominii 
in the town of Berga. For the renewed importance and shifting meaning of the Patum , see  
Barrera (1985: 99-102 and 245-51) and Noyes (1992).
350 On the cuadrilla and other kinds of social networks, see  Della Porta and Mattina (1985). 
Another Basque tradition is the txikiteo, which consists in a  cuadrilla ritually going on a  fixed 
itinerary from one bar to another drinking and eating small quantities of food (Ramfrez 
Goicoechea 1991: 289-97).
351 El 75 % dels bascos sdn creients, perd nomds un de cada tres habitants d ’ Euskadi 6s 
praticant, "Diari de Barcelona", 19 February 1988. S ee  also Perez Agote (1990).
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New developments in language planning.
As an outcome of the new process of devolution, striking progress has been made in the 
field of linguistic rights: the use of the three main non-state languages, Galician, Basque and 
Catalan,352 is now constitutionally recognized. To these, there are pressures to add two other 
languages: the bable or Asturian (spoken in the region of Asturies) and thefabla aragonesa 
or Aragonese (spoken in a small mountain area of North-East Aragon). Furthermore, in the 
Pyrenean valley of Aran within Catalonia, the Catalan government has granted official 
recognition to Aranese, a Gascon variety of Occitan (see map 3).353
As expected, Catalonia played the leading role in the linguistic 'reformation' of the Spanish 
state. Privileged with a prolific tradition of sociolinguistic studies, Catalans had both the 
theories and the data to set in motion a policy of language planning.354 In chapter 8, we shall 
mention some of the data which was indispensable to this task. The birth of an 
autochthonous sociolinguistic school dating back to the late 1960s was a response to the 
unparalleled Catalan situation. Given such uniqueness, which demanded original case- 
studies, it was difficult to find international examples to emulate.355 Once the Generalitat was 
established, the basis was there for a rapid change in linguistic policies. In all realms of 
culture, the powers of the 1979 Estatut far exceeded the ones provided by the 1932 statute 
(Balcells 1992).356
The Generalitat is composed of several Departments. Within the Department of Culture, a 
key role is played by the Direccio General de Polftica Linguistica (DGPL), an institution 
explicitly charged with coordinating the process of language planning. In 1982-83, this 
agency set in motion a campaign aimed at increasing public awareness of language issues. 
The campaign was carried on with the help of various tools: gadgets, billboards, 
advertisement spots, cartoons' strips, radio and television skits, adhesive badges and stick-
352  Catalan also includes its "Valencian" regional variety. S ee  Ninyoles (1969, 1977) and 
Sanchis Guarner (1972).
353 For som e rich data on the present status and diffusion of Aranese, see  Climent (1986).
354 For a synthesis of Catalan sociolinguistics, s e e  Vallverdti (1980). For its theoretical 
contributions, se e  also Conversi (1985, 1988b, 1992).
355 Both Catalan sociolinguists and nationalists see  the experience of Q uebec as  the most 
worthy of emulation, and academ ic contacts betw een the two countries are  now firmly 
established. See, for instance, Manuel Par6s  and Gaetan Tremblay (eds.) Catalunva. Quebec. 
Dues nacions. dos  models culturals. Pondncies del Primer Simposi, Barcelona, May 1985. 
Barcelona: G eneralitat de Catalunya, 1988; ibid. (eds.) C atalunva. Q uebec. Autonomia i 
mundialitzacid. Pondncies del Segon Simposi, Montreal, March 1987. Barcelona: Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 1990.
356 In all respects related to culture and language, the powers given to the Generalitat in 
1979 considerably exceeded those enjoyed under the Republic. In particular, the C atalans were 
given an unprecedented freedom in the control of mass-media and education (Balcells 1992).
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on labels, balloons, music, free classes for adults, short movies, sponsored debates, 
lectures, and so on. One of its objectives was to encourage speakers to use their own 
languages whilst at the same time being able to understand the contrasting language of their 
interlocutor(s) without expecting the latter to be reciprocally accommodating (Boix 1993). 
Borrowing from the Catalan sociolinguistic school, the DGPL described this 'ideal' practice 
as passive bilingualism, whereas each of two -or more- speakers would use their language 
expecting their interlocutors to do likewise (Vallverdu 1980). Without expecting the 
interlocutor(s) to be accommodating, bilingualism was thus meant to be encouraged.
The campaign was a prelude to a new law passed in 1983 by the Catalan Parliament with 
the unanimous approval of all political forces. The Llei de Normalitzacid Linguistica (Law of 
Linguistic Normalization) set the juridical basis for language use in all public domains 
(Generalitat 1983). In particular, it established Catalan as the language of instruction.357 So, 
step by step, the official use of Catalan was extended, it recovered the space and the status it 
formerly enjoyed under the pre-war Republican government, and in many cases even 
improved upon it. Similar Laws of Linguistic Normalization were approved in Galicia, 
Euskadi and Navarre. The Basque and, to a certain extent, the Navarrese governments have 
attempted to make good use of the Catalan experiment, although from a much more difficult 
point of departure. A promotional campaign was put into action, and a Law of Linguistic 
Normalisation for Euskera was approved by the Basque Parliament in 1984 (Villa 1986).
In short, by the 1980s the use of regional languages in Spain was finally secured through 
the Constitution, national decrees, statutes of autonomy and laws of linguistic 
normalisation.358
Concluding rem arks
The overall aim of this chapter has been to show the portentous expansion of nationalist 
mobilisation as soon as democracy was installed. In this way, we have also brought together 
our two case studies allowing for a first occasional comparison. In Euskadi, the diffusion of 
nationalism was characterized by increasing fragmentation, not only amongst parties but also 
within them. In Catalonia, the nationalist message also spread and became more diversified, 
whilst maintaining a broad consensus around a few central themes.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the main aim of this thesis is to show the importance of
357 For a brief discussion on this law, see  Mar-Molinero (1989: 314)
358 For a  chronology of educational legislation in Catalonia, s e e  Petherbridge-Herndndez
(1990: table 1)
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cultural models and symbols, especially language, in the delineation of patterns of nationalist 
mobilisation. Notwithstanding the extensive changes experienced by the two nationalisms, 
the key characteristics of both have been maintained throughout dictatorship and democracy. 
Catalan nationalism remained moderate and broadly united around a cultural platform. 
Basque nationalism kept its radical separatist posture and its internal fragmentation. If 
anything, Basque nationalism increased its radicalism, thanks to state repression.
This chapter also confirms the second main thread of my thesis, that is, the relationship of 
cultural and political fragmentation to political violence. In Euskadi, the scattered nationalist 
scenario was continuously compounded by mass mobilisations resulting from the alleged 
'crimes of the occupation army'. Funeral processions of murdered etarras or other Basque 
militants turned into epic events of national self-assertion (Aretxaga 1988). The massive and 
threatening presence of the police and other mechanisms of state control exacerbated the 
conflict and ignited popular discontent. The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque 
mobilisations, a partial fulfillment of the "action/repression/action theory" envisaged by 
ETA’s first theorists, has in some way handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict 
Since repression was needed to hold such an eclectic movement together, ETA was also 
needed as a continuous trigger of both 'state violence' and 'nationalist counter-violence' - and 
as a glue for the nationalist movement 
A key feature of ETA was its all-pervasiveness. The military organisation responsible for 
terrorist attacks was just the tip of the iceberg of what has been named the 'ETA 
complex'.359 A whole oppositional ideology with its own language and separate institutions 
emerged from the conflict. Lawyers were particularly prominent in the struggle, but other 
professions abounded.360 Slogans, graffiti, posters, murales, placards, banners and all kind 
of visual propaganda inundated the Basque public space (Chaffee 1988). With democracy, 
this heterogeneous yet tightly bound world burst into the open as a major actor in local 
politics, finding its electoral expression in HB. This organisation is notoriously accused of 
being ETA's political wing, but its huge strength in terms of votes and popular support 
reveals much about the illegitimacy of the Spanish state in Euskadi.
In the twilight of dictatorship, the struggle for democratic rights went hand in hand with 
the fight for cultural freedoms and political autonomy. These were all viewed in the
359 La policfa cita a HB, comitSs de parados y  a los abogados de San Sebastiin dentro del 
"complejo ETA ", "El Pafs", 13 Septem ber 1987
360 On the recent 'discovery' of young lawyers as a  major secret force behind ETA, see  
Tape traps Eta Lawyers, "The Independent", 6 February 1993. On the social c lass and 
occupation of ETA's members, se e  Clark (1984: 144-7).
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framework of a single inseparable concern to attain the political goals of civic liberties. Soon 
after Franco's death, the unitary movement reached its maximum momentum in 1977. 
Massive street demonstrations, particularly the million-strong Diada in Barcelona and the 
continuous clashes with the police, such as in Vitoria in 1976, put an inescapable pressure on 
the central government's resistance to change. Nevertheless, the unity of democratic 
opposition started to break down in 1978.
According to a 1982 survey, 38% of the Basque population considered ETA activists to be 
idealists and patriots, and only 31% believed that they were criminals or insane. However, 
the same survey indicate that only 8% of the Basques claimed to support ETA, while 77% 
said that they were opposed to its activities (Linz 1985: 614, in Olabarri 1985). This blend of 
justification and accusation may either derive from a persisting fear to express one own's 
view or from the fact that some people really believed in the genuine commitment of ETA's 
activists. However, successive surveys indicate a slow decline in ETA's popularity, 
especially after 1987, a period which I am not covering in this thesis.361
Another opinion survey undertaken in 1982 indicates that only 13% of the population in 
Euskadi felt primarily Spanish, 24% felt a dual Basque-Spanish identity and 60% considered 
themselves only Basques. By contrast, 30 % of the Catalans felt primarily Spanish, 40% 
assumed a dual Catalan-Spanish identity and only 26% considered themselves Catalans (Linz 
1985: 527-673, supra note 782).362 Thus, Basque identity seemed to be more accentuated 
than the Catalan one. Considering that immigration figures were roughly the same in Euskadi 
and Catalonia, such percentages would seem to contradict my basic argument that Catalan 
culture and nationalism are more integrative than the Basque. But we are considering here the 
much more elusive issue of identity and feelings of belonging. It is undeniable that under 
Francoism and in its aftermath, the Basques have developed a more inclusive and open 
identity.363 We have analysed in depth this development throughout chapter 4, and will 
repeat its main points in chs. 7 and 8. However, this new identity has been formulated at the 
cost of a more moderate brand of nationalism. It was the overall confrontation with the 
Spanish state and 'its 'occupation armies’ that moulded an overarching identity in which 
blood-type and surnames no longer mattered. It was the continuous emergency character of
361 ETA's popularity certainly declined after 1987 as  a  result of indiscriminate killings and 
purely terrorist acts which sharply diverged from its original tactics.
362 The difference is even sharper as  regards working class perceptions: only 14% of the 
'C atalan ' working c lass considered itself C atalan, com pared with 40%  of working class 
Basques.
363 g e e  Jauregui (1981), Gurrutxaga (1990), Perez-Agote (1986), Tejerina (1992).
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the situation, in itself a consequence of the fact that nationalist leaders saw the Basque nation 
as verging on extinction, which created a strong and all-pervasive aura of solidarity between 
all sections of the population. At the end, in particular during the Transition phase, when the 
illegitimacy of the state reached its zenith, all kinds of social issues, from class struggle to 
women lib and the environment, were subsumed under the umbrella of radical nationalism. 
Disguised by a circumstantial unity, Basque culture remained fragmented and only started to 
recover ground again in the mid-1980s.364
A key feature in recent Basque politics has been the formation of new nationalist parties 
challenging the PNV's supremacy. Such a development has contributed to the articulation of 
the nationalist message along different political lines and competing ideologies. In the Basque 
Country, ETA has been the backdrop of such changes. Given its popularity and its symbolic 
value, ETA became an inescapable point of reference for a galaxy of groups, interests, 
unions, and individuals, who were looking for representation in the new democratic political 
arena, but at the same time rejecting the dominant value system.
Nationalist pressures have resulted in momentous institutional changes. Spain was 
transformed from the most centralised Western European state to one of the most 
decentralized. Though often hampered, the Basque and Catalan Autonomous Governments 
succeeded in being granted considerable powers in many sectors. Now, Catalonia has its 
own parliament, school system, television channels, social welfare, etc. Likewise, the 
government of Euskadi, with its seat in Vitoria/ Gasteiz (in the province of Alava/ Araba), 
enjoys similar prerogatives, albeit separately from Navarre; since the early 1980s, the Basque 
Autonomous Community has its own police force, the Ertzaintza, as the Catalans have their 
Mossos d'Esquadra,365 Gasteiz's government has even moved swiftly into areas previously 
not covered by governmental action. For instance, it has offered the best official support in 
Spain for the development of new technologies.366 Its efficiency, like those of its Catalan 
counterparts, has been widely acclaimed in the Spanish press.367
364 We should remind ourselves here that the unified standard batda  w as only proposed in 
1964, accepted by the Basque Language Academy in 1968 (Sarasola 1976: 23) and adopted as 
E uskadi's co-official language after 1980 (Villa 1986). Ever since, albeit not without 
resistance, this unifying norm has spread through the media, the schools and other m eans, 
contributing to create  a  new shared identity based on language, rather than on any of the 
previous shifting and divisive values.
365 La Ertzaintza quiere ocupar su sitio, "El Pafs", 24 November 1986.
366 El parafso de las subvenciones publicas, "El Pafs", 27 November 1986, p. 19.
367 Eficacia autondmica, "El Pafs", 18 December 1989.
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Chapter 7
LANGUAGE and OTHER VALUES
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I will underline the persisting importance of 
language in Catalan nationalism, contrasting it with the discontinuous attention which it has 
received in the Basque context. Secondly, I will explore how the stress on a particular core 
value has influenced the development of two very different nationalist ideologies. The choice 
of a particular symbol of national identity, such as language or race, can have consequences 
for subsequent political developments, as reflected in each movement's ideological 
formulations. In its mm, this choice is based on the availability of pre-existing human 
resources or cultural 'material'. In broader terms, historical and anthropological conditions 
can indirectly, but consistently, influence patterns of local mobilization.
Drawing from my two case studies, I will try to demonstrate three related hypothesis:
1) Where an ethnic language is scarcely spoken, its absence makes difficult the choice of 
another element of national identification.
2) In my specific case study, I will demonstrate that language was a core value for the 
Catalans, while it was not so for the Basques, at least until very recently. This difference was 
related to the dissimilar diffusion of the two languages.
3) In the Basque case, the absence of a clearly identifiable core element created ambiguity in 
the nationalists' political programmes.
I will speculate on how this difference affected the development of the two nationalisms, 
relating this difference to the inclusive or exclusive nature of the two nationalisms. My 
contrast will show how minority linguistic nationalism, which is the major variant of cultural 
nationalism, can be inclusive and other kinds of nationalism (for instance, racially or 
religiously oriented) can be exclusive.
Among many elements that a nationalist movement can choose, the Catalan movement was 
greatly facilitated by the availability of a lively, rich and widespread language. Even today the
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contrast between the two regions remains stark: whereas over 90% of the population in 
Catalonia proper (Principat) understand Catalan and more than 60% can either speak or read 
it (CIDC 1987), in the Basque Autonomous Community only around 20% of the population 
knows Euskara, with a maximum of 35-40% in Gipuzkoa and a minimum of 4-5% in Araba 
(Letamendia 1987:23).368 The seven main dialects correspond broadly to the seven Basque 
provinces. A standard form of Euskara (batua) is only recently attempting to bridge this 
segmented plurality. By contrast, the Catalan language was fully standardized at the 
beginning of our century by Pompeu Fabra, and is now universally accepted by all 
Catalans.369 Catalan represents a paradox in the contemporary European scene. It may in fact 
be the only 'minority' language 370 which is rapidly expanding the number of its speakers. In 
chapter 8 we shall see that this increase is backed by abundant and reliable data.371
In order to understand this phenomenon we must take into account a peculiarity which casts 
Catalonia sharply apart from other 'minorities', especially from the Basques. In its syntax, 
lexicon, phonetics and even orthography, Catalan is very similar to Castilian. In contrast, 
Euskara is completely unrelated to any other known language,372 being the only remnant of a 
pre-Indo-European aboriginal stratum. Catalan is a neo-Latin (Romance) language, thereby 
belonging to the same family of Spanish, Italian and French.373 This structural similarity and 
proximity to Castilian can explain why immigrants can learn it with relatively little effort and 
without great investment of time. In turn, this can also explain why it was easier for 
nationalist elites to formulate an 'inclusive' nationalist programme, given their faith in the 
possibility of cultural integration.
368 In the three provinces of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi, the number of Basque 
speakers has recently increased from 21.5% in 1981 to 24.5% in 1986 (Tejerina 1992: 165).
369 The exception being som e "regionalist" groups in Valencia and centralist forces, which 
have attempted to break up the unity of Catalan by fostering regional varieties.
370 The term "minority” is unsuitable to fully describe the situation of Catalan, because  it is 
not a  minority language in its own territory but only in respect to the overall Spanish state. 
Neither are the Catalans conceivable a s  a  minority in a  "social" sense , i.e. a s  a  disadvantaged 
sector of the population.
371 In Galicia, Spain 's third historical nationality, Galician is spoken by over 80% of the 
population. However, the nationalist movement has been traditionally weak. Comparing the 
three regions, it seem s that, contrary to most assum ptions, the popularity of nationalism is 
inversely proportional to the diffusion of the local language. Euskera is by far the least diffused 
of the three languages, both in gross numbers and in proportion to the territory claimed by the 
nationalists.
372 The most known, yet unproven, hypothesis claims that Euskara is related to Georgian. 
Other philologists and linguists have speculated about its relationship with Peul, Berber, etc. 
S ee King (1994).
373 A superficial observer may think that it derives from an intermingling of Spanish and 
French (and even Italian). Its detractors em phasize its patois-like character and its 'hybrid' 
features from a  border area.
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However, it is necessary first to introduce the concept of core value as an essential heuristic 
tool for my analysis.
Core values and key symbols.
A recurring phenomenon amongst successful nationalist movements is their use of 
particular mobilizing symbols, which are deemed to be central for the self-definition of their 
community, and which convey widely shared popular values. Since the last century, 
European nationalist movements have been particularly concerned with language. Among 
present-day ethnonationalists, language continues to be the basic criterion of self-definition 
and nationhood. Few works have attempted to explain the reasons for this emphasis. 
Gellner's (1983) focus on industrialization and its need for social mobility seems to refer 
exclusively to the rise of the nation-state and may be less relevant for more recent 
ethnonationalist movements, which he explains in term of uneven development One might 
argue that, since the model cherished by many ethnonationalists is the state itself (i.e., they 
wish to achieve their own separate statehood), they also try to emulate the state's stress on an 
unified culture, by contrasting their language to the dominant one. Hence, there is a 
correlation between state intervention in the cultural-linguistic domain (=homogenization) and 
the counter-tendency among ethnonationalist movements to emphasize their differentiae. 
West European stateless languages have dramatically receded in the last two centuries. One of 
the causes of this shift, but by no means the only one, has been official monolingualism 
enforced by the state (Fishman 1968, 1972, 1980, 1982, 1985, Haugen 1966). Therefore, 
language has acquired a previously unknown political dimension and its centrality has 
increased in most nationalist claims. Language shift and language politicization have 
developed in tandem. However, imitation per se - imitation of state policies - cannot account 
for the stress on language. Theories of ideological diffusionism (Kedourie 1993) offer, thus, 
a limited explanation to the spread of the special bond between language and nationalism.
Endogenous (structural or economic) factors also play a role. A different viewpoint 
advances that "an emphasis on language is usually an emphasis on something else,- on 
dignity and economic power. Socioeconomic fights can be carried out under a linguistic 
guise; language as culture lends the necessary symbolism" (Khleif 1979: 61). However, to 
claim that language is merely a disguise for civil rights or welfare claims would be missing 
the point. Language is indeed both a means and an end. It has both an instrumental and a 
symbolic value, and, as Khleif himself recognizes, it is one of the many available boundary
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mechanisms. We have already stressed the importance of symbols and the fact that language 
itself is the most elaborated symbolic system available to man. The more so if the symbol in 
question has the power to subsume in itself the entire identity of the group.
Every ethnic group confers particular importance on a specific element of its own culture. 
This stress, as well as the element in itself, is subjected to change especially in contexts of 
inter-cultural contacts and inter-group communication. According to Jerzy J. Smolicz (1979, 
1981,1984,1988), there are elements which more than any other appear apt to epitomize the 
intimate essence of a culture: they therefore become its core values. Smolicz defines them as 
"pivots around which the whole social and identificational system of the group is organized", 
insofar as they form "the heartland of a group's culture and act as identifying values that are 
symbolic of the group and its membership... Removal of such pivots, through enforced 
’modernization’ or dominant assimilation, would result in the entire edifice crumbling to 
pieces" (Smolicz 1988: 394). Different words have been used by other scholars in order to 
define the same concept. Thus, Ortner (1973) has used the definition of key symbols to 
describe those "key elements which, in an ill-defined way, are crucial to [the group's] 
distinctive organization" (1973: 132). At the same time, "all nationalist movements select 
from the range of symbols available to them one, or perhaps two, that represents them and 
their goals" (Di Giacomo 1984:21-22).
There are many ways of identifying which are the core values of a particular population or 
national group. Ortner (1973:133) quotes five of them:
1) The natives tell us that x is culturally important
2) The natives seem positively or negatively aroused about x, rather than indifferent
3) x comes up in many different contexts (behavioural or systemic).......
4) There is a greater cultural elaboration surrounding x
5) There are greater cultural restrictions surrounding x, either in sheer number of rules or 
severity of sanctions regarding its misuse.
All these points can be found in Catalan society in relation to language. For a sociological 
study, I assume, all these points have to be demonstrated adequately, through the use of 
quantitative or qualitative data. In this chapter, I will present some quotations by the main 
Basque and Catalan leaders. This will be sufficient to understand with clarity the different 
role played by language in the two national movements. The period covered will be from the 
first openly nationalist formulations (1886 for Catalonia and around 1882 for the Basque 
Country) until the present-day
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In his comparative studies on immigrant ethnic groups in Australia, Smolicz has observed 
how each group tends to emphasize a peculiar aspect of its own cultural tradition which is 
held to be of paramount importance. Such an element can vary from community to 
community. In some of them it is the religion which is manifested as a differentiating factor 
(Smolicz cites the Irish, Arab, Malay and Polish examples) 374, in other groups this role is 
assumed by the family (Italians and, I should add, secular Jews), in yet others it is the race 
(Chinese) 375. The most universal core value in the contemporary world, however, is 
language. It is of basic importance among all literate groups, where it is occasionally 
superseded by other elements according to a particular historical or political situation and to 
their relation with dominant or other groups. The significance of language is also heightened 
among those groups whose sacred texts are written in their language. But in these cases, 
religion often assumes priority, exactly because it is a religion written and codified in sacred 
texts.376
This perspective also underlines the situational and historically-determined character of each 
core value. Periods of oppression or foreign domination are often those in which these values 
are consolidated. If a particular aspect of one’s own culture, especially when it is already 
perceived as important, is subjected to proscription or forced marginalization, then the 
affections and the attentions of the community coagulate with particular energy around it.377 
An example of this shifting stress on different cultural elements is given by the Polish case: in 
Poland, the core value has been language essentially until the Second World War. Then it 
became religion, for the very reason that it was this aspect of Polish identity which had been 
put under particular restrictions (Smolicz 1981). Likewise, a thorough study of legislative 
measures against Catalan shows that they have often strengthened the linguistic 
consciousness amongst regional elites, even though many of them adopted Castilian (Ferrer i 
Girones 1985).
The next section will illustrate that the Catalan language is a classical example of a core 
value, and that its political importance has been strengthened as a consequence of repression.
374 Hutchinson, also, illuminates the Irish as  an example. He argues that a  "plausible reason 
for the decline of the [Irish] language is that, as  a  symbol of nationality, most Irish men and 
women regarded it as definitely secondary to religion" (1987: 308).
375  In view of its importance, territory  could also be considered a  core value among the 
Aborigines and other Native groups. A territorial dim ension is p resen t in all Kinds of 
nationalism.
373 S ee  the parallel importance of religion and language in such groups as, for instance, the 
Arabs, the Georgians or the Armenians.
377 yye have a |re acjy highlighted this phenomenon in chapter 1 (Scott 1990).
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The cultural roots of nationalism.
In chapters 2 and 3 we have demonstrated that both nationalist movements, particularly the 
Catalan one, were preceded by cultural revivals. These revivals were often apolitical and their 
protagonists conceived regional regeneration in the framework of a Spanish nation. The 
result was a partly unintentional regional nationalism. A similar process was repeated during 
the two dictatorships (Primo de Rivera and Franco), when, due to the banning of political 
parties, people turned to culture as a safe haven for nationhood. But in this case the focus on 
culture was not unintentional and culture quickly became politicized as the highest expression 
of nationality. Cultural resistance gave way to political resistance as soon as the regime 
weakened its grip. This phenomenon is not confined to our study: "the struggle for 
nationhood in the modem world has been preceded everywhere by emerging cultural 
nationalist movements... These movements have formed recurrently in post-eighteenth 
century societies as historic cultural revivals, in order to propound the idea of the nation as a 
moral community, and have inspired rising social groups to collective political action" 
(Hutchinson 1987: 2). Indeed, once the political movements were established, they had to 
rely on a pre-existing definition of what the essence of the nation should be. This work 
should have already been completed by the cultural revivalists which, as in most 
ethnonationalist movements, preceded the political nationalists.378 However, my stress is on 
the type and impact of the cultural revival, since the evolution of political nationalism also 
depended, in turn, on which aspects of the national culture had been selected as central 
values.
In Catalonia the Renaixenga provided an essential basis for the subsequent spread of 
nationalism. Its success and the rich output which the Catalan literature has produced ever 
since (Terry 1977), constitute a solid base upon which political nationalism could draw its 
legitimacy. In the Basque case we have seen the much more modest precedent of the 
Associacion Euskara (1877-1883), founded in Pamplona by Navarrese intellectuals in order 
to preserve the language.379 The association's estimated membership of 300 to 400, with a 
minimal popular influence, seems insignificant in comparison to the great manifestations of
378 W hereas this has been particularly the case for Catalanism, it has only been partially so 
for Basque nationalism. For this reason, its founder, Sabino Arana, will also have the task of 
being a  myth-maker and a  value-orientator for his nation.
379 S ee  Chapter 3, section 'Euskaros and Euskalerriacos: an aborted Basque renaissance'. 
On the Euskaros, s e e  Elorza (1978: 11-ff.). On the E uskalerriacos, s e e  Larronde (1977: 
2 6 1 -ff.)
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the Catalan Renaixenga. However, the Associaci6n Euskara assembled people of high 
standing: researchers, professors, liberals, priests. These were the same categories of people 
who later became prominent in the Basque nationalist movement (Letamendia 1987: 58). But 
the revivalists were not successful in spreading their message of cultural regeneration to the 
masses. The other group, Euskalerria (1876-1899), was not precisely a cultural movement. 
The relatively small success of the Basque revival, in comparison to the Catalan Renaixenga, 
can be ascribed to multiple factors, but certainly the most important is the scarce diffusion of 
Euskara, coupled with a low language loyalty on the part of the upper classes, and with 
diffuse diglossic habits among the overall population.380 Sarasola (1976:179-83) considers 
that the overall number of books published in the Basque language during the 16th, 17th, 
18th and 19th centuries is slightly over 600. In comparison, the number of publications in 
Catalan for the same period rises to several thousands.
The concept of diglossia is useful when comparing the Basque and the Catalan case. In a 
classical article, Ferguson (1959) describes 'diglossia' as the uneven coexistence of two 
languages, or varieties of language, within a single community. The high variety (H) is used 
in public and formal domains, it has a written and standardized form, and is normally 
associated with a high status. The low variety (L) is spoken in informal situations, for 
instance, within the family, among friends, etc., and it has normally a low degree of prestige. 
Basque is a standard case of diglossia.381 In contrast, Catalan has been associated with a 
high (H) position since at least last century, because of the language loyalty of most upper 
classes, at least in heartland Catalonia (the Principat).382 It has therefore to share its 'relative 
prestige' with Castilian.383 Diglossia tout court has never really prevailed in Catalonia; daily 
interactions respond instead to diglossic patterns,384 partly as a consequence of the past 
proscriptions by the central governments. Catalan sociolinguists use the term linguistic 
conflict, rather than diglossia (Aracil 1982, Vallverdu 1972, 1980). A linguistic conflict is 
conceived as an unstable situation in which two languages compete for hegemony and its
3 80 The concept of 'language loyalty  w as coined by Weinreich (1953) and, since then, it 
has been extensively used in sociolinguistics (Fishman 1966).
381 With the Autonomy Statute (1979) and with its final codification in a  standardized 
variety (batua ), Basque language has moved -slowly- towards an higher (H) position. Yet, it 
still faces great difficulties to spread among most sectors of society.
382 Language loyalty w as not a constant and universal feature am ongst Barcelona's upper 
classes. S ee  McDonogh (1987 and 1986: 108-122) for the adoption of Castilian among the 
upper bourgeoisie, particularly in periods of centralization.
883 o n  the concept of 'relative prestige' applied to the Catalan case , s e e  Woolard (1982, 
1983).
884  a  lengthy and critical presentation of the concept of diglossia is available in Vallverdti 
(1973, 1980), who prefers the term 'diglossic patterns' for the Catalan case.
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final result is either the disappearance of the weaker language (and the triumph of the stronger 
one) or its full normalization (Conversi 1985, Kremnitz 1993). Linguistic normalization is 
therefore defined as the effort to extend the use of a language to all the formal and informal 
domains which had hitherto pertained exclusively to the dominant language.
Catalonia: language as a unitary bond
As we have seen throughout our historical chapters, Catalan nationalists consistently 
focussed on the issue of linguistic rights. For them, as well as for lay people, language 
represented a classical core value. It was -and is- both a symbol and an essential instrument 
for the diffusion and the expressiveness of their own culture. This may be clearly observed 
by a rapid glance through the principal texts of the main Catalanist intellectuals and 
politicians. They persistently saw language as the vessel of national identity (Man 1987). 
Such emphasis appeared less pronounced at the end of the last century than it does today, as
reflected by AlmiralTs following statement:
"in reality, language is not the most important element of the personality of a people, because what
doubtlessly has more importance is the community of moral and material interests However, while
not being the most important, it is the most visible  A distinct language supposes a distinct
character. The form of expressing ideas corresponds to the way of conceiving them" (Almirall 1979:77).
For Almirall, language was merely the main visible manifestation of a people's personality. 
What seemed to matter more to him was the mentality and 'spirit' of Catalonia. Yet, language 
is deeply associated with his idea of a Catalan character,385 and he subsequently adds in 
Romantic overtones:
"The use of our language is the more eloquent manifestation of our personality. Until the Catalan 
language will exist, every attempt at [cultural] unification will be a true act of tyranny, whichever the 
domain in which it will be exercised" (1979: 78, my italics) .
The Bishop of Vic, Josep Torras i Bages, tried to promote religion as an alternative value.
Nevertheless, he alsQ recognized that: ^
"Language is the people,... the thought of a nation, it is what characterizes and portrays it.... Among 
all the social bonds, apart from religion, language is the most deeply unifying" (Torras i Bages 1981: 
42).
Torras i Bages continually stressed the Christian origin of Catalonia in the Middle Ages, so 
that the Catalan 'spirit' and Catholicism were seen as inseparable dimensions of a single 
world-vision. He is often quoted as saying: "Catalonia will be Christian, or will not be" 
(Benet 1968). However, his attempt has remained relatively unsuccessful in a secular society 
like the Catalan one. Unlike the Basque Country, religion in Catalonia did not play a central 
role. On the other side, the secular Catalanist leader Ernie Prat de la Riba asserted that:
385 Almirall never used the concept of Volksgeist, which w as later adopted and elaborated 
by Prat de la Riba.
LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM 189
"Language is the most perfect manifestation of the national spirit and the most powerful tool for 
nationalization and, therefore, for the survival of a nationality" (Prat 1978: 84).
Prat's vision tended to identify Spain's nationalities with the distribution of its linguistic 
territories. Therefore he proposed to rebuild the Spanish state on the 'natural base' of four 
federated regions: Galicia, Euskadi, Catalonia and Castile (this last including Andalusia and 
all other Castilian-speaking regions).386 This also implied the reunion of all Catalan-speaking 
territories under the project of a Greater Catalonia, which would have included the Principal 
the Valencian region and the Balearic Islands. Prat (1978) expressed this project in his 
theory, but in practice he was a moderate politician, inclined to compromise and prone to 
bilateral negotiations with the central government. Beyond his wider ambitions, he was able 
to stand firm on a few points: decentralization and, above all, a full development of the 
Catalan language and culture. During his presidency of the Mancomunitat, the efforts for the 
recovery of the language were increased and systematized. Among the new institutions, we 
mentioned the Institut d' Estudis Catalans and the work of Pompeu Fabra. From Prat 
onwards, language assumed an increasing central importance, as expressed over and over
again by other nationalist leaders:
"Our language, the expression of our people, which can never be given up,... is the spiritual
foundation of our existence".387
"The Catalan problem has as its only foundation the existence of a sense of Catalan distinctiveness 
(Jet differencial), of an irrefutable and indestructible Catalan personality. Within this distinctiveness, the 
least questionable [element] is language and the adhesion of Catalan people to their mother tongue” 
(Cambo’ 1930: 26-26).
"Of all the elements which constitute a nationality, language is the deepest, the strongest and the most 
decisive. That value, at once corporeal and spiritual, which Joan Maragall found in the word, turns 
language into the symbol and the lively expression of the personality of a people" (Rovira i Virgili 1982: 
208).
"Language is the strongest marker of a nationality. The linguistic map of Europe is, ...with a few 
exceptions, the map of its nationalities. Linguistic unity is the synthesis of all other unities: it 
presupposes in the peoples a long cohabitation, a shared culture, a common history, and a centuries-old 
brotherhood. Thus, it becomes an indestructible spiritual bond" (Rovira i Virgili 1982: 97).
"The Catalan personality can only be fully expressed through the intermediary of its language. When
the latter recedes, the former fades, weakens and becomes corrupted, the Catalan ceases to be a
Catalan [and], in ceasing to be a Catalan,... he/she ceases simply to be" (Fenater i Mora 1980:140).
Economists, such as Carles Pi-Sunyer (1929), also expressed the idea that language, 
development, identity and prosperity were deeply inter-linked.388 This tie between language 
and identity has been continually stressed until the present-day. In recent years, its
386 g ee  Map 2 in the Introduction.
387  Catalonian Cultural Committee, Appeals on Behalf of Catalonia. G eneve: Catalonian 
Cultural Committee, 1924, p. 13, cited by Fishman (1972: 46).
388 pi-Sunyer (1929) saw  the nation as  a  linguistic and cultural entity. As a  nationalist, he 
claimed that nations aspire to have their own state, but more recently expressed  his deep 
rejection of aggressive expansionist nationalism, such a s  in pre-war Germany. He contrasted 
the latter with the liberal and open character of Catalanism (Pi-Sunyer 1975).
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importance has greatly increased. To mention a recent case, on the 1st of March 1989, Jordi 
Pujol met with Felipe Gonzalez, the socialist head of the Spanish Government. Here is an
extract of the former's speech:
"The language issue will indicate whether the relations with the central government are progressing or
not If some issue is absolutely crucial to Catalonia, it is its language and culture, because they are
the core elements of our identity as a people. Catalonia will not deem its historical grievance resolved 
until the cultural issue is settled Catalonia did not want autonomy for political or administrative
reasons, but for reasons of identity”. 389 
The same Pujol re-stated the crucial importance of language when, on a visit to the Emperor
of Japan (23 May 1990) praised the figure of King Juan Carlos for being the "first chief of
state who spoke Catalan in many centuries".390
According to the writer and historian Joan Fuster, language is "not only the result of a
previous unity [of all the Catalan people], but also the main thrust for the future and the basis
of new bonds of solidarity" (Fuster 1977 :134).
The central importance of language in present-day Catalonia means also that cultural and
political nationalism often coincide. In Catalonia, social actors concerned with language and
politics do not necessarily play different parts, because language is an overriding concern
which sometimes supersedes even economic interests.391 But whether or not they play
different roles, the drama is certainly played by the same actors.
Euskadi: out of assimilation, fragmentation
In chapter 3, we have studied Arana's struggle to define the key elements of Basqueness 
and its ambivalent attitude towards language. In his early formulations, language was not a 
core value and it was replaced by race and religion. The Basques therefore found themselves 
in a much more difficult position in their attempts to select an element which would carry the 
symbolic weight of national identity.
There was a further obstacle in the use of language as an unifying national symbol. It was 
in fact used by Arana and his followers as an ethnic border,392 That is to say, its function 
was to divide the autochthonous population from the newcomers. This is in sharp contrast 
with the Catalan case, where language has been conceived as a tool of integration. So, Arana
389 Declaration of Jordi Pujol, in El Pais, 2 March 1989, p. 14
390 El Pafs, 24 May 1990.
391 j o  confirm this, it is enough to consider the yearly expenditure which the Catalan 
government specifically allocates to language planning and to the improvement of the knowledge 
of Catalan in the school curricula. Also, the initial monetary input directed towards the creation 
of an autonomous TV channel, was very high.
392 The concept of language as an 'ethnic boundary* has been applied to Welsh by Khleif 
(1979), although with a  more general meaning.
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simply saw language as a means of keeping the Basque people away from mixing with the 
'foreigners':
"The Vizcayans [=Basques] are as much bound to speak their national language, as not to speak it to 
the maketos or Spaniards. It is not to speak this or the other language, but rather the difference between 
languages which is the great means of preserving ourselves from the contagion of Spaniards and avoiding 
the mixing of the two races. If our invaders were to learn Euskera, we would have to abandon it, 
carefully archiving its grammar and dictionary, and dedicate ourselves to speaking Russian, Norwegian or 
any other language, as long as we are subject to their domination. For the Catalans it would be a great 
glory if the Spanish government appointed Catalan as the official language of all Spain; on the contrary, 
if it were to do the same with Euskera, it would be for us the final blow of unavoidable death dealt from 
the most refined diplomacy" (Arana 1982:404)
Yet, this attitude of Arana is paradoxical in so far as we know that one of his main concerns 
was recovering his country's ancestral tongue. Even more so, Arana's strategy was also to 
utilize the language (or at least in part) as an instrument of political mobilization, albeit only 
among the Euskaldun population. However, this strategy could not be pursued in the cities, 
especially in Bilbao, where Arana operated and his PNV was founded in 1895, had its first 
meetings and achieved its first electoral successes in 1907.393 Here, Euskara was scarcely 
spoken.
This seems to be a basic contradiction: at least in its beginning, Basque nationalism was 
more powerful among those sectors of the population who did not speak Euskara 394. The 
nationalist periodicals and magazines of the turn of the century (even the official organ of the 
PNV), were written 80% in Spanish, "an essential condition, if this kind of press were to 
attract readers" (Letamendia 1987: 25). One reason is that probably the nationalist ideology 
had more appeal to those urban groups which felt a greater sense of dispossession and loss 
of their culture: this constituted a grievance which ought to be redressed through political 
action, although they themselves were incapable to extend, let alone maintain, their own use 
of Euskera.
These ambivalent attitudes of most early Basque nationalists can therefore be blamed on the
3 9 3  However, it is also true that for the last ten years the centre of gravity of Basque 
nationalism has shifted eastward from Bizkaia to Gipuzkoa and today the highest proportions of 
nationalist voting can be found in the countryside and small towns (Clark 1987: 437). Other 
anthropological studies deny the rural character of Basque nationalism. In the French Basque 
Country, the youth's renewed interest for nationalism was not shared  by most elders (Ott 
1981: 28) and nationalism is much weaker than in the Spanish side. Among som e plausible 
reasons, one is at once economic and tied to state-building: "the people realize that they owe 
much of their recent economic prosperity to the French social security system  and the various 
government subsidies, which now provide them with more than half their annual cash  income" 
(Ott 1981: 28).
394  por a  different thesis, albeit one which refers to the late 1970s and early 1980s, see  
Clark (1979: ch. 6 , 1980: 81-83, 1981, 1987: 439). According to Shabad and Gunther, today 
it is in Euskadi "that the use of the regional language is more strongly associa ted  with 
attachm ent to the ethnic group”, confirming a  shifting trend in B asque identity and in the 
identification of core values (1982: 450-ff.).
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scarce diffusion of Euskara: political activists revered it as a national symbol, but they 
overlooked it as a modem means for communication. In this, they were simply perpetuating 
the diglossia which they inherited. The same Arana did not know Euskara, nor did his 
parents speak it at home (Garcia Venero 1968: 239, Ortzi 1975: 124). But he learned the 
language of his own will: the time and effort invested in it are a measure of his 
commitment.395
In his consideration of language as an element of national awakening, how far was Arana 
influenced by his five-years stay in Barcelona ? He lived there at a time in which nationalism 
and language revival were simultaneously on the rise . All Arana's biographers have 
pondered about the influence of his stay in Barcelona on his formulations, but they could 
hardly prove that Arana was inspired by Catalanism. On the contrary, "if there were some 
influences, they were only negative" (Larronde 1977). His writings on the ’Catalanist errors' 
are full of pejorative comparisons between 'Vizcaya' and Catalonia. For instance, the latter is 
considered as a Spanish region which aspires to mere autonomy, while Euskadi never 
considered herself as part of Spain and strove for independence. The same Arana expresses 
this difference:
"Catalonia suffers from the ingratitude of her own mother Spain, Vizcaya has been taken over by an 
alien nation, which is the common Fatherland of Catalans, Balearics, Galicians, Valencians, etc. We can
already see how unreasonable is an alliance between the Catalans and the Vizcayans " (Arana 1982:
406).
Arana was indeed very explicit about the difference between his programme and the
successful Catalan one:
"Catalan politics, for instance, consists in attracting other Spaniards to it, whereas the Vizcayan 
[=Basque] programme, v.gr., rejects all Spaniards as foreigners. In Catalonia every element coming from 
the rest of Spain is Catalanized, and it pleases them that urban immigrants from Aragon and Castile 
speak Catalan in Barcelona. Here we suffer greatly when we see the name P6rez' at the bottom of a poem 
in Euskera, when we hear our language spoken by a rojano teamster or a Santander salesman, or by a 
Gypsy, or when we find a maketo [=Spanish immigrant] name among a list of seamen shipwrecked in 
Vizcaya. The Catalans want all Spaniards [immigrants] living in their region to speak Catalan, for us it 
would be ruin if the maketos resident in our territory spoke Euskera. Why? Because the purity of race is, 
like language, one of the bases of the Vizcayan banner (=lema). So long as there is a good grammar and 
a good dictionary, language can be restored even though no one speaks it. Race, once lost, cannot be 
resuscitated' (Arana 1982:404).
We will later see the reasons for this preference of race over language. Here language is 
considered purely as a symbol. It does not make a big difference if nobody speaks it. I had to 
add between inverted commas the word 'immigrants’ because Arana seldom tended to use it. 
This might be meaningful as he perhaps did not want to emphasize their migratory nature, as
395  Arana himself learned Euskara from scratch, during a  long convalescence, using as  his 
only source a French-Basque dictionary written by Willem Jan  van Eys (1825-1914) (Basaldtia 
1977: 47). He learned it well enough to use it for many of his political writings (all collected in 
the three-volum es Arana 1982 ca.). Many of his first works were etymologies and his main 
commitment w as to write a  Basque grammar (1977: 53). On van Eys, se e  Villasante (1979: 
2 7 9 -8 0 ) .
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much as their foreignness and Spanishness. The purpose might well have been to underline 
their extraneousness as a people and as an alien body which Basque society could not 
absorb.
The strategy of Arana has been to adopt a double and contradictory attitude facing the
autochthons and the immigrants. The following passage shows the ambiguity of Arana’s
project vis-d-vis the language:
'To an euskeriano' (=native speaker of Euskara).
In the streets of the towns of Vizcaya I have seen many children speaking erderc?^. Are there any 
Vizcayan fathers in these towns ? Yes: But it is not enough to be a son of Vizcaya. It is necessary to be a 
patriot........
You tell me that you don't love Euskera, because it does not have any utility. I perfectly understand 
this; it is better then loving it [just] because it is beautiful. But, is not Euskera the language of your race 
and of your blood ? It is not the language of your Fatherland?
If a people loses its tongue, it is because it has become the slave of another people. Do you want to be 
the child of an enslaved people ?
Don11 you have a Fatherland? If you have it, why don't you love your language ?
...If you don't love the language of your Fatherland, you can't love your Fatherland either. If you do 
not love your Fatherland, you cannot love your forebear. Do you want your children and progeny to 
despise you? (Arana 1982:1306-1307)
To an euskerdfilo (=non native speaker or learner of Euskara).
To know Euskera means nothing, if one is not a patriot Patriotism is everything, even if one does not 
know Euskera.
Euskara cannot save the Fatherland; only patriotism can save i t
Propagate patriotism and, along with it, the language will also be propagated. If you propagate 
Euskera as a language without Fatherland, the enemies of the Fatherland could be understood and could 
understand with it
Many are the euskerianos who do not know Euskera. This is bad. Many are the maketos who know it. 
This is even worse.
Great damage can be done to the Fatherland by one hundred maketos who do not know Euskera. 
Even worse is the damage that can be done by only one maketo who knows it.
If Euskera dies, it is because there are no patriots....
 In the heart of the Fatherland, every euskeriano who does not know Euskera is a thorn; every
euskeriano who knows it and is not a patriot is two thorns; every Spaniard who speaks Euskera is three
thorns.397
The above passage clearly indicates a double strategy of using Euskera as a purely patriotic 
symbol (1 thorn) subordinated to wider nationalist goals (2 thorns), whilst refusing to spread 
it as a modem communicative means or to assimilate the immigrants (3 thorns).
As expressed by another influential figure of Basque nationalism, Father Evangelista de 
Ibero, nationalist leaders had at their disposal different elements around which a national 
sense of awareness could be formed: the origin, character, language, customs, laws, 
'glories' (historical past), "tendencies, aspirations and destinies". But language was awarded 
a secondary role:
"of all those properties, which one constitutes essentially a nationality ? In the first place, the blood, 
race or origin; in the second place, the language. The other qualities are nothing but the consequences of
the first two, most specifically of the first one" (Ibero 1957:17)398
396  E rdera  = Foreign language (specifically, Spanish). E rda ldun  = Foreign-speakers 
(specifically, Spanish-speaking).
397  La Patria. A un euskerdfilo. ' B aser r ita rra \ nfi 8, 20 june 1897. Reprinted in Arana 
(1980 ca .: 1307-8).
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Like other early nationalists, De Ibero stressed race and religion as the key element(s) of 
national identity. 399 However, de Ibero, who wrote three years after Arana's death, also 
declared that "physical difference will never be as important, as intimate, as scientific, as that 
of language and moral character" (Ibero 1957:18, cited by Payne 1975: 88).400
Race and the concept of collective nobility.
The stress was thus firmly placed on race as a substantial characteristic of the ser vasco 
(being Basque). The motives of this stress can be found in the peculiar anthropological 
situation of the region, to which the nationalists tried to adapt. In the Basque Country, 
Euskara had become a minority language, spoken by a minority within the minority. Its 
destiny of extinction was sensed by many early nationalists and pre-nationalists.4®1 The 
appeal was therefore directed to race. This was a more obscure and less tangible element, 
although in the Basque case it was more powerful and charged with mobilizing effects. But 
why race, and not any other element or value? Was there not a more accessible symbol of 
identity in sight? One possible answer lies in the semantic transformation of the ancient 
concept of 'collective nobility* {hidalguia colectiva). This was the "moral core of the Basque 
sense of ethnic uniqueness", a fact that "seems to have few parallels elsewhere in Europe", in 
so far as "any Basque able to prove birth of Basque parents... was automatically recognized 
as noble by virtue of purity of blood" (Greenwood 1977: 86).
The historical origins of hidalguia colectiva can be traced back to at least 1053, when for 
the first time, the inhabitants of a local valley were granted the permission to bring arms and 
raise their own popular militia.402 But the great bulk of these concessions date from the late 
14th century. They coincided with the first major thrusts towards Spanish centralization and 
were conferred in order to protect the northern borders from French incursions.403 This was
398 Also quoted by Krutwig (1963: 547) and Linz (1973: 37).
39® On Father de Ibero and his Catechism, with its characteristic technique of question and 
answer, s e e  Martinez-Pefiuela (1989: 38-48). Religion cam e even before nationality: "Between 
seeing Euzkadi in full exercise of its rights, but separated  from Christ, and seeing her a s  in
1901 [i.e., a s  an  integral part of Spain], but faithful to Christ, the PNV would opt for the
second” (de Ibero, cited by Garcia Venero 1968: 325 and Clark 1979: 44).
40 0  por 0 e ibero, race was then defined by language (quoted by Clark 1979: 45-6). Since 
race w as defined by language, language was in turn conceived a s  an impenetrable barrier of 
protection around Basque culture and values.
401 For instance, Arturo Campi6n wrote that "Euskara is retiring to the mountains in order 
to die closer to Heaven" ('El Baskuenze', 1901, cited by Heiberg 1989: 48, my italics).
402  s e e  also Caro Baroja (1971-72: 73) and Aranzadi (1981: 395-431).
403 "In return for the grants, the people swore to personally defend their a rea  without
recom pense. By doing so, they served as  the border garrisons of the Spanish state. When 
attacks w ere particularly severe, their resistance gave the time needed to bring the sta te  's
LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM 195
so because the new centralization trends had caused "an immediate problem of vulnerability 
to border attacks and increased the French motivation to step up their incursions. Unable to 
afford massive border defences, the Catholic kings and their successors were able to use 
grants of collective nobility to insure themselves a degree of border control. The Basque 
sense of ethnic uniqueness and their acceptance of the idea that they were Spanish were at 
that time easily compatible" (Greenwood 1977: 92). 'Reverse' theories of modernization 
(Connor) claim that ethnic conflicts and wars are a by-product of modernization (see ch. 
I).404 In the previously discussed concept of homeostasis, to every action that threatens the 
stability of the social system corresponds a reaction devised to reestablish its integrity. When 
economic development irreversibly alters traditional lifestyles, nationalism supposes an 
attempt to reconcile the new state of things with the ancient system of social relations. That is 
why nationalism unmistakably arises in the cities, as cities epitomize modem disruption. 
Eventually, it can spread from the cities to the countryside (as occurred in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia), but not the other way around.
In Euskadi, an 'homeostatic' reaction against increased state control, urbanization, 
industrialism, immigration, and the abolition of the fueros, produced an explosive situation. 
These tensions were to find their political expression through nationalism only many decades 
later. Many historians stress the abolition of the fueros as a main cause of the subsequent 
rise of Basque nationalism (Payne 1975, Corcuera 1977). This abolition created the first 
blow to traditional Basque identity and can also explain the difference in core values with 
respect to Catalonia. Whilst the Basques retained their traditional privileges until the last 
century, Catalonia did not keep its own institutions, yet, its distinctive sense of identity was 
affirmed from time to time, following a pattern of continuity. Early Basque nationalists found 
a stable basis upon which they could build a cohesive sense of distinctiveness in the 
persistent sense of a collective nobility. In this sense we can find the origin of the strong 
concern by Arana for racial integrity and purity of blood. Arana was the man who 
transformed the ancient concept of 'collective nobility' into the more modem one of Vace'.
A few supposedly objective non-historical factors came also in the rescue of racial 
boundaries: scientific investigations proved the existence among the Basque population of an 
high percentage of blood group O and of a rarer presence of blood groups B and AB (Goti
army into position" (Greenwood 1977: 91-92)
404  S ee  C orcuera (1986), Jaureguiberry (1983), Clark (1979) and m ost sociological 
studies on Basque nationalism, which follow a  similar position by historians (see  subsequent 
note).
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Itumago 1962). Less grounded claims included arguments on a different cranial formation 
and distinct hair and eye colouring.405 Therefore, the concept of collective nobility emerges 
from an interrelation of historical, anthropological and biological factors. Another feature of 
this concept lies in the egalitarian ethos in which it is deeply entrenched. As all Basques were 
nobles, "thus, a butcher, shoemaker, charcoal burner, scribe or soldier -rich or poor- was a 
noble” (Greenwood 1977: 87). This myth of Basque egalitarianism is central to the 
understanding of the strong recent impact of leftist parties and ideologies despite the religious 
and tradition-bound orientation of most Basque rural society. Modem Basque egalitarianism 
has its roots in the concept of shared nobility, which advocates no in-group differences of 
status.406 Otazu (1973) contends that Basque egalitarianism was little more than a myth. 
However, an anthropological research on Basque shepherds in the French province of Soule 
has shown how egalitarian values are deeply rooted in traditional ideals of co-operation and 
reciprocity. They are the essential basis of the three main local institutions: the household, the 
'first neighbours' and the pastoral institution of the olha, or cayolar (Ott 1981: VIII).407
It may be argued that the Spanish concept of 'cleanliness of blood' (limpieza de sangre) 
filled a similar place to Basque 'collective nobility'.408 However, a comparison reveals two 
different world views: 1) Limpieza de sangre "had to be demonstrated by a meticulous 
process of genealogical investigation'' (Greenwood 1977: 87, Amiel 1983), while Basque 
collective nobility was ipso facto conferred by the mere fact of being of Basque ancestry. 2) 
Spanish limpieza de sangre was also very difficult to prove, because Spain as a socio­
cultural entity had been created through the Reconquest. Such historical process was carried 
out, not only by mass expulsion of the Moors and Jews, but also by a fanatical campaign of 
forced conversion and assimilation. Therefore Spaniards cannot trace back their ancestry to a
405  Collins dism isses these claims a s  neither objective nor scientific (1986: 5) and holds 
that "they are dictated by the predeterm ined requirem ents of a  nationalist ideology, rather 
than by a  process of rational deduction" (Collins 1986: 7). According to the sam e author, 
language is "the sole satisfactory tool with which it is possible to approach the question of 
Basque identity and origins” (1986: 8).
406  Greenwood (1977: 87) u ses  the argum ent of a  shared  nobility to explain why its 
vestiges "presently manifest them selves in the egalitarian and dem ocratic tone of Basque 
society". A good account of this egalitarian ethos can be found in Heiberg (1985: 288-ff, and 
1989: 32-33).
407 The olha  is "a pastoral syndicate which consists of a  group of shepherds, their 
communal herding hut, corral, and the mountain pastures on which their flocks graze during the 
months of summer transhum ance" (1981: 4). Egalitarianism is furthermore em phasized by the 
importance accorded to two ordering principles: ald ikatzia, or "serial replacem ent, taking 
turns, or alternation" (814) and unguru, literally, rotation.
408 while preferring the concept of pureza de la raza (purity of race), Arana occasionally 
also used limpieza de sangre and other 'Spanish' terminology, such a s  hidalguia originaria, 
nobleza originaria (Arana 1982: 545-ff.)
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purely Christian past, untouched by the exposure to Islam, or by Berber, Jewish or Arab 
blood. In contrast, the Moors never entered the Basque Country which, along with Asturies, 
remained the last outpost of Christian Spain.
The stress on race therefore had a specific meaning for the Basques, probably with no 
parallels in other parts of the industrialized word. But this very stress has proven to be 
untenable in present-day Euskadi after massive immigration at the end of the last century and, 
in much greater proportions, since the late 1950s. It was not a coincidence that ETA was 
created then. By the end of the immigration period, in the late 1970s, ETA reached the peak 
of its violent campaign.409 The sheer numbers of immigrants caused great distress among the 
native population and ETA was to capitalize on these tensions. Immigration as an indirect 
variable in the popularity of ETA is stressed in ETA's Libro Blanco: "Massive immigration 
is creating new lifestyles, customs [which are] incompatible with our way of being and
which will end up by submerging the Basque people if we do not react The threat of
extinction is so great that we Basques only have one path: to unite, forgetting all differences 
among us" 410 Such a concern for immigration occurred despite the fact that most of ETA's 
founders and organic intellectuals (Txillardegi, Benito del Valle, Krutwig, etc.) were 
themselves coming from immigrant families (Jauregui 1981:135). This also explain why, in 
contrast with Aranism, the immigration issue was not tinged by racist overtones.
However, ETA has continuously tried to escape the bequest of Aranist ideology. 
Struggling to define itself in progressive terms, its ideologues have repeatedly accused Arana 
and his PNV’s followers of being racists.411 This often led to the brink of alienating its rural 
Euskaldun base, which had hitherto accepted the Aranist tenets of Basque exclusiveness. 
The racially-oriented theses of Sabino Arana are today rejected by all Basque nationalist 
parties. However, as they characterize the first formulations of Basque nationalism, Arana's 
writings have indirectly conditioned the subsequent choices of the nationalist movement.
Another element of unfathomable primordiality is the Basque tongue, conceived as a still- 
living proof of the survival of the most ancient people of Europe. In fact, Euskara's origins 
still remain an enigma. Likewise, the origins of the Basque people are wrapped in mystery. It 
was especially because of its value as prehistoric testimony, that many early Basque
409 The largest number of political killings in ETA's history w as carried out between 1978 
and 1980 (Clark 1980: 125).
410 Reprinted in 'Documentos Y\ El Libro Blanco. Donostia: Hordago, 1981
411 For instance, Krutwig has declared that "Arana w as more racist than Hitler" (interview 
in Cambio 16, 23-1-1984, quoted in Gillmor 1985). While Krutwig accepted  the bulk of 
Arana's ideas, he could not subscribe his views on religion and race.
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nationalists attached importance to language (King 1994). Thus the situation was made more 
complicated by the mythic value attributed to Euskara, "which is the complete identification 
most Basques make between Euskera and their own cultural identity. Many Basques equate 
its potential loss with the total demise of Basque identity.. .In connection with their linguistic 
insularity, Basque identity is founded on an acute awareness of their enigmatic past. Their 
being a 'mystery people' is also what seems to be of most interest about Basques to 
outsiders. No founding myth or political revolution substitutes for such an archaic definition 
of their group origin. Identity runs in an unbroken line from the ancestors..." (Zulaika 1988: 
7).
The re-emergence of language
Language has discontinuously emerged as a central issue for Basque leaders, especially 
amongst the radicals. For instance, Txillardegi considered Euskera as "the key to the survival 
of the Basques as a distinct people and he felt astonished that people could consider 
themselves nationalists while failing to speak, study and propagate it".412 Txillardegi 
confesses that his abertzale sentiment was "intimately bound up to the discovering of 
Euskera" at the end of the 1940s.413 His autobiographic sketch on the foundation of Ekin 
explains to what extent the development of a new Basque nationalism was related to the will
to preserve Basque culture, especially the language:
"We started to reunite in Bilbao. We learned Euskera, we read the existentialists ...and we began to
study the foral legislation, each one choosing the branch of his or her major interest We were
young, we loved reading and felt the need to rationalize the Basque problem. We rejected that excess of 
sentimentalism, affective motivations and good will which, from our viewpoint, was the 'official' 
nationalism and which was translated into an attitude so incomprehensible for us as the one denouncing 
the oppression of Euskera, without doing anything to learn it" (364). For "we were the ethnic patriots 
and the others [the PNV] were the political patriots. I believe this definition fully hits the mark and 
propounds something that in the future will become evident" (cited by Ibarzdbal 1978: 369).
We have repeatedly mentioned that, in its origins, ETA was mainly a cultural nationalist 
movement and that Txillardegi’s cultural activism was at the root of one of ETA's main 
splits, which gave life to Branka. ETA’s two 'organic intellectuals', Beltza and Krutwig, 
argued that "as forms of thought depended on language use, Basque socialism must be led by 
people who spoke Euskera, while nationalists must strive to restore it as the language of the 
whole Euskadi"414 In another essay, they held that only those who spoke Euskera were
41 2 g e e  Txillardegi's interview in Ibarzdbal (1978) as  quoted by Sullivan (1988: 29).
413 S ee  his interview in Ibartz&bal (1978: 361). For a  critique of Txillardegi's position, see  
Ereno (1979).
414  Estrategia y  Tictica, in 'Documentos Y\ vol. 12, p. 298, quoted in Sullivan (1988: 
130).
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fully Basque and other Basques had a special duty to learn it.415 Vasconia stressed language 
as the Basque Country's basic value: "Euskera is the quintessence of Euzkadi. While Euskera 
will live, Euzkadi will live" (quoted by Gurrutxaga 1985: 244). In his definition of a 
nationality, Krutwig considered five basic and 'objective' factors, in order of importance: 
language; mentality and culture; religion; race; and, finally, the economic, social and material 
factors. He held that language was the most important of all, and, as regard to the second 
ones (mentality and culture), "are both sustained by language: as soon as language 
disappears, the other two factors also fade away" (Krutwig 1963:29).
Conclusion
In the writings of most Catalan intellectuals we find a persistent and strong concern for the 
fate of language. This continual effort gave Catalan nationalism its peculiar strength and 
stability. It acted as a firm standpoint for its negotiations with Madrid, which in its turn, 
during the democratic phases of Spanish history, has seen it as a stable point of reference for 
improvements in its relations with the periphery. By contrast, Basque nationalism, lacking a 
similar stable basis (and consequently, similarly persistent politics), has, at least in the past, 
been more outwardly unclear in its relations with the central government and more inwardly 
ambiguous in its self-definition in terms of identifying the highest and most important values 
to be maintained and promoted. As we have seen, this does not mean that language was 
unimportant for Basque nationalism. Indeed, it has been a central concern for all its main 
theorists and intellectual figures. Yet, the scarce diffusion of Euskara and its dialectical 
fragmentation led most Basque politicians (especially within the main nationalist party, the 
PNV), to play it down in favour of other more traditionally-oriented factors, such as religion 
and race.416 This indeterminacy, ambivalence and indefiniteness helped to shape the 
development of Basque nationalism.
In Catalonia the emphasis on language provided a powerful instrument both for the 
consolidation of the nationalist ideology and for a slow integration of the immigrants. In this 
different emphasis lies the characterization of the exclusive identity promoted by early 
Basque nationalism, versus the inclusive identity adopted by Catalanism since its beginning
415  Principios de nacionalismo revolucionario, in 'Documentos Y\ vol. 12, pp. 20-21, 
quoted by Sullivan (1988: 130).
416 Basque is divided into at least seven dialects, corresponding more or less to the seven 
Basque provinces and each having its own spelling.
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417. We have already tackled this dichotomy in the chapter on immigration. Catalanism 
resembles what Hans Kohn (1968) defines as ’open nationalism', directed to absorb and 
welcome new elements, exogenous stimuli and contributions to its culture. These are 
endogenously translated in order to merge them into an unique, but articulated, national 
culture, conceived as in perpetual evolution.418 Conversely, Arana's programme reflects the 
model of a 'closed nationalism' outlined by Kohn (1968)419 tending to avoid any overlap 
between the two groups. It is always possible to learn a new language. It is not possible to 
change one's forefathers.
Notwithstanding their initial differences, today both movements stress the centrality of 
language for the definition of their national identity. This viewpoint is shared in Catalonia by 
all political parties (except by a large part of the extreme right) and in Euskadi by most of 
them. However, it is still hard to maintain that language has became a core value for Basque 
society, though now even ordinary people start to attach to it considerable importance.420 
This affective dimension often cannot be translated into an active use of Euskara, due to the 
intrinsic difficulties of mastering the language, in contrast to the relative ease for a Castilian- 
speaker to learn Catalan, a closely related tongue.
In this chapter, I showed how language played a central role in the formation and 
programmes of the two nationalist movements. The absence or presence of a powerful
417 On the shifting patterns of the Catalan identity, see  Di Giacomo (1984), Woolard (1986) 
and Llobera (1991).
418  According to Salvador Giner, open societies "hinge upon the overt recognition of 
individual responsibility, privacy and citizenship as collective values for the conduct of human 
affairs. No known collectivity embodies perfectly the virtues of such a  society...[but] Catalonia 
must surely be counted among those countries which have m anaged with relative success to 
approximate to the distant ideal" (Giner 1980: 14).
419 If we wish to avoid Kohn's dichotomy, we can question the self-description of Arana's 
movement as  'nationalist' and, rather, view it as  a  neo-traditionalist reaction by a  threatened 
ethnocentrism. For instance, Arana takes much from pre-nationalist thought without greatly 
modifying it: his praise for the excellence of the Basque race and culture w as also typical of 
the XVI century Basque apologists (Corcuera 1979: 16). His confessional em phasis on 'God and 
the Old Laws' (PNV's official motto) is also  a  neo-traditionalist feature, ra ther than a 
nationalist one. If nationalism can be described also a s  a  traditional society's response to the 
m enaces of modernity, its response is normally syncretic, rather than 'hom eostatic'. That is, 
it must adapt and re-create endogenously the new elem ents brought by modernization. This is 
hardly the case  of Arana: Arana's mixture of confessionalism, racism and legal traditionalism 
greatly limited the spread  of his m essage, at least if we com pare it with the enorm ous 
popularity enjoyed by Catalanism. Sharing with Catalonia a  similar economic structure and 
patterns of social disruption (rapid urbanization, immigration, c lass tensions, etc.), Arana's 
simplistic and oppositional ideology could not be accepted by local upper classes, whilst its 
racist overtones alienated it from the immigrant working class.
420 For a  thesis which s tresses  the centrality of language in present-day Basque nationalist 
programmes, see  Urla (1987, 1988). See also Tejerina (1992).
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element of distinctiveness such as language can affect the growth of two otherwise very 
similar social movements. I have also explained why language has been replaced by race in 
Euskadi and, finally, why this substitution became impracticable with the mass arrival of 
immigrants. In chapter 8 , on immigration, we shall see that the latter is not a new 
phenomenon: much of Arana's most visceral writings were inspired by it. The Aranist 
concept of 'race' developed with, and against, massive immigration.
Through a comparative analysis of Basque and Catalan nationalism, the chapter has shown 
that regional culture, especially language maintenance, has a direct effect on the development 
of nationalist movements. The method was a comparison of the ideas of the leading 
nationalist leaders and intellectuals of Basque and Catalan nationalism. Through their 
writings and speeches, the latter's choices are shown to be related to existing cultural 
conditions in their respective regions. Two patterns emerged from the analysis, which can be 
applied to other nationalist movements as well: the Catalan model, based on language, and 
with a thriving cultural nationalism; and the Basque model, not based on a single value and 
more confused over its definition of the nation's identity. These two patterns resulted in two 
opposite reactions towards massive immigration: the Catalan developed an inclusive 
framework in which the immigrant could be considered a Catalan after having acquired the 
culture of the host society; in contrast, Basque nationalism was more isolationist and 
exclusivist from its inception until the early postwar era. The relationship between cultural 
ambiguity and political violence among the Basques is the subject of the final chapter of this 
thesis.
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Chapter 8
NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION 
in CATALONIA and the BASQUE COUNTRY
The aim of this chapter is firstly to describe the quantity and significance of the immigration 
phenomenon in Catalonia and Euskadi, and, secondly, to analyze its impact upon both 
nationalisms. Since the sheer number of immigrants was enormous, the consequence on both 
Catalan and Basque identity was inescapable. Nationalist leaders were correspondingly 
compelled to re-elaborate regional identities and relate them to the new trend. Both the 
Basque Country and Catalonia have been the targets of massive immigration and both have 
recently been granted Autonomy Statutes which recognize Catalan and Euskara (Basque) as 
regional languages co-official with Castilian. But since well before these radical changes, 
immigrants arriving in the two regions faced very different patterns and possibilities of 
integration. This is also tied to the relative facility of learning Catalan, as compared with the 
difficulty of learning Euskara for an average immigrant arriving from the rest of Spain. 
Catalan historical records, moreover, have demonstrated long-term and durable integration 
trends. On the other hand, integration has been strewn with difficulties in the Basque 
Country. However, this chapter will not focus on the sociolinguistic problems of learning the 
two languages, but rather on the effect of large-scale immigration on nationalism and the 
different responses which it inspired in the local leadership.
As we said in the thesis’ introduction, the wide range of academic literature existing on 
Basque nationalism, even in English, has not been matched by similar studies for Catalan 
nationalism, apart from historical ones. In contrast, the latter region has produced a 
considerable amount of literature on immigrants, whereas the output of works on 
immigration is extremely poor in Euskadi. This difference is self-revealing: in itself, it may
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be a further proof that in contemporary Catalan social science the main trend has been an 
optimistic assessment of the newcomers' issue, whereas in Basque scholarship -as in 
politics- the main issue has been Euskadi's confrontation with the Spanish state, relegating 
immigration to a sub-category of that issue. This is a difference that we also encounter in 
political action. If in Catalonia the main concern has been its self-definition and socio-cultural 
composition, in Euskadi the problem was 'Spain'. Whereas Arana and the first peneuvistas 
were aiming to separate Euskadi from the rest of Spain, early Catalanist leaders were instead 
aiming to exert some kind of control over the Spanish state, presenting themselves as an 
alternative model to Castilian hegemony. Finally, we have also to consider the small degree 
of development of social sciences in Spain under the dictatorship. Once democracy emerged, 
the two regions had different sets of priorities which resulted in distinct theoretical schools 
and specializations.
What follows is a brief historical and quantitative sketch of immigration and of the ensuing 
conflict it generated in the two regions.
CATALONIA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Catalonia terra de pas
Catalonia's special position along the Mediterranean coast and between Castile and France 
has made it a traditional receiving ground for multiple cultural influences and movements of 
people. The population in the coastal area open to commerce through the port of Barcelona 
increased at a much faster rate than most of the interior, since birth rate and immigration were 
higher on the coast. Massive immigration also occurred in Valencia (Vilar 1977: 2: 42-94; 
1977: 3: map 56). In Catalonia, most immigrants came from neighbouring and culturally 
alike regions, often from nearby Occitania, and hence had no particular difficulties in 
assimilating.421 This can help explain why the assimilative traditions of Catalonia are often 
treated as a primordial given. The past success in integrating Southern French elements 
provided a stimulus for future optimism.
After a sharp decline in the fifteenth century, the population of Catalonia underwent a 
spectacular demographic recovery between 1550 and 1620. Part of this increase was due to 
mass immigration from France. By the end of the sixteenth century, some 20% of the male 
population was made up of French (=Occitan) immigrants (Elliot 1963: 26). Until the xix
421 Here, Occitan (Provengal) was spoken, the nearest language to Catalan in lexicon, 
grammar, syntax, morphology, and phonetics. Relationships between C atalans and Provencals 
were mutual and intense. As for cultural m atters, many C atalans travelled to Provence in 
order to attend the original Floral Games.
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century, most immigrants came from the North, especially from this area. Important
migratory movements occurred during the Eighteenth Century, when Barcelona recovered
part of its economic splendour (see Nadal and Giralt 1960).
As we have highlighted in the introduction, the population of Catalonia-Principat today
approaches six million. Before 1700, Catalonia hardly reached half a million inhabitants.
Hence, it has increased more than tenfold in two hundreds years. Only in the Eighteenth
century do we find a sharp demographic increase. The population doubled from 407,000 in
1718 to 814,000 in 1787. This was a time of economic development, following the setting
up of textile manufacturing, the expansion of commerce and a good period for agricultural
output. In the Nineteenth century the population continued to expand. Steady industrial
growth allowed the formation of manufacturing cities and the enlargement of Barcelona. In
1887 the population of the Principat reached 1,843,000. The demographic distribution also
changed: most of the population moved to the coast or not far from it, gradually leaving the
agricultural hinterland depopulated. By 1900, the birth rate began to decrease, a decline
which lasted to the present day. The difference in birth rates between Catalonia and the rest of
Spain drastically increased, but the population continued to grow due to immigration. The
overall demographic balance with the rest of the peninsula correspondingly shifted:
Catalonians, who represented 10.6% of the Spanish population in 1900, became 15,77% in
1975 (Termes 1984:132).
Several authors (Ferrater i Mora, Maluquer, C. Pi-Sunyer, Vives, etc.) have described
Catalonia’s historical capacities of assimilation: its position along the Mediterranean coast,
between two large countries, France and Spain (both champions of an intolerant and
chauvinist vision of ethnic relations), the constant flux of different peoples, the cosmopolitan
nature of Barcelona, of its port and its commercial activities, Catalonia as a terra de pas
(literally = country of passage).422 The historian Vicens i Vives uses the concept of passadts
(=passageway, corridor, passage):
"The peoples who inhabit these passageways are subjected to considerable human pressures, some 
peaceful, other bellicose and warlike. The play of both trends continually aroused by the ebb and flow of 
historical events, engenders a permanent vital tension and develops particular qualities... A passageway 
people finds always itself in dangerous historical situations, so that powerful currents of resistance rise up 
in the spirit of the people, creating and recreating it over the centuries" (1984:20).
This vision may be related to other social theories which ascribe an integrative and
accommodating capacity to seaborne societies. In particular, Lenski's (1984) definition of a
422  jh is  concept has been elaborated, among others, by the philosopher Ferrater I Mora 
(1 9 8 0 ).
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maritime society seems to fit the Catalan case.423 One of the characteristics of maritime 
societies is their greater openness in comparison with other societies, such as agrarian 
societies. Their reliance on free movement of goods and labour endow them with peculiar 
integrative traits towards out-groups.
In 1887, immigrants represented only 1.25% of the Catalan population. This number 
slowly increased: 3.33% in 1897,4.22% in 1900, 5.44% in 1910. The percentage became 
salient for the first time in 1920, when it reached 14.03% (Termes 1984: 129), as a 
consequence of the industrial boom prompted by Spain's neutrality in World War I. This 
rhythm was kept constant until 1930. Rural immigrants from Barcelona's hinterland were 
now competing with immigrants from outside Catalonia. However, individuals from Catalan 
speaking areas still represented the majority: they came firstly from Valencia, then from 
Menorca, Majorca, and some from Southern Aragon.424 Only in 1930, when the non natives 
became 19.61% of Catalonia's population, did the numbers of Castilian-speaking immigrants 
(318.956) approach those of Catalan-speaking ones (329.708), at least in the province of 
Barcelona (Termes 1984:131).
During Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, many immigrants were attracted by the salt 
potassium mines and, especially, the works for the 1929 Universal Exposition. This first 
generation of newcomers were collectively known as murcianos , the ones from Murcia. 
The economic stalemate of the 1930s produced a decrease in the immigration rate. Finally, 
the civil war and its aftermath caused an income of several thousands fleeing hunger from 
Andalusia as well as a huge political exodus from Catalonia. Afterward, immigration halted 
for a while. Only in the 1950s was the trend reversed. Between 1951 and 1970,1.16 million 
immigrants arrived in Catalonia from other parts of Spain, mainly from Andalusia 
(Rebagliato 1978: 256). In 1970, 37.69% of the Catalan population was bom outside the 
region (Termes 1984: 132), and finally in 1975 the immigrants reached 39% of Barcelona's 
population (Rebagliato 1978: 260). Not even in countries such as the USA and Argentina at
423 According to Lenski, maritime societies are distinguished from agrarian societies by the 
following key features: their chief source of economic surplus derived from commerce, rather 
than agriculture; m erchants were much more favourably situated; their governm ents were 
typically republican and plutocratic, rather than monarchical; militarily, they relied on naval 
force, more than other forces. Lenski's classical exam ples a re  the Phoenicians, the 
Carthaginians, the Venetians and the mid-15th century Dutch. However, he also consider cases  
of hybrid societies, part maritime and part agrarian, mentioning the Athenians from the sixth 
century B.C. until the Roman conquest and England from the 16th to the early 19th century 
(Lenski 1984: 191-2). Perhaps, Catalan society may be included in this latter group, since its 
government was officially monarchical and its economy was based on agriculture as  well.
424 T hese contacts did not result in major linguistic changes, since "the slight dialect 
differences did not weight on the process and were soon erased” (Badia 1964: 107).
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the peak moment of their maximal receptiveness did immigrants exceeded 30% (Marsal, cited 
by Termes 1984: 132). However, the phenomenon was unevenly spread, as most immigrant 
families clustered in the newly built barris of Barcelona’s outskirts. Their highest 
concentration was to be found in the suburban townships of Cornell^ (78.4 %) and Santa 
Coloma (78.7 %) (Strubell 1981: 76). Also crucial was the immigrants' higher birth-rate as 
compared to the natives’. By 1965, immigration accounted for 65% of the total growth of 
Catalonia, while natural growth represented only 35% (S&ez 1980: 26). That is, if taken 
together, the immigrants and their children far outnumbered the natives.
All nationalisms attach an enormous importance to population figures. The more numerous 
the population, the more strength the nation has. Demography is therefore a power game. 
And a declining population is a bad omen for every sincere nationalist.42  ^That is why most 
cases of demographic decline in human groups are bound to generate a counter-trend in the 
search for a political solution through either self-determination or a campaign to expel 
immigrants (and, failing this, outright racism). Most nationalist movements in world history 
exploded at times of massive population upheavals, huge transmigrations or, simply, 
changes in the demographic balances. For instance, the rise of Serbian nationalism, which 
has led to the present-day war in the Balkans, was notoriously brought about by a dramatic 
shift in the demographic balance of the Kosovo province. This region, which is considered 
by Serbs as the cradle of their nation, has seen an unprecedented increase in its Albanian 
component, so that at the moment of writing Albanians make up over 90% of its population 
and the remaining Serbs behave like a 'besieged' minority (Magas 1993).
A decrease in birthrate has also fostered radical visions of Quebecois nationalism.4 26  Both 
Quebecois and Catalan demographers have traditionally lamented population decline, but the 
hope of integrating the immigrants could cajole their separatist components into a more
425 In considering several nationalist movements world-wide, it is nearly impossible to find 
a  single one of them which encourages birth control. This does not mean that this pattern cannot 
change in the future
426 Suffering from net emigration, Q uebec's share of C anada's population has declined from 
29% in 1966 to about 25.5%  in 1989. However, the biggest problem in the policy of 
immigrants' attraction is to incentivate their further staying, a s  many of them prefer to leave 
for other Canadian provinces after a while. Q uebec's immigration officials award more points 
for good French proficiency (15) than for English (3). Therefore, Q uebec has become the main 
focus of immigration from som e French-speaking countries, notably Haiti (even though Haitian 
Creole is sharply different from standard French) and Lebanon. Robert B o u ra ssa 's  government 
wanted to "raise the province's annual intake of immigrants from 17% to 25% of an expanding 
Canadian total", more or less 50,000 to 60,000 per year (The Econom ist. June 10, 1989). 
However, the fact that many immigrants insist on learning English, rather than French, inspire 
many Q uebecoises to believe that only independence tout court will make it clear to any 
potential newcomers of the French identity of their nation.
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moderate stance. Accordingly, the unity of the Canadian and Spanish states can only be 
saved by policies which ensure the integration of the non-native population into the regional 
cultures. Finally, there is a pro-immigrant argument in that the only remarkable population 
increase in this century in Catalonia was produced through immigration. Since immigration 
stopped in the 1970s, bringing about a zero-rate growth, it is possible that nationalist leaders 
will be prone to encourage further immigration, once the instruments of Catalanisation will be 
fully available and the immigrants' will to integrate out of discussion.
The failure of racism in Catalonia
Given Catalonia's traditional capacity to absorb immigrants, Catalans leaders were never 
particularly interested in drawing up insurmountable barriers between natives and 
newcomers. Immigrants were not resented as a major threat to Catalan identity, the main 
menace coming obviously from Madrid. Madrid posed a far greater danger to the survival of 
the Catalan nation, and its policies were a major source of de-Catalanisation. Moreover, 
thanks to the strength of linguistic identity, racialist definitions of the nation never gained 
currency. There have been attempts in this direction, but what strikes is their overall lack of 
success. We shall now examine some of these racialist definitions, contrasting them with 
more integrative ones which won the day.
At the turn of the century, the positivist writer Pompeu Gener (1848-1920) tried to define 
Catalan identity on the basis of race and descent. The Nordic Gothic character of Catalonia 
was opposed to the Arab and Berber nature of Castile. Relying on Nietzsche's vitalism, 
Gener avowed for the creation of a super-nationalism. Since 'science' provided an 
irrefutable instrument of legitimation, it is not surprising that most European nationalist 
movements in the last throes of the century developed overt racist rationalizations. Race was 
considered to be the most reliable and incontestable way of supporting group differentiation. 
'Science' provided a kind of esoteric doctrine through which a self-appointed secular clergy 
tried to impose their vision grounded on pretentiously immovable dogmas. The steadfastness 
of these dogmas was based precisely on the difficulty of demonstrating them. I hope to have 
shown in the previous chapter that the choice of race was directly related to the absence of 
other elements of ethnic differentiation. The more the differences between groups are difficult 
to demonstrate, the more race comes to the fore. In Catalonia, linguistic consciousness 
provided an impediment against race-centred ideas. In the end, the racist ideas of Gener and 
other marginal pundits never acquired legitimacy in Catalonia.
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For a while L'Aveng, the eclectic Modernist mouthpiece, gave hospitality to the racist 
ideas of Gener with the aim of differentiating Catalonia from the rest of Spain.427  For the 
Modernists, this was simply a byproduct of their scramble for all things modem, scientific 
and European. Their use and abuse of 'scientific' terminology was a means of distancing 
themselves from the Romantics and the Renaixenga.The stress on race was intended to 
provide a provisional foundation for an allegedly more 'modem' form of nationalism, against 
previous nostalgic attitudes. But Gener’s and others' attempts were quickly forgotten. When 
several decades later a massive influx of immigrants created the conditions for a racist 
backlash, few remembered his name.
A new stream of racial thought appeared in the 1930s.428 In his quasi-apocalyptic portrait 
of Catalonia's 'decadence', the demographer Josep Vandellds (1899-1950) backed up his 
anti-Malthusian defence of human natality with a wealth of statistical data.4 29  Catalonia was 
threatened with extinction by the falling of birth-rate. As a remedy to what he described as 
racial decadence and generational egotism, he proposed the spread of nationalism. In this, 
Vandellds was influenced by Italian Fascism and German pessimism 4 3 0  Although more 
influential than Gener, his preoccupations about Catalan 'decadence' as a result of 
immigration and miscegenation were not seriously taken up by nationalist politicians.
Another author expressing concern for immigration was Manuel Rossell i Vilar, who linked 
culture with race. He was preoccupied about immigrants' 'ghettos' and the paucity of mixed 
marriages, but was also concerned about possible threats to 'mental purity' resulting from 
massive inputs of 'foreign blood'. Thus, although inbreeding (mestissatge) was a desirable 
perspective, it would have brought about long-term 'mental perturbations' (Hall 1983: 77). 
His writings were even less popular than the ones of Gener and Vandell6 s.
Much more important than them all was what I define as the integrationist trend. This was 
exemplified by several authors and scattered in most nationalist literature.431 However, its
427  G ener played a more influential role in the radical magazine Juventut (Youth, 1900- 
1906) of the Uni6 Catalanista.
428 As predecessors, Term es (1984: 138-ff) mentions several anti-Malthusian hygienists 
preoccupied with the lowering birth-rate at the turn of the century. Later, the physician Puig i 
Sais spoke of the fatal dangers of de-Catalanization and the need to increase the number of 
C atalans of pure stock.
429 Although Vandellds avoided the concept of ’race', he often spoke of 'racial qualities' (Hall 
1983: 77).
430 Vandellds studied with the fascist statistician Corrado Gini and w as also influenced by the 
German philosopher Oswald Spengler (Bilbeny 1988: 156).
431 Some authors stressed  the economic advantages derived from immigration (Muntaner, 
Nadal, cited by Culla 1989: 339).
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importance fully emerged only in the 1960s as a consequence of massive immigration and the 
competing danger of an anti-immigrant backlash. At this stage, it was absolutely imperative 
to rediscover, and appeal to, supposedly 'primordial' integrative trends innate in Catalan 
society. The previously mentioned works of Vicens Vives, Ferrater i Mora and others served 
this purpose. But active integration could be more easily achieved in the wake of a common 
opposition to the dictatorship. As in Euskadi, the oppositional character of the nationalist 
movement helped to mobilise immigrants and natives against a common enemy. In this task, 
the whole opposition remained united. Memories of the Tragic Week and the potential for 
communal strife in Catalan society haunted both left and nationalist politicians. The two main 
representatives of this integrative current are the journalist Francis Candel (b. 1925) and the 
nationalist leader Jordi Pujol (b. 1930).
Candel (1964), himself an immigrant, published a defence of the immigrants' contribution 
to Catalan society which became a regional best-seller. Significantly, the book was titled Els 
altres Catalans (The other Catalans). However, he did not present an overall solution to the 
problem of cultural integration, especially in the linguistic aspect His main merit was to have 
personified the immigrants' love for the host land and its people. Candel was criticised by 
Cruells (1965), who called his own book Els no Catalans i nosaltres (The non-Catalans and 
ourselves): according to Cruells, the majority of the immigrants were not ready to accept 
Catalan culture (1965:17) and even showed connivance at the regime's suspicious 'linguistic 
universalism' (1965: 24). At this stage, the idea of a single Catalan community is destined to 
remain simply "a fiction (enthelequia)... if it does not bring what is essential to Catalanity, 
which is its language" (1965: 12) .432
The most relevant thinker in this period was Jordi Pujol, whose ideas we already expanded 
on in other chapters. His programme consisted in addressing the immigrants' issue through 
linguistic incorporation, seeing acquisition of Catalan as a step 'naturally' ensuing from 
acceptation in the host country: "Our central problem is immigration and, hence, integration. 
The basic objective is to build up a community valid for all Catalans. And I care to add that 
by Catalan I mean everybody who lives and works in Catalonia, and who makes Catalonia 
his/her own home and country, which he/she incorporates and identifies with" (Pujol 1966). 
Hence, the stress was put on residence in an attempt to build a non-ethnic sense of citizenship 
(Woolard 1986, 1989). However, within what looks like an unmistakably civic concept of 
the nation, language (especially language use in the family) remained the real crucible and
432 Cruells (1965) attacked Candel's work em phasizing the distance between what, he
claimed, were two opposite communities: Catalans and non-Catalans.
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badge of successful incorporation: "Language is the decisive factor in integration. It is the 
most definitive. A man who speaks Catalan and who speaks Catalan to his children, is 
already a Catalan at heart {de soca i arrel)" (Pujol 1966: 82-3). Pujol first expressed his 
vision in the late 1950s in some clandestine pamphlets. Obviously, such literature could not 
have a large circulation, but was very influential among important circles of intellectuals who 
can be defined as Catalonia's 'militant minorities' (Terms 1984:154)433
BASQUE COUNTRY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Immigration, centralism and modernity
In contrast with Catalonia, the Basque Country did not posses a vibrant tradition of 
acceptance of newcomers. The concept of universal or collective nobility (hidalguia 
colectiva) discussed in the previous chapter served a clear isolationist purpose. "All those 
who wish to be considered as inhabitants (vecinos) had to, if they were not from the 
country, prove their nobility. This required a long and costly legal procedure. The applicant 
had to finance the trip of two persons -a bailiff and an inhabitant of the place - to his 
birthplace, where he had to prove... his nobility and purity of blood with witnesses or a 
baptism certificate" (Fernandez de Pinedo 1974: 51). Already in the XV century, people who 
came from outside Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa had limited civic rights and duties. With Bizkaia's 
Fuero Nuevo, the permission of the anteiglesias,434 villages and towns was needed in 
order to acquire stable residence. This implied an investigation into the moral conduct of the 
applicant, to be carried out in the place where he /she last resided.4 3 5  In 1585, the Junta 
Provincial of Gipuzkoa forbade the residence to all those who could not prove their collective 
nobility (Vazquez de Prada 1978: HI: 170-2).
The abolition of xhefueros found the local population unprepared for the vast upheavals to 
come, and unable to counteract them. The rapid industrialization of the Bilbao area after 1876 
meant that many people from both the surrounding countryside and other regions of Spain 
flocked into the city, while the locals could not have a say in these developments. Bilbao 
more than doubled its population from from 35,505 inhabitants in 1877 to 83,306 in 1900.
433 Also influential w as the Left nationalist activist Antoni P6 rez, inspired by social 
Catholicism (Munoz 1990: 166-ff).
434 The a n te ig les ias  (literally, before the Church) w ere adm inistrative units roughly 
corresponding to municipal districts based on the parishes.
435 This attitude had been kept in the XVII century, when Bilbao's c lass structure started to 
change and expand. The members of the city's Junta periodically affirmed that its inhabitants 
were of noble lineage and thus they had to admit foreigners only after accurate research on 
their genealogies (Dominguez Ortiz 1976: 171).
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By 1900 about 80% of the city's population was made up of immigrants, and only 23.4% 
were bom in Bilbao (this figure also includes children of immigrants). Nearly half of the 
immigrants were non-Basques (Corcuera 1979: 73-5).
The amount of social disruption brought about by these dramatic changes in the human, 
cultural, social and ecological spheres was an essential catalyst for the birth of Basque 
nationalism. The massive arrival of dispossessed people who appeared impossible to 
integrate was at the root of a widespread anti-Spanish resentment which is fully reflected in 
Arana's words:
If a foral and euskalduna (Basque-speaking) Vizcaya were morally possible, though of maketo race, 
its realization would be the most hateful event in the world, the most creeping and abject (<rastrera) 
aberration for a people, the most iniquitous and wicked political development and the most amazing 
falsity in history (Arana u.d.: 1:197)
Maketismo or espafiolismo [creeps] in every sphere of Vizcayan society: within the cultural and 
religious authorities, in the press, in recreational and political groups, in professional and religious 
organizations... (189)
Our race has became despicably dominated by that of its most hard-fought enemy' (326) 436
Indignation and bitterness for the destruction of Basque traditional society are the main 
touchstones of Arana's thought. A self-righteous outrage for the decline of Basque 
civilization, its laws, language and values was at its basis. This wrath was reflected in 
Arana's manichean typologies of the incompatible human characters of Basques and 
Spaniards. Spaniards epitomized all negative attitudes and behaviour, all that Basques 
abhorred: they were painted as lazy, violent, prone to drunkenness,... By contrast, Basques 
excelled in all those fields where the Spaniards failed.
However, if by racism we mean a hierarchical evaluation of human groups on an universal 
scale, Arana can only partially be referred to as a racist, because the target of his contempt 
were exclusively the Spaniards.437 His 'racism' was a situational one, driven by hatred for 
Spanish political oppression and mentality.438 We must not forget that in Arana's time, at the 
turn of the XIX century, the concept of race was a fashionable one. This concept served to 
legitimise Basque aspirations to achieve an equal status to that of other modem nations. In
436 Arana also referred to the preferential allocation of administrative posts to the Spanish 
immigrants as  maketismo (326).
437 Indeed, Arana was also able to express som e solidarity for other peoples fighting against 
Spain or similar W estern foes, like the American Indians (1980: 189-90) or the Berbers of 
Morocco (189-90 and 193-4), who were at that time waging their struggle against the Spanish 
army. In regard to the latter, Arana ironically asked: "What kind of culture can the Spaniards 
bring to El Riff ?" (189), implying that Berber civilization was superior to the Spanish one.
438 On the different m eanings which the concept of race assu m es relative to prevailing 
historical conditions and discourses, see  Goldberg (1992).
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this sense, it was an even stronger reminder and seal of distinction than language. Racial 
exclusiveness pre-existed Arana and was a common sentiment among Bilbao's residents in 
the third quarter of the century. The Castilianized and pro-centralist upper echelons were 
equally -if not more- racist than the Basque-speaking proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. Later 
on, both nationalists and anti-nationalists resented the maketos as invaders. However, only 
among the nationalists did they become openly identified with the state, since most of them 
came from Castile, the land of the oppressors.
We do not have any reliable proof that Arana knew directly the works on racial superiority 
which were very popular in Europe at the end of the century, especially in France, which he 
visited for brief periods. In his self-taught and disordered syncretism, Arana rarely, if ever, 
mentioned his sources. Certainly, Arana had a lively intellectual curiosity for everything that 
could reinforce his nationalist creed. Allied with the fin  de siicle mood of Spanish 
decadence, European racial theories may have had a strong impact amongst some 
Regenerationist intellectuals. Physical anthropologists, both foreign and local, were asserting 
their theories of Basque racial uniqueness.439 Aranism helped only indirectly to popularize 
these concepts, which became more well-known after Arana's death. The consciousness of 
racial superiority "persisted at the ideological level long after openly racist aspects 
disappeared from the nationalist programmes" (Corcuera 1979: 386). As we saw, this legacy 
created internal conflicts and bitter fragmentation during the 1960s, when most nationalists 
began to consider how to involve the immigrants in their struggle.
In the previous chapter, we said that all nationalist movements search for common and 
shared values through which to mobilise the masses. This search is directed in order to re­
create the 'essence' of national culture through an effort of syncretism. Core values are 
nothing else but symbolic precipitates of ethnic cohesion and synthesis of a rapidly changing 
culture. Arana's choice of race was the consequence of the lack of other differentiating 
elements. He found that race had a stronger mobilising potential precisely because it defined 
the 'communitarian essence' of the nation, whereas no other element could operate likewise. 
Our contrast between Catalan openness and Basque exclusiveness refers to the initial period
439  For instance, Telesforo de Aranzadi published at the turn of the century his 
anthropometric works on cephalic indexes, eye colour and other physiognomic peculiarities. The 
former topic was also studied by the phrenologist Federico Oloriz. When race w as associated to 
superiority, we can find easily the features of a  'chosen people'. Thus, Engracio de Aranzadi 
declared in 1904 that "we B asques constitute the aristocracy of the world, the noblesse of the 
earth" (cited in C orcuera 1979: 386). In this sen se , race w as not necessarily racist, but 
resem bled more a  spirit of caste . Furthermore, these  declarations did not form a  cohesive 
doctrine of racial superiority.
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of the two nationalist movements. The substance of the original formulations remained 
basically untouched until the Civil War, as alternative visions could not find the conditions to 
emerge. In the postwar, Basque attitudes changed dramatically: the reaction to the second 
massive wave of immigration in the 1960s was to look for, and create, alternative values in 
order to include the immigrants into the nationalist struggle, rather than rejecting them. But 
we shall first examine which were the conditions of, and the reaction to, the first great 
immigration.
The end of Basque traditional society: forerunners of a violent upheaval
At the beginning, industrialization was limited to Vizcaya and concentrated in the mining 
area around Bilbao. Given the impact of subsequent urbanization and immigration, it was 
also here that nationalism was bom and slowly spread.440 We have to remember that, 
initially, Arana spoke just of a "Vizcayan nation" and only later did he extend his nationalist 
programme to the other Basque provinces, inventing the term Euskadi. This happened as 
soon as the effects of industrialization sprawled into neighbouring Gipuzkoa. Immigrants in 
the Bilbao area were then living in pitiful conditions. A vivid picture of the appalling 
conditions in the mining industry was sketched by the Communist leader Dolores Ibaurri, La 
Pasionaria:
"The miners worked from dawn to dusk with no set hours. They left home before it was light and did 
not return until well after nightfall. The bunkhouses that the mining companies offered as shelter to those 
who came from other regions resembled the lairs of wild beasts rather than human dwellings.
At night...the interior of the [miner's] bunkerhouses looked like a scene from Dante. The air was filled 
with the smoke of harsh tobacco.. .and illuminated by a flickering light. The blurred figures of half-naked 
men could be seen moving among the cots or seated in their bedrolls in a foul atmosphere compounded of 
sweat, fermented food, and the odours of the latrine, which was located in a small compartment...The 
men slept on sacks stuffed with comshucks placed on top of narrow wooden benches...
If one of the men contracted smallpox or typhus... he was removed from his cot and taken to a hut 
where the sick were housed. If he died, his bunk was sprinkled with lime water, and his cot was 
immediately occupied by someone else. The temporary labourers, most of whom were of peasant origin, 
were...carriers of fatal illnesses and epidemics which spread without control from Vizcaya to Castile and 
from Castile to Vizcaya " (Ibaurri 1976: 17-8).
A first natural reaction to the arrival of the immigrants was self-induced isolation. The natives
440  Until the late 1950s, Gipuzkoa had relatively little non-B asque immigration. Its 
industrialization was a  subsidiary spill-over from Vizcaya, following an eastw ard  trend from 
the towns at the border between the two provinces towards the French frontier, where It 
halted. Industrialization in Gipuzkoa consisted mostly of small industrial enterprises. In this 
environment, cooperativism flourished, as  exemplified by Mondragon. The process w as slow 
and, until the 1950s, it w as not a s  traumatic as  in 1880s* Vizcaya. The other two Spanish 
B asque provinces, Alava and Navarre, rem ained largely agricultural and untouched by 
industrialization for a  much longer time. The agricultural character of th ese  provinces has 
retarded the growth of nationalism.
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reacted in the typical way of threatened minorities, reinforcing traditional barriers. Efforts in 
this direction are normally bound to fail if the minority in question does not have the 
(economic) means to implement its wish of seclusion. In the Basque case, isolationist 
attempts were encouraged by the natives’ economic well-being in comparison to the 
immigrants. They could afford to display some kind of ’superiority’ in regard to the latter, 
whilst they could hardly do so in respect of the central government
Again, the population nearly doubled from 1900 to 1930 (Fusi 1984: 15). In the 1930s, 
religion became increasingly more important than race. The clergy participated massively in 
the nationalist movement, possibly as a response to the secular threat emanating from the 
Second Republic. In the Basque Country, religion became an indispensable tool of social 
cohesion at a time of erstwhile social instability in the rest of Spain. At the popular level, this 
new religious awareness was expressed by visionary events, religious apparitions and 
performances of miracles (Christian 1987). But the cataclysm of the Civil War irreparably 
broke this traditional balance. The Catholic field was split along ideological and geographical 
lines; Navarre and part of Alava sided with the Francoists against nationalism. In the daik 
night of oblivion which followed, an underground movement slowly emerged challenging 
what had been an hitherto static nationalist ideology. We shall now see how this ideology 
focused first on language, and subsequently on voluntary action, as an unitary platform and 
source of cohesion.
In the 1960s, the Basque economy underwent a massive process of expansion. 
Immigration had been constant since the 1890s, but the record figures of the 1960s led to 
inevitable strains on Basque culture and society. The fracture between immigrants and natives 
was in part healed through attempts to create a new sense of Basque identity carried out by 
some educators and nationalists. This effort to achieve 'national' unity is epitomized by the 
role of the anderenos (Basque teachers) as agents of the Basque cultural revival. They 
insisted on creating common schools where immigrant children could learn Basque side by 
side with native ones. But their first attempts failed on several occasions, not because of 
opposition from the immigrants, but, on the contrary, because many villagers were firmly 
opposed to their children being sent into mixed classes. Only a nationalist explanation - 
namely the sincere desire and right of the immigrants to become Basques -succeeded in 
convincing the reluctant parents about the viability of such schools, chasing away centuries- 
old prejudices. The root of the problem was the different view the teachers and the rest of the 
inhabitants had of Basque culture. The anderenos had a highly positive view of it, the
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villagers traditionally did not. In true Aranist spirit, their main concern was to be kept safe 
from 'negative foreign' influences, more than maintaining Basque culture. In the early phase 
of the cultural revival, positive national self-appraisal was still skin-deep.
The perception of their culture as a badge of inferiority is common to many minorities. In 
particular, social mobility in industrialized societies demands the mastery of a standard 
language as a vehicle of a homogeneous high culture (Gellner 1983). Hence, the retention of 
un-standardized varieties is seen as an hindrance to social mobility, as well as an emblem of 
cultural backwardness. This did not necessarily mean that the Basques themselves despised 
their culture. Quite the contrary, they often loved it, but, having continually to confront the 
impact of the dominant one, they did not have the means - political power - nor the 
knowledge - political skills - to promote Basque culture at a higher level. Centuries of 
diglossic inertia prevented them from even considering the possibility of transforming 
Euskara into a vehicle of high culture.
Eventually, the old ideology of racial superiority - which de facto downgraded Basque 
culture - waned with the spread of a neo-nationalist ideology which, in contrast, tried to 
promote Basque cultural manifestations. In 1971, a special issue of Alderdi, the 
underground newsletter of the PNV, was entitled "43 words for you, immigrant in 
Euskadi".44! Its leading article called those who "came from other lands... to assume fully 
the duties which the impending crucial situation demands from us all". The call opened with a 
"welcome to our land... this is your land, you are Basque... we [the natives] are not better or 
worse than any others". A vigorous rebuke of the centralizing dictatorship concealed a plea 
for the respect of all non-Spanish cultures. The immigrants were asked first to respect 
Basque culture and then to join the struggle for freedom. Immigrants were finally given the 
possibility of becoming Basques. The only condition was to accept the Basques and their 
desire for independence and democracy. Hence, the stress was primarily on participation in 
the struggle for freedom and collective rights. Faute de mieux, it is a call to respect at least 
Basque culture and the Basques' efforts to preserve it. Hence, the next section will analyze 
the emergence of this voluntary conception of the nation.
BASQUE COUNTRY: CONTEMPORARY PERIOD
Voluntary action and political struggle as avenues of national integration
We have mentioned that religion assumed a primary oppositional character under the
441 Alderdi, n® 270, December 1971.
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Second Republic. Things changed again in the 1960s: through the contribution of Ekin and 
then of Krutwig's Vasconia, language became the new crucible of conceiving Basqueness. 
The main novelty was precisely that the previous ascriptive requirements for membership in 
the Basque nation were replaced by a kind of voluntary association centered on personal 
involvement in the political struggle. Albeit remaining in the background as a symbol of 
Basque identity, language was continuously overshadowed by political action. An increasing 
number of immigrants were enrolled in the armed struggle, and Clark (1984: 147-9,1986a, 
1986b) gives interesting figures about non-native membership inside ETA.442 Many activists 
were sons of immigrants, sons of mixed parents or even immigrants themselves, and many 
of ETA's martyrs as well. Such was Juan Paredes Manot, who cried "Long live free 
Euskadi" in front of the firing squad, seconds before being executed. Even the most 
traditionalist Aranists were deeply impressed by this act of ultimate generosity and their 
beliefs in Basque purity were deeply shattered. Action became far more important than race 
and, generally, it was also more important than language as a marker of Basqueness. One of 
the main reasons for this choice was precisely that immigrants, as well as assimilated 
Basques, could not be mobilised through the old primordial tools of race, religion, and 
language revivalism.
This new way of conceiving Basque membership through active participation draws from a 
pre-existing autochthonous value, ekintza (action) .443 Its inner meaning is a "commitment as 
far as possible to implement in secular life what the religious belief dictated to be true" 
(Zulaika 1988: 39). In other words, the Basque defines herself/himself as a person by 
'doing' (Del Valle 1989: 127). The nationalists felt that a Basque is one who, "loving his 
nation, fights for its liberation"... Hence, "a true Basque can only be a Basque nationalist" 
(Heiberg 1979: 187). This conception was also present in Arana's stress on patriotism as a 
moral obligation. Also, a true Basque is one who actively (and politically) defends the 
symbols of Basque cohesion and differentiation (Heiberg 1979:195). Activism is especially 
a duty for the youth and every youth has a particular responsibility to be an ekintzaile
442 According to the surnam es of ETA members, 40.1% of them cam e from mixed ancestry, 
that is, either the mother or the father had a  non-Basque surnam e. Furthermore, 16.6% cam e 
from purely non-Basque ancestry, that is, both surnam es were Spanish. In the whole, 56.7% of 
the etarras  were not of purely Basque origin (Clark 1984: 147). The B asques follow the 
Iberian tradition of using both maternal and paternal surnam es.
443 Zulaika (1988: 36-56) links the revival of this concept to the influence in Euskadi of the 
pro-regim e ecclesiastical movement, Accidn Catdlica (Catholic Action). According to the 
group's representatives, the notion of militancy had to be the central vocation of any Christian 
(ibid: 40).
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(activist). The concept contains in it a sense of mission and a striving to 'convert' other 
people to act likewise (Zulaika 1989: 39). The new post-1960s Basque nationalism extended 
this sense of mission to the immigrants, where it achieved a new class-oriented meaning. The 
choice of Marxism as a central ideological tenet was directly linked to this drive at 
immigrants' mobilisation. The root of the concept of ekintza is contained in the name of the 
organization and journal Ekin, the predecessor of ETA. Ekin means 'to do' and its young 
founders conceived it as in opposition to the static, out-dated and passive attitude of the old 
peneuvista generation.
The relationship between this concept of self-fulfilling action and violence is clear. Ekintza 
is enhanced whenever the activity involves some kind of risk. Thus, "the requirement of 
underground secrecy for the more political type of ekintza was a proof of its importance. 
The high risk involved in following the dictates of one’s conscience exposed the intrinsically 
evil nature of the existing political establishment and gave a moral, almost sacred imperative 
to the ekintza" (Zulaika 1988: 44). All participants in the struggle were not simply Basque 
citizens, but also Basque nationalists and part of the corresponding 'moral community', 
irrespective of where they were bom. The 'targets' of these mobilisation tactics were both 
Spanish-speaking Basques and the immigrant population. Hence, the peculiar conditions of 
secrecy under the dictatorship, transformed each ekintza into a daring act and favoured the 
metamorphosis from simple action and militancy into violence. The choice of a voluntarist 
definition of the nation brought about the subsequent fall into a mounting spiral of violent 
actions and reactions.
Conflicting parameters of Basque identity: some data
There are different means of measuring political integration and participation. If we take 
into account voting patterns, the high percentage of votes for the pro-independence coalition 
Herri Batasuna in areas where immigrants are a majority can testify to the immigrants' 
involvement in nationalist politics.444 In Renteria, an industrial town of Gipuzkoa, only 19% 
of the population was native-born, yet the overall nationalist vote was 48.65% in 1979 (Llera 
Ramo 1985: 405, SIADECO 1981) and achieved 62.7% in the 1987 municipal elections 
(Annuario El Pais 1988, Silver 1988: 124).445 The greatest gain was recorded by radical
444 Euskadi, 'otro' pais. Los partidos nacionalistas entran en la disputa del voto inmigrante, 
"El Pafs". 19 de junio de 1986.
445 The total vote for the nationalist parties (62.77%) w as distributed as  follows: HB 
28.13%, EA 15.92 %, EE 13.05 % and PNV 5.67 %. The PSOE remained the first party with 
31.93 %. The positive result for the Left parties indicates that the choice of class-related 
politics by Basque radical nationalism started to yield results and vindicate their initial choices.
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parties: HB (from 19.97 % in 1979 to 28.11 % in 1987 and 24% in the 1989 legislative 
elections) and EE (from 12.62 % to 13.1%). 446 Before the Civil War, when immigrants 
were a small minority in Renteria, the overall nationalist vote was a mere 36.1%. Moreover, 
this was exclusively directed at the conservative PNV. In 1979, the PNV's percentage 
declined to 16.9%, while the radical parties achieved top positions. The conclusion put 
forward by Silver (1988) is that when immigrants vote for nationalist parties, they tend to 
vote for radical nationalists.
Such changes occurred on the background of a dramatic demographic shift. The population 
of Renteria increased from 3,062 inhabitants in 1877 to 45,789 in 1981. That is, it multiplied 
over fourteen fold in little more than a hundred years (Goicoechea 1991: 20). Immigration 
also caused a change in the age structure and there is a higher percentage of youth than in 
other cities (21). This is a further variable that may be taken into account in order to explain 
radical nationalism's strength. Indeed, the peculiar appeal which nationalism exerts over the 
youth has been highlighted by research in many other nationalist movements.447 Most 
immigrants were non-Basque: in 1975, 40.1% of the inhabitants of Renteria were bom 
outside Euskadi (Goicoechea 1991: 21-2). Of course, this percentage did not include their 
Basque-bom offspring, who were considered as natives, so that, if taken together, the 
immigrants and their children formed the overwhelming majority of the population. The 
average of immigrants in the comarca (36.3 %) was much greater than in Gipuzkoa as a 
whole (27.77 %) or Euskadi as a whole (30 %, including Navarre). As in most other Basque 
towns, the support for HB in Renteria has increased at every election. After a brief decrease 
to 16.59 (general election of 1982), HB support increased to 24.65 (municipal election of 
1983), 25.71 (legislative election of 1986), 25.44 (regional election of 1986), and 28.13 
(municipal election of 1988). HB has to compete with the PSOE (Socialists), the only 
relevant Spanish-based party, for the immigrants' vote.44** Since Renteria has been a special 
target for repression by the Guardia Civil, the city is a good ground for testing a correlation 
between nationalism, immigration, lack of common culture and state violence.
446 See Anuario Estadlstico Vasco 1985. Bilbao: Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jaurlaritza, 1986; 
and Anuario Estadlstico Vasco 1988. Bilbao: Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jaurlaritza, 1989. For the 
data up to 1980, see  SIADECO (1981) Anilisis Descriptivo de la Comarca Renteria Pasages. 
Donostia: Caja Laboral Popular, pp. 132-151. For a  detailed analysis of the 1977 and 1977 
elections in the four Basque provinces, see  Llera Ramo (1985).
447 s e e ,  for instance, Alter (1989: 72). Referring to the period of the rise of nationalist 
m ovements, B. Anderson s ta tes  that "both in Europe and the colonies young ' and youth ' 
signified dynamism, progress, self-sacrificing idealism and revolutionary will" (1983: 109).
448 Given its steady but slow growth, HB also appeared to be the most stable party in the 
region (Goicoechea 1988: 407).
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This propensity towards immigrant radicalization is confirmed by other more general data. 
Everybody living in the Basque Country can identify him or herself as either Basque or 
Spaniard. Thus, many immigrants identify themselves as Basques. In Linz's (1986: 40) 
sample, 8.4% of immigrants identify themselves as 'more Basque than Spaniard*. Among 
them, 36% want independence for Euskadi, compared with 24% among those natives [that 
is, with both Basque parents] who identify themselves as 'more Basque than Spaniard' (not 
all natives identified themselves as such) .449 Assuming that desire for independence is a 
reliable indicator of nationalism, we can see that nationalism is stronger among those 
immigrants who feel Basque, even stronger than among the natives in general (whether they 
feel Basques or Spaniards). When the immigrants 'feel' Basque, they are less prone to 
compromise over independence and other issues. The oppositional mechanism of nationalist 
mobilisation has resulted in the direct incorporation of many immigrants into the 'moral 
community'. The crucible for nationalist militancy is hence a shared Basque identity, rather 
than origin or race. Furthermore, paradoxically, the percentage of people opposed to 
independence is higher among 'pure Basques' than among all the other groups of immigrant 
or mixed origin.450  Linz concludes that "when immigrants are forced to choose between a 
primordial and a territorial definition, they naturally incline towards the latter"... .That is why 
"the most extreme nationalism in the Basque Country seems to be associated with a 
territorial, rather than a primordial, conception of the nation" (Linz 1985: 206).451 This 
seems to contrast with Clark's finding on the positive correlation between language 
maintenance and nationalist voting, but Clark refers mainly to the native population, rather
449 Obviously, these percentages are subject to widely divergent interpretations, since they 
touch a  politically sensitive a rea  (the desire for Basque independence). The percentages of 
those desiring independence vary greatly according to the source: for instance, a  survey 
promoted in 1983 by the PNV's magazine, Euzkadi, claimed that 74% of the interviewed 
B asques were in favour of independence, "if this was peacefully achieved". Only 21 %  opted 
against it. As to their perception of identity, 54 % assum ed that the B asques are a  people 
apart, whilst 32% claimed that the Basques do not differ from other Spaniards. Thus, the 
percentage of respondents aspiring to independence w as much higher than that of those 
perceiving the Basques (and thus themselves) as a  different people. The paradoxical conclusion 
is that nationalism -the drive to achieve a form of separate  statehood - w as more widespread 
than a  sen se  of separate identity -a belief in sharing a  different culture and origins. This bears 
a  relation to the lack of core values as  discussed in the previous chapter(s). S ee  Euzkadi, na 
94 (15 julio 1983), pp. 10-15. The sociological reliability of this survey, m ade out from a 
sam ple of only 89 interviews, is quite doubtful.
450 Rejection is obviously strongest of all among those who feel them selves to be purely 
Spaniards: 75% of these firmly reject independence, a  far higher percentage than any of the 
other groups.
451 Among the 'primordial' traits, Linz includes language, which can obviously be acquired. 
This is perhaps on the ground that the sociolinguistic nature of Euskera (its scarce  diffusion, 
low prestige and difficult learning) m akes it more 'primordial' than Catalan.
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than to the immigrants (Clark 1984,1987).
Also, among those who favour a centralized Spanish state, the definition of who is Basque 
tends to focus on birth and descent: this stress on putative origin or race is adopted by 80.3% 
of the pro-centralists. That is, the espaholistas are unable to conceive an integrative 
dimension in Basqueness. In parallel, people who define Basqueness on the basis of race or 
descent are 'only' 45.5% of those favouring independence (1985: 215). Thus, a racially 
exclusive conception of the nation is more widespread among the centralists than among the 
nationalists.
CATALONIA: CONTEMPORARY PERIOD 
Mass migration and the limits of cultural integration
The regime's propaganda deliberately falsified the causes of migratory movements: they 
were explained away in terms of the "attraction exerted on the simple peasant mentality by the 
city, with its theatres, avenues and elegant women" (Hall 1983: 74-5). Minimizing the 
seriousness of the social problems caused by its policies, the regime's cop-out was to say 
that "these are problems common to all developed countries" (cited by Hall 1983:75). As we 
have seen, the most crucial period of massive immigration occurred at a time when Catalan 
was still rigorously forbidden in all public spheres and its use was liable to prosecution. The 
immigrants did not stand a chance to learn it formally. At the same time, Catalan remained de 
facto  the habitual language among Catalans 'by birth'. Francoist prohibition therefore 
rendered impossible the immigrants' cultural integration at the very moment in which a 
massive effort in this direction was most needed. On the other hand, many scholars were 
optimistic about the immigrants' gradual assimilation into Catalan culture. For instance, 
Maluquer (1963: 62-ff.) found that in the Pyrenean industrial town of Campdev&nol all the 
immigrants' offspring spoke Catalan and behaved as Catalans. He explained this success as a 
result of the children’s parents' desire for social mobility and the prestige they associated 
with the natives as a reference group: "Their situation of socio-professional inferiority 
explains the efforts of the immigrants to be similar to the autochthons". While the natives 
labelled the immigrants as xarnegos (literally, half-breed, half-caste, or hybrid), the most 
relevant finding was that "such form of verbal discrimination was employed against the 
newcomers, not only by the Catalans, but also by older immigrants, who tried thus to elevate 
themselves by stressing a social distance" (63). This, Maluquer concluded, was a clear proof 
of successful integration into Catalan culture and society, extrapolating optimistic conclusions
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for the Catalanization of future generations: "Despite the fact that the teaching was carried out 
only in Spanish, the school children spoke Catalan among themselves and called xarnegos 
those who did not master the language yet. ...This [attitude] encourages assimilation" (63). 
By defining anyone who did not speak Catalan as xarnego, hence member of an outgroup, 
the children also testified to the central importance of language in the definition of their 
identity. These attitudes highlighted prevailing integrative trends, since the immigrants were 
no longer considered xarnegos as soon as their language proficiency was clearly established.
We have seen that these assimilatory trends have ancient roots and remount to Catalonia's 
centenary concept of terra de pas. In the recent past, this process has led to optimistic 
attitudes on the Catalan side. Thus, in 1965 the linguist Antoni M. Badia i Margarit claimed: 
"the possibility that the immigrants would escape assimilation is simply nil" (cited by 
Vallverdu 1980).452 Again, still in 1978, the anthropologist Claudi Esteva i Fabregat 
assumed that the autochthonous culture was still dominant and a new ’ethnic group' was 
emerging in the form of 'hybridization1 (mestissatge): "in Barcelona, the Castilian-speaking 
population (that is to say, the monolingual one, my addition) is losing about 17% of its 
components by the second generation" (Esteva 1978).
Catalan culture started to show signs of renewed vitality once the trauma of dictatorship 
was overcome. However, things did not go as well as many expected. Pi i Sunyer (1971: 
119) warned that "the argument that this minority within a minority can, given the right 
conditions, be assimilated with few problems smacks of wishful thinking and is not borne 
out by similar historical cases". According to Hall (1983: 74), since reliable data on 
immigration was still scarcely available in the 1970s, the gravity of the situation was hidden 
to many Catalans. An article published in 1979 in the journal Els Marges (Argente et al. 
1979) expressed a strong preoccupation that, without drastic measures on its behalf, the 
language was condemned to extinction in the space of a few generations.4 5 3  The article 
struck a chord, achieving a certain resonance also beyond academia. It indicated that the main 
threat to the fate of the language was the unprecedentedly large number of immigrants who 
barely had any occasion to interact in Catalan. The number of monolingual Castilian-speakers 
was the highest ever recorded in Catalan history. In such circumstances, actual daily use of
452 He also asserted  that, "by the mere act of living in Catalonia, the immigrants have 
placed them selves along/ on the road which sooner or later will lead to their Catalanisation” 
(Badia i Margarit 1964: 109).
453 Similarly, Woolard argues that "politically motivated claim s that there is only one 
community in Catalonia do not reflect current reality and the divisive potential of ethnic 
identity... has not yet been overcome” (1986a: 57).
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Catalan was unlikely, even for people who did master the language.
However, assimilation was not the issue. On the contrary, the issue was the diffusion of 
bilingualism, which does not imply the loss of the immigrants' culture.454 Indeed, the very 
term Castilian-speakers normally refers to the monolingual population (i.e, unable to speak 
Catalan), whilst Catalan-speakers are always bilingual (and normally use Catalan).4551 use 
the concept of two groups, Catalan- and Castilian-speakers, only for heuristic purposes. This 
will prevent us from reifying the two communities in sharp terms, since there are both 
Catalanized immigrants (or immigrants who are undergoing a process of Catalanization), and 
Castilianized natives (even though they are a minority and mainly among higher echelons). 
Linguistic competences form a continuum shading from pure monolingualism to 'perfect' 
bilingualism, or the preferred use of Catalan as daily language.
To a lesser extent, the same notion of a continuum can be applied to the Basque case, 
where most of the literature emphasizes a chasm between autochthonous inhabitants and 
immigrants. In Euskadi we also find a continuum of identities and behavioural patterns, 
rather than a sharp opposition between two groups, although cultural integration is less 
likely. Several studies tend to reify the immigrants as a tightly bound and easily identifiable 
community, over-emphasizing the fracture between them and the host society. This may 
occur both in nationalist and more balanced analysis 456 
Moreover, as the big wave of immigration ended in the late 1970s, the very term 
immigrant can no longer imply territorial displacement from one region to another.457 The 
largest part of those who migrated in the last twenty years are well-established and intend to 
remain in the 'host' country. This is especially true for the second generations who have 
virtually no desire to return to their parents' land (Sol6  1981: 18-24 and 344-53). Certainly, 
many immigrants mythologise their land of origin surrounding it with a halo of nostalgia. But 
the myth falls apart as soon as they have a chance to return to their pueblos. Here, often
454 \/Ve can find a  plethora of nationalist literature on bilingualism, its limits and dangers. 
The argument against bilingualism (and in favour of Catalan monolingualism) is backed by 
extensive sociolinguistic studies (see, for instance, Aracil 1982, S abater 1984: 37-8).
455 In a  classic case  of language loyalty, Catalans tend to use their code daily in most in­
group interactions. Language erosion only occurs among very limited secto rs of the native 
population. In fact, most children with two Catalan parents have daily occasion to use Catalan 
within the family (Strubell 1981: 151-ff). However, the natives' com petence in Catalan is 
often far superior to their com petence in Castilian.
456 Some studies of Basque society (Escudero 1978, Heiberg 1989) speak  plainly of 'two 
communities'. For the case  of Catalonia, see, for example, Pi i Sunyer (1983) and Di Giacomo 
(1985).
457  Pascual and CardelOs (1987: 332) note that the fact of being born outside Catalonia 
does not justify the definition of a  person as an 'immigrant', since he or sh e  could have been 
residing in Catalonia for at least 20 years.
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unrecognized as members of their own kin by the local population, they are called, ironically, 
los catalanes (the Catalans) (Sold 1986,1987). After such disappointing experiences, they 
frequently feel the impossibility of being re-integrated in their former 'homeland'. The 
ensuing identity conflict sometimes results in a desire to acquire a stronger Catalan identity. 
As older immigrants find it difficult to make this step, they are nonetheless anxious that their 
offspring be fully integrated into Catalan society and culture. This desire is shown by several 
surveys mentioned in the next section, which show a clear wish for future generations to 
have full access to Catalan.
The spread of Catalan
We have seen in the previous chapter, that the percentage of those who are able to 
understand Catalan has grown spectacularly from 79.8% in 1981 to 90.3% in 1986; that is to 
say, in only five years it has increased by over 10% (data from the municipal census of April 
1986). In the Basque Country the increase has been only 3% in the same period, nevertheless 
it is an increase.458 Different explanations are available to explain the diffusion of Catalan 
among immigrants. For instance, 'relative deprivation theory' suggests that since the 
autochthonous group is economically better placed, it constitutes a "reference group" for 
many immigrants, representing a pattern of behaviour which many migrants aspire to 
emulate. The language of the reference group is part of the apprehended items that people 
wishing to become its members may try to adopt. In sociolinguistics, the phenomenon is 
known as linguistic prestige (Weinreich 1956) or status (Ryan 1979). Thus, language "is 
generally inseparable from the prestige of those who speak it" (Woolard 1989: 93). Many 
authors tend to see class and ethnicity in Catalonia as overlapping, in that Catalans are 
concentrated in the middle- or upper-classes, while immigrants allegedly represent the 
working class (Woolard 1989, Di Giacomo 1985).459 Indeed, most immigrants initially fell 
into semiskilled and unskilled labour pools (Pinilla de las Heras 1973:105). However, this is 
only a rough generalization and we cannot speak of class as coterminous with ethnicity, 
particularly in more recent years. In fact, some Catalans are likely to be found at the bottom 
of the social ladder too. On the other side, there are immigrants who have succeeded in
458 However, actual linguistic u ses are much more resilient to change. Furthermore, they 
are  difficult to a s s e s s  statistically: ce n su s ' forms only contained item s on language 
proficiency, not language use.
459 Di Giacomo argues that "the confluence of social class and ethnicity is painfully obvious" 
(1986: 73).
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reaching the highest ranks of class stratification, thanks to a relatively diffuse social 
mobility.460
Numerous sociolinguistic studies have confirmed the immigrants' highly positive attitudes 
towards Catalan language and culture.461 A large part of the data refers to the respondents' 
opinions about the introduction of Catalan in the school curricula. The proliferation of such 
surveys is in itself a signal that the Catalanists were very concerned about the possible impact 
of forthcoming linguistic normalization on immigrants' attitudes. The investigations preceded 
or followed swiftly the recent changes in the local education system. A survey by Badia i 
Margarit (1969) was the first one to unveil a heartfelt desire to learn Catalan among the 
general population. The first serious quantitative work made by FOESSA (1970) came to 
more reliable conclusions: in a sample of housewives, 97% of the interviewees favoured the 
introduction of Catalan into the school system (33% of the respondent women were 
immigrants themselves, while 50% had at least one parent bom outside Catalonia). Other 
surveys were specifically concerned with the attitudes of the overall immigrant population. In 
the prevalently rural comarca of Osona, 94% of the respondents, all bom outside Catalonia 
and in Castilian-speaking areas, expressed the wish that their offspring learn Catalan 
(Reixach 1975). In the satellite city of Cornell^ de Llobregat, which had -and has- the highest 
percentage of monolingual Castilian speakers in all Catalonia (CIDC 1987), 97% of the 
parents were favorable to increasing the teaching of Catalan (cited by Torres 1980). 
According to another study, 90% of an interviewed sample of both native Catalans and 
immigrants expressed a preference that the teaching of Catalan be extended to the overall 
territory, while about 80% held as necessary the introduction of Catalan as a compulsory 
subject in all school curricula (Bibiloni and Junyent, cited by Torres 1980). Paradoxically, 
the zone which showed the strongest support for the teaching of (and in) Catalan were the 
suburbs of Barcelona, that is to say, the place of maximum immigration and of minimum 
knowledge of the language (Torres 1980: 53). This evidence has been backed by more recent 
data on the pressing request for 'immersion schools' in the metropolitan periphery on the part 
of immigrant fathers on behalf of their children (Conversi 1987).462 The fact that almost all 
the immigrants expressed a desire to learn Catalan is a measure of its perceived utility. In
460 On social mobility among the immigrants in the 1960s and the first 1970s, see  the 
classical sociological investigation by Pinilla de las H eras (1973). S ee  also Miguelez (1987), 
Miguelez and Sold (1987) and Pascual and Cardelus (1990).
461 For an exhaustive review of these studies, see  Torres (1980, 1988).
462  For an overview of changes in the Catalan education system  in the early 1980s, see  
Conversi (1987 b). For the implementation of 'immersion' c lasses  adapted to Catalonia on the 
Canadian model, se e  Arenas (1986).
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fact, this desire seems to be stronger in those areas which are less knowledgeable of Catalan 
and, therefore, have a greater need to acquire basic rudiments of the language. However, this 
pragmatic demand does not guarantee an increasing use of Catalan, nor does it necessarily 
reflect a positive attitude towards the language.
Some authors indicate a further factor of integration in the solidarity between the immigrant 
workers and, generally, the Catalans experienced during Francoism, a solidarity found in the 
wake of the common experience of oppression by the centralist state.463 With its double 
crusade against 'separatists' and 'reds' alike, Falangist rhetoric reinforced such situational 
alliance. After years of unceasing propaganda against the rojoseparatistas, even ordinary 
people came to perceive some sort of identity among the two dimensions. The experience of 
the Spanish Republic was still fresh in popular memory, when the Catalan nationalists and 
the Left were allied against the centralist right However, probably the most important factor 
of integration was that the working class leaders were themselves raised in Catalanist 
milieux, or directly involved in Catalanist politics. Due to the common struggle for 
democracy and against a common foe, a solidarity bond was created amongst leftist and 
nationalist leaders. This brings to the fore once more the role of the political intelligentsia as 
the moulder of a new social identity. Sometime, nationalist, communist or socialist leaders 
were members of the same families.
In this section we have demonstrated that the immigrants perceived a strong need to be 
integrated and that learning Catalan facilitated this process. In the next section, we shall 
explore the dynamics of Catalan identity.
Catalan identity: a dynamic process.
The concept of identity is among the most elusive and difficult to define both in general 
terms and in terms of any specific identity associated with a given ethnic group. In the 
theoretical chapter, we stressed Barth's (1969) view that the creation of a group’s identity 
derives from the group's interactive activity with other groups. Barth also noticed that the 
intensity with which group members stress their ethnicity increases when there is intense 
spatial-geographical contact between groups. The most isolated ethnic groups are probably 
the least self-defined in ethnic terms. Thus, it is more likely that the Catalans and the Basques 
who underwent massive immigration and overall acculturation, would become more
463  This may seem  part of nationalist or leftist mythology, but similar exam ples are given 
by num erous authors. On immigrant-Catalan solidarity during later Francoism , s e e  Candel 
(1964, 1985).
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consciously 'national' than their Galician counterparts, inasmuch as the Galicians did not 
experience anything like the same amount of cultural interference. Immigration is particularly 
important in this respect, because, thanks to the massive arrival of people belonging to a 
different culture, the average person becomes conscious of cultural differences on a daily 
basis. As the immigrants' all-pervasive presence can no longer be ignored, cultural conflict 
becomes part of every person's everyday life. In particular, wherever immigration occurs on 
a great scale, it is inevitably perceived as a form of aggression. Traditional ethnic borders are 
attacked daily and plunged into deep crisis. These borders might either be utterly reinforced 
by this crisis, as in the early Basque case, or prone to be more pliable, adapting to new 
trends, as in the Catalan case. The natives adopt different strategies in order to defend their 
identity. In both cases, national identity is a concentric process, but the hierarchy of values is 
clearer in Catalonia.
The Catalan leaders' attempt to define a specific sense of Catalan identity have tended to 
underline territoriality and residentiality ("A Catalan is whoever lives and works in 
Catalonia").464 On a second and more inward level, there is the linguistic aspect ("A Catalan 
is he/she who speaks Catalan"), which is not automatic, but can be acquired. With the stress 
on either residentiality or language, ascriptive and hereditary criteria of national membership 
have been cast aside ("A Catalan person is a child or descendant of Catalans"). Hence, 
present-day definitions of who is a Catalan include individuals coming from other regions, 
provided they remain resident in the Catalan Countries. Furthermore, this is also part of the 
immigrants’ self-conception, insofar as 'second-generation immigrants' (that is, the 
immigrants' children who were bom in Catalonia) usually define themselves as Catalans, 
independently of their knowledge or use of the Catalan language (S0 I6  1981,1982). On the 
part of the nationalist leaders, this integrative definition is certainly linked to political -not 
merely electoral- goals of nation-building. However the factor 'residence' is often played 
down in everyday life, until it becomes almost epiphenomenal. In the previous chapter, we 
have seen how language gradually emerged as the core value of the Catalan nation. In this 
chapter we have also seen that many immigrants themselves see in it a crucible of 
Catalanness. The fact that language tends to be accepted as such by many immigrants as well 
is a measure of its integrative strength.
464 For instance, the historical works of the fathers of Catalanism: Antoni Rovira i Virgili, 
Francesc Pi i Margall, Enric Prat de la Riba, Vincent Almirall, etc. Among the works which are 
specifically dedicated to immigration, those of the now president of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol 
(1966), lay the foundation for a  non ascriptive definition of Catalan identity.
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Hence, we are faced with a series of concentric circles and progressively integrating 
concepts, as with an onion's layers. First, there stands a civic territorial definition of 
nationhood based on the jus soli. This definition is prevailing at least in political rhetoric. 
Then, there comes a deserved and acquirable membership in the nation through voluntary 
efforts, symbolized by the mastering of the language. The idea of 'nation of will' has to be 
actively demonstrated through a 'will of the nation', a longing to be part of the nation. Here, 
we can find some parallel in the French concept of citizenship: "Etre Frangais, cela se 
m&rtte" cried the French assimilationists. "To be a Catalan cannot be bought or sold, it can 
only be gained. And [the immigrants] will not be Catalans until they speak like us, until they 
make our needs [and feelings] their own..., until they feel hurt in seeing all things Catalan 
despised" (Cruells 1965: 32). Finally, perhaps limited to rural strongholds, stands a 
declining stress on origin and descent, usually to be proved by a person’s double Catalan 
surname. This definition is occasionally used amongst the assimilated Catalan diaspora as a 
tool to rediscover a Catalanity which has been lost in its cultural aspects. However, its 
application has never implied an extreme stress on race, as in the Basque case.
The three above mentioned concepts of Catalan identity are often situational. A proof that 
language is considered more important than residence at a more intimate and popular level is 
well addressed by Woolard (1986: 58). She mentions that "many leaders object vigorously to 
any reference to 'two communities' within Catalonia, but their broad-based definition of 
Catalans is rarely if ever employed by individuals to talk about themselves. Even those who 
are in sympathy with the Catalan leaders' political goals find it difficult to avoid the basic 
Catalan-immigrant dichotomy that the political definition attempts to abolish. In any extended 
or serious discussion, the dichotomy inevitably surfaces" (Woolard 1986: 58). The basis of 
this dichotomy is language, and the migrant can become fully Catalan only by mastering the 
language and acquiring the corresponding mentality and world-vision associated with i t
Language is hence the hallmark of integration, but not its only avenue. Immigrants often 
find an easier way into Catalan identity by participating in folksy events of popular culture, 
such as popular dances, colles de castellers (human towers), Orfeon choirs, trekking 
excursions, etc. In the crucial years of resistance and transition, these activities provided a 
relatively painless means of integration, where not much personal reputation or sacrifice was 
at stake. "They were readily available and, unlike language, risked little loss of face" 
(Johnston 1991: 120). A particular symbolic element of integration has been provided by the 
Catalan national dance, the sardana. This dance was created during the Renaixenga by the
NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION 228
Andalusian immigrant Pep Ventura (1817-1875) on the basis of a folk tradition which dates 
back at least to the 16th century. It was ’launched' in 1859 at the Liceu theatre and, since 
then, it acquired increasing popularity (Rebull 1976, Barrera 1985: 300-8, Brandes 1990). A 
typically invented tradition, the sardana can be seen as a symbol of the inclusive nature of 
Catalan culture: "By stressing the inclusion of everyone who learns the rules, the dance is a 
microcosmic reflection of the general Catalan belief in ethnicity as an achieved status. 
However, the sardana also excludes those who neither know nor follow the detailed rules of 
the dance" (Brandes 1990).
Children's entertainments and shows were also aimed at the immigrants' offspring. As an 
example, in several Barcelona's suburbs the Roda d'Espectacles Infantils (Children Shows 
Group) organised shows based on the study of Catalan traditions and the revival of lost 
celebrations. The Roda was founded in 1977 by the initiative of neighbourhood associations 
and recreation groups, at a time when it was still imperative to revive customs and traditions 
which had been suffocated by years of clandestine existence.465
Comparative trends
Several factors can be singled out as determining the more or less successful extent of the 
immigrants' cultural integration in Catalonia and Euskadi:
1. The region of origin is an important factor in the capacity or will to acquire the regional 
culture. According to a survey conducted in the Catalan town of Matard, the most adaptable 
of the immigrants came from Andalusia and Catalonia's nearby regions; the more refractory 
came from the Castilian centre (Duocastella, cited by Maluquer 1963: 59) .4 6 6  In Euskadi, 
Castilian immigrants outnumber those from all other regions and are known to be more 
resistant to assimilation (Blanco 1990).
2. The structural quality of the two languages is even more crucial. The facility of learning 
Catalan cannot be matched by the difficulty of learning Basque, which is completely 
unrelated to Castilian.
3. The prestige associated with language is also determinant. Catalan enjoys a high 
prestige, not only in cultural terms, but also because it is associated with a dynamic 
entrepreneurial part of society. No such prestige has hitherto been accorded to Basque.
4. Its worth in the labour market may make the language a valuable means of economic
465 Lluisa Celades: la integracid dels fills dels immigrats mitjangant la cultura, Avui. 4
June 1986.
466 j h e  survey simply asked the interviewees if they understood Catalan.
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integration. What we defined as 'instrumental' motivations for language learning are nearly 
all-pervasive in an environment where Catalan is used in virtually every sector of the 
economy. In contrast, notable attempts to introduce Euskara in the public administration have 
not been matched by equally successful efforts to introduce it into the private sector. As a 
consequence, in the Basque Country economic integration can bypass cultural integration.
5. The reception of the local population to the immigrants' efforts to assimilate is also 
crucial. In contrast with Catalonia, the initial Basque isolationist attitudes implied that the 
locals were not particularly interested in promoting the knowledge of their language. This 
may have influenced the respective success of the two countries' integrative efforts.
6. The nationalist leaders' different interpretations of national identity may finally have 
influenced both the attitudes of the natives towards the immigrants and the immigrants' 
confidence of being accepted into the host society, so that their efforts of assimilation will be 
rewarded. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, we are faced with two original concepts of 
nationhood and potential citizenship. Perhaps this distinction runs parallel to the one between 
the German and French concepts of citizenship, the former based on the ius sanguinis, the 
latter on the ius soli (Brubaker 1992).
Probably other factors can be added to the above. For instance, before venturing into 
learning a new language, an immigrant may ponder what its intrinsic worth is, what has this 
language to offer per se. Again, Catalan was greatly advantaged by its rich and ancient 
literature.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have seen that immigration not only plays a central role in the formation 
and evolution of nationalism, but also that immigrants can be active participants in the 
nationalist movement. This will most likely occur if the latter promote a new inclusive vision 
of national identity, which is non-ascriptive and not based on putative descent. But in order 
to do so, the nationalist movement has to concentrate on inclusive myths, symbols and core 
values which are not always available. Yet, the construction of an oppositional ideology can 
achieve the same effects, bypassing the cultural dimension. The Basque case has shown that 
some immigrants are likely to participate in nationalist politics in the presence of high 
polarization between the nationalist movement and the state, when the latter lacks widely 
accepted legitimacy. As we stressed throughout this thesis, Catalan identity was originally 
conceived as integrative, while Basque identity had an exclusivist bent. In Catalonia, only
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marginal intellectuals (never the intelligentsia) adopted racist or segregationist approaches. 
Such trends, whenever they emerged, were quickly superseded by the nationalist leaders' 
integrative stance. Barcelona has been a point of destination for immigrants for over a century 
(Joffe 1978). However, the steadiest migratory wave in modem Catalan history occurred in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, coinciding with the final phase of Franco's dictatorship. In a few 
years, nearly a million immigrants, most of them from Andalusia, settled in the new 
insalubrious peripheries of Barcelona's "industrial belt" and in other cities, such as 
Tarragona.467
Contrary to Catalonia, the Basque provinces had never experienced massive population 
income prior to the industrial revolution. Hence, the Basques had correspondingly little 
preparation and faith in integration. We have mentioned the special fueros which did not 
allow non-Basques to reside in the country. According to Arana, the immigrants were 
maketos from despised Maketania (=Spain, or the rest of Iberia), that is, fifth columns of 
the hated Spanish foe. For many Catalanists, the immigrants were instead uneducated people 
who needed human care and full integration into the more European and modem Catalan 
'civilization'. Catalonia turned this sense of confidence into a pillar upon which its successful 
drive to turn the immigrants into 'new Catalans' rested. Arana himself recognized this when 
he opposed his solipsist philosophy to the Catalan aims (see chapter 7).
From Arana's virulent statements, one is tempted to infer that ethnic conflict between 
immigrants and natives would be much more acute in the Basque case. But it is not exactly 
so. On the contrary, Catalonia has a tormented history of strife between natives and 
immigrants. This tension reached its peak in 1909 with the anti-Catalan populist revolt of 
Alejandro Lerroux. It is important to consider that such anti-Catalan feelings barely depended 
on the language gap. Periods of great expansion of the Catalan language at the official level 
were not characterized by particular inter-ethnic strife. The main cause of these strifes 
consisted in the identification of Catalanism as a pure bourgeoise product. An often inflexible 
Catalan bourgeoisie was unable to meet the workers’ demands. In contrast, Arana's anti­
capitalist emphasis and his stress on social Christianity made him less a target of class hatred 
than people like Camb6 or even Prat. In a period of rabid social conflicts all over Europe, the
467 Desarrotlismo (= fast and savage industrial and urban development) is the nick-name 
for the last economic ph ase  of Francoism, when the regime devoted itself to unbridled 
technocratic developm ent a s  a  pan acea  for the centuries-old econom ic gap  betw een the 
peninsula's North and the South. The government tried to find a  "remedy” for this economic 
imbalance by encouraging 'internal' migration.
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fact that Arana appeared as a racist mattered less than his visceral anti-capitalist sermons. 
Moreover, Lerroux's mobs saw the Catalanists as representatives of a surreptitious hidden 
power, the power of economy and industry, which had few equivalents in Basque 
nationalism. In the latter case, the bourgeois sector of Sota was always contrasted by more 
radical separatists, who were prone to join common cause with the working class.468
Only after World War II was race banished altogether from the nationalist vocabulary. In 
the aftermath of the Nazi concentration camps, appeals to race became universally discredited 
and Basque nationalists had to face a most serious challenge in the search for a new core 
value to adopt in its place. Both countries experienced suburban segregation from the late 
1950s. Both nationalist movements, as they developed in the 1960s, resisted these trends. 
However, although the aim became the same (the immigrants' incorporation), the tactics were 
different. Catalan nationalism tried to attract the newcomers through the mobilisation of 
cultural symbols, presenting the language as the final prize of a successful incorporation. 
Postwar Basque nationalism tried instead to penetrate immigrants milieux by voicing their 
class concern through direct mobilisation of workers and the creation of a new solidarity. The 
national struggle with its final achievement of independence for Euskadi, rather than culture, 
was presented as the final prize of a successful incorporation.
In Catalonia, attempts at stigmatising and segregating the immigrants have been pushed 
aside by several factors: Firstly, the natives' traditional predisposition to redefine their "ethnic 
borders" in flexible terms helped to limit ideological segregationism. This implies a 
remarkable capacity to absorb external cultural elements. Secondly, as working class’ leaders 
and nationalists formed a common front of resistance against Francoism, Catalanism was 
assumed by relevant fringes of the immigrant proletariat. Thirdly, Catalonia's economic 
vitality made its original inhabitants into a reference group for the newcomers. Fourthly, the 
Generalitat more recently took over the main instruments of secondary socialization, 
particularly education.469 Since Catalonia has been granted autonomy, Catalan has knocked 
down most of the remaining resistance to be accepted as a vehicle of high culture.470
468  S ee, for instance, G allastegi's (1993) identification with the exploited workers in 
chapter 3.
469 The role of television has been of even greater importance in fostering the spread of 
Catalan a s  a  language of 'high' culture. Since football is the m ost popular sport among 
immigrants and natives alike, the broadcast in Catalan of national and international m atches and 
other sport events has been central for its diffusion.
470 Should this integrative trend still persist, Catalonia could constitute a  model for those 
who fear immigratory waves from the Third World a s  a  threat to European cultural "integrity”. 
A slow process of natural integration has occurred in Catalonia in the tim e-span of a  few 
generations, without any of the official m eans which a  bureaucratic sta te  apparatus normally 
has at its disposal: without schools, without m ass-m edia, and even without the official
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Apart from some general similarities, the two regions face different immigration patterns. 
They have different timing and forms of adaptation for the immigrants. Furthermore, we 
have seen that their nationalist movements have tackled the issue of immigration in opposite 
ways.
presence of the language in any public domain.
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Chapter 9
THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE
In the previous two chapters, we have shown how two national patterns of nationalist 
mobilisation developed through the focus on different core symbols and values and how far 
the latter achieved an integrating effect. Our main hypothesis was that the stress on different 
values influenced the formation of different patterns of mobilisation, integration, and identity, 
and that nationalist elites are limited in their choice by existing cultural conditions. Our 
historical overview showed that in the 1960s-80s Basque nationalism's preference for 
violence contrasted with Catalanism's traditional pacifism, although Catalan society was itself 
ridden by violent conflict. In this final chapter, we are going to advance a second set of 
hypotheses: that cultural assimilation and fragmentation created the condition for the 
emergence of a violent form of nationalism. However, this violent potential needed a further 
condition, in order to materialize, namely, state repression. The focus of this chapter will be 
essentially the Basque Country. I am arguing that the two most relevant factors for explaining 
Basque violence are respectively anthropological and political: a lack of shared core values, 
and the repressive action on the part of the state's military forces. These two factors are 
connected with all other sub-factors.
But, before considering our main argument, we have to dispel some myths about the 
violent character of Basque society. Hence, we shall investigate whether violence was 
something peculiar to Basque nationalism in comparison with Catalanism.
Violence: not endemic to Basque society
It is sometimes claimed that Basque society is inherently violent, but this can be shown to 
be false. In this respect, the comparison with Catalonia does not hold. There have been times 
when Catalonia was one of the most violent societies on the continent. In the fifteenth
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century, Catalan society was permanently wracked by civil war. In 1511, the Italian political 
writer Francesco Guicciardini (1993: 19-22) described Catalonia as a land infested with 
bandits and ruled by the anarchy of violence. In 1603, a viceroy report claimed that "the 
majority of the population live in a state of fretfulness, belonging to bands and factions, 
which give rise to infinite excesses" (quoted by Regld 1956: 124). In the 1830s, "Barcelona 
led all other European cities in urban rioting and intermittent wholesale insurrections against 
central authority" (Payne 1975: 50). Frederic Engels described it as "the city whose history 
records more struggles on the barricades than that of any other city in the world" (cited by 
Payne 1975: 50). Anarchist murders, urban rioting and burning of monasteries became 
commonplace in the 1910s. Barcelona has been described as "the most violent city of Europe 
during the early part of this century" (Hooper 1986: 234). Again, during the 1920s, 
Barcelona "ranked first among Spanish cities in terms of absolute numbers of labour-related 
shootings, and second after Bilbao in terms of labour-related shootings as percentage of the 
total population" (Meaker 1974: 429-30). Finally, in the 1930s extremist factions began an 
escalation which led to the Spanish Civil War.471 Pre-Civil War Euskadi was in contrast 
characterized by other kinds of phenomena, not specifically politically-oriented 472 This is in 
sharp contrast with the present-day, when Catalonia's relative civil peace strikes the 
observer, as much as does Basque radicalism.
What I argue in this section does not invalidate the basic argument of my thesis. Although 
before the Civil War Catalan urban society was more violent and fragmented than Basque 
society, this was basically true of Left-wing organisations, rather than the nationalists, who 
stuck to a clear definition of Catalan identity since at least Prat's compilation (1906).473 
Certainly, the PNV remained for long the only significant force in Basque nationalism, in 
contrast with Catalonia's plural scenario. But Catalanism carried more weight in Republican 
Madrid, and was more coordinated in terms of its goals, identity and organizations. Rather, 
the fact that the cluster of Left-wing political ideologies stemming from Anarchism to 
Socialism and Republicanism were themselves divided and heteronomous may be a good
47  ^  This heritage of violence has inspired som e Catalan authors to identify an underlying 
vein of Catalan character: the term rauxa, or passionate extremism, has been  used, among 
others, by Vicens Vives (1984: 190-ff) to describe this intermittent featu re of Catalan 
personality. Vives opposed the rauxa to the seny (common sense, wisdom, consideration).
472  For instance, Christians (1987) describes the amazing upsurge of phenom ena of Holy 
visions, religious trances and other mystic happenings in the early 1930s. Approximately in 
the sam e period, the first half of the 20th century, this phenom enon characterized a  much 
broader area, stretching from Southern France (Lourdes) to Portugal (Fatima).
473  The Catalanist ERC was a  coalition of several groups which nevertheless shared a 
common vision of Catalan identity.
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indication of how ideological (and cultural) fragmentation is conducive to violence in non­
nationalist conflicts as well.
Also important is which [and how] memories of the Civil War were selected, rather than 
the immediate impact of the Civil War per se. But why did the memories of the Civil War 
have such an unparalleled impact on Basque nationalists? Was not the Civil War equally 
associated with national oppression in Catalonia? Unlike in Catalonia, the Civil War in the 
Basque Country was experienced as a nationalist war. The nationalists had their own army, 
the gudariak (=Basque soldiers), who fought for the Republic and whose memories created 
a nationalist myth of armed resistance. In Catalonia, the war was experienced as a fissiparous 
and self-destructive conflict between opposite extremisms. Today, the Civil War is not 
celebrated by Catalan nationalists as part of their heritage.474
The first ETA activists considered themselves gudariak. For the Basque youth, the myth 
of the gudari remained alive, spread by a popular literature on war events. This is not the 
case for Catalonia, where the nationalist troops were just a few. One reason for this lack of 
prominence of Catalan nationalism during the Civil War was that, in contrast with the PNV, 
the main Catalan nationalist party, ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalonia), was a recently 
established coalition without a tested structure, historical experience or definite cadres. Bom 
as a federation of about a hundred nationalist centres, ERC represented an electoral venture 
more than a fully-fledged party such as the PNV, which was bom over 50 years before. 
Moreover, a vast sector of the moderate right was marginalized by the war and was unable to 
take sides with either the Francoists or the Republicans.
Religious persecution was a key factor in this complex development. We have mentioned 
the 'tradition' of church-burning and priest-bashing which developed in Catalonia. This did 
not occur in Euskadi, where religious persecution was limited to a few episodes at the 
beginning of the war. Once the PNV imposed itself as the key resistance force, such cases 
ceased to enbitter the pro-clericalists, at least in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In contrast, anti­
clerical persecution in Catalonia was so ruthless that many Catalanists had to move to the 
Francoist field fate de mieux.
But was repression in the Basque Country different, or more ferocious, than in Catalonia? 
There is no clear-cut answer. Firstly, while in Catalonia cultural repression helped to 
accentuate an awareness of the importance of language, in the Basque case the attacks were 
not so clearly targeted. Secondly, after 1959, Francoist repression became more widespread
474  I am grateful to Jo sep  Benet for pointing out the very different impact that the Civil
War had on Catalan and Basque nationalisms.
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in Euskadi, so that on some occasions the target seemed to be the entire Basque population. 
This stemmed from the same factor central to my thesis, namely the two regions' different 
degrees of cultural fragmentation and assimilation into the Spanish state: language became the 
main target of repression in Catalonia precisely because it was the symbol of Catalan unity. 
Since no such clear element was identifiable in the Basque resistance, repression was blind 
and unable to distinguish nuances. According to Sullivan (1988: 34), "there was never any 
serious attempt to prohibit the use of spoken Basque"475 and all aspects of Basque identity 
were instead suppressed. Certainly, Euskera was particularly under attack, at least up to 
1968.476 However, repression in Euskadi had a physical side that Catalonia only experienced 
in the early phalangist phase, characterized by arbitrary imprisonment, police attacks on 
unarmed citizens, torture, etc.477 Since the 1950s, repression in the Basque Country 
"achieved a much higher intensity then in the rest of the state. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that, out of a total of eleven states of emergency decreed by Franco between 1956 and 
1975, ten of them affected Vizcaya, Gipuzkoa, or both of them at the same time" (Jauregui 
1981: 208, my italics). It may still be argued that most of these states of emergency 
concerned strikes and other forms of workers’ mobilization, yet this polarized environment 
was ideal for ETA to prosper. "The most distinctive feature [in Euskadi]... was the intense 
physical repression of all resistance..., particularly since 1960" (Jauregui 1981: 205).
This role played by the state had an immediate impact on the ways of political mobilization. 
The states of emergency reinforced the feeling of besieged identity hovering over Basque 
society and were reflected in ETA's priorities. One of its leaders admitted that "ETA has 
never been defined by an ideology (in the strict sense), but by its spirit of struggle".478 As 
continuous schisms created more fragmentation, they were followed by new upsurges of 
activities directed to shift the conflict away from within the organization, and against the 
common enemy. From a certain point onwards, action totally replaced ideology. The 
ideological and cultural vacuum was filled by direct action, the latter being the only means by 
which the movement could be given a direction, a sense of change and purpose. Only in this
475  However, Sullivan's extreme interpretation is rejected by many B asques who blame on 
the Francoist regime a  big share of responsibility for the decline of Euskara.
476 For instance, the use of Basque nam es at baptisms or on gravestones remained forbidden 
until 1976 (Sullivan 1988: 34) together with a  persisting general ban on all forms of written 
Euskera.
477 On this, s e e  the various reports published by Amnesty International, especially from 
1968 to 1975.
478  Juan  Jo s6 Echave, in Garaia, n9 28, 1979, p. 29.
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way, could ETA demonstrate that they were still alive and reacting to their predicament The 
choice of action was in-built into the very foundation of ETA: "When a situation appears 
desperate, with no exit, action always precedes hope", their leaders declared in the 1950s 
(Documentos T, vol. 1, p. 10).
In Catalonia, cultural activities offered a way out "They presented an escape valve, as well 
as more opportunities for action. Cultural activism gave young people wishing to act 
something worth struggling for. In Catalonia, the defence of language could be carried out by 
everybody, independently of their political orientation. There was unanimity around the need 
to defend Catalan" (Benet, personal interview). For instance, the official magazine of the 
Communist Party, Treball (f. 1936, n.s. 1942), was published in Catalan, although most 
working-class immigrants spoke Castilian only. Nothing on a similar scale could be achieved 
in Euskadi.
The separatist dimension
It is often observed that the violent character assumed in the 1960s by Basque nationalism 
was related to its original separatist aim. However, the latter was also a compensative 
device for the lack of shared cultural values, and, in particular, for the Basques’ severely 
restrained relationship with Madrid. In other words, separatism served to stress Basque 
determination vis-d-vis a state dominated by liberal centralism and unable to take into 
account peripheral aspirations. It also served to enhance the us-them divide as a counter- 
strategy for the absence of clearly defined cultural borders. With his moralistic, purist and 
anti-immigrant crusade, Arana aimed at rejecting Spain and all Spanish elements, before 
establishing a serious programme of nation-building. His invention of nationalist symbols 
was aimed at cementing a new oppositional loyalty, but his own definition of Basqueness 
was contradictory. His deep-seated hatred against Spain featured often more prominently 
than his love for the Basques. Hence, his confusion over a definition of Basqueness: he was 
good at rejecting, not constructing. Although he created the key symbols of Basque modem 
identity (flag, name, hymn, etc.), he was much more ambivalent in respect to Basque 
identity. Arana's oppositional dichotomies served to push Spain farther apart from Euskadi. 
That was part of a border-making enterprise in which differences were exasperated, as ethnic 
identities seemed to melt and overlap in his native Bilbao. Therefore, any contact with Spain 
was to be abolished and anybody indulging in that would be branded as espanolista. Arana's 
main qualm was that Bizkaia (and Euskadi) could be downgraded to the lower status of a
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Spanish region or province. Arana stressed continuously that Euskadi was a nation, not a 
region. Hence, his vitriolic attacks against Catalanism: Euskadi was not to follow the Catalan 
path to an integrationist regionalism at any cost. The idea that Basque autonomy could be 
better protected by controlling the reins of Madrid's government was a Carlist one, and the 
Carlist wars had resulted in a devastating defeat for the Basques. The latter "decimated the 
countryside, encumbered the population with huge debts in the form of war retributions, and 
left a standing army of occupation" (Douglass and Silva 1971: 155-6). The defeat led to a 
climate of intimidation against the native culture, best expressed in the attacks of Unamuno 
and other pro-centralist intellectuals.
Stress on separation from Spain was also reinforced by powerful myths of origin persisting 
despite assimilation. The all-pervasive apathy characterizing Basque society from 1939 to 
1959, contrasts with the nationalist upheaval of the 1960s. This contrast testifies to the 
continuing resilience of memories and shared identities, when the nationalist movement 
appeared dormant. Since no political options could be freely expressed, memories of past 
suffering remained deeply entrenched, perhaps were even reinforced. When no uncensored 
history book is allowed to circulate, history is more likely to become myth or counter-myth. 
Hence, nationalism assumes an even stronger oppositional potential.
State repression: the legacy of the past
In this section, we shall analyse two sub-factors of state repression, which were conducive 
to the violent turn of Basque nationalism: lack of pre-existing autonomous institutions and 
memories of the Civil War. The former is a direct consequence of state centralization. Local 
autonomies were 'given up' only after prolonged military struggle and defeat (the Carlist 
wars). Absence of pre-existing autonomous institutions is often taken by analysts 
as encouraging violence, rather than more accommodating attitudes. According to Kellas 
(1991: 112), "violence erupts in areas where participative institutions are weakest; more 
sophisticated areas with an history of self-rule as the Baltic republics tend towards 
constitutional action...". Although this observation seems to be correct in the short term, it 
fails to account for long-lasting periods of interrupted self-rule. In other words, cases of late 
centralization and consequent disruption of local self-rule, as with the Basque fueros, do not 
correspond to cases in which a new form of self-rule was established, as in Twentieth 
century Catalonia. For instance, immediately before Francoism, the Catalans enjoyed a great 
degree of autonomy under the Second Republic. In contrast, the Basques were initiated to the
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experience of regional self-rule only under the dramatic circumstances of the Civil War, their 
autonomy statute was recognized by the Spanish Republicans too late to be put into practice. 
The Catalans also ran a semi-autonomous Mancomunitat from 1914 to 1925, at a time when 
Basque nationalism was still unable to build up alternative institutions.
However, if we go further back, we have to consider the persistence of Basque fueros 
right up into the early 1870s, while Catalan privileges were eroded more than hundred years 
before, in 1716. Hence, in 1914 (Mancomunitat) and again in 1931 (Generalitat), the 
Catalans started to rebuild their regional institutions virtually from scratch after two centuries 
of oblivion. In the same period, the more recently abolished Basques' traditional autonomies 
could not be revived. Such precedents exerted their impact in the aftermath of Francoism: 
once a new decentralized constitution was approved in 1978, the Catalans were better 
equipped for self-government and ready to re-build their institutions. Hence, absence of pre­
existing autonomous institutions can arguably be related to the need to resort to violence, 
insofar as the latter worked as a supplement to the former, and insofar as fragmented elites, 
unable to reach agreement over self-rule, could not control radical elements. But this absence 
was due to the state's opposition to nationalist demands, even during the short-lived period 
of democracy under the Republic.479 It was part of the more general factor of state 
repression. If they had not been hampered by centralist repression, local institutions might 
well have flourished. Indeed, we can identify centralization and the abolition of the fueros, 
not merely as a process of state intervention, but as overt acts of state repression. Local rights 
were not abolished with the consent of the people, rather their abolition was imposed upon 
them. The only sector of the population openly welcoming the elimination of the fueros was a 
small-sized bourgeois oligarchy of miners and iron industrialists.
Basque postwar resistance was characterized by a special discourse on the glorious 
memories of the Civil W ar and the horrors which accompanied i t  We mentioned at the 
outset that the Civil War provided a moral and emotional watershed in Basque political 
culture. The triumph of the winners was total, the humiliation of the losers became 
immeasurable. Under a ruthless militarization of society, the war initiated a process of 
oppositional culture which had to last till the present day. In the wake of the Civil War, the 
Basques experienced destruction of their cities, enforced cultural assimilation and physical 
obliteration. A law-decree of 23 June 1937 declared Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa as 'traitor
479  This point is in contradiction to another factor, late state-building, a s  indicated by Linz
(1973, 1975, se e  the section on separatism).
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provinces'. "Since 1936, all mentions of the Basque people were thoroughly omitted in the 
constitutive administration of the Spanish state" (Jauregui 1981: 206).480 The remembrances 
of the Civil War, with their heroes and villains, were transmitted to the young generation 
couched in mythical terms. Hence, the legacy of totalitarian violence was felt all through the 
following decades. Much of these feelings are symbolized in Picasso's Guernica. What did 
the bombing of Guernica represent ? In the words of Robert Clark, it "is without doubt the 
most powerful and driving symbol in the entire Basque political culture. For an American, it 
would be Pearl Harbor, the Alamo, and Bunker Hill all combined in a single, searing 
metaphor" (in Aguirre 1991:70-1).481 The legacy of the Civil War remained vivid in the new 
generation of Basque nationalists. Most of the references in the bibliography of Zalbide's 
Insureccion en Euskadi are war studies or memoirs of the Resistance against the Nazis, 
especially in France. Similarly, in the short bibliography supplied by ETA's Libro Blanco, 
references include works by the French partisans fighting the Nazi occupation.482 The 
comparison between the Basques under Franco and other European peoples under Nazi 
occupation was frequent, because of the level of violence experienced both during and after 
the Civil War. It is important to remember that it was Nazi planes of the Condor Legion 
which bombed Guernica on a market day 483 These were constant topics among Basque 
radicals and emerged with new virulence after the Americans opened up to Franco. The
480 The official negation of any Basque entity touched "all aspects  of the sta te 's  functional 
division", so  that Euskadi did not have its own district, neither in the military sphere 
( Capitanfa General), nor in the judicial (Audiencia Territorial), in the religious (archdiocese), 
in the educational (university district), etc. (Jauregui 1981: 206).
481 On the destruction of Guernica, see  Southworth (1977).
482 Charles Tillon, Les FTP: TSmoianaqe pour servir £ I'histoire de la R esistance. Paris: 
Julliard, 1962. M. Granet & H. Michel, C om bat: Histoire d'un m ovement de  resistance de 
julliet 1940 £ iulliet 1943. Paris: P re s se s  Universitaire d e  F rance, 1957. Jea n  Marie 
Domenach, La Propaganda Politique. Paris: P resses Universitaire de France, 1955. Maurice 
M6gret, L' Action Psvchologique. Paris: Fayard, 1959. Also considered valuable was General T. 
Bor-Komorowski, H istoire d' une arm6e secrete  (Paris: Les lies d'Or /Plon, 1952), on the 
Polish resistance movement against Nazi occupation (1939-1944). Three 'reactionary' manuals 
were included, in order to study the strategy and tactics of the enemy: Dominique Ponchardier 
(Les PavSs de I'Enfei), Colonel Roger Trinquier (La Guerre Moderne) and Curzio Malaparte 
( Technique du coup d'Etat). The latter was read in its French edition (Technique du Coup d'Etat. 
Paris: G rasset, 1948). Trinquier was translated in English a s  Modern Warfare. A French View 
of C ounterinsurqencv. London: Pall Mall, 1964 [French original, Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961]. 
Central to ETA, was Trinquer's view that the allegiance of the civilian population becom es one 
of the most vital objectives of the whole struggle and how to ensure such allegiance. Finally, 
C laude Delmas, La guerre rSvolutionnaire. Paris: P resses  Universitaires de France, 1959, a  
guerrilla classic which w as to be the most relevant for ETA activists who quoted it repeatedly. 
Focusing on Algeria, Tunisia and Vietnam, as  well a s  Communist insurgents in G reece and Iran, 
Delmas theorized a  tactical distinction between civilian terrorism  and rural terrorism and 
formulated the transformation from the 'citizen-soldier' to the 'militant-soldier'.
483 Yet, although the bombing of Guernica was the first and most famous one, Catalonia was 
subjected to more aerial bombardments than the rest of Spain.
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response of the young nationalists to this disenchantment with the West was a slow drift 
towards the adoption of Third World anticolonialist and anti-imperialist models (Conversi 
1993). But this drift can hardly be explained without the intervention of the crucial variable, 
state repression.
State repression: the impact on the present.
After the devastation, postwar Basques were ready for a true 'ethnogenesis', for a re­
definition of their identity vis-d-vis the state.484 Many authors agree that Basque nationalism 
under Franco was reborn in a thoroughly new shape (Gurrutxaga 1990). Going further, it is 
legitimate to claim that, not only a new Basque nationalism, but a new Basque identity as 
well was forged in the process. This identity was based on the self-perception of the Basques 
as a heroic people fighting bravely for their survival against a powerful tyranny supported by 
the West. In turn, ETA's violence has been identified by several scholars as an offspring of 
the Franco era (Jauregui 1981: 208,1986, Clark 1979,1984, Douglass 1988, Douglass and 
Zulaika 1990, Gurrutxaga 1985, 1990, Silver 1988). It is a description which we basically 
subscribe to. We shall also consider ETA as the tip of the iceberg of a much wider popular 
resentment against Francoism. This cause-effect interpretation is central to nearly all studies 
on political violence in Euskadi. Accordingly, 'terrorism' is a result of the ruthless use of the 
Guaidia Civil, police, and other repressive forces, to deal with nationalist dissent.
ETA's spiral 'theory of action/repression/action' tallied with reality: "In the measure in 
which the nationalist forces in general, and ETA in particular, advanced in their struggle, the 
para-military occupation of Euskadi returned with extraordinary intensity" (Jauregui 1981: 
205). Yet, each dismantling of an ETA cell through the use of torture was a Pyrrhic victory 
for the regime: it brought about a massive amount of confessions, but it inspired an indelible
hatred for the 'occupation forces'. This condition was clear in ETA since the beginning:
"Repression and torture, when they uncover the horrors of individual sadism  and collective 
cynicism, becom e the best recipe for the youth's rebellion. Then, no reasons or arguments are 
left. If morality only condem ns the violence exercised by one side, justifying the other side's 
actions by reasons of order and authority, it loses its character of moderating social value and 
displays the reality of its ideological content at the service of specific in te re s ts " .4 8 ^
There was another proof of the conscious and direct bond existing between state repression 
and nationalist violence. ETA's maximalist programme aimed at the liberation of all seven 
Basque provinces, including the three on the French side. Nevertheless, "in all ETA's
484 As the anthropologist Richard Wilson puts the case , "ethnocidal s ta te  policies imply
ethnogenesis, and the two must be studied together if we are to grasp the full meaning of war"
(Wilson 1991: 57).
485 Reprinted in Documentos Y: vol. 1: p. 371.
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writings there is not a single reference to the need to use violent methods against France" 
(Jauregui 1981: 213). This is surprising, particularly if we think that ETA's main model of- 
urban guerrilla came from Algeria's relentless struggle against the French. The obvious 
reason for this omission is that France provided a shelter for Basque refugees and a base 
where they could reassemble in the hope of launching new attacks.486 There was also an 
understanding and mutual respect between Basque leaders and many Left-wing French 
intellectuals (in particular, Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists). However, another 
reason was more important: France was not an authoritarian state, at least not in its 
'metropolitan territory', and not as much as Spain. Hence, it was an unsuitable target for 
ETA's theory of action/repression/action. Only the Spanish state could be the chosen foe ,
because of its predictable response in terms of mindless repression. As Jauregui puts it,
"it was precisely Francoism, with its repressive violence, which provoked ETA into the choice of 
violent methods of struggle; the lack of freedom, the impossibility to put into practice a legal political 
activity,... [all this] prompted ETA to adopt, nearly instinctively, a method of action with no 
relationship with traditional Basque nationalism, and which, furthermore, did not find precursors in any 
other European patriotic movement in those years" (Jauregui 1981:213).
One of the characteristics of nationalism can be described as 'blame-shifting'. Each side of 
the conflict blames the other for the exclusive responsibility of all current and past misdeeds. 
Francoist propaganda consistently described Basque nationalism as an evil force. Thus, in all 
ETA publications, the blame for violence was diametrically reversed: state violence was 
continually described as the 'original', 'real' form of violence, the one which justified all 
ETA's actions. The Francoist regime was not just bad, but it was evil per se. In this context, 
any accusation of violence against Basque patriots was self-defeating. This view is clearly
formulated in the first issue of Zutik:
"Several young Basques just happen to be condemned to large periods of detention. They are accused of 
having used violence to express their opposition to the regime. The accusers are Francoists. That is, the 
same people who 23 years ago rose in arms against a constitutionally legitimate Republic,... the ones 
who launched against Euskadi an army of Requetis (Carlist militia, my note), Falangists, Moors, 
Italians and Germans..., the ones who set Guernica and Durango ablaze with barbarous bombardments,
the ones who murdered thousands of Basques......These friends of violence unleashed a war which caused
more than a million dead and are kept in power only by the use of force The violent are condemning
violence They destroyed, trampled on and burned the flags of Euskadi. They persecuted our language
and culture...But violence generates violence. The Basque youth do not want to live as slaves. They are
the gudaris of the new resistance. They have the right of the oppressed on their side".48?
This vision spread to all comers of Basque society by the late 1960s. A local magazine in the
town of Itziar, Gipuzkoa, claimed in 1968 that: "...there is already an ever-present
institutional violence; any response to it, even pacifism, is violence. Violence therefore is the
basic agent of social change; and whoever refuses to participate in it lacks personal
486 o n  Basque nationalism in France, see  Jacob (1994).
487 • zutik" n® 0, 1961, reprinted in Documentos Y: vol. 1: p. 371.
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commitment" (cited in Zulaika 1988: 55). In the Basque underground literature and media, 
one can find endless examples like this. Hence, state violence worked directly as legitimation 
of nationalist counter-violence.
A consequence of state repression was the clandestine character of political 
opposition. This can account for both the choice and persistence of violence. On the one 
hand, illegality was attractive and prohibition exciting, especially for the youth. Never mind 
the consequences, ETA's challenge to authority exercised an irresistible invitation for some 
individuals. On the other hand, the regime was itself victim of the illusion that the use of 
force could restore order. Francoist prohibitions created a secretive climate conducive to 
violence: violence became a way of expressing one own's identity and of asserting the 
popular will to survive repression (Perez-Agote, 1984, 1987, 1993). In the fullest sense, 
violence replaced language, and became itself a language.
The popular resonance of violent actions was crucial during the stalemate of Francoism and 
violence became one of the most powerful political statements and a metaphor of the state's 
illegitimacy. Officially, Basque nationalism had ceased to exist For the radical opposition the 
only means to prove the contrary was through continuous armed attacks. Against a backdrop 
of censorship and against a regime which pretended to have overcome 'separatism' forever, 
ETA's actions disproved all such pre-conceptions, demonstrating the world opinion that 
Basque nationalism was still alive. ETA broke the 'curtain of silence' imposed by the 
dictatorship. In turn, ETA’s actions were translated into an immediate loss of legitimacy for 
the regime, which had always justified its existence as the supreme guardian of Spanish 
unity. Hence, Basque violence must also be understood as a method of communicating a 
people's existence, where no other means were available. ETA's violence in the 1960s 
became an unparalleled avenue of self-expression.
The ideological consequences of fragmentation: ETA's internecine conflict
In chapter 5, we have seen that ETA has undergone intense internal debate and splintering 
throughout its history, especially in the mid-1960s. But every time an ideological impasse 
emerged, the most violent factions took the lead and showed the way with their concrete 
actions. "The victory of the partisans of armed struggle was a constant feature during each 
crisis of the movement" (Jauregui 1981: 310). Which are the roots of this fragmentation?
The confusion in the nationalist goals and formulations dates back to Arana. In turn, these 
were related to Euskadi's pre-existing cultural peculiarities analysed in chapters 3 and 7.
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Cultural fragmentation and assimilation were exasperated by mass immigration (chapter 8). 
When ETA attempted to involve the immigrant labourers in the nationalist struggle, it had to 
acknowledge this fragmentation in order to overcome it. ETA started to expand through 
participation in working class disputes. But this was no easy choice. The debate over 
immigration, and, hence, the continuous tension between class struggle and nationalism were 
centre-pieces in ETA's evolution. The only way for this impasse not to degenerate into a 
virtual break-up of the organization, was to 'externalize' the tension by fighting back against 
the regime. Once started, violence assumed a ritualized pace, a self-fulfilling dynamic of its
own. Violence becomes a form of action
not governed entirely (or even predominantly) by instrumental means-ends considerations. ETA's 
ekintzak...ai& condensed events, as well as public performances, in which chance plays a key role. 
Action for action's sake becomes quintessential to small militant groups and acquire a momentous 
efficacy that far surpasses its own instrumentality. As if by magic, each action, in its renewed 
challenge to authority, signals a new beginning which promises to trigger a revolutionary process 
aimed at transforming everything (Douglass and Zulaika 1990: 255).
This interpretation can explain why violence becomes an end in itself.488 In turn, many 
Basques deemed ETA necessary to protect them from state encroachment 
As we have seen, most of the relevant ideological production of ETA dates back to its very 
first years. The reader will recall that since at least 1970, ETA has abandoned any intellectual 
pretension, giving absolute priority to political praxis over theoretical debate.489 It is 
therefore not surprising that the ideological output has since then been virtually nil. "To all
intents and purposes since 1970 ETA has been ideologically dead all theoretical and
doctrinal activity was paralysed. All discussions after 1970 have centred only around 
problems of strategy and political tactics; even so they have been of greater intensity than 
previous debates" (Jauregui 1986: 398)490 
Indeed, in the 1970s violence began to plague the organization from within. State 
repression contributed not only to increase ETA's violence, but also to increase its 
fragmentation in a spiral process: as a consequence of police swoops and the arrest of
488 Lacking a  historical perspective, Zulaika's interpretation is perhaps not suited to explain 
the origins of ETA's violence, that is, why ETA's leaders chose at a  certain stage to adopt 
armed struggle.
489 "e t a  did never halt to analyse its previous evolution. It always moved forward, even 
during the most tormented ideological crises”, guided by a  "sufficiently blind confidence in the 
nationalist principles" (Jauregui 1981: 310).
490 As ETA w as more interested in practical action than in abstract theory or doctrine, its 
'ideologues' never tried to justify their project of aiming at Basque independence. Despite some 
intermittent debate over what are the central values of the Basque nation, there have been few 
attem pts to theorize its aspiration to statehood in more precise term s than Arana's already 
vague ones. ETA was "not preoccupied with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the right to self- 
determination but with the need to se t in motion the appropriate machinery in order to give 
credibility to this dem and at the earlier opportunity" (Jauregui 1986: 399).
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leaders, ETA's leadership was continuously changing. However, it was precisely from 1970 
onward that, in the wake of the Burgos Trial, massive demonstrations started to erupt in the 
streets, breaking forever the curtain of silence of the dictatorship. In this process, the 
[national] symbols came into the open: "nationalism became public, together with the 
symbols of difference;... a consciousness which was previously confined to intimacy was 
more and more openly expressed" (Perez-Agote 1984: 116). ETA was the let-motif on the 
background of all these changes.
The initial anti-bourgeois character of Basque nationalism has already been 
commented upon, both in the previous section and in the historical chapter about the birth of 
Basque nationalism. This factor is of little value in explaining the choice of violence, though 
it is useful in explaining both the stress on separation (lack of interest in maintaining 
economic ties with the centre) and on left-wing politics. Payne (1973: 80-3) labels Basque 
nationalism as an "anti-bourgeois" movement supported by pre-capitalist classes, including 
peasants and small town businessmen with their rural values (Payne, cited by Zirakzadeh 
1985). Linz (1975, 1980) identifies its main trend as "an opposition to cosmopolitan 
corrupting influences". However, Zirakzadeh (1985, 1991) corrects this viewpoint by 
showing how, at least in some phases, business classes were also interested in the nationalist 
movement. In chapter 3, we have seen how anti-bourgeois ideologies latent in Basque 
nationalism periodically emerged when the movement radicalized its separatist demands, like 
in the case of Gallastegui. Hence, separatist overtones increased everytime anti-oligarchic 
radicals and pro-bourgeoisie moderates came at loggerheads within the PNV.
Fears of cultural annihilation.
Fear of cultural annihilation represent a crucial link between our two main variables. It was 
brought about by the eclipse of the traditional symbols of ethnic distinctiveness and 
reinforced by the state's repression of these very symbols and elements. After a centuries- 
long decline, Euskara seemed on the verge of receiving its final coup-de-grace with 
industrialization. The lack of alternative core values made this sentiment particularly acute 
amongst nationalist intellectuals, who perceived the whole nation as being on the brink of 
extinction. This predicament was felt at the end of the last century as much as in the 1950s, 
yet Arana's followers never turned to violence. In the 1960s, the full impact of state 
repression politicized the pre-existing cleavages.
THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 246
The fear of assimilation was exasperated by the snobbish attitude of Basque mainstream 
intellectuals. Ramiro de Maetzu, the right-wing Catholic antagonist of Arana, cynically 
sneered at the ’regionalists’ 'attempts to revive Euskara: "In this enterprise, the intellectual 
efforts of the Basque race have been squandered for half a century. And what has been 
achieved?: a handful of philologists have learned Euskara, many thousands of Basques have 
forgotten it. Just ten years ago it was still spoken by the children of San Sebastian, Guernica, 
Deusto,...".491 Unamuno reinforced this with an inflammatory speech against the use of 
Euskara which provoked utter radicalization in the debate. He urged the Basques to drop their 
language, defining it as a grave obstacle to the spread of European culture (Ugalde 1979:11). 
Arana's cohort had to drain the cup of misery to the dregs.492 Their language loyalties under 
attack, Basque nationalists emerged from Unamuno's harangue more determined than ever to 
pursue their separatist programmes. Since Unamuno was a respected intellectual in Spanish 
mainstream circles (and eventually abroad), his words had a particularly strong effect on 
nationalist feelings (Uria 1993:106).
However, such wounded sensitivities were initially experienced by a mere minority. Only 
with the Francoist onslaught did this perception spread to the masses. As we said, Ekin's 
founders were six or seven students-intellectuals. Witnessing the alarming decline of 
Euskara, with an overwhelming sense of cultural loss and under the threat of police 
persecution, the young students of Deusto University instinctively opted for an intransigent 
form of nationalism. Every member and supporter of ETA, especially its founders, sensed 
living under a final threat For those who doubted, the menace materialized in increasing acts 
of police repression, which went hand in hand with the decline of traditional elements of 
Basque distinctiveness. State repression only enhanced this all-pervasive apprehension of 
being a people on the brink of extinction, adding to it an immediate fear of physical 
annihilation. "Guerrilla mysticism found its justification in the sense of desperation latent in 
ETA since its origins. On several occasions, ETA alluded to the idea that Euskadi was on the 
verge of disappearing, of being erased from the map of peoples, because its language and 
culture were slowly dying out and its customs were being replaced by alien ones. Hence, the 
peremptory and urgent need to put an end to this progressive disappearance" (Jauregui 1981: 
233).
491 In El Impartial, 14-9-1901. Reprinted in Maetzu (1981).
492 In his journal Euzkadl, Arana, who claimed to be well acquainted with Unamuno, assured 
that the latter did not feel the way he spoke: Unamuno simply wanted to hurt the B asques in 
their more sensitive affects, and his only aim w as a  purely personal yearning for attention. 
Arana also suspected that Unamuno wanted to wheedle Madrid's politicians in order to prop up 
his career (cited by Villasante 1979: 292).
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As for the life of individual etarras, it simply reflected the broader agony of the nation. 
Thus, ekintza actions were not politics, but acts of survival: "ETA guys are like... cornered 
animals holding to their instinct of survival".493 The driving force behind the disinterested 
putting at risk one’s own life was something above personal circumstances. It related to a 
deadly challenge against one own’s kin, extended family, or nation. The latter challenge 
manifested itself as a blow to one's very existence and sense of being.
Proof of the personal commitment required of any sympathizers wishing to join ETA was 
given by the severity of its rules. Glancing through the ’security norms' which made up the 
Libro Blanco and other official ETA's publications, we can see that the organization was 
extremely demanding. It required that each member "radically alter his/ her own habits, 
lifestyles, friends, environment", etc., up to the point that his/her new way of life would 
'become natural'494 The tragedy was that all the 'security norms' were rendered useless by 
the use of torture: ETA itself recognized that "during the interrogations, torture destroys all 
the patterns of behaviour and self-defence which the security norms pretended to create in the 
activist".495 Yet, the fight went on, and there was always plenty of enthusiastic youth ready 
to immolate themselves for the cause.
Needing to attract more members, Ekin's founders had to expand in areas which were 
partially alien to their enterprise: cultural fragmentation and the urban/rural divide impinged 
on their original eclecticism. They were soon presented with a dilemma and had only two 
possible alternatives: either minimize (even drop) the ethnic content of their straggle, in order 
to recruit assimilated Basques and even non-Basques, or limit their recruitment strictly to 
those areas which maintained a strong Basque identity (and where Euskara was still spoken). 
The first option would have meant a betrayal of ETA's original principles; the second one 
would have confined their action to a precious few, without the chance of much expansion. 
The stress on ethnicity would have hampered ETA in an increasingly urbanized society 
undergoing galloping cultural assimilation.
The conflict between these options stands at the core of most of ETA's internal diatribes 
and schisms, whatever ideological disguise they assumed. However, the choice between 
these two strategies was rarely spelt out. It was rather silently subsumed under the priority of 
fighting back the hovering external threat. Hence, political fragmentation was determined by
493  A woman 'closely involved with ETA' and 'extremely knowledgeable about most of its 
leaders', quoted in Zulaika (1982 [thesis] : 460, 1988: 313).
494 s e e  Libro Blanco, p. 3, reprinted in Documentos Y, vol. 1, p. 151.
495 Documentos Y, vol. 2 , p. 369.
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cultural fragmentation and the loss of Basque culture. The two concepts of national liberation 
were related to two concepts of Basque identity. Indeed, these identities changed whether the 
stress was put on language or other elements, but, within ETA, many activists never 
abandoned the cultural definition of Basqueness. As demonstrated in the study of other 
nationalist movements, a cultural definition of the nation serves as a reservoir of political 
legitimacy (Hutchinson 1987).
That political fragmentation was determined by cultural fragmentation is not an easy thing 
to demonstrate, since both the nationalist struggle and the ideology supporting it served the 
purpose of binding internal fissions and, hence, of hiding any potential internal cleavages and 
lack of cohesion. The very emphasis on names indicating unity, as with the coalition Herri 
Batasuna (Popular Unity), was meant to deny this creeping fragmentation. The unity of the 
Basques was stressed in all major street demonstrations and other political manifestations, yet 
such unity could only be brought about by popular indignation against the state.49^ By 
definition, nationalism purports to be the ideology of a bound, compact, Unitarian and clearly 
defined body. The nation is conceived in quasi-organic terms and no major internal divisions 
are acknowledged. Hence, the strictly cultural- linguistic definition of the nation may clash 
with other definitions: civic, as based on territory; ethnic, as based on putative origin; racial, 
as based on biological determinants; etc. Since all of these elements were eroded, confused or 
not fully representative, the nationalist community felt under threat whichever of them was 
chosen. Certainly, the lack of a shared culture was constantly felt as a grave handicap by 
most nationalists leaders.
However, preoccupation over the Basques' survival overwhelmed preoccupation over 
details. "What mattered to ETA was that the nation found itself in a lethal situation and that, 
in order to save her, it was urgent to adopt a series of drastic measures. As a 
consequence,...it considered the will of the Basque people to recover their national identity 
as the only valid element to save the nation" (Jauregui 1981:151). Hence, the adoption, after 
1963, of Ernest Renan's concept of the nation de volonti. But in the Basque case, the idea 
of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite' was to be implemented through the call to arms.497
496 Without ETA's actions and the s ta te 's  predictable reactions, Herri B atasuna would 
probably cease  to be, since what binds together this plethora of small Left-wing groups is the 
climate of radicalization induced by ETA.
497  This also d ism isses a  w idespread acquisition in the literature of nationalism, namely, 
that Herderian principles are more rigid and less adaptable than the R enanian vision of the 
nation a s  a social contract. Voluntarist and contractualist visions of the nation can easily be 
used by radical separatists stressing opposition, rather than compatibility. Catalan nationalism 
w as at the sam e time organicist and integrationist, whilst Basque nationalism w as voluntarist
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Nationalism: cultural, political and  military
As stressed in the theoretical chapter, my analysis follows the distinction between cultural 
and political nationalism highlighted by some recent works (Hutchinson 1987,1992). In this 
thesis, I consider that a further form of nationalism should be kept distinct from the two 
previous ones: military nationalism. The latter became crucial when the radicals' armed 
branch started to act autonomously from political nationalists and, finally, became a self- 
propelling force. At the same time, cultural nationalists loomed in the background, exerting a 
wider legitimizing influence over the general process of mass mobilisation.
One of the reasons for the resignation of Txillardegi and others from ETA in 1967 was that 
the organization was no longer interested in promoting Euskara, and that all the articles in 
Zutik were now in Spanish. The split, which resulted in the foundation of the group 
Branka, occurred at a time of intense internal crisis. In their communiqud, the culturalists 
declared that "ETA is no longer the adequate means to achieve certain aims and has been 
converted exclusively into a Marxist-Leninist party".498 The new attitude of ETA was in 
sharp contrast with the principles adopted by its First Assembly in 1962, which stated that 
ETA's first task was to strengthen Euskara. Now, little remained of such aim. "The defence 
of Euskara became a matter of fighting for equality of treatment with Spanish... As ETA 
seriously tried to recruit immigrants, it was faced with its own [Aranist] heritage" (Sullivan 
1988: 48).499
What united opposite trends within ETA were occasional alliances of one or more trends 
against the other(s). Thus, for instance, what united culturalists and thirdworldists was not a 
common understanding on Basque identity, or on how to liberate Euskadi, but a joint effort 
to defeat the 'workerists' (obreristas), which were perceived as traitors of the Basque cause 
(Jauregui 1981: 307). However, after the expulsion of the workerists (see chapter 4), the 
thirdworldists hegemonized the organisation, pushing Txillardegi and his followers to resign 
from ETA. In turn, the thirdworldists' emphasis on urban -and rural- guerrilla warfare is also
and separatist. The influence of Herder and other German philosophers mingled in Catalonia to 
produce a  m oderate and integrationist scenario. The influence of Renan and other French 
maitres-k-penser mingled in Euskadi to produce a  much more radical separatism . Again, these 
two different patterns can be traced back to pre-existing cultural factors, in particular the 
diffusion of regional languages.
498 J . L. Alvarez Emparanza (Txillardegi), J. M. Benito del Valle and Xabier Imaz, Por que 
dejam os E.T.A.. 1 page communique, 14 April 1967 [reprinted in Caracas: E.G.]
499  The subordination of cultural to political goals is reflected in an eschatological vision of 
independence as  a  panacea for all problems of cultural identity, in particular the recovery of 
the language: "There is only one path to save Euskera: political independence for Euzkadi." 
(nZutikm, 3d series, 15: 3, cited by Gurruchaga 1985: 245).
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related to ideological and cultural fragmentation.500 The thirdworldist field was itself divided 
between the proposers of urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Franz Fanon, possibly the most 
influential foreign theorist among the radicals, theorized about urban guerrilla warfare and the 
mobilisation of the lumpenproletariat. Thus, Fanon's Algerian model contrasted with the 
Maoist, Vietnamese and, to a certain extent, Cuban models of peasant war led by (urban) 
intellectuals.50! These two concepts reflected two opposite visions of nationalist 
mobilisation, which in turn were related to two opposite visions of Basque identity. The 
supporters of urban guerrilla warfare tended to focus on assimilated Basques and immigrant 
workers. The supporters of rural guerrilla warfare tended instead to focus on the Euskaldun 
heartland. Again, the conflict was resolved through action, or, better, a competition to act in 
the most prompt and effective way.502 But the fracture between the two trends was never 
really formalized within ETA, although it was at the root of several splits.503 The two 
currents were later included in the vague definition of pueblo trabajador vasco (Basque 
working people). The fragmentation remained latent, but, on several occasions, the unity of 
the organization was saved at the cost of increasing its external aggression.504 Cultural 
nationalists in Euskadi were constantly under pressure from more radical elements, impatient 
to act. They had to adopt radical attitudes in order to maintain their credibility. The radicals 
kept on pressing them, questioning them roughly in the following way: "certainly, Euskara is 
a valuable tool, it is the proof of our ancestral uniqueness, but how can we manage to build a 
cohesive Basque nation if the language is spoken just by a minority ?”.505
500 This was recognised by Txillardegi, who declared later: "We were in favour of a  much 
more political, and much less military, form of struggle. ...Urban guerrilla, and guerrilla in 
general, ...is not apt to a  heavily industrialized country... It is feasible in Vietnam, not here" 
(Kaufmann, cited in Jauregui 1981: 308).
501 I thank Sebastian Balfour for these suggestions.
502  Obviously, this did not result in anarchy and chaos, since a  prize in authority and 
respect was granted to those who most put their own life at stake.
503 Indeed, a  clue to ETA's internal fragmentation is given by the fact that "each single 
ideological line... [within] ETA assum ed those aspect of [Vasconia] which most suited its 
political and ideological positions" (Jauregui 1981: 225). This explains why Krutwig's book 
scored such a  success and, despite its ambiguities, worked as  an Unitarian framework for the 
radical movement.
504 In order to establish their hegemony, the thirdworldists were required to appropriate 
som e of the tenets of both political and cultural nationalists. This resulted in a  'superficial' 
adoption, respectively, of Marxism-Leninism and the cultural struggle. However, both 
program m es w ere de facto rendered void: Marxism w as subordinated to anti-colonial and 
anti-imperialist struggle, while Euskara w as no longer used in official publication.
505 Zulaika explores the unsuccessful attempts by a  local leader near to ETA-VI and the 
'workerists' to convince his younger disciples about the primacy of class struggle over national 
liberation. He could not convince them, as  "they were definitely not interested in political 
groupings and polemics... [which] seem ed to them just boring rhetorical subtleties" (1988: 61).
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Since their identity was splintered, nationalists also felt more threatened. Thus, whether 
language, race or religion were taken as central elements of Basqueness, their upholders 
always felt that the Basque nation they identified with was under threat. At the same time, 
these opposing trends created confusion over the core values to be adopted, and engendered 
the conditions for ideological fragmentation. In the Basque case, the failure to define steadily 
and persistently one core value resulted in the impossibility of developing a popular form of 
cultural nationalism. The weakness of cultural nationalism led to the prevalence of other 
kinds of political activism in which an ambivalent attitude over the definition of cultural 
values concealed a deep conflict over forms of political mobilization. I now wish to explore a 
couple of other reinforcing factors.
Other reinforcing factors
Another situational factor which influenced the radical choice of both violence and Marxism 
was the American about-face (see chapter 5). This had long-lasting consequences on the 
morale of the Basques. Hopes for Allied -especially American- military intervention to topple 
Franco were dashed in 1945. Since the PNV's reliance on an American 'salvation' plan 
justified much of the party's stalemate, the new generation was particularly anxious to get rid 
of the American model.506 They were politically socialized during the period of 
decolonization and thus were unavoidably inspired by the newly independent Third World 
'nations'. It is possible to gather which were ETA's principal ideological influences by 
looking at the short bibliography supplied in its Libro Blanco (White Book): only one 
Basque source is mentioned,507 the other references being works from the protagonists of 
successful liberation movements or analysis of their struggles, normally in their Spanish or 
French editions.50** As I have shown elsewhere (Conversi 1993), the most influential 
external model came from the Algerian revolution. The main theorist of the Algerian model 
of decolonization was Franz Fanon (1925-1961), who was also an advocate of revolutionary
Local groups still led by Marxist ex-sem inarians "offered a  platform to ra ise  political 
consciousness. The beneficiary was ETA", which swelled with new members (Zulaika 198: 61).
506 The rejection of the American model and the subsequent drift towards Marxism, did not 
imply an immediate renunciation of the principle of democracy. ETA's leaders vowed to fight 
against all forms of dictatorship and never formally rejected democracy. Yet, they believed it 
impossible to achieve it without the use of violence.
507 It is Ereintza: Siem bra de Nacionalismo Vasco. 1894-1912. an essentialist manual of 
separatism  by Engracio de Arranzadi (San Sebastian: Editorial Aufiamendi, 1980; [first edition 
1935]).
508 French w as the foreign language most currently spoken by the B asques in Spain, for 
obvious reasons, given the continuous cross-borders contacts with their northern brethren and 
the placement in France of the largest slice of the Basque diaspora.
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violence. The experience of Algeria seemed to promise that only violence could pay off and 
lead the insurgents to victory. This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also 
determined by the internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. As predicted by Fanon, 
state violence was an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general 'national awareness' 
among the wider population, instigating them to fight back. In synthesis, the adoption of 
thirdworldist models could not be realized without state repression. State repression was the 
central part of the Fanonian 'theory of action/repression/action' as 'imported' by ETA.
The underlying religious character of Basque nationalism has been indicated as 
a possible inspiration for Basque violence, as manifested through abnegation and self- 
sacrifice. Our exposure to media coverage of ethnic conflicts leads us to think that religious 
animosities are often exacerbated when they go hand in hand with nationalist claims.509 
However, four observations must be made in order to put the link between nationalism and 
religion in the right perspective. Firstly, although until very recently the Basques considered 
themselves to be more religious than other Spaniards, they nevertheless share the same 
religion. Secondly, the strong Catholic attachment of the Basques long antedated the rise of 
nationalism. Thirdly, violence began to spread at the same time in which religion was 
becoming irrelevant, as part and parcel of a Western-wide process of secularisation. Many 
recent surveys indicate that the process of secularization in Euskadi is comparable to that of 
most Western industrialized societies.510 Fourthly and finally, the religious emphasis of early 
Basque national ideology and the link between religion and nationalism were a consequence 
of the previous point, namely, the lack of alternative cultural elements shared by the majority 
of the population. The dismissal of religion was also a tool of further distancing ETA from 
the PNV and its Catholic ideology. In May 1962, the participants to the First Assembly 
published the organization's first formal statements of principles which called for the creation 
of a federated Europe based on ethno-nationalities not guided by religion. They also rejected 
the idea of racial superiority and opposed all forms of dictatorships.
Is there a continuity between the original religious foundations of Basque nationalism and 
the new Basque political culture? We already pointed out the initial religious emphasis 
prompted by Arana, but, as we said, Basque nationalism did not purvey a violent face until 
the 1960s. Some authors have indeed demonstrated the deep religious vocation which
509 The description of political violence a s  emanating from the religious background of their 
protagonists has been applied to other terrorist groups, such a s  the Italian Red Brigades 
(Acquaviva 1979).
510 See for instance, FO ESSA  (1975) and  Perez-Agote (1990).
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animated many activists in the 1960s. In his study on the 'sacramental character’ of Basque 
political violence, Zulaika (1988) observes the important influence exerted on ETA's militants 
by Catholic social doctrines, especially the ones emanating in those years from Accidn 
Catdlica. Many etarras have lived though a phase of religious vocation followed by a 
disillusion with religion and the idea that their vocation cannot be carried out within the tracks 
of traditional Christianity. Basque nationalism has been defined as a millennialist movement 
(Aranzadi 1981). Many nationalists passed from religion to secularism, this passage being 
rather a leap forward when they tried to adapt Marxism to such a purpose. Most of them 
came from Accidn Catolica and its working-class branches, J.O.C. (Juventudes Obreras 
Catdlicas) and H.O.A.C. (Hermandad Obrera de Accidn Catdlica), and their 'apostolic' 
origin remained "passionately [entrenched] with their personal frustrations".511 Students 
from different seminaries and novitiates (Franciscans, Benedectines, Jesuits, Carmelites, 
etc.) jointly participated in the framework of local publishing in Euskara (P6rez-Agote 1986: 
431). In most cases, protection by the Church was what made viable such enterprises. In the 
crucial phase of the early 1970s, when Marxist ideology permeated most local nationalist 
organisations, the Church eventually withdrew its support causing many local groups to 
collapse. Their disaffected membership was faced with two options: either join one of a host 
of nationalist left-wing organisations or join ETA.512 How could this Catholic heritage have 
influenced the new generation of activists? Was there a link between their self-abnegation and 
the principles of Christianity? We have already analysed the importance of religion in both 
early and late Basque nationalism. However, it is difficult to infer a direct causal link. Zulaika 
(1988: 55) contends that radical nationalism was linked to Christian models of sacrifice and 
martyrdom. We have discussed above how violence itself can be seen as a ritual, albeit 
secular, act, the finality of which goes beyond the mere physical damage caused (Douglass 
and Zulaika 1990).
In popular wisdom, economic factors are often indicated as causes of nationalist 
mobilisation, and even of nationalist violence. From the mid-1970s, the Basque Country 
underwent a process of major recession and rises in the level of unemployment. This factor 
can be considered as a lateral explanation and precipitant of nationalist violence, rather than 
its cause. But the economic crisis was a general world trend commonly experienced in most 
of the industrialized capitalist world. Yet, only in some areas it was accompanied by 
nationalist mobilizations, and even in fewer cases by nationalist violence. However, in some
511 Documentos Y: vol. 1: 371. See also Ortzi (1975: 276-7).
512 S ee  Zulaika (1988) for the example of the main radical group in Itziar.
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sectors this crisis differed from the one experienced in other countries, and its effect in 
Euskadi took a particularly heavy toll: large industries were the main pillar of the Basque 
economy. As branch plants of multinational corporations dominated, Euskadi was severely 
struck by the international crisis and many factories had to close down (Zirakzadeh 1989: 
321). When the international economy slumped in the 1970s, Euskadi was badly hit because 
of the relevance of its export sector and the specialization in metallurgy and capital goods. 
Small and big industries alike found themselves without customers. Hence, "oscillation with
international demand........ lead to wave of popular support for nationalist parties that aim to
protect the semi-peripheral areas from external economic pressures" (Zirakzadeh 1989:323).
Yet, wide ranging economic change had already occurred in the 1880s, but did not prompt 
a violent reaction. Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa were the poorest Spanish provinces in 1877. In a 
few years, they became the richest, creating both social discontent and demographic 
displacement. The virulent anti-Spanish tones of Arana concealed the rage of many Basques, 
yet such rage was, for the moment, simply channelled through a non-violent nationalist 
movement. Still in 1973, Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa held the first and third place respectively 
amongst all Spanish provinces in term of per capita income.513 Moreover, the economic 
crisis occurred approximately ten years after ETA had adopted armed struggle. Undoubtedly, 
violence rose to a new peak in the wake of the economic doldrums, when unemployment, 
recession and their corollary reinforced social tensions. For instance, between 1975 and 1981 
the adult labour force shrank by 11% and Euskadi's gross product had a negative growth rate 
for three successive years (Zirakzadeh 1989: 327). ETA took advantage of these negative 
circumstances. But a convincing reason for the increase of violence could hardly be given on 
the basis of the economic situation alone. Undoubtedly, the electoral programme of Herri 
Batasuna (the political wing of ETA) included powerful appeals to the economically 
dispossessed "through the use of pictorial representations of shovels, anvils and pitchforks", 
constantly alluding "to its candidates' firsthand experiences with unemployment layoffs and 
insecure jobs" (Zirakzadeh 1989: 328). Theories of 'relative deprivation' can be partly useful 
to explain this outcome. But, again, it seems better to consider the economic situation as a 
powerful reinforcing factor rather than as a determinant of the choice of violence.
513 See Garcfa Crespo et al. (1981) and Payne (1975: 229-33).
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Declining state legitimacy and persisting legitimacy of ETA during the
Transition
State measures to defeat 'terrorism' have often prompted the fear of a much more 
indiscriminate kind of violence falling upon the Basques.514 This perception of the state as a 
terrorist machinery persisted after the demise of the dictatorship, defying the dialogue with 
the nationalists initiated by the King, the UCD, and other reformers. Abertzale parties 
alleged that repression continued unabated after Franco's death. For instance, several 'anti­
terrorist laws', some of which were condemned as unconstitutional, resulted in arbitrary 
arrests and detentions (Clark 1991).515 Widespread opposition to the law has been expressed 
by popular demonstrations in several Spanish regions.516 Furthermore, the murder of 
Basque political exiles in France by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacidn), a self- 
styled 'anti-terrorist' commando,517 provoked angry popular demonstrations,518 unfolded a 
political scandal,519 and prompted accusations of central government's complicity.520
Let us now see how this situation of violent conflict was reflected in the social texture. 
Since the 1970s, political violence seems to have become an intrinsic feature of Basque 
society.521 This has brought about the division of society in at least two opposite fields. With 
some exaggeration, Heiberg highlights the polarized atmosphere which pervaded most areas 
of public life: "Political parties, artistic production, amnesty organizations, historical 
research, economic enterprises, schools, newspapers, public projects, popular festivals, 
publishing houses, etc. were forced into the mutually exclusive categories of abertzale /  
espaholista, nationalist/ non-nationalist, Basque/ anti-Basque" (1989: 110). However, 
Heiberg's dichotomy cannot be extended to more recent developments: following the 
approval of the autonomy statute, internal tensions started to plague the nationalist camp
514 If we were to apply W eber's definition of the state a s  that agency within society which 
p o ssesses  the monopoly of legitimate violence, we would be inclined to conclude not only that 
Spain is not a  nation, but to many Basques it has not been even a  state  -at least in the 1970s.
515 Part de la llei antiterrorista, considerada incostitucional, "Avui", 18 Decem ber 1987.
516 Cinco mil personas pidieron en Barcelona la dimisidn del ministro del Interior, "Egin", 
16 July 1983
517 This paramilitary organization murdered several ETA militants living in exile In France, 
and is said to be composed of security personnel (Korn 1989, Miralles and Arques 1990).
518 Violentas manifestaciones en el Pals Vasco tras el doble asesinato de militantes de ETA 
por los GAL, "La Vanguardia", 10 February 1984.
519 On the bloody trail of ETAgate, "Media-Guardian", 27 November 1989. A particularly 
detailed study is Miralles and Arques (1991).
520 Chaffee (1988: 565) mentions graffiti which appeared  in B asque cities and read 
GAL=PSOE, accusing the government that without the PSOE's approval the GAL commando could 
not operate.
521 Erradicar la violencia en Euskadi, "El Pafs",15 November 1987.
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along the radical-moderate line.522 Non-political gatherings too have often degenerated into 
collective eruptions of youth violence.523 The climate of antagonism has prompted a lack of 
communication between different segments of the society.524 Although the Autonomy Statute 
helped to restrain support for ETA, the provisions therein contained fell short of the 
requirements of most Basque nationalists. In particular, the statute could hardly mend the 
political hiatus that, at that time, separated the Basques from Madrid.
The environment was so polarized that the Civil Guards and policemen lived isolated from 
the rest of society.525 Nobody dared to speak to them and, as soon as somebody was seen 
doing so, he/she was immediately suspected of being a police informer. One of the first 
duties for all committed abertzale was to shun any chivatos (suspected police informers, 
who sometime included people who had any sort of contact with the 'occupation forces'). 
The chivatos were rejected and ostracized as moral outcasts from the community. After 
decades of behaving as ruthless boss of the region, the 'occupation forces' experienced a 
dramatic anti-climax from the 1970s onwards: the Civil Guards' and policemen's extremely 
hard situation was reflected in a sharp rise in suicide rates amongst their numbers.526 This 
backlash was an unavoidable side-effect of the Spanish state's profound transformation.
Such a boundless resentment against the forces of 'public order' testifies to the direct link 
between state repression and counter-repression. The security apparatus was considered a 
legitimate target of political violence because they were popularly seen as the origin and prime 
actors of political violence. Hence, policemen became symbolic targets and ETA's activists 
could rarely step up their campaign of terror against more important targets, such as 
industrialists, MPs, etc., because in this case the popularity of their actions risked ebbing or 
dwindling. There were no other social figures in Euskadi who could command similarly 
negative feelings.
522 Violent incidents entre des sdparatistes et le president du gouvernement basque, "Le 
Monde", 16 August 1983; Jestis  Ceberio, Cisma en la tribu de Aitor, "El Pafs-Domingo", 23 
November 1986, pp. 1-3.
523 45 heridos en choques entre jdvenes violentos y  polictas en Vitoria, "El Pafs", 9 August 
1987, pp. 1 and 11.
524 UNZUETA, Patxo (1986) Euskadi invertebrada, "El Pafs", 25 November 1986, p. 16
525 On the Guardia Civil as  a  powerful instrument of centralization, s e e  Lopez Garrido 
(1982).
526 El SUP previene sobre nuevos suicidios de policias en el Pafs Vasco, "El Pafs", 19 July 
1987.
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The dynamics of political violence
In order to explore the double causes of the choice of violence and of its permanence, we 
need different interpretations. As it has been pointed out, "various theories may have 
differential utility at different phases of terrorist movement. In the early stages, theories that 
explore the political roots of collective violence may have relatively greater utility. Later, 
theories that emphasize the tendency for violence to become an end in itself may be more 
useful" (Thompson 1989: 694-5). In the 1970s, a familiar pattern in ETA's evolution began 
to acquire a quicker tempo: as the more experienced and mature leaders of ETA were killed or 
forced into exile, younger and more radical leaders quickly replaced them, in a process that 
continues up to the present day. The Military Front, composed predominantly of very young 
people, became more and more uncontrollable, while its autonomous initiatives provoked 
further conflict. It clearly appears, especially during the "transition" phase, that violence has 
became a self-generating mechanism, a vicious circle very difficult to stop.527
Every exile, imprisonment or killing of ETA leaders created a vacuum which was soon 
filled by younger and more radical elements. For instance, in 1986, Txomin', at the time 
ETA's number one, was forced into exile. This action reached a new climax in the process of 
distancing the older leadership (the so-called histdricos) from the emerging militant base.528 
New radical elements were swiftly incorporated into ETA’s Executive Committee to replace 
the histdricos. The new guerrillas, who were more ruthless and determined, could move 
much more freely and safely across the border to France, while the known histdricos could 
hardly deceive the French information services. In this way, the latter become increasingly 
displaced by the former inside ETA. In ETA, "it was not possible to be a militant while being 
abroad".529 By being abroad, the older leaders lost many of their contacts with the closely- 
knit social networks of Basque resistance and the information and protection they provided. 
New ambitious young militants were eager to replace them in a process which was regulated 
by unrelenting internal competition.
Paradoxically, while the police exulted over the elimination of ETA's leaders, moderate 
nationalists expressed serious concerns about further uncontrollable violence.530 In fact,
527 Parallels with other guerrilla movements easily spring to mind: the IRA in Northern 
Ireland and the Khalistan movement in India's Punjab were • and are - plagued by a  similar 
internal logic. In both cases, violence served to complement internal fragmentation.
528 Los 'histdricos' do ETA dan paso a los jdvenes, "El Pafs-Domingo", 13 July 1986.
529 Txillardegi, in Garaia, op. cit....
530  Medios nacionalistas consideran mun serio error" e l alejamiento de Txomin', "El Pafs", 
12 July 1986.
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ETA's history has shown that the young arrivies are unmistakably more radical, more 
uncompromising and less prone to negotiate. Thus, Txomin’s expulsion hampered the 
progress of peace talks, since he was one of the leaders most favourable to negotiation.531 
The elimination of the old guard in 1986 and the following year can also explain why some 
of the most bloody terrorist acts occurred in 1987.532
In the last phase of the Francoist dictatorship, popular mobilizations were dependent on 
ETA's actions. As we have seen, each ekintza (ETA's action) had a deep impact among the 
youth, especially in the slumbering villages of the countryside. ETA has also been a means 
through which the Basque-Madrid conflict, and the oppositional identity related to it, have 
been kept alive. And as the new Basque identity was (since the 1960s) founded on conflict 
and opposition, the prospects of any peaceful de-assimilation from Spain was closely linked 
to the possibility of creating a positive self-identity no longer based on the negation of the 
enemy.
The trend towards 'de-ethnicization' prevailed at the time of the Marxist 'conversion' in the 
early 1960s with its class politics and its lack of interest in Basque culture. Although the 
Military Front operated within the superficial legitimacy of Basque culture, it also used 
violence as a mobilizing avenue by continuously redefining the Basque-Spanish conflict in 
irreconcilable terms. Thus, these military activists have tacitly pursued the option of 
reinforcing ethnic borders without reinforcing ethnic contents. The task of reinforcing 
ethnic contents was left to the cultural nationalists, who, although eclipsed by the military 
branch in the media, grew along with them. With its Maoist-derived emphasis on the 
countryside as the spearhead of revolutionary change, Krutwig's Third-Woridist option was 
an attempt to reconcile cultural, political and military nationalism, to merge ethnic borders and 
ethnic contents. Yet, although this direction apparently gave place of pride to culture, culture 
was unavoidably subordinated to armed action in ETA's practice and military nationalism 
became a separate force. In the aims of the nationalists, violence proved to be an effective 
substitute for culture insofar as it contributed to delineate the 'boundaries' of the Basque 
community by sharply demarcating outsiders from insiders.
We are now left to ponder whether this is the most useful way to understand what 
happened. Couldn't violence be an outcome of uncertainty over cultural values, rather than 
lack of cultural contents? The answer is that the two are deeply inter-related and we have
531 Los 'histdricos'..., "El Pafs-Domingo", 13 July 1986.
532  ETA cometid en 1987, en Barcelona y  Zaragoza, los atentados mds sangrientos, "El
Pafs", 29 January 1988, 15. Algo cambiard tras Hipercor, "El Pafs", 28 June 1987.
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repeatedly came across this mutual relationship: firstly, Arana the philologist gave way to 
Arana the racialist; secondly, the urban/ rural and Castilian/Euskaldun divide was at the core 
of ETA's lacerating dilemmas. These dilemmas were normally resolved by privileging action 
over introspection. Since at least the Fifth Assembly, "action" became the core value 
promoted by ETA. The concept of ekintza, generally used to indicate an armed attack by 
ETA, also conveyed a whole model of participating into the national struggle. Likewise, the 
concept of abertzale became an inclusive one by virtue of ETA's expanding struggle: 
"Abertzale is a status not defined by birth but by performance: an abertzale is one who 
participates in the political struggle... You are not bom abertzale. You make yourself one" 
(Mac Clancy 1988). Modem batua condenses these trends in the verb abertzaletu (=to 
become a patriot) and the substantive aberriordeko (= adopted homeland). Basques, in 
ETA's eyes, were distinguished from non-Basques mainly on the basis of their involvement 
in the struggle for Basque liberation. Lacking a discrete and visible element such as language, 
the requirements of Basque identity have shifted to a simpler voluntarist dimension. The 
more a person is involved in the struggle, the more he/ she is accepted as a member of the 
national community. Hence, the most radical option was likely to be considered also the most 
'Basque' and thus the most morally acceptable. As a consequence, the social environment 
was far more polarized in Euskadi than in Catalonia, with each nationalist stressing his/her 
nationalist credentials in order to be accepted by the 'moral community’.533 But does this 
mean that activists will not accept a Basque who is passive as a member of the Basque 
nation? No, one thing does not imply the other. There is always a hope that passive ones, 
either Basques or non-Basques, will re-awaken from their lethargy and rejoin the nation by 
means of struggle. Hence, such a Renanian idea of the 'nation of will' is an open concept, 
which stands at the antipodes of Arana's closed vision. In chapter 8, we have shown that the 
crucible for second-generation immigrants' integration is their political involvement. They 
can prove their involvement by participating in more and more demanding tasks, in a 
concentric circle of loyalties and identities, layer upon layer into the heart of the 'moral' 
community. Only then, they might feel the urge of learning Euskara.
The border-making functions of violence have not always been self-conscious among 
activists. Obviously, militants could see that violence exerted a powerful emotional impact 
and attracted more people into political action. But they seldom, if ever, conceived violence
533 The concept of the nation a s  a  'moral community' is due to Symmons-Symonolewicz
(1970: 50-ff).
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as a mere replacement for something else missing. Hence, no political writing of ETA 
theorizes about violence as a substitute for culture. Because of the nationalist tendency to see 
the nation as an organic whole and to deny all internal cleavages, we have to infer ourselves 
these internal gaps.534
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have postulated several points. Firstly, we asserted that Basque violence 
is the product of the interaction between state repression and the nationalists' own internal 
tensions. These internal tensions were reflected in opposite ideologies and political trends co­
existing inside ETA. Secondly, we have observed that such ideological and political 
fragmentation was related to cultural fragmentation. The different factions pursued different 
vision of Basque identity, aimed at different strata of the population (immigrant /native, rural/ 
urban, etc.), stressed different aspects of Basqueness, and adopted different strategies and 
tactics in order to achieve their goals. Thirdly, we have shown that cultural fragmentation 
was in part the result of cultural assimilation. The latter originated from several factors which 
were discussed throughout the thesis: urbanization, elites' Castilianization, industrialization, 
centralization, and, finally, mass immigration. At this point, we must reiterate our picture of 
Euskadi's cultural space as plural and fragmented. In contrast with Catalonia, there is a lack 
of clear-cut and undisputed shared values. In chapter 7, we related the latter particularly to the 
degree of language maintenance, once established the centrality of language in most European 
nationalist movements. At no time have we argued that, because of fragmentation, Basque 
identity is weaker. Quite the contrary, its strongly oppositional and antagonistic character 
guarantees a continuous rehearsal of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite'.
Finally, this chapter has stressed how central the role of state repression was in cementing a 
common identity out of previous anthropological chaos. If we are to apply a purely 
functionalist approach, political violence responded both to an internal logic (the need to 
foster unity in the organisation) and an external logic (the need to respond to the challenge 
of the state). At any moment of stormy ideological debate within ETA, the initiative was 
seized by some violent factions. In this way, direct action, rather than ideology and culture,
534 In a rare display of the border-making m echanisms of violence, the playwright Alfonso 
Sastre, a  former Communist and sympathizer of radical nationalism, declared: "Violence is one 
way of building a  nation”. He meant that oppositional violence is a mobilizing force which can 
create a sense  of solidarity and a border where previously few or none were evident. This does 
not m ean that the 'nation' is defined by violence; the latter is solely a  m eans to its creation. 
"La viol&ncia 6s una forma de construir una naci6m, El M6n. n® 204, 21 March 1986, pp. 20- 
2 1 .
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showed the way to be followed in order to achieve mass mobilization with its concomitant 
effect of galvanizing public support. While the theorists debated over the importance of this 
or that element of Basque culture, or about this or that ideological line or strategy to be 
adopted, the hard-liners overcame all of them. With their attacks, they demonstrated the 
simple reality that only direct action could achieve popular support and even extend 
mobilization to non-ethnic Basques. The 'ideologues' thus had to face the music and bow to 
the argument that only a violent uprising could revitalize Basque nationhood, while 
disquisitions about the details of Basque identity retained a divisive effect At least from 1973 
onwards (year of the killing of Carrero Blanco), ETA operated under the slogan "Actions 
Unite, Words Divide". ETA's activity has thus taken an anti-intellectual turn, the antithesis of 
Ekin’s original philosophy.
A common feature of insurgent nationalist guerrillas in many countries is their relation 
with, and even dependence on, state repression.535 All over the world, a plethora of 
nationalities and former tribes are drawn into violent confrontation with the state as a result of 
decades of coercion by central authorities which are felt to be largely illegitimate.536 The 
more recent the memories of suffering and horrors are, the more acute the conflict seems to 
be. Of all Krutwig's ideas, his principle of 'retaliation', as expressed in the theory of action/ 
repression/ action, was the only one which in practice remained constant in ETA throughout 
its long history of mutations and splits (Jauregui 1981: 220). Lacking the cultural link or 
other clearly defined rallying points, the guerrilla could only rely on action. We have also 
indicated who were the foreign ideologues exerting the most profound influence on both 
ETA's strategies and new ways of conceiving the nation: Renan and Fanon. The fact that 
both were French-speaking and French-educated was not a coincidence.537 As many Basque 
nationalists were well-versed in French, most foreign ideologies were imported into Euskadi 
via France and in French. French intellectuals, especially in the 1960s, exerted an 
unparalleled impact on the Basque radical intelligentsia.538
Recent studies have began to stress the cultural components and ethnic origins of
535 Wilson's study of the impact of s ta te  repression on G uatem ala's Indian communities is 
illuminating: "Acting on M ao-Tse-Tung's fam ous dictum that guerrillas depended  on the 
population like fish on the sea , the army set about draining the sea . In the end, Q'eqchi villagers 
suffered far higher loss of life than the armed com batants. R epression itself w as the most 
significant factor of all that led to Q 'eqchi's joining the guerrilla" (1991: 40).
536 In many Third World countries, this has been one of the legacies of decolonization, 
w hereas local elites have proved unable to impose their rule and values unless by force.
537 We cannot define Fanon as a  Frenchman at heart, but technically he was, as French was 
his education.
coo
000 We mentioned the impact of the existentialists, especially Sartre.
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ethnonationalist movements (Hroch 1985, Smith 1986,1991). However, movements which 
began as forms of cultural activism altered their strategies and objectives in the course of their 
struggle. Thus, at different stages, ETA relegated the cultural struggle to second rank, in 
order to deploy its full resources for a frontal clash with the state. How was this possible ? 
This chapter has postulated two modes (normally opposed) of political mobilisation: culture 
or violence. Where differential cultural elements were available as ethnic boundaries, the 
ethno-nationalist movement tended naturally to use them. In this way, the movement could 
also present itself as their saviour, while promoting a new militant vision of national culture. 
Operating through semi-legal institutions, Catalan leaders could more easily advance their 
claims under an unified platform and find internal cohesion around the centrality of one (or 
more) values. In contrast, when they cannot take advantage of pre-existing ethnic borders, 
nationalist leaders are compelled to choose other types of mobilization. Cultural assimilation 
also highlights and uncovers a vital threat against a group’s basic identity. Through the 
conceptualization of this existential crisis, nationalist leaders can formulate a strategy of direct 
defence against central power. In one breath, the state is blamed for military repression and 
for destroying the national culture. Hence, cultural, political and military nationalists, all have 
a grudge and a reason to welcome violence.
The transition to democracy reinforced the pre-existing trend at a time when the old order 
was collapsing and the new one still undefined. However, as both radical and moderate 
nationalists attempted to build up a consensus on the idea of the nation, a cultural revival 
became possible. Autonomy concessions seriously undermined ETA, offering a chance to try 
out the new constitutional arrangements. Through the reinstatement of fundamental freedoms 
(and that does not necessarily mean independence), the Basque community had its first 
chance to face a serene future and experience a positive sense of self-realization. But the 
process was continuously hampered by persisting state repression and indecision over 
Basque identity. Since Basque identity was not so strongly defined by discrete cultural 
elements (such as language), the nationalists needed a constant process of mobilization in 
order to raise collective awareness. This may be one of the reasons why it is so hard to bid 
farewell to political violence.
My thesis rests on the case of the Basque Country, but it is possible to find similar 
examples in other countries (Conversi 1994). Some of these may appear to be less 
convincing, yet under more careful scrutiny they do not contradict my thesis. If, for instance, 
we look at the Welsh case, we can see a cultural situation highly similar to Euskadi: around
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20% speak the national language, there is a rural/ urban divide, etc. Why, then, did this case 
not produce violence? According to my thesis, the answer lies in the absence of the second 
factor, state repression. This has never hit the Welsh national movement indiscriminately. 
Hence, it is also much more difficult for the nationalists to blame the loss of Welsh culture on 
the repressive action of the state.
In this chapter, I followed Smith's (1984,1986) theory that memories and myths are what 
found collective identities. National identities are based on shared memories and myths and, 
by definition, violence weighs heavily on collective memory. Myths of ethnic foundation arc 
based on discourses and records of recent or past collective sufferings. Images of resistance 
are constandy re-evoked and cast against opposed images of oppression, where the people is 
the hero and the state the villain. My contribution to Smith's theory adds four further points: 
a) ethnic memories can survive over the centuries in spite of linguistic assimilation; b) 
assimilation, without erasing collective memories, make ethnic borders and national identities 
more vague, fragmented and less easy to mobilise; c) this assimilation cum fragmentation 
carries in itself the seeds of a possible violent evolution, once a nationalist movement is 
superimposed on this context; and d) a second variable, state repression, is necessary for this 
violent potential to fully emerge. When state repression interacts with a lack of shared 
culture and values, the potential for violence is likely to materialize.
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Epilogue
Throughout my thesis I have stressed the importance of culture, particularly language, in 
the project of identity construction of ethno-nationalist elites. I have shown that, to a different 
degree, modernity has eroded the traditional markers of ethnicity through the subsequent 
processes of state centralization, assimilation of local elites, and, finally, mass immigration. 
All these processes have deeply altered the anthropological structure of the two regions, but 
have not impaired their basic identity and sense of separateness. On the contrary, they have 
reinforced the determination of the local leaders and their followers to pursue an autonomous 
status for their nation, even political independence. In this epilogue we shall formulate some 
conclusions on the oppositional character of nationalism, through a comparison of the two 
movements.
First of all, let us remind ourselves of the main similarities and contrasts between the two 
movements. They shared the following similarities:
1. they operated within the same state structure, Spain
2. they arose broadly at the same time, end of the Nineteenth century
3. they are among the most popular nationalist movements in Western Europe
4. their regions have been at the vanguard of the Spanish economy
5. they received vast amounts of immigrants and had, thus, to face the challenge of 
integrating them
However, the dissimilarities were greater, and some were related to class structure:
1. The Basque bourgeoisie was pro-centralist. The Catalan bourgeoisie wanted to control 
the central state, but failing this, turned to regionalism.539
2. The Basque bourgeoisie was small in numbers (the six to ten families who controlled the 
local economy can be defined as a semi-oligarchy), but big in capital concentration. The 
Catalan bourgeoisie was more diversified, there were several family-run enterprises scattered
539 Economic elites diverged in their attitude towards the state: the Basque semi-oligarchy
w as staunchly liberal, free-m arketeer and centralist, while C atalan  industrialists w ere
protectionists and lobbied for increasing tariffs to shelter their production.
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across a wider geography, but none so rich and financially powerful as the big Basque firms.
3. The timing of industrialization was also different, or at least its impact radically differed: 
Basque industrialization was massive and abrupt, after the abolition of the fueros in 1876.540 
Catalan industrialization was a lengthier process.54! Hence, Basque society had less time to 
adapt to such radical changes.
4. Some of the economic factors are obviously related to cultural ones. Basque industries 
were concentrated in a particular area of Bilbao, the left bank of the river Nervion. But Bilbao 
was never the 'moral' capital of Euskadi. It had to compete for this place at least with San 
Sebastian and Pamplona. Indeed, the choice of Vitoria/Gasteiz as the capital of today's 
Autonomous Community responds to the need to choose a neutral centre, alien to the 
traditional cultural, geographic and economic divergence. In contrast, Barcelona was the 
centre for both the regional culture and the industrial revolution. Yet, the latter was not really 
concentrated in a single area, and several towns in Barcelona's province were the seat of the 
most important textile factories.542
5. Politically, Catalan autonomies were crushed in 1716, whereas centralism reached 
Euskadi more than a hundred years after, in 1876.
6. According to local historians, the Basques had an 'egalitarian ethos', whereas the 
Catalans had an entrepreneurial and familial bourgeois ethos.
7. Religiously, we have seen that Basque society was more traditional, Catholic and 
conservative than Catalan society. It was also less modernized when nationalism emerged, 
and more alienated from the central government.
The dissimilarities in national identity patterns have been illustrated particularly in chapter 7 
to 9. There are several explanations for these differences:
1. A 'popular' explanation focuses on their different 'national character'. Obviously, such a 
concept is more apt to reinforce stereotypes than to analyse.
2. The economic explanation privileges uneven development between core and periphery as 
a catch-all factor. This is difficult to relate to the two regions, since they were both advanced 
sectors of the Spanish economy.543 Furthermore, their economy was, and is, not internally
540 The only exceptions were the coastal areas of GuipOzcoa and Vizcaya, which becam e 
"centers of commerce, trade and manufacturing as early a s  the sixteenth century” (Huxley, 
cited by Clark 1979: 8). The shipbuilding industry also developed on a  quasi-industrial basis, 
but no large-scale industrialization began prior to 1876. Economic fragmentation w as also 
typical of the Basque provinces. See Gonzalez Portilla (1989).
541 Catalan industrialization was also more autochthonous, that is, less influenced by foreign 
capital.
542 In particular, Matar6, Sabatell and Terrassa.
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homogeneous.
3. The class explanation focuses on the different role assumed by the local hegemonic 
classes (see above).
4. The historical explanation considers that the Basques never achieved statehood, if we 
except the jueros granted by the monarchy until 1876.544
5. The political explanation focuses on the role of state repression. It is useful in accounting 
for the intensity of Basque radicalism, but only after ETA was bom.
6. The anthropological/ cultural explanation focuses on the role of the local culture. The 
latter supplied the raw material to the first nationalist formulations.
As we have said, my account privileges the last two factors. Let us now reiterate the main 
contrast between the two movements, taking into consideration the different relationship with 
the Spanish state they championed. First, Basque nationalism was intransigent and separatist 
from its very inception. In contrast, the initial Catalan appeal was mildly regionalist and pro- 
Spanish, rather than fully nationalist. Second, Basque separatism has developed from the 
1960s a notoriously violent component. Catalan nationalism is more accommodative and 
broadly non-violent. For many onlookers, the former personifies blind irrationality, as the 
latter exemplifies bourgeois rationalist calculations. Catalan nationalism was, thus, a form of 
Spanish Regenerationism which aimed at regenerating the entire Spanish state. By contrast, 
Arana's drive to independence implied a break of major proportions with the Spanish state. It 
aimed at withdrawing from the state and drastically re-drawing its borders. This emphasis 
was rarely found in Catalonia, a country which could always boast obvious linguistic 
markers in order to advance its national 'credentials', both inwardly (dissemination among 
the people of the idea of belonging to the same Catalan nation) and outwardly (cultural 
legitimation of Catalan ethnic claims vis-d-vis Castile).
Intransigence and maximalism remained a central tenet of Basque nationalism throughout 
the years. But the Basque separatist option did not translate itself into an immediate recourse 
to violence. In fact, Arana and his followers were convinced apostles of non-violence. Until 
the Civil War, no violent form of nationalism had gained any popularity. Other crucial 
conditions had to intervene in order to foster violence.
543  However, the impressive decline of mining, siderurgy and other big industries in the
1970s affected the Basque economy to a  much greater extent than Catalonia (Zirakzadeh 1989,
1991).
544 This point is disputed by Agirreazkenagua (1987) who describes Vizcaya before 1876 as
a  quasi-independent state.
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Fragmented constituencies and authoritarian leadership
We have seen that the Basque Nationalist Party remained the sole representative of Basque 
nationalism, dominating nationalist politics for most of this century until the 1970s. In 
contrast, early Catalanism was not represented by a single party (all the main historical 
Catalanist parties emerged from coalitions of previously established groups), but its lack of 
political unanimity was compensated by its common aim and breadth of appeal.545 We have 
also seen how the situation was partially reversed in the 1980s, when nationalism was 
represented by a single main party in Catalonia (CiU), but by several parties in Euskadi 
(PNV, EE, EA, HB).
In the first two historical chapters, we have analyzed how Basque nationalism was centered 
around a single leader, Sabino Arana, whilst Catalan nationalism had been articulated through 
the voice of several intellectuals and political figures. But appearances should not deceive us. 
Paradoxically, Basque nationalism emerged from a fragmented political environment, whilst 
Catalonia was moving around a platform of consensus, which was basically provided by the 
undisputed need to regenerate Catalan culture as a minimum demand. Preceded by the 
Renaixenga, Catalan nationalism could always refer back to the revival of powerful cultural 
symbols, epitomized by a literary renaissance. Basque nationalism was much more subject to 
bitter internal rifts, rivalries and ideological confrontation than Catalan nationalism at any 
given time. Only the charismatic-authoritarian personality of Sabino Arana could hold 
together under a single banner an archipelago of often solipsist and quaint local figures. 
Indeed, without Arana and his intransigent programme, Basque nationalism could hardly 
ever have arisen in its present form. Probably, no PNV could have emerged and no Unitarian 
nationalist programme would have been able to gain popularity. Once Arana died, he left a 
legacy of firm principles, a line of assertiveness, a radical credo, a political bible made up of 
a few simple slogans, which was to be followed by several generations without significant 
ideological alterations until the 1950s. Attempts by bourgeois elements to infiltrate the party 
and to mollify its line had only temporary success. A hard-core of unswerving sabinianos 
always emerged to claim for themselves the reins of the party.
Yet, Arana’s legacy was in itself confused and its commitment to language maintenance 
should not be taken at face value. An interesting episode shows clearly the incapacity of 
Arana to conceive a language with any integrating power, even among the Basques. At the
545 Catalanist parties won elections and swept the polls much earlier that their Basque
counterparts.
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beginning of the century, a significant effort was made to reunite in Fuenterrabia the most 
relevant Basque linguists and philologists from both sides of the Pyrenees for a congress on 
orthographic unification. Most illustrious scholars "trembled at the news that Arana was 
going to participate with 320 of his followers, most of them incompetent people, blind and 
unconditional henchmen of their master. The congress... was a complete fiasco because of 
the intransigence of the Aranists.... The colleagues from the French Basque Country 
withdrew in disgust, and the orthographic disagreement between them and us persists until 
the present-day" (Villasante 1979: 294-5).546 For Arana, language had to remain exclusively 
an ethnic barrier, and all efforts to dampen its purism met with his total opposition. Hence, 
Arana's credo was coherent only in its opposition to Spain, but not as Basque identity was 
concerned.
This oppositional character is present in all nationalisms and, indeed, in all forms of group 
identity. However, opposition can be articulated either through the self-appraisal of one 
own's identity, or through a negative and constant comparison with an external enemy. The 
contrast between these two models has emerged clearly in the thesis: Catalan mobilization has 
been centered on the positive assertion of the group's culture. Conversely, since Arana, 
Basque politics has been based on negation and confrontation. This is related to the two 
nationalist patterns, Basque exclusivism and Catalan integrationism. The latter proposition 
does not imply that oppositional movements are always exclusivist. Authoritarian leadership 
persisted after Arana’s death and was revived during Francoism. As no personality like 
Arana could emerge in a captive society deprived of any freedom of expression, a strong 
authoritarian leadership could only arise in the underground, through a faceless organisation. 
That was one of the main roles filled by ETA.
In such a society, where no other communication was possible, the "logic of 
action/repression/ action" was indeed a form of communication. In Catalonia, an 
underground, but rich, cultural life could convey veiled messages of self-determination and 
hopes for future resurgence. In Euskadi, no high culture meant no hope, while the nationalist 
intelligentsia had to invent new ways of counter-mobilisation. The de-Basquisation of 
Basque elites was one of the prime causes for this confusion.
In short, we have seen that Basque nationalism progressed from political unity to
54 6  £ Ver s jnce Arana, the struggle to revive Euskara always remained an argum ent of 
passionate debate amongst nationalists. In their heart and mind, Euskera remained the vessel of 
Basque uniqueness, yet, although hailed as a  symbol of nationhood, its promotion w as rarely put 
into practice.
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fragmentation, while in Catalan nationalism the direction was opposite, from political 
fragmentation to unity. The influence of core values was crucial to this evolution. In order to 
clarify this point, we shall stress again the role of cultural nationalism in its dialectics with 
political nationalism. There was a difference in the way in which cultural nationalists 
interacted with the state. In Catalonia, they used cultural arguments as a disguise for political 
mobilisation, not only as an end in itself. In this way, Catalanists carved up a non-political 
space for themselves and were for a while, from the 1950s, able to elude total censorship. 
As cultural arguments were weaker in Euskadi, culture could not unite the democratic 
opposition, but Basque nationalists were more intransigent in their demands. Since the state 
was also more intransigent in dealing with Basque opposition, the latter had to act in 
complete secrecy. Following Franz Fanon and other radical political theorists, Basque 
nationalists set out to morally regenerate their nation through violence. Moral regeneration is 
a task normally accomplished by cultural nationalists (Hutchinson 1987), but the lack of a 
robust cultural nationalism and shared cultural elements implied that this regeneration had to 
be carried out with other means.^47 The opposite process occurred in Catalonia, where the 
slow release of censorship allowed a timid but steady revival of the national culture, which 
served as a focus for the opposition.
Immigration
The relationship between cultural nationalism and political nationalism had also to 
withstand the test of mass immigration. In chapter 8, I have shown how immigration 
influenced the evolution of Catalan and Basque nationalism. By refuting Heiberg's (1989: 
196) thesis that "nationalism has created two antagonistic political communities", I showed 
that postwar Basque nationalism has helped instead to compound and smooth pre-existing 
ethnic divisions, but at the cost of magnifying the overall opposition between Basques - both 
immigrants and natives - and Madrid.548 
The perception of immigrants as bearer of the oppressor's culture characterized late 19th
547 Parallels with Irish history can be drawn, although the degree of B asque 'success ' is 
relative. As in the Irish case , through opposition and repression "a self-actualizing myth 
developed in the course of a successful war of liberation against alien rule. This serves two 
purposes. It identifies the nation in the popular mind with specific nationalist ideals and leaders 
and provides an enemy who acts as  a  negative reference point. It also furnishes a  se t of 
common experiences -of triumph and of suffering - that, when invoked by cultural nationalists, 
may re lease  collective energ ies after independence in support of the  nation-building 
programme" (Hutchinson 1987: 306).
548 I do not pretend to deny that a  fracture still exists between natives and immigrants, yet 
this fracture does not depend on nationalism.
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century Basque nationalism (Arana 1982: 197-199). Sabino de Arana was particularly 
concerned with the fate of the language, but, contrary to what happened in Catalonia, Arana 
felt it impossible to assimilate the immigrants. To many Basques the language appeared to be 
irreparably lost, so the emphasis was increasingly put on more ambiguous concepts as 
defining traits of the Basque nation. Arana's ideology focussed on a nostalgic mythification 
of the past and on Basque racial purity. The goal was therefore not the assimilation of 
newcomers, but, quite the contrary, a nostalgic striving for an uncontaminated sense of 
Basqueness. This self-enclosure was bound to fail, because the increasing wealth of the 
region continued to attract immigrants. These could not be culturally integrated for several 
reasons: because of the central regime's oppression of Basque culture, because of the hostile 
attitudes of some of the natives, and because a difficult language such as Euskara could not 
be properly learned without its own school system.549 The failure to transform Basque 
culture into an high culture must again account for its failure to attract immigrants.
In contrast, rejection of immigrants has not traditionally featured as a prominent Catalanist 
concern. An anti-immigrant reaction did not materialise after the war thanks to both the Left 
and the social-Catholic nationalist leadership. Knowledge of Catalan was an important feature 
of civil participation, representing a powerful stimulus to adaptation for many immigrants 
(the more so from the second generation onwards). Given the similarity between Catalan and 
Castilian, Catalan identity was based on highly permeable borders and non-Catalans could 
easily become Catalans by adopting bilingualism. And, since the stress on language was 
clear, such borders were also more clearly identifiable and, thus, easier to cross. Immigrants 
were encouraged both in their integration into, and identification with, Catalonia, by the 
obvious stress on language as a carrier of national identity. With the twilight of Francoism 
and during the democratic transition, Catalan has assumed a key role on the political scene. 
Most political, intellectual, artistic, and religious forces fully committed themselves to the 
recovery of the language. Their purpose was to elevate it into a communicative instrument 
fully appropriate to the needs of a dynamic and modem society.550
The belief in the capacity of Catalan culture to absorb newcomers was one of the main 
reasons an anti-immigrant reaction did not surface in spite of the immigrant* numbers. 
Cultural vitality is at the basis of what can be broadly defined as Catalan optimism, as
549 In Euskadi, the language gap between immigrants and natives is even wider than in most 
industrialized countries.
5 5 0  The centrality of language also explains the ex istence of a prolific school of 
sociolinguistic stud ies. S ee  VallverdO (1980) for an exhaustive overview of C atalan 
sociolinguistics up to the year 1979.
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opposed to Basque pessimist attitudes. As many immigrants coming from the 
underdeveloped Andalusian countryside perceived Catalan culture to be superior to their 
own, they were both encouraged and willing to integrate, despite the fact that another high 
culture, Castilian, had the one and only support from the state.
Language maintenance
Over the last century, the Basque language has been stressed over and over again as the 
most important distinctive element of Basqueness by politicians and scholars, both foreign 
and local. The founders of Basque nationalism were also cultural nationalists and saw 
Euskara as the quintessence of Basque identity. However, their dream of reviving it clashed 
with the reality of a declining tongue. This sociolinguistic situation influenced Basque politics 
in at least five ways:
1. It radicalized potential cultural nationalists as they faced the possible disappearance of 
Euskara. Their compensatory reaction was to forge an uncompromising movement stressing 
separation from Spain. Arana was first a Carlist, then became a nationalist. After 
understanding that a language revival on the Catalan pattern was not viable, he focussed on 
race and religion and beat a retreat into separatism.
2. Cultural assimilation prompted a contrast among nationalists over which element(s) of 
Basqueness should be fostered. These tensions were recurrent in ETA's internal quarrels. 
Although strictly political discussions were to the fore, cultural debates always loomed in the 
background.
3. This lack of definition of the central elements of Basqueness created a vacuum in 
political programmes. Once political violence was triggered under Francoism, this vacuum 
was easily filled by military actions.
4. It added a powerful element of accusation against the centralist regime, identified as 
bearing the main responsibility for cultural assimilation and loss. Accusations of cultural 
genocide served to justify internally armed struggle as a defence from, and response against, 
the state.
5. It fomented a sense of despair since many Basques perceived themselves as belonging to 
a people on the verge of extinction. Only drastic counter-measures, such as a mass 
insurrection, could save the Basques from their doomsday and their state of abeyance.551
551 Jauregui (1981) uses the powerful expression sentimento agonico (that is, a  feeling of
anguish and despair, of impending collective threat, of living on the threshold of oblivion).
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All the above conditions remained confined to a coterie of committed militants until a 
decisive external factor contributed to spread it to the masses. State repression at a time of 
regime decline and change was the main trigger of popular support for armed reaction against 
the dictatorship. Although cultural nationalists such as Txillardegi did not overtly embrace 
violent strategies, they were nevertheless radical die-hards not prone to compromise. In the 
1960s, Txillardegi's attempt to build an Unitarian nationalist front through cultural 
nationalism provided the bond for a plethora of mutually arguing factions. Nevertheless, 
cultural nationalists could not put a halt - perhaps, they also did not want to- to the increasing 
spiral of political violence.
It is worth recalling the contrasting status of Catalan. The dictatorship sheltered a highly 
abnormal situation: Catalan was alive and widely spoken in many walks of life, but its public 
use was strictly forbidden, forcibly confined to domestic life, far from police inspection. 
Subsequently, the vitality of civil society has turned Catalan into one of the most creative 
non-official languages in Europe. Today it is used in all domains, it is a scientific language 
with a continuously expanding output of neologisms, it has a rich literature, it is the main 
language of theatre, arts, universities and television, and it is making great inroads in the 
movies, as well as in the daily and weekly press. All this progress was unthinkable only ten 
years ago, when the country came out of an uncertain transition from autocratic rule to 
Westem-style democracy (1975-1982).
How can we explain the different impact of cultural nationalism? An answer lies in the 
different role played by the two nationalist intelligentsias. Nationalist leaders normally pursue 
the following three tasks:
1. to mobilize their constituencies through common symbols and values
2. to allocate a 'division of labour' within the movement and, in this way, control radical 
deviations and inter-generational tensions.
3. to convey the message that, if the nation is fatally threatened, they are able defend it 
through their programme of moral regeneration.
These three points have had opposite effects on our two case-studies:
1. The Catalan intelligentsia could mobilize vast numbers through the use of specific 
symbols and values (namely, language), and in their defence. The Basque intelligentsia could 
not achieve the same result
2. At a time when political nationalism was still quiescent, the Catalan youth was drawn 
into the struggle for cultural regeneration. Lacking a similar tradition of cultural nationalism
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and without a corresponding 'division of labour', the disoriented Basque youth was more 
prone to engage in other forms of struggle.
3. The Catalanist leaders could reassure their constituencies that the nation could be saved 
through their own programme of cultural regeneration. In contrast, the Basque youth was 
disenchanted with the incapacity of the old leadership to put forward a programme of national 
regeneration and decided to act on their own.
These three factors prompted Basque radicals to drift towards political violence, a drift 
which was continuously reinforced by state repression. Cultural nationalism functions not 
simply as a binding force, but particularly as a way to channel the energies of enthusiastic 
young nationalists who are eager to act with all available means. It follows that, without a 
thriving cultural nationalism, the chances are greater for such nationalist youth to engage in 
political violence.
Nationalism as border-making
The state is the most powerful institution in the modem world. Given that nationalism is 
also an ideology aimed at the control of the state by the nation, it should not be surprising that 
nationalism is also the most powerful contemporary ideology. Nevertheless, scholarship has 
reacted tardily to such evidence and the study of nationalism has belatedly emerged as an 
academic discipline in its own right. Hence, theories of nationalism are deficient in various 
respects and omit essential aspects of the phenomenon. For instance, few of the mainstream 
theories of nationalism starts from the crucial consideration that nationalism is a form of 
border creation and/or maintenance.552 Borders are needed to ensure a distinction between 
two or more differentiable groups, or the spaces they inhabit, which could otherwise be 
confused and intermingle with each other. Borders are a natural mechanism of both 
individual and group defence and are an universal phenomenon occurring amongst all living 
beings.
However, the process is enormously facilitated when such borders include some clear 
differential markers or signposts.553 In the process of universal homogenization which has 
characterized modernity, many ethnies have lost their distinctive customs, laws, mores, 
traditions, etc. Nevertheless, this process of erosion of traditional societies has left almost 
unscathed historical memories and even myths of original independence which are at the heart 
of national identities (Smith 1986, 1991). Hence, the potential for nationalist mobilization
552 On this, see  Breuilly (1993).
553 The concept of 'cultural markers' has also been used by Gellner (1973).
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and conflict has remained intact despite cultural assimilation. The nationalist leaders'job is to 
reawaken such 'slumbering' human material, giving voice and putting order to a set of often 
confused popular perceptions and myths. This job will be facilitated enormously if the 
leaders can focus the loyalty of their people around some shared symbols of identity or core 
values, and if they can express this in a distinct language.
The thesis has looked at how this process of national reawakening has worked in two 
opposed cases, that is, cultural persistence (Catalonia) and cultural assimilation (Euskadi). 
Firstly, the thesis showed that cultural preconditions and the anthropological landscape have 
had a determining impact on the evolution of the two nationalist movements. Secondly, it 
appeared that cultural fragmentation brings with it fragmented conceptions of national 
identity. Hence, cultural fragmentation paves the way to political fragmentation. Thirdly, it 
analysed the role of state repression in reinforcing previously weak or confused ethnic 
boundaries. Fourthly, it theorized the influence of cultural vitality and state action on the 
violent or non-violent character of nationalist mobilization.
An underlying rationale of the thesis was to uncover the fallacy of those who still believe 
that the advent of a global culture could inspire peace and prosperity through a lessening of 
conflict. This is far from the truth and a rapid glance at the map of world conflicts (Gurr 
1993, Gurr and Scarritt 1989, Harff and Gurr 1989) will enable us to see that all of them 
have emerged in situations of close cultural contact and, for most of them, such contact has 
resulted in assimilation of the weaker by the dominant culture. Thus, in endless cases, violent 
conflicts have been revived by weak identities, and weak identities have been rejuvenated 
through violent conflicts. However, the use of violence results in a further contradiction: it 
brings about more disruption of the local culture, mass mobilization and homogenization (the 
two concepts must be treated in tandem), and massive human losses. Nevertheless, it also 
reinforces boundary perceptions, disrupting multicultural coexistence and reviving centuries- 
old antagonisms, which once triggered have a power of their own. As shown in countless 
cases, among which the Yugoslav conflict stands out, once a conflict is initiated, people are 
helplessly drawn into it on each side. The more violent the conflict, the more likely that 'un­
hyphenated' individuals with no predetermined allegiances are compelled to take sides.
Through a reappraisal of the role played by cultural factors, my thesis has related them to 
the process of boundary making and boundary maintenance. The vitality of these cultural 
factors is thus related to the vitality of cultural nationalism, which, in turn, is linked to the
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elites' different formulations of national identity. A final finding has been that violence is 
used to reinforce ethnic boundaries when the latter are particularly weak or under threat
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GLOSSARY of TERMS
BASQUE TERM S 
aberrietsai= enemy of the fatherland 
aberrigabe= person with no country 
aberrigabetasun- state of being without a country 
aberritasun=pa.triotism 
aberriordeko= adopted homeland 
aberrikeria= national chauvinism
Aberri Eguna= Day of the Fatherland (coinciding with Easter Sunday)
abertzale= patriot (p. dbertzaleak; Sp. abertzales)
abertzalekeria= chauvinism
abertzaletasun- patriotism
abertzaletu =to become a patriot
alderdi- political party
aldxkatzia- aldikatze- act of alternating, substituting 
batzar= meeting, reunion, session 
batzoki- meeting place (referred to the PNV centres) 
baserri= farmhouse, homestead (pi. baserriak) 
baserritar= farmer, country dweller, peasant (pi. baserritarrak) 
batasuna- unity, union, unification
batua= standard unified Basque (from bat= one, batu- to unify)
bertsolari= troubadour
Donostia = San Sebastian
ekinkide- militant
ekinkideria= militant group
efcwtaywrt=persistence, perseverance
ekintza= action, activity, undertaking; ETA's action, normally a killing. 
ekintzaile= activist
erdara /  erdera= foreign language (normally, Spanish or French) 
erdaldun/ erdeldun = Spanish-speaker, popularly used as 'foreigner'
Ertzainza- Basque police
Euskadi/Euzkadi= Basque Country (as a political entity)
Euskal Herri! Euskalerria/ etc.= Basque Country (historical name)
euskaldun- Basque-speaker, Basque population (=autochthonous; originally, Basque
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speaking)
euskaldundu= to become Basque and to learn Basque
euskaldunberri = new Basque speaker (not necessarily an immigrant)
euskaldun-zaharra = old Basque speaker (zaharra -  old)
euskaltegi= Basque school or language centre
Euskaltzaindia= Basque Language Academy
euskaltzalel euskozale= Bascophile
euskaltzaletasun/ euskozaletasun= love of all things Basque
euskaral euskera- Basque language
Euskaros- members of the Associacidn Euskara
Euskalerriacos= members of the Associacidn Euskalenia
Eusko Jaurlaritza= Basque-govemment
etarra= ETA member
fueroakffueros- local charters and laws
Gasteiz- Vitoria (capital of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi) 
gudari= warrior, soldier, fighter (part. Basque soldier) (pi. gudariak)
Hegoaldea- South; Southern Euskadi (the four Spanish provinces)
herri= country, nation; people, population; town, village
Iparralde= North; Northern Euskadi (the three French provinces)
ikaratzaile= terrorist
ikastola- Basque school
ikur= symbol, sign
ikurrin/ ikurriha- Basque flag
itzjostaldiak or itzjostaketak= literary competitions
kulturgintza/ euskalgintza= promotion of [Basque] culture, cultural activity
lehendakari= president (of the Basque government)
maketo- pejorative for non-Basque immigrant (used by Sabino Arana, no longer used) 
mendigoizale- mountaineer, mountain climber, alpinist
CATALAN TERM S 
barri- quarter, borough 
Joes Florals= Floral Games (poetry contexts)
Modernisme- Modernism, local variant of Art Nouveau, Liberty, etc. 
murciano- From Murcia, extended to most immigrants in the 1930s 
rauxa- impetuosity, propensity for violence, 
sardana- Catalan national dance
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Els Segadors = Catalan national hymn 
seny- common sense, 
senyera-  Catalan flag
tertulias= informal group of friends who regularly meet to discuss 
xarnego= pejorative for immigrant Git., half-bred)
SPAN ISH  TERM S 
aldeano= rustic
anderenos= Basque teachers, especially in the ikastolas 
anteiglesia- old Basque administrative division (broadly, parish) 
barrio= quarter, borough
bunker-  the extreme right (esp. the military during the Transition) 
caciquismo- mainly referred to electoral corruption during the Restoration 
conciertos economicos= special tax privileges granted to the Basques 
desarrollismo- ideology of development as panacea for all social diseases 
diputacidn- provincial assembly/ government 
espanolista- pejorative for Hispanicist (sometime used as 'traitor') 
fuerismo- foralism, defence of the fueros (esp. in local historiography) 
governador civil- civil governor, appointed by Madrid 
hidalguia collectiva= collective nobility 
interior= inside Spain (as opposed to exile) 
limpieza de sangre- cleanliness of blood 
milagro econormco- economic boom
nacionalcatolicismo= official Francoist doctrine merging Spanish nationalism with the 
defence of Catholicism 
obrerista- dedicated to the working-class struggle 
peneuvista- member of the PNV
rojoseparatistas= epithet which the Falangists used to address their common enemy, 'reds' 
and 'separatists' (both terms to be intended in a very broad sense) 
tercermundismo= Third-Woridism
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